Summary: Background:The petitioner, Ali Raza, a constable in the Punjab Police, was dismissed from service on charges of inefficiency and misconduct, including involvement in criminal cases. The disciplinary proceedings were initiated under the Punjab Police (Efficiency & Discipline) Rules, 1975, and the dismissal order was issued on March 8, 2019. Raza's departmental appeal was filed on December 26, 2019, but was rejected as time-barred on March 14, 2020. His subsequent service appeal was also dismissed by the Punjab Service Tribunal on September 1, 2020, on similar grounds. Raza contended that the Punjab Police (Efficiency & Discipline) Rules, 1975, do not specify a time limit for filing appeals, relying on a precedent set in the case of Tahira Paras.-----Issues:The central issue was whether an appeal could be dismissed due to lapse of time when the governing rules do not specify a deadline for filing such appeals.-----Holding/Reasoning:The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that despite the absence of a specified deadline in the Punjab Police (Efficiency & Discipline) Rules, 1975, the appeal was correctly dismissed as time-barred by applying the 60-day limit under Section 21 of the Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974. The Court found the petitioner's appeal to be significantly late, filed nine months and 18 days after the original order. The Court also deemed the reliance on the Tahira Paras case as misplaced, labeling it as per incuriam (decided without regard to the law) since it overlooked the applicable provision in the Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974. Additionally, the Court dismissed the petitioner's argument regarding the delay in receiving the punishment order, considering it an afterthought and not entertained at the appellate stage or before the Tribunal.-----Citations/Precedents:Raja Khan v. Manager, Faisalabad Electricity Supply Company (WAPDA) [2011 PLC(CS) 856]Muhammad Aslam v. WAPDA and others [2007 SCMR 513]NED University of Technology v. Ashfaq Hussain Shah [2006 SCMR 453]Chairman, PIA and others v. Naseem Malik [PLD 1990 SC 951]Tahira Paras v. Chief Traffic Officer, Lahore [C.P.2477-L/2019] (Referred but found per incuriam)Police Authority for Huddersfield v. Watson [(1947) K.B. 842] (Referenced in the context of administrative authority and discipline)

Summary: (a) Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 (XVII of 1979) ----Ss. 2(h), 15(2)(ii), 16(1)---Jurisdiction---Factory premises---Scope. Eviction suit filed by the Plaintiff (Askari Bank Limited) for possession of factory premises and recovery of rent was challenged by the Defendant on the ground that the Rent Controller under the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 (SRPO) had exclusive jurisdiction. Plaintiff contended that the premises, being a factory, fell outside the purview of the SRPO. ----Held: Under Section 2(h) of the SRPO, premises let without any machinery affixed do not qualify as a "factory" and remain within the jurisdiction of the Rent Controller. In the present case, the premises was a vacant building intended for trade or manufacturing, but without any machinery. Therefore, eviction remedies lay before the Rent Controller, not the civil court. However, the civil court retained jurisdiction for recovery of arrears of rent. ---- Cited Cases: Rahman Cotton Factory v. Nichimen Co. Ltd. PLD 1976 SC 781 Bashir Ahmad v. Zubeda Khatoon 1983 CLC 390 Ahmad Hassan v. Abdur Rauf Khan 1986 SCMR 494 (b) Transfer of Property Act, 1882 ----Ss. 106, 109, 111---Notice of eviction---Statutory tenant. Plaintiff acquired ownership of the premises via a registered conveyance deed and issued notice to the Defendant under Sections 106, 109, and 111 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. Defendant acknowledged the Plaintiff as the landlord but failed to vacate or pay rent. ----Held: A statutory tenant is obligated to pay rent to the landlord upon notice of change in ownership. Defendant's letters acknowledging the Plaintiff as landlord established knowledge of transfer, and arrears of rent became payable. (c) Limitation Act, 1908 ----Art. 110---Recovery of arrears of rent---Time-barred claim. Under Article 110 of the Limitation Act, arrears of rent are recoverable within three years of becoming due. Plaintiff sought recovery of rent from 2009, but the claim for arrears prior to September 2012 was time-barred. ----Held: Plaintiff was entitled to recover rent for the period from September 2012 to February 2024 at the agreed rate of Rs. 200,000 per month, totaling Rs. 27,600,000. (d) Civil Procedure Code, 1908 ----Ss. 35, 35-A---Compensation for frivolous litigation. Plaintiff sought compensation of Rs. 1,000,000 for a prior suit filed by the Defendant, claiming it was false and frivolous. ----Held: Plaintiff failed to demonstrate how the earlier suit was frivolous or caused specific damage. No compensatory costs were awarded as evidence of loss was lacking. ------ Disposition: Suit partially decreed. Plaintiff awarded Rs. 27,600,000 as arrears of rent with costs of the suit. Claim for compensation was dismissed.

Summary: Background: The Petitioner filed an application under Section 22-A Cr.P.C. before the Ex-officio Justice of Peace, Ahmadpur East, seeking an order to compel the SHO of Police Station City Ahmadpur East to register an FIR against the Respondents. The Petitioner alleged that the Respondents, including some police officials, unlawfully entered the house of her son and detained several family members. They were later released, but the Respondents allegedly returned, abducted the family members again, and subsequently killed them during a staged police encounter. The Petitioner’s attempts to file an FIR were ignored by the police, prompting the application. ----Issues: 1- Whether the Ex-officio Justice of Peace erred in dismissing the application due to the delay in filing it. 2- Whether the provisions of the Torture and Custodial Death (Prevention and Punishment) Act, 2022 apply to the alleged incident. 3- Whether the registration of FIR No. 205/2023 precludes the filing of a new complaint under the Act of 2022. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The court found that the delay in filing the application should not have been the sole reason for dismissal. The Ex-officio Justice of Peace should have considered the severity of the allegations, which warranted a thorough investigation by an independent agency. The court held that the Act of 2022 applies to cases where public officials are accused of torture or custodial death. In this case, the allegations involved actions by public officials while the victims were effectively under their control, fitting within the definition of "custody" under the Act. The court determined that the registration of FIR No. 205/2023 does not prevent the filing of a new complaint under the Act of 2022. The Act is lex specialis and provides a new remedy that operates independently of the general criminal procedure. ----Citations/Precedents: Rafique Bibi v. Muhammad Sharif and others (2006 SCMR 512) Sughran Bibi v. The State (PLD 2018 SC 595) Muhammad Bilal Nawaz v. Director General, Federal Investigation Agency, and others (2024 LHC 3288) Tallat Ishaq v. National Accountability Bureau (PLD 2019 SC 112) The State through Regional Director ANF v. Imam Bakhsh and others (2018 SCMR 2039) Khizar Hayat and others v. Inspector-General of Police Punjab (PLD 2005 Lahore 470) The petition was accepted, and the Petitioner was directed to file a complaint with the FIA under the Act of 2022, which would proceed according to the law. The impugned order of the Ex-officio Justice of Peace was set aside.

Summary: Background:This case arises from a legal dispute in Pakistan involving a partnership for a petrol pump business, dating back to 1997 between Haji Musharraf Mahmood Khan (petitioner) and Sardarzada Zafar Abbas (respondent). After disagreements, an arbitrator was appointed, and an award was announced in 2001. The petitioner sought to have the award confirmed by the court, leading to various legal challenges and remands between trial courts and the Lahore High Court (LHC). The Civil Revision at the center of this appeal, initially dismissed for non-prosecution in 2016, led to further legal challenges when the petitioner sought to revive the case. The revival was rejected by the LHC in 2017 due to a failure to file within the prescribed 60 days and lack of vigilant pursuit by the petitioner.---Issues:The core issues addressed by the Supreme Court include:Whether the LHC erred in sustaining the office objection against the revival of the civil revision dismissed for non-prosecution based on technicalities without sufficient cause.The applicability of procedural laws and statutory limitation periods in the context of reviving a dismissed revision petition.---Holding/Reasoning/Outcome:The Supreme Court of Pakistan found that the LHC had improperly applied procedural limitations by enforcing a 60-day period for the revival of the case, which contradicted the broader three-year limitation period provided under Article 181 of the Limitation Act for situations not specifically covered elsewhere. The Court emphasized that legal processes should not be unduly hindered by technicalities and that justice must be served by addressing matters on their merits. Consequently, the Supreme Court set aside the LHC's order, restored the civil revision, and directed the LHC to decide the matter on its merits.---Citations/Precedents:Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908: Guides the revisional jurisdiction of high courts.Limitation Act, 1908: Specifically, Article 181 used for filing applications where no other limitation period is prescribed.Manager, Jammu and Kashmir State Property v. Khuda Yar (PLD 1975 SC 678): Highlighted that technicalities should not obstruct justice.Muhammad Sadiq Vs Mst. Bashiran and others (PLD 2000 SC 820): Discusses the absence of a specific provision for recalling a revision dismissed for non-prosecution.Wali and others v. Manak and others (PLD 1965 SC 651): Advocates for adjudication on merits.House Building Finance Corporation v. Mrs. Sarwar Jehan (PLD 1992 Karachi 329): Applies to situations without specific procedural guidance under the C.P.C.Mandi Hassan alias Mehdi Hussain and another Vs. Muhammad Arif (PLD 2015 SC 137): Discusses the use of Section 151, C.P.C., for restoring a revision dismissed for non-prosecution.Mst. Jameela Bibi (Deceased) through LRs Vs. Mst. Fatima Bibi (Deceased) through LRs (2023 SCMR 485): Pertains to limitation periods for restoration applications.Ghulam Qadir and others v. Sh. Abdul Wadood and others (PLD 2016 SC 712): Concerns the applicability of Article 181 of the Limitation Act.

Summary: Background: The petitioner filed a suit for declaration seeking the cancellation of two mutations. The first mutation, executed on 24th June 1996, allegedly transferred land owned by the petitioner's mother to the first respondent without the petitioner's knowledge. The second mutation, executed on 21st March 2006, involved the further alienation of the land to a second respondent through a gift. The petitioner claimed the transactions were carried out fraudulently, depriving him of his rightful inheritance. The trial court initially decreed the suit in favor of the petitioner. However, the appellate court overturned this decision, which prompted the petitioner to file this civil revision petition. ----Issues: 1- Was the suit barred by the law of limitation? 2- Were the mutations validly executed, and were they legally enforceable? 3- Did the petitioner’s mother execute the sale mutation under undue influence? 4- Was the appellate court justified in overturning the trial court’s decision? ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The court held that the suit was barred by the law of limitation. The possession of the land was transferred to the respondent in 1996, and the petitioner had delayed challenging the transaction for over a decade. The court found that the petitioner had knowledge of the mutations earlier than claimed, and his assertion that his mother was unaware of the transactions until her death was unsupported by evidence. The appellate court's judgment was affirmed as it was based on proper analysis and appraisal of the evidence. The trial court had misread certain key facts, leading to an erroneous judgment. Consequently, the civil revision petition was dismissed, and the appellate court’s decision stood. ----Citations/Precedents: Faqir Ali vs. Sakina Bibi (PLD 2022 SC 85) Ghulam Farid vs. Sher Rehman (2016 SCMR 862) Rehmatullah vs. Saleh Khan (2007 SCMR 729) Faheeman Begum vs. Islam-ud-Din (2023 SCMR 1402) Salamat Ali vs. Muhammad Din (PLD 2022 SC 353) Haji Muhammad Younis vs. Mst. Farukh Sultan (2022 SCMR 1282) Mst. Rabia Gula vs. Muhammad Janan (2022 SCMR 1009) Muhammad Nawaz vs. Haji Muhammad Baran Khan (2013 SCMR 1300) Amjad Ikram vs. Mst. Asiya Kausar (2015 SCMR 1) Muhammad Hafeez vs. District Judge, Karachi East (2008 SCMR 398) Mst. Saeeda vs. Muhammad Naeem (PLD 2013 Sindh 39) Muhammad Akram vs. Mst. Noor Begum (PLD 2019 SC 599)

Summary: Background:In the case of M/s Saeed Buksh (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Mst. Azra Bibi, the respondent filed an eviction petition under section 17 of the Cantonments Rent Restriction Act, 1963 against the appellant. The appellant was proceeded against ex parte, resulting in the acceptance of the ejectment petition. Subsequently, the appellant filed an application seeking setting aside of the ex parte order, along with an application under sections 5 & 14 of the Limitation Act, 1908 for condonation of delay. Despite the respondent's failure to file a reply to these applications or controvert the attached affidavits, the learned Rent Controller dismissed the applications, leading to the filing of the instant appeal.----Issues:The primary issue before the court was whether the appellant was condemned unheard due to improper service of notice and whether the application for setting aside the ex parte order was filed within the prescribed limitation period. Additionally, the court had to determine whether the procedural irregularities warranted setting aside the ex parte order and remanding the case for fresh consideration.-----Holding:The Lahore High Court held that the appellant was condemned unheard due to improper service of notice, as there was no evidence to suggest that proper service had been affected. The court emphasized the importance of adhering to the principle of Audi Alteram Partem and decided to set aside the impugned order. The court also noted that the application for setting aside the ex parte order was filed within the limitation period prescribed by Article 181 of the Limitation Act, 1908. Consequently, the court accepted the appeal, set aside the impugned order, and remanded the case to the Rent Controller for fresh consideration.----Citations and Precedents:Abdul Karim v. Muhammad Ibrahim, 1976 SCMR 79Nasim Nizami v. Habib Bank Limited, 2006 CLC 1213-LahoreM. Imam Ud Din Janjua v. The Thal Development Authority through The Chairman, T.D.A., Jauharabad, PLD 1972 Supreme Court 123Mandi Hassan alias Mehdi Hussain and another v. Muhammad Arif, PLD 2015 Supreme Court 137Ghulam Qadir and others v. Sh. Abdul Wadood and others, PLD 2016 Supreme Court 712Allah Ditta v. Aziz Din, PLD 1981 Lahore 508

Summary: Acquittal upheld ---Background: The case involves allegations of forgery and land grabbing by the accused respondents. The complainant alleged that the accused, in collusion, forged allotment chits and engaged in fraudulent activities to acquire and sell state-owned land. ----Issues: 1. Competence of the appeal filed before the High Court. 2. Determination of the limitation period for filing the appeal. 3. Application of section 249-A of the Criminal Procedure Code regarding the trial court's power to acquit. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The court found the appeal filed before the High Court to be competent, as the Additional Advocate-General, classified as a public prosecutor under the AJ&K Law Officers (Terms & Conditions) Act, 2014, possessed the requisite competence. Appeals against acquittal orders filed by the State are governed by a six-month limitation period under Article 157 of the Limitation Act, 1908, as clarified by relevant case law. The court upheld the trial court's decision to acquit the accused respondents, as it found no evidence indicating their involvement in the alleged offenses. The trial court's power to acquit an accused at any stage under section 249-A of the Criminal Procedure Code was deemed applicable in this case. ----Citations/Precedents: Rustam Khan’s case (supra) Mohammad Ibrahim vs. Goppi Lal AIR 1957 (Madras) 300 AIR 1975 (Andra Pradesh) 406 AIR 1958 (Andra Pradesh) 230 AIR 1957 (Allahabad) 500 The State vs. Syed Ali Baqar Naqvi and others

Summary: Issues:Limitation Period: Whether the 90-day limitation period for filing the award in court, as per Article 178 of the Limitation Act, 1908, starts from a formal written notice by the arbitrators or if general knowledge of the award suffices.Court's Authority: Whether a court can reject objections to an award yet refuse to enforce it on the grounds of the enforcement application being filed out of time.----Holding/Reasoning:The Lahore High Court found that the Appellate Court erred in its decision to not enforce the award based solely on the issue of timeliness without considering the merits. The court emphasized that the limitation period starts only upon the formal written notice of the award's issuance, as required by the Arbitration Act, 1940. It was further held that the presence of general knowledge about the award does not suffice to start the limitation period. Consequently, the petition was allowed, the Appellate Court's judgment was set aside, and the case was remanded for a decision on the merits, expected to be concluded within two months.----Citations/Precedents:Article 178 of the Limitation Act, 1908: Specifies a 90-day limitation period for filing an arbitration award in court, starting from the date of service of the notice of the award's making.---Section 14(1) of the Arbitration Act, 1940: Mandates that arbitrators must provide a written notice to the parties upon making and signing the award.----Muhammad Shafi and others v. Muhammad Sabir and others (PLD 1960 Lahore 591): Highlighted the strict interpretation of laws restricting court access.----Noor Muhammad vs ADJ Nankana Sahib etc. (1996 CLC 268): Stressed that once an award is filed in court, the court has the jurisdiction to proceed as per the law.----M/s. Awan Industries Ltd. v. The Executive Engineer, Lined Channel Division and another (1992 SCMR 65): Established the court's power to set aside an award without waiting for an objection to be filed, regardless of timeliness.----A. Qutbuddin Khan v. Chec Milliwala Dredging Co. (Pvt.) Ltd. (2014 SCMR 1268): Reiterated the court's duty to scrutinize the award once filed, irrespective of objections or timeliness.

Summary: Background: The appellant filed a civil appeal against the judgment and decree recorded by the learned District Judge Neelum dated 17.06.2021, which upheld the judgment and decree of the Senior Civil Judge Athmuqam dated 30.07.2019. The case involves a suit for declaration cum possession filed by Mst. Hajiran Bibi, who claimed that her father was the owner of certain land. She alleged that after her father's death, the land was fraudulently transferred to the appellant through a forged gift deed. -----Issues: 1- Whether the suit filed by the respondent was time-barred. 2- Whether the gift deed dated 20.10.1997 was fraudulent and invalid. 3- Whether the lower courts erred in their findings regarding the validity of the gift deed and the age of the respondent at the time of its execution. -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: --Time-Barred Suit: The appellant argued that the suit was time-barred and that this specific plea was not addressed by the lower courts. The court found that the respondent had stated in her plaint that she became aware of the fraudulent gift deed only a few days before filing the suit. The appellant’s failure to specifically deny this claim in his rebuttal implied an admission. Additionally, the court referenced legal principles that in cases of fraud, the limitation period begins from the date of knowledge of the fraud (2013 SCR 563, 2016 MLD 365). Therefore, the suit was deemed to be within the limitation period. --Fraudulent Gift Deed: The appellant contended that the respondent was a minor at the time of the execution of the gift deed, and the courts below did not properly consider the evidence proving her majority. The court found that both lower courts had concluded that the gift deed was obtained through fraud. It was established that the respondent was a minor at the time of the gift deed’s execution, which invalidated the deed under the Transfer of Property Act. The court reaffirmed that concurrent findings of fact by lower courts are not to be disturbed unless there is clear evidence of misreading or non-reading of evidence, which was not present in this case (2022 SCR 416). --Lower Courts' Findings: The court found that the lower courts had thoroughly and correctly evaluated the evidence and reached a judicious conclusion. The respondent’s minor status at the time of the gift deed’s execution and the fraudulent nature of the deed were adequately proven. The concurrent findings of fact by the lower courts were supported by the evidence and did not warrant interference. The appeal was dismissed, and the judgments and decrees of the lower courts were upheld. The suit filed by Mst. Hajiran Bibi was within the limitation period, and the gift deed dated 20.10.1997 was declared fraudulent and invalid. -----Citations/Precedents: 2013 SCR 563 2016 MLD 365 2022 SCR 416

Summary: Background:The case originated with a civil suit filed by the respondents (Kareem Hussain Shah and others) in 2004, claiming ownership of specific parcels of land in Mauza Khui Narran, Haripur, Pakistan, and challenging the legitimacy of a power of attorney issued in 1998 and related land mutations attested in 1990. The appellants (Mst. Iqbal Bibi and others), who were defendants in the lower courts, disputed the respondents' claims. After progressing through several judicial levels, the case reached the Supreme Court of Pakistan following the dismissal of the appellants' civil revision by the Peshawar High Court, Abbottabad Bench, which upheld the decisions of the initial civil judge and the appellate court.---Issues:The primary issues at stake were:1.The validity of the power of attorney allegedly granted to Gohar Shah by the respondents, based on which land mutations were registered.2. Whether the suit filed by the respondents was barred by limitation under Article 120 of the Limitation Act, 1908.Holding/Reasoning/Outcome3. The Supreme Court overturned the lower courts' decisions, which had favored the respondents. ---Holding/Reasoning/Outcome:The power of attorney was genuine and validly executed, as evidenced by the authentication by the Pakistan Consulate General in Malaysia.The suit by the respondents was barred by limitation since it was filed more than 13 years after the key transactions in question, exceeding the six-year period specified under Article 120 of the Limitation Act, 1908.The Court also criticized the High Court for extending the limitation period by incorrectly interpreting the creation of a fresh cause of action with each new revenue record entry (Jamabandi).The Court allowed the appeal, set aside the impugned judgment and decree, and declared the appellants as the rightful owners of the disputed land parcels.---Citations/Precedents:Article 120 of the Limitation Act, 1908: Prescribes a six-year limitation period for suits not covered specifically by any other provisions.Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, Article 95: Establishes a presumption regarding the execution and authentication of documents like powers of attorney.Abdul Rehman and others Vs. Ghulam Muhammad (2010 SCMR 978): Cited by the High Court but misapplied in the context of the limitation.A. Rahim Foods v. K&N?s Foods (2023 CLD 1001) and Nazim-ud-Din v. Sheikh Zia-ul-Qamar (2016 SCMR 24): Discuss the principles when appellate courts should interfere with concurrent findings of fact.Rabia Gula v. Muhammad Janan: Provides clarification on "actual denial of right" versus "apprehended or threatened denial of right" in the context of limitations and property rights disputes.