Summary: Moot-point is that not a single prosecution witness has been cross-examined by the defence despite the fact that the appellant was given more than sufficient opportunities and ultimately his right of cross-examination was closed by the learned trial court with cogent reasons???. Held that the criminal cases should be decided with regard to the totality of impressions drawn and inferred from the circumstances of the case rather than on the restricted basis of a witness's cross-examination or otherwise on a specific fact disclosed by him.

Summary: Background: The petitioners filed a suit for declaration, separate possession through partition, recovery of mesne profit, and injunction. During the proceedings, the petitioners requested to summon records from the Inland Revenue Department, which was initially allowed by the trial court. The respondent, not a party to the original suit, invoked Section 216 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, claiming privilege to prevent the production of the requested records. The trial court dismissed the respondent's application, but the respondent successfully appealed to the Additional District Judge, who set aside the trial court's order. The petitioners then challenged this decision in the Lahore High Court. ----Issues: 1- Whether the Inland Revenue Department can be compelled to produce tax records in civil court proceedings. 2- The interpretation of Section 216 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, concerning the confidentiality of tax records and the exceptions to this confidentiality. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The Lahore High Court dismissed the petition, upholding the decision of the revisional court, which had set aside the trial court's order for the production of tax records. The court reasoned that: Section 216 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, imposes a confidentiality obligation on tax records and restricts their disclosure even in court proceedings. Subsection (2) explicitly bars any court from requiring a public servant to produce tax records, except as provided within the Ordinance. Subsection (4) allows for the production of certain documents before a court but cannot be interpreted in isolation from the broader confidentiality protections in subsections (1) and (2). The revisional court was correct in setting aside the trial court's order as the trial court did not properly consider the statutory confidentiality obligations. ----Citations/Precedents: Mrs. Khalida Azhar v. Viqar Rustam Bakhshi and others (2009 PTD 1694)

Summary: Background: The petitioner sought post-arrest bail in a case involving charges under Sections 324, 109, 148, 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code (PPC), along with Section 13(2a) of the Pakistan Arms Ordinance, 1965 (as amended in 2015). The incident occurred within court premises and involved firing, which allegedly resulted from a personal vendetta. The main issue was whether the case fell under the jurisdiction of the Anti-terrorism Court (ATC), given that the offense occurred on court premises but was not a direct act of terrorism. The prosecution filed the challan before a court of ordinary jurisdiction. ----Issues: 1- Whether the offense of firing within court premises falls under the jurisdiction of the Anti-terrorism Court as per the Third Schedule of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997. 2- Whether the court of ordinary jurisdiction erred in entertaining the bail petition despite the offense being triable by the ATC. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: Jurisdiction of Anti-terrorism Court: The court held that under the Third Schedule of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, offenses involving the use of firearms in court premises are exclusively triable by the Anti-terrorism Court, regardless of whether terrorism is involved. The court emphasized that the offense, although stemming from personal vendetta, still fell under the ATC's jurisdiction due to its occurrence in the court premises. Transfer of Case: Since the trial had already commenced in a court of ordinary jurisdiction, the court clarified that the correct procedure was for the case to be withdrawn from that court and transferred to the ATC. The bail petition was not decided, as the petitioner was advised to seek bail from the ATC after the case was transferred. The court ordered that the case be transferred from the court of ordinary jurisdiction to the ATC, Sahiwal. The petitioner was granted the option to file a new bail petition before the ATC, which would be decided on its own merits. ----Citations/Precedents: Ghulam Hussain and others vs. The State (PLD 2020 SC 61) Farooq Ahmed vs. State and another (2020 SCMR 78) Amjad Ali and others vs. The State (PLD 2017 SC 661) Muhammad Bilal vs. The State and others (2019 SCMR 1362) Rao Fahd Ali Khan vs. The State and another (2014 P Cr. L J 1071 Islamabad) Mir Ali vs. The State and another (2020 P Cr. L J 1060 (Karachi)) Ali Akbar and another vs. The State (PLD 1995 Karachi 10) Azhar Hussain and others vs. Government of Punjab and others (1992 P Cr. L J 2308) Allah Din and 18 others vs. The State and another (1994 SCMR 717) Rana Abdul Ghaffar vs. Abdul Shakoor and 3 others (PLD 2006 Lahore 64) Muhammad Jawad Hamid vs. Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif and others (PLD 2018 Lahore 836) Muhammad Akbar Khan and 3 others vs. SHO P.S. Garhi Khairo, District Jacobabad and others (2017 P Cr. L J 1280 Sindh)

Summary: Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act (XLII of 1997)--- ----Ss. 3 & 29---Companies Ordinance (XLVII of 1984), S.263---Powers of court and Security Exchange Commission to interfere in internal management of a corporate entity---Scope---Court would not interfere in internal management of companies, if they were working within parameters of law--- Commission could conduct investigation of affairs of company in exercise of its suo motu powers under S. 29 of Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act, 1997 or on application by members of company under S. 263 of Companies Ordinance, 1984---Failure of Commission to exercise its powers by invoking relevant enabling provisions to protect interest of minority shareholders in a company would frustrate very basis of its establishment.

Summary: The plaintiff's counsel argued against the competence of defendant No. 5, who was transferred to the plaintiff's post. However, the judge instructed the plaintiff's counsel to focus on whether the transfer and posting violated the law. The plaintiff's counsel argued that the transfer was mala fide and relied on regulations of the National Highway Authority (NHA) and relevant case law. Defendant No. 5's counsel argued that NHA's rules and the NHA Code 2005 governed transfers and postings, and these were within the prerogative of the competent authority. The court analyzed the arguments and material presented. The plaintiff's appointment letter indicated that he would be governed by Federal Government Employees rules. The court noted that the plaintiff was an engineer and a Member Technical. It referenced the National Highway Authority's Employees Service Rules, 1995, and the NHA Code 2005 to determine the authority's power to transfer and post employees. The court concluded that these rules allowed the competent authority to transfer an employee to different locations under its administrative control or management. The court further stated that there was no violation of fundamental rights and that the plaintiff had not demonstrated a colorable exercise of power. The court noted that the plaintiff's own transfer history showed that he had not consistently remained in one position for three years. Therefore, the plaintiff's application seeking injunctive orders was dismissed.

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----Ss. 114, 151, O. XLVII, R. 1 & O. XXVI----Review---Scope---Provisions of review of order under S. 114 or O. XLVII, R. 1, C.P.C. and provisions of S. 151, C.P.C., for correction of clerical or arithmetical mistakes in the order, could be invoked simultaneously---Appointment of Commission by Court to examine witnesses---High Court accepted application of interveners; whereas, Division Bench of High Court modified the said order of acceptance, remanded the case to decide issue as to legal status of the interveners within six months, for which Commission had been appointed---Applicant filed application for review of said order of appointment of Commission---Validity---Applicant was not sure as to whether the order sought to be reviewed contained typographical errors, or the same was result of overlooking certain facts on record, nor had he showed as to what prejudice had been caused to him, for which review was necessitated---Failure of applicant to record evidence on pretext of pendency of review application was calculated move to delay decision on merit---Application was dismissed with cost in circumstances. (b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----O. XIV, R. 5----Settlement of issues---Power to amend, and strike out, issues---Scope and object---Issues can be resettled even after recording of evidence and just before final order, either suo moto by court in terms of O. XIV, R. 5, C.P.C. or on request of parties---Purpose of said provision is to ensure that recording of evidence of parties should not be postponed.

Summary: A formal inquiry was ordered to be conducted. That order of de novo inquiry could have beenpassed only when authority was convinced that decision of dismissal wasneither lawful and nor based on legitimate findings and unless such finding offacts are unearthed through de novo inquiry, the order of dismissal would bemeaningless. De novo inquiry in fact impliedly means that the order was set-aside otherwise there was no wisdom or logic behind such formal inquiry.

Summary: The petitioner filed a writ petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan, challenging the detention of his brother, Zeeshan Razzaq, under Section 3(1) of the West Pakistan Maintenance of Public Order Ordinance, 1960. The detention order was issued by the Deputy Commissioner of Narowal based on the recommendations of the District Police Officer (DPO). The petitioner argued that the detention was unjustified and lacked any solid evidence or material against the detainee. -----Issues: 1- Whether the detention order issued under Section 3(1) of the West Pakistan Maintenance of Public Order Ordinance, 1960, was justified and based on sufficient evidence. 2- Whether the petitioner's failure to file a representation before the Government of Punjab affected the maintainability of the writ petition. 3- Whether the apprehensions and recommendations by the DPO were sufficient grounds for the detention. -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: ----Detention Order Justification: The court found that the detention order issued by the Deputy Commissioner was based merely on the recommendations of the DPO without any solid or cogent evidence. The allegations against Zeeshan Razzaq were general and lacked specific material, such as audio/video recordings or written transcripts of the alleged speeches. The court emphasized that mere apprehensions without valid reasons or supporting evidence cannot justify curtailing an individual's liberty. ----Maintainability of the Writ Petition: The objection raised by the Assistant Advocate General regarding the maintainability of the writ petition due to the non-filing of a representation before the Government of Punjab was overruled. The court highlighted that the right to file a habeas corpus petition is a constitutional remedy available for addressing illegal confinement, and the availability of an alternative remedy does not oust the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court. Relevant case law, such as "Muhammad Irshad versus Government of the Punjab" (2020 P Cr.L J 206) and "Abdul Rauf versus Govt. of Punjab" (2023 LHC 2697), was cited to support this position. ----Apprehensions and Recommendations by the DPO: The court noted that the DPO's recommendations were based on mere apprehensions without any substantial evidence. The report did not provide any material to establish that the detainee was acting or about to act in a manner prejudicial to public safety or order. The Assistant Advocate General was unable to produce any evidence that Zeeshan Razzaq was a member of any banned group or involved in anti-state activities. The lack of any criminal case registered against the detainee further weakened the grounds for detention. -----Citations/Precedents: Muhammad Irshad versus Government of the Punjab and others, 2020 P Cr.L J 206: Emphasized that the availability of an alternative remedy does not oust the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court in habeas corpus matters. Abdul Rauf versus Govt. of Punjab, 2023 LHC 2697: Reiterated the maintainability of habeas corpus petitions despite alternative remedies. Abdul Latif Shamshad Ahmad v. District Magistrate, Kasur, 1999 PCr.LJ 2014: Established that the failure to make a representation before the provincial government does not bar the filing of a writ petition. Mst. Sana Jamil v. Government of the Punjab through Secretary and 5 others, 2016 PCr.LJ 424: Supported the maintainability of constitutional petitions in cases of illegal confinement. Syed Mubbashar Raza v. Government of Punjab through Secretary Home Department and 2 others, PLD 2015 Lahore 20: Highlighted the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court in habeas corpus matters. Muhammad Zafar Iqbal versus Sadozai Khan and two others, 2021 YLR 1206: Stressed the importance of adhering to legal procedures and requirements. Maqsood Yameen versus R.P.O. Multan and others, 2015 PCr.LJ 923: Emphasized the necessity of valid reasons and supporting evidence for detentions.

Summary: The moot question require determination is that when the petitioner has admittedly proceeded under the Government Servants (Efficiency & Discipline) Rules, 1973 (Rules) and dismissed form service, then whether same will amount to statutory intervention and writ is maintainable. The perusal of Rule 1(2) of the Rules shows that same are only applicable to the civil servants and not employees of Authorities such as NADRA, however said Rules were adopted under Regulation 23 of the National Database and Registration Authority (Application for National Identity Card) Regulations, 2002 (Regulations). As the Rules are not applicable to employees of NADRA on its own but applied by way of adoption and reference under regulation 23 of the non-statutory Regulations, therefore, the same would not amount to statutory intervention. However the legal position would have been different and writ petition would be maintainable if Rules were applicable to employees of Authority such as NADRA by virtue of its own provisions and not merely by way of adoption by NADRA.

Summary: Where Nikahnamma does not specifically mention that whether dower amount was prompt dower or deferred dower rather only mentions that same is dower payable on demand, then it is not deferred dower only payable on dissolution of marriage either by death or divorce, but same is payable at time of demand even during the subsistence of marriage. Further held that when prompt dower is payable on demand then it will be a fallacy to argue that dower payable on demand is deferred dower and payable only on dissolution of marriage by death or divorce.