Summary: The High Court of Sindh at Karachi addressed two related suits, Suit No. 333 of 2012 (FGBC Limited & Another vs. Director General Mines and Minerals Development & Others) and Suit No. 675 of 2014 (Fateh Textile Mills & Others vs. Government of Sindh & Others), both concerning leasehold rights to 8,626 acres of land in the Lakhra Coal Field, District Jamshoro, situated outside the territorial jurisdiction of Karachi districts.During a joint hearing on June 12, 2018, the Court considered the maintainability of the suits in Karachi, given the land's location. The plaintiffs argued the suits were maintainable, citing the defendants' offices in Karachi and past legal actions taken in Karachi as establishing jurisdiction. They also differentiated the leasehold rights in question from more permanent rights, suggesting this affected jurisdiction.However, the Court, referencing its own precedents and legal provisions, concluded that it lacked territorial jurisdiction as the land in dispute was outside Karachi. The Court clarified that its original civil jurisdiction, as defined by legal statutes, is confined to Karachi districts and does not extend to the entire province of Sindh. Consequently, the Court found that the suits could not be maintained in Karachi and ordered the plaints to be returned to the plaintiffs for presentation in a court with appropriate jurisdiction, as mandated by Order VII Rule 10 of the Civil Procedure Code. ---- The first suit, known as Suit 1, seeks to assert rights in the land and prevent dispossession, while the second suit, Suit 2, aims to obtain a declaration of title or rights over the same land. Both suits are related to the leasehold rights held by a common corporate entity. The court conducted a joint hearing for both suits to determine their maintainability. The plaintiffs argued that the suits were maintainable because certain legal provisions exempted the High Court in Karachi from territorial jurisdiction restrictions. They also claimed that the defendants had accepted the court's jurisdiction by filing written statements and that the causes of action were alleged to have occurred in Karachi. In response, the defendant's counsel argued that the suits were not maintainable due to the land being located outside Karachi's jurisdiction. They cited relevant legal provisions and previous judgments to support their position. After reviewing the arguments and relevant legal precedents, the court concluded that it did not have the territorial jurisdiction to hear the suits. It relied on the principles outlined in various judgments, including the fact that the suits concerned immovable property located outside the court's jurisdiction. As a result, the court ordered the plaints in both Suit 1 and Suit 2 to be returned to the plaintiffs, with copies retained for the court's records, as per the mandatory provisions of Order VII Rule 10 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC).

Summary: The goods which have already been subjected to sales tax under the previous regime and were in stock by 30.6.2019 and to be supplied after the effected date of the standard regime would be subjected to input tax adjustment under standard regime to save the goods from double / increased incidence of tax. Several sectors have been accommodated by the FBR such as steel sector, oil and ghee sector etc., but specifically the bulk importers of edible oil were not given this fair opportunity to maintain equality. Thus STGO No.105/2019 in its true spirit be applied in the case of the petitioner in relation to a stock for which stock report has been filed in terms of FBRs letter dated 09.7.2019. The manual returns thus filed in terms of the orders of this Court shall be taken into consideration in view of the above, wherein adjustment of the stock, as mentioned above is claimed.

Summary: It is well-settled that proforma promotion cannot be awarded to a retired government servant with retrospective effect as per dicta laid down by the Honble Supreme Court in the case of Government of Pakistan and others vs. Hameed Akhtar Niazi and others, PLD 2003 SC 110

Summary: Illegal Dispossession Act (XI of 2005)---[ Act, 2005 (Section 3 & 4)]----Ss. 3 & 4---Illegal dispossession---Appreciation of evidence---Complainant had alleged that he was absolute and exclusive owner of the suit property being purchaser of the same---Proposed accused persons/respondents had encroached upon the same without any lawful authority---Record showed that complaint was filed along with the report of police inquiry---Documents annexed with the criminal revision against the proposed accused persons/respondents were copies of documents from an earlier complaint, which was dismissed---Basic ingredients of a complaint in terms of S. 3 of the Act were missing---Allegation of use of force for dispossession of the appellant/ complainant from the premises in question was not mentioned anywhere in the complaint---Even date of dispossession was not given in the memo---Allegedly, plot was purchased by complainant from attorney of the original owner but power of attorney was not on the record---Complainant was not in possession of suit plot for over twenty years as the plot was not demarcated---Earlier complaint of complainant/appellant was dismissed and if he was aggrieved by the disposal of his earlier complaint, he should have filed appeal/revision---Filing a fresh complaint on the same facts was not permissible---Circumstances established that dispute, in the present case, of civil nature and could only be resolved in civil court---Application was, therefore dismissed in circumstances.

Summary: Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance (XVII of 1979)--- [Civil Procedure Code CPC (Rent Matters), Sind Rented Premises Act - Eviction---15]---Ss. 16 & 15---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199---Constitutional petition---Ejectment of tenant---Tentative rent order, non-compliance of---Effect---Compromise between landlord and tenant before the court---Scope---Ownership of tenement in possession of tenant had not been conferred upon him---Mere taking plea of denial of tenancy was not enough to take away the jurisdiction of Rent Controller to pass tentative rent order---Tenant would continue to be tenant unless he established his ownership rights conferring title on him---Rent Controller had passed order for payment of arrears of rent and future rent that same would be subject to withdrawal after final judgment/order and interest of tenant had been secured---Tenant had willfully disobeyed the tentative rent order---Tenant knowing the penal consequences of non-compliance of tentative rent order should have deposited the rent in the court instead of putting his claim of ownership at risk and physical possession from the tenement---Compromise before Rent Controller could not be termed as absolute transfer of ownership right in favour of tenant nor terms of compromise could be enforced against landlord in a fresh round of litigation before Rent Controller---Compromise was not enforceable through Rent Controller and same could not be defence to deny payment of rent to the owner---Tenant should have file a suit for specific performance of contract/ compromise to enforce terms of the same---Compromise between the parties before the court was not more than a mere contract and a breach of the same would give rise to fresh cause of action and fresh suit could be filed by an aggrieved person for redressal of his grievance---Tenant could not be allowed to enjoy the tenement as an absolute owner pending the case on the grounds that landlord had promised to transfer the title in his favour---Constitutional petition was dismissed in circumstances.

Summary: [Order VII, Rule 11., LIMITATION] Plaint rejected by invoking legal maxim actio personalis moritur cum persona and Article 36 of the Limitation Act, 1908. Legal maxim actio personalis moritur cum persona (a personal right of action dies with the person) death extinguishes liability in Tort, is enforceable in Pakistan subject to certain exceptions. First, where a tortfeasors estate is benefited by the wrong done, then an action would lie against his representatives, secondly, when already a decree is passed, inter alia, for damages, the legal representatives / heirs of a deceased can continue the litigation, thirdly, if in a service case, the Trial Court has reinstated a petitioner in service, which is overturned by an appellate court and in the intervening period, person dies, his legal heirs can continue the litigation, because if a Higher Forum restores the Order of Trial Court, then the legal heirs would at least be entitled for the service benefits. However, no suit can be filed after the death of a person for his individual acts, against his legal heirs.

Summary: [Customs Act, 1969 (336) Like Letter of Credits, which essentially establishes the intent ofcommercial transaction, the presence of vessel at high seas has to beseen within the same frame i.e. it is there for the petitioners and such hasnot been established via vessels Bill of Lading or private contracts asthey are can be easily faked

Summary: The department raised preliminary objections regarding the hearing by a single member of the Tribunal, which was dismissed by the court, citing internal administrative arrangements and precedents allowing such practices. On merit, the department contested the importation based on the argument that the crane and truck, being of different makes and assembled together, did not comply with the Import Policy Order 2013, suggesting an attempt to circumvent import restrictions.The court examined the merits, including the issuance of pre-shipment certificates by agents of recognized inspection companies, and found that the objections regarding the assembly and make of the imported units were not tenable under the law. It referenced clarifications from the Ministry of Commerce and previous court decisions affirming the legality of such imports, provided they met the conditions of the Import Policy Order.Ultimately, the court dismissed the Special Customs Reference Applications, thereby upholding the tribunal's judgments and allowing the petitions filed for the implementation of these judgments. The decision emphasized that the importation of the truck-mounted cranes by M/s Quick Contractor & Traders and M/s Rehman Contractor Co. was in accordance with the Import Policy Order 2013, despite the cranes and trucks being of different makes and assembled together. The court's ruling reinforced the interpretation of import policy regulations, providing clarity on the importability of such specialized vehicles.

Summary: The case involves a trademark dispute over the ownership and use of the "Peek Freans" trademark, which is alleged to have been abandoned. The applicant, claiming to be the registered proprietor of the subject trademark, filed an application under section 10 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC) seeking a stay of proceedings in a related suit (No. 1562 of 2002). The applicant argues that the relief sought in the suit overlaps with the relief that may be granted in a pending appeal related to the trademark. The applicant's counsel argues that the issues in the subject suit and the appeal are substantially the same, particularly concerning ownership of the trademark, and that a decision in the suit would operate as res judicata in the appeal. They also rely on various legal precedents to support their arguments. On the other hand, the respondent's counsel challenges the maintainability of the Revision Application, asserting that the District Judge had jurisdiction to decide the application under section 10 CPC. The judgment discussed the applicability of section 10 CPC and the conditions under which a stay of proceedings can be granted. It also considered the possibility of conflicting decisions and the potential for res judicata. The judgment ultimately concluded that the civil/district court can proceed with the trial but should not pass a final judgment until the disposal of the pending appeal. The judge emphasized the importance of avoiding conflicting decisions and ensuring that justice is served in the case. The judgment also refers to relevant legal provisions and precedents to support the decision.

Summary: Water tankers / business--it is the basic duty of the Karachi Water & Sewerage Board to supply water to the citizens of Karachi. When Karachi Water & Sewerage Board was / is unable to meet the water needs of the city of Karachi, a water tanker mafia had sprung up in Karachi. During the argument, we have been informed that there is certain direction of the Hon'ble Supreme Court for the closing of illegal hydrants from Karachi city. Prima-facie, the Management of KW&SB has failed to remove illegal hydrants operating in the city despite Honorable Supreme Court directions. Moreover, the Honorable Supreme Court of Pakistan had directed the Management of KW&SB to focus upon their core operations to provide portable water via a regular distribution network. Even, if hydrants are needed, there should be a rational and scientific study to evaluate the need for hydrant services in water-scarce areas. The hydrant services preferably should supply water to improvised population. On the aforesaid proposition, this Court has already settled the issue in the case of Muhammad Rafique Sia vs Province of Sindh and others, 2016 CLC 170. Besides that, the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in HRC No.28963/2014 directed the respondents to take action against illegal and unauthorized hydrants--Dismissed.