Summary: The petitioners, represented by Abdul Sattar Pirzada and assisted by Mamoon N. Chaudhry, sought three main reliefs: to challenge the authority under which Munir Akram held the office of Ambassador/Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the United Nations in New York, to declare the appointment letter as illegal and issued without lawful authority, and to declare Munir Akram's appointment as unlawful, illegal, and void ab initio.The case was heard on multiple dates in November and December 2020, with the decision rendered on January 12, 2021, by Justices Nadeem Akhtar and Adnan-ul-Karim Memon. The petitioners argued that the appointment was not in the public interest, was based on favoritism, and violated constitutional provisions and the Civil Servants Act, 1973. They contended that the Federal Cabinet, not the Prime Minister alone, was the competent authority for such appointments.The respondents, represented by Kashif Paracha and others, defended the appointment by arguing that the Prime Minister was the competent authority for appointing the head of missions abroad and that such appointments could be made from among non-career individuals in the public interest. They emphasized Munir Akram's distinguished diplomatic career and contributions.The court considered the arguments, focusing on the maintainability of the petition, the competent authority for the appointment, and whether the appointment was in accordance with the Civil Servants Act, 1973. The judgment concluded that the issues raised were related to foreign policy and diplomatic missions, which are not typically within the judicial domain. The court found no illegality or material irregularity in the appointment process or the impugned letter of appointment. Consequently, the petition was dismissed as misconceived, with no order as to costs. ---- i)Whether the post of Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the United Nations is to be filled amongst the career foreign service officers or eminent personalities from business, media, law, and other areas on a contract basis ;ii)Whether the Prime Minister of Pakistan is the competent authority under Rule 15(1)(g)(h) of the Rules of Business, 1973 or the Federal Cabinet under Article 90 of the Constitution of Pakistan to make such appointment ; and,iii)Whether appointments on a contract basis are prohibited under or contrary to Section 14 of the Civil Servants Act, 1973, and the Policy unless the conditions specified therein are satisfied?

Summary: The petitioner, a former contractual employee of the Sindh Revenue Board (SRB), challenged the engagement of private legal counsel by the SRB, arguing that as a government department, the SRB should be represented by the office of the advocate general, rather than hiring private lawyers. The petitioner claimed that the SRB had retained the services of private counsel, resulting in substantial legal fees. He cited the Rasheed Ahmed case as a precedent against the engagement of private counsel by government entities and requested the court to declare the vakalatnamas (authorizations to represent) issued by the SRB in specific cases as void and to direct the deposit of the fees paid to advocates into the national exchequer. The SRB's representative argued that the petitioner's claims were motivated by personal grudges and that the Rasheed Ahmed case applied to the Rules of Business of the Federal Government, not the Government of Sindh. It was contended that the SRB's role in the Government of Sindh was akin to the Federal Board of Revenue's role in the Federal Government, allowing them to engage legal counsel to protect revenue interests. The court considered the arguments presented and referenced the Rasheed Ahmed case, which deprecated the engagement of private counsel by the government without compelling reasons or public interest. It noted that the SRB was not a ministry or division of the Government of Sindh, as confirmed by official documentation. Therefore, the court concluded that the petitioner had failed to demonstrate any legal restraint on the SRB's ability to hire private legal counsel. Additionally, the court expressed doubt about the petitioner's claim being an act of public interest litigation, given the absence of a matter affecting the public at large. The court dismissed the petition, finding it misconceived and lacking in merit.

Summary: The scheme of the Customs Act reveals that the subject is governed in terms of Section 25 of the Customs Act and in case it could not be determined under Section 25, then the recourse is available by applying valuation ruling if available in terms of Section 25-A whereafter it is finalized under the Customs Act, 1969. After the assessment and the release of the consignment, the goods are made out of any charge of the Customs. In case the aforesaid process is required to be revisited, (in appropriate cases), the mechanism is available under the law such as Section 32, 193 and 195 of the Customs Act, 1969.--The event of post scrutiny of the goods declaration after assessment and release of goods, is not covered by Section 80(3), as undertaken. It is applicable at the time of original checking of the goods declaration in his hands and goods are yet to be assessed and released and not at belated stage when even the goods have been released. This situation (for appropriate cases) is catered by Section 32, 193 and 195 of the Customs Act, 1969 where under a show cause and/or an appeal within 30 days could have been preferred, or the Board or the Collector of Customs or the Collector of Custom (Adjudication) may, within his jurisdiction, call for the examination of the records of any proceedings under the act for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality or propriety of any decision or order passed by a subordinate officer respectively, could have been followed, however, none of them were invoked. Surprisingly the applicant opt to invoke Section 80(3) of the Customs Act which is then shown to have been followed by consequences. It is thus under above referred provisions when the competent authority is of the view that the assessment was not made in accordance with law, the past and closed transaction could be reopened but not in the manner as done in the instant case. Prima-facie it is neither a case of mis-declaration as correct PCT was claimed by the consignee nor this is a case of mis-declaration in terms of its value declared, to make out a case under Section 32 of the Act.--- Without prejudice applicants case is that Section 80(3) of Act was rightly invoked under the given facts and circumstances. In the instant case, if at all, there was any illegality in the assessment of the goods, it could be attributed to the sub-ordinate officers of the Customs and hence the implication of Section 32 of the Customs Act, 1969 would not be attracted to penalize the respondent or their directors. The purported action by Customs was triggered under Section 80(3) of the Customs Act, 1969 does not have a legal cover in view of the goods being out of charge and the recourses which could have been made were under Section 32, 193 and 195 of the Customs Act, 1969 which were not directly invoked.

Summary: [Custom Act, 1969 (147) (Import Policy Order)]Import-ability of Dump Trucks after amendment in Import Policy decided in this case --- The plaintiff, represented by legal counsel, sought a declaration and injunction allowing the import of specialized vehicles based on a sale agreement and a standby letter of credit established prior to a change in the Import Policy Order.The plaintiff argued that the vehicles were imported under a binding contract and a standby letter of credit opened before the policy change, granting them a vested right as per precedent from the Supreme Court case Al-Samrez Enterprise V. The Federation of Pakistan (1986 S C M R 1917). The defendants, including governmental bodies and banks, countered that a standby letter of credit does not equate to a letter of credit and does not provide the same protections under the Import Policy Order, referencing the case Hajji Abdul Raziq Khan V. Federation of Pakistan and others (2014 S C M R 1821) and State Bank of Pakistan?s Circular No. 33/2007.The court, upon reviewing the arguments and relevant legal and policy frameworks, determined that the standby letter of credit in question did not qualify as a letter of credit under the Import Policy Order and that the plaintiff?s actions post-amendment did not warrant protection under the vested rights principle. As a result, the application for interim injunction for the release of the imported vehicles was dismissed, citing the lack of merit in the plaintiff?s claim for the benefits under Para 4 of the Import Policy Order.This summary encompasses the core arguments, legal reasoning, and outcome of the case as presented in the document, highlighting the distinctions between different types of credit instruments and their implications for import transactions under changing regulatory environments.

Summary: The central issue in HCA 235 of 2009 revolved around the trust property's handling and the applicability of the doctrine of cy-pr?s, which allows for the adjustment of trust objectives when the original purpose cannot be fulfilled. The court found the Single Judge's dismissal of Stay Applications problematic, as it failed to preserve the trust property's corpus pending the suit's adjudication, thereby potentially affecting the suit's outcome.In HCA 239 of 2009, the appellants argued that the plaint should have been rejected on grounds of res judicata, limitations set by the Specific Relief Act 1877, and other legal barriers. However, the court upheld the Single Judge's decision, finding no merit in the appellants' arguments and confirming that the issues raised, including limitation, could be addressed post-evidence.The judgment allowed HCA 235 of 2009, setting aside the Single Judge's order regarding the Stay Applications and imposing restrictions to prevent the creation of third-party interests or construction on the trust property until the suit's conclusion. Conversely, HCA 239 of 2009 was dismissed, with the court finding no basis to overturn the Single Judge's decision on the O.VII r.11 Applications.This summary encapsulates the court's reasoning and conclusions on the matters at hand, reflecting the legal principles involved, particularly concerning trust property and procedural law in civil litigation. --- ''The Stay Applications are hereby disposed withdirections that the defendants are restrained from creatingany third party interests in the suit property and barred fromraising any construction thereupon, till the final adjudicationof the Suit.----Dismissed''

Summary: [Civil Procedure Code CPC (O.XXXIX, Rule.1 & 2 Interim Injunction)] Undoubtedly and undisputedly the circumstances governed by anagreement no longer exists to enable defendant No.1 to continue usingthe registration. This drug was registered on the application of foreignprincipal in favor of defendant No.1 enabling it to manufacture, marketand sell the products of the foreign principal. In view of severance ofrelationship between plaintiff No.2 and defendant No.1, as disclosedabove the agreement came to an end.---In the absence of any contract between foreign principal anddefendant No.1 it would be a matter of serious concern if defendantNo.1 would continue to manufacture, market and sell product of foreignprincipal without its permission and authorization. Plaintiffs thus havedisclosed a prima facie case with balance of inconvenience andirreparable loss in their favour.

Summary: Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)-------O. XXIII, R. 3---Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), Ss. 42 & 54---Suit for declaration and permanent injunction---Appeal--- Compromise--- Suit was dismissed concurrently against which appeal had been preferred---Defendants had filed compromise application with the request to decree the suit against them on their admission of claim of the plaintiff--- Validity--- Compromise application with the clause of two months' time to be given to defendants to vacate suit property from the date of order on the said application had been filed---Two months' time to vacate suit property by the defendants had already expired prior to filing of present application---Terms and conditions of compromise should have already been complied with by the parties during the period of pendency of proceedings---Condition of order of the Court on such compromise was absurd---Decree for disposal of suit/appeal on compromise would not serve the purpose---Appeal on such compromise had become infructuous, in circumstances---Alleged compromise was one sided and contrary to the record and conduct of appellant---Compromise application was dismissed, in circumstances and counsel for the appellant was directed to address the court on merit of the case on the fixed date. Peer Dil and others v. Dad Muhammad 2009 SCMR 1268 rel.

Summary: [H.C.A (Discretionery Powers of Single Judge to pass interlocutory order)] -----Learned Division Bench on theapprehension of the appellants and the counsel representing Board ofRevenue, Government of Sindh that the private respondents will createthird party interest as the construction was being raised regularly,granted an interim order that no further third party interest shall becreated, however, nowhere the order suggests that the powers of learnedSingle Judge to pass any other injunctive order that may require in theinterest of justice before or at the time of disposal of the injunctionapplication, were also curtailed. This aspect of the argument ofappellants cannot be termed as ratio of judgment. ------If the learned Single Judge was empowered topass an order while deciding the injunction application finally, then thesaid judge equally enjoys the powers to pass interim or ad interim ordersof the restraining nature, on the tentative assessment of claims, keepingthe interest of the parties and to save interest of the litigants involved.Discretionary powers of the court are wide enough to foster the interestof justice and equity, as it demands.

Summary: The plaintiffs, large sugar mills in Sindh, filed suits challenging the allocation of export quota for sugar by the Cane Commissioner, Sindh. The Economic Coordination Committee (ECC) had approved the export of 250,000 MT of surplus sugar with quotas distributed among the provinces (Punjab 61%, Sindh 32%, KPK 7%) based on installed crushing capacity and sugar production. However, the Cane Commissioner, Sindh, allocated equal quotas (2,500 MT) to all sugar mills in the province, regardless of their crushing capacity or production levels. The plaintiffs argued that this allocation was discriminatory, irrational, and contrary to the federal government’s policy, which had considered production-based criteria. ------ Issues: ------ 1) Whether the Cane Commissioner, Sindh, implemented the federal government’s policy for the allocation of export quotas correctly. ------ 2) Whether the Cane Commissioner had the authority to create an independent policy for quota distribution. ------ 3) Whether the equal distribution of quotas among all sugar mills in Sindh, regardless of capacity or production, constituted discrimination under Article 3 of the Constitution. ------ 4) Whether the Court could intervene in the implementation of federal policy by the Cane Commissioner. ------ Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: Holding: The Court held that the Cane Commissioner, Sindh, acted contrary to the federal government’s policy by allocating equal quotas to all sugar mills in Sindh. It directed the Cane Commissioner to reallocate quotas based on performance metrics, such as sugarcane crushed and sugar produced by each mill. ------ Reasoning: Federal Policy Supremacy: The federal government’s policy, as approved by the ECC, mandated that provincial quotas were based on performance metrics like crushing capacity and sugar production. The Cane Commissioner was only authorized to implement this policy and had no discretion to create a new allocation formula. ------ Violation of Equality: Equal distribution among mills with vastly different production capacities and contributions violates the principle of equality. Treating unequals equally is discriminatory. Larger mills with greater production capacity bear higher costs and obligations to cane growers, justifying higher quotas. ------ Judicial Review: While courts generally refrain from intervening in policy matters, the Court found the Cane Commissioner’s actions arbitrary and inconsistent with the federal policy, warranting judicial correction to ensure fairness and adherence to the law. ------ Performance-Based Allocation: The Court emphasized that the federal government’s rationale for allocating provincial quotas must be mirrored in intra-provincial allocations to maintain consistency and fairness. ------ Outcome: The Court granted the injunction, restraining the Cane Commissioner from implementing the equal allocation formula. It directed the Cane Commissioner to reallocate export quotas based on performance metrics (sugarcane crushed and sugar produced) within two weeks. ------ Citations/Precedents: Baloch Distillery & Sugar Mills vs. Secretary Industries & Commerce Department (PLD 2017 Sindh 313) I.A. Sharwani vs. Government of Pakistan (1991 SCMR 1041) Ahmed Yar Chohan vs. Federal Public Service Commission (1998 MLD 1832) State of Maharashtra vs. Kamal Sukumar Durgule (AIR 1985 SC 119) Shuja Sharif vs. Federation of Pakistan (2023 SCMR 129) Uttar Pradesh Power Corporation (2008 SCC 139)

Summary: [Civil Procedure Code CPC (Order VII Rule 10)] The appellant through present first appeal has challenged the Judgment and decree passed by the learned District Judge, Karachi (Central), in a summary chapter suit filed by respondent No.1 for recovery its amount against the appellant.In this case Section 3(2) of Microfinance Institution Ordinance 2001 and Order XXXVII of CPC were discussed.It was considered that in a summary suit under Order XXXVII of CPC, in which summons have been issued in Form No.4 Appendix B, the defendant is not entitled to appear or defend the suit as a matter of course unless he obtains leave from the Court so to appear and defend. In default of his obtaining such leave for his appearance and defence in pursuance thereof the allegations in the plaint shall be deemed to be admitted and the plaintiff shall be entitled to a decree. Section 3(2) of Microfinance Institution Ordinance 2001, was examined and it was observed that the Banking Companies Ordinance and any law for the time being in force relating to banking companies or financial institutions shall not apply to microfinance institutions licensed under the Ordinance. And microfinance institutions shall not be deemed to be a banking company for the purposes of the said ordinance