Summary: (Against the order dated 27.02.2024 passed by Lahore High Court, Lahore in I.T.R. No. 41034 of 2017). Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)--- ----Ss. 114 & 133---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Ss. 3 & 5---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185(3)---Reference to High Court---Limitation---Office objection---Condonation of delay---Petitioner/tax-payer was aggrieved of order passed by High Court on tax reference of authorities, which was filed beyond the time frame given by office of High Court---Validity---If objections raised by office of High Court were not removed within the time specified by the office and in the meantime limitation for filing appeal stood expired, such appeal would be rendered as time barred---Limitation is not a mere technicality, as once limitation expires a vested right is created in favour of other side by operation of law which cannot be taken away lightly---High Court had passed the order on merits of the case but failed to discuss averments of application with regard to limitation by specifying whether the same was allowed or rejected---High Court should have decided such objection of limitation as a preliminary issue---Supreme Court set aside the order passed by High Court and remanded the matter for decision afresh on application for condonation of delay---Petition for leave to appeal was disposed of. Asad Ali and 9 others v. The Bank of Punjab and others PLD 2020 SC 736; Abdul Jabbar Shahid and others v. National Bank of Pakistan and others PLD 2019 Lahore 76; Abdul Hafeez Abbasi and others v. Managing Director, Pakistan International Airlines Corporation, Karachi and others 2002 SCMR 1034 and Collectors of Customs E & S.T. and Sales Tax v. Pakistan State Oil Company Ltd 2005 SCMR 1636 rel. Hassan Kamran Bashir, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner. Mrs. Kausar Parveen, Advocate Supreme Court and Dr. Ishtiaq Ahmed Khan, DG (Law) FBR for Respondent. Date of hearing: 4th March, 2025.

Summary: ----S. 9, O. VII, R. 14 & O. XVI, Rr. 1, 2---Suit for recovery of damages---Fatal road accident---Negligence on the part of vehicle company alleged---Onus to prove---Expert evidence, relevance of---Doctrine of res ipsa loquitur 'the thing speaks for itself', applicability of---Claim of vehicle being mechanically unfit resulting in the accident had to be proved through specific evidence---The appellants/plaintiffs filed a civil suit for damages against a transport company, following a serious road accident---Appellants/plaintiffs Nos. 1 and 2 (mother and daughter) were passengers on the bus, while the remaining appellants/ plaintiffs were immediate family members affected indirectly by the consequences of the accident---As a result of the accident, appellant/ plaintiff No. 1 was rendered permanently disabled, causing physical, emotional, and financial distress to the family---The primary claim was that the bus was mechanically unfit and unstable from the start of the journey, whereas, defendant company contended that the accident occurred due to a fault of another vehicle which suddenly changed lanes, forcing the bus driver to swerve, resulting in a rollover---The Trial Court partly decreed the suit, awarding Rs. 140,000 to plaintiff No. 1 and Rs. 40,000 to plaintiff No. 2---Dissatisfied from the Trial Court's decision, the appellants/plaintiffs filed the present appeal---Held: Considering that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur 'the thing speaks for itself' only supplied an inference and not a conclusive presumption and since the defendants through their evidence were able to cast doubts by denying the claim of the appellants, the appellants/ plaintiffs were required to produce some expert evidence to bridge the gap but none was produced---The evidence brought by the defendants remained unchallenged---Since the appellants/plaintiffs had opted to take a specific position that occurrence was due to bus's mechanical and fitness failure, therefore, they had to prove it by producing some evidence but they failed to do so---It was clear that in the present case doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was not attracted and normal rule of evidence prevailed, therefore, the onus of proving negligence on part of the defendant was on the appellants/plaintiffs, particularly when the defendant had unrooted the prima facie presumption by producing bus driver, bus hostess and workshop in-charge, since it was appellant/ plaintiffs' position that the accident occurred due to fault in the bus---Neither the appellants/plaintiffs sought to rely on the record of maintenance and fitness of the vehicle in issue nor they sought to produce any such record or evidence through process of the court in terms of O. VII, R. 14, read with O. XVI, Rr. 1 & 2 of the C.P.C.---Had the appellants/plaintiffs applied for expert [advice or evidence] for the inspection of the bus or sought appointment of any expert and the response the respondent/defendant company had opposed such prayer, there would have been some inference in favour of the appellants/ plaintiffs---Although it was proved that appellant/plaintiff No.1 had sustained injuries, she was bedridden for life and her family members might be facing trauma and emotional stress for life, however, it was not proved that those had occurred due to direct negligence by the respondent/defendant company---There was nothing on record which could have established that the bus carrying the appellants/plaintiffs had any mechanical fault, which fault was then instrumental for causing the accident---Appeal being without merit was dismissed, in circumstances. N K V Bros (Pvt.) Ltd. v. M Karumai Ammal AIR 1980 SC 1354 ref. (b) Damages--- ----Doctrine of 'Res ipsa loquitur' 'the thing speaks for itself'---Essential ingredients---Applicability and significance---'Res ipsa loquitur' is Latin for 'the thing speaks for itself'---This doctrine applies, when the things that inflicted the damage was under the sole management and control of the defendant; secondly, the occurrence was such that it would not have happened without negligence; and thirdly, there must be no evidence as to why or how the occurrence took place---In such circumstances the defendants have to persuade the court that the accident did not occur on account of their negligence---In simple words, res ipsa loquitur means an inference of negligence in civil proceedings; it permits an inference of a defendant's negligence from the happening of an event and thereby creates a prima facie case of negligence sufficient for submission to a Court---To warrant submission of the inference for the court's consideration, the plaintiff must establish: (i) the event must be of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone's negligence; (ii) it must be caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant; (iii) it must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the plaintiff---However, it is equally important to register that a defendant may rebut the inference of negligence with evidence that tends to cast doubt on the plaintiff's proof; and more importantly, the doctrine permits an inference of negligence to be drawn solely from the happening of the accident---The rule simply recognizes that some accidents by their very nature would ordinarily not happen without negligence---Res ipsa loquitur does not create a conclusive presumption in favor of the plaintiff but merely permits the inference of negligence to be drawn from the circumstances of the occurrence---Mere happening of an accident or injury will not give rise to an inference or presumption that it was due to negligence on the defendant's part, even in a strict liability context---It is insufficient by itself to establish a prima facie case of negligence , or to prove negligence as a matter of law---Stated another way, proof of an accident does not equate with proof of negligence---In an action based on negligence, the maxim res ipsa loquitur is merely a rule of evidence effecting onus; it does not alter the general rule that the onus to prove negligence rests upon the claimant---The doctrine has been applied to situations where a motor vehicle mounted the footpath , where a vehicle struck a pedestrian who was walking alongside the highway , where it was shown that the brake pipe of the vehicle was beyond repair, and where a vehicle of unsound condition was being driven on a poor road on a dark night. Mst. Kamina and another v. Al-Amin Goods Transport Agency through L.R.s and 2 others 1992 SCMR 1715 and Pakistan Steel Mills Corporation Limited and another v. Malik Abdul Habib and another 1993 SCMR 848 rel. Dermatossian v. New York City Tr. Auth. 67 NY2d 219 [1986]; (E.g. James v Wormuth, 21 NY3d 540 [2013]; Morejon v Rais Constr. Co., 7 NY3d 203 [2006]; States v. Lourdes Hosp., 100 NY2d 208 [2003]; Abbott v. Page Airways (23 NY2d 502, 511 [1969]; Kambat (89 NY2d at 497) and States 100 NY2d at 212; Kambat v. St. Francis Hosp., 89 NY2d 489; Morejon v. Rais Const. Co., 7 NY3d at 209; States v. Lourdes Hosp. 100 NY2d at 214; Esso Petroleum Co. Ltd. v. Southport Corpn. [1956] AC 218; [1955] 3 All ER 864; Collvilles Ltd. v. Devine [1969] 2 All ER 53; Monforti v. K-Mart Inc. 690 Sol. 2d 631; Fla. Dist. Ct. App.5th Dist. 1997; Thompson v. Volles, (37 Del. 83); Transit Homes, Inc. v. Bellamy, 282 Ark. 453; Callvert v. Katy Taxi, Inc. [413 F.2d 841 (2d Cir. 1969); Brown v. Rolls Royce Ltd. [1960] 1 All ER 577; Ellor v. Selfridge & Co. Ltd. (1930) 46 TLR 236; Isaac Walton & Co. Ltd. v. Vanguard Motor Bus Co. Ltd. (1908) 25 TLR 13; 22 Bhagyawati Mittal v. Uttar Pradesh State Road Transport Corpn Lucknow AIR 1978 All. 356 and Gopibai Ghansbamdas Advani v. Food Corpn of India, Bombay AIR 1983 Bom. 137 ref. (c) Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984)--- ----Arts. 72, 117 & 120---Tendering of document in the statement of counsel---Admissibility of such documentary evidence---Disputed documents tendered in evidence through counsel's statement cannot be considered because such procedure deprives the opposing party to test the authenticity of those documents by exercising its right of cross-examination. Rustam and others v. Jehangir (deceased) through L.R.s 2023 SCMR 730; Mst. Akhtar Sultana v. Major Retd. Muzaffar Khan Malik through his legal heirs and others PLD 2021 SC 715; Manzoor Hussain v. Misri Khan PLD 2020 SC 749 and Hameeda Begum v. Irshad Begum 2007 SCMR 996 rel. (d) Damages--- ----'General damages' and 'special damages'---Definitions---Distinction---Standards of proof---The "general damages" are implied or presumed to have accrued from the wrong complained of, for the reason that they are its immediate, direct or proximate result or such that thus necessarily result from the injury, or such that they did in fact result from the wrong, directly or proximately---The term "special damages" is defined as those which are actual, but not the necessary result of the injury complained of, and which in fact follow it as a natural and proximate consequence in a particular case i.e. by reason of special circumstances or conditions---Such special damages must be specifically pleaded and proved---In a suit for damages, the wrong done to the plaintiff must be proved to be immediate, direct or proximate result of the act, or acts of negligence. (e) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----S.9---Suit for recovery of damages, filing of---Jurisdiction of Civil Court, invoking of---Ouster of Civil Court's jurisdiction in certain cases discussed--- Question as to what law governs the suit for recovery of damages---Held: Suit for recovery of damages is governed by S. 9 of C.P.C. as it would operate and vest jurisdiction in the Civil Court to adjudicate the suits for recovery of damages and the Civil Court is not robbed of its jurisdiction to try such kinds of suits as the said provision is all encompassing---This is based on well settled position of law that ouster of jurisdiction of Civil Court conferred upon it under S. 9 of C.P.C. cannot be readily inferred and an ouster by special law has to be specific, clear and unambiguous---Exclusion of jurisdiction of Civil Court must be expressed, and ouster clause, ousting general law's jurisdiction, must be construed very strictly. Messrs Sui Northern Gas Pipelines Limited (SNGPL) v. Messrs Noor CNG Filling Station 2022 SCMR 1501; Keramat Ali and another v. Muhammad Yunus Haji and others PLD 1963 SC 191; Khulna and 4 others v. Abdul Jabbar and 9 others PLD 1968 SC 381 and Abbasia Cooperative Bank (Now Punjab Provincial Cooperative Bank Ltd.) through Manager and another v. Hakeem Rafiz Muhammad Ghaus and 5 others PLD 1997 SC 03 rel. (f) Tort--- ----Definition---"Tort" is an act or omission that gives rise to an injury either to person or property---A tortious breach is where one party (the tort-feasor) breaches the legally protected rights of another party (the claimant)---Torts tend to fall within four categories---They are: 1) torts of physical integrity; 2) torts of interests in property; 3) torts of use and enjoyment of land and; 4) torts of reputation. Pakistan Television Corporation v. Noor Sanat Shah 2023 SCMR 616 rel. (g) Jurisprudence--- ----Justice and morality---Standards and yardstick to be adopted by courts while deciding cases---Scope---Judicial decisions must rest on legal principles, not on compassion or emotions--- Justice or morality do not signify any concept of precision as morality may fluctuate from one community to another and from one country to the other---Courts are not required to enforce moral standards but as courts of law are merely concerned with the enforcement of law enacted by the legislature--- Courts of law are not mandated to rule on the basis of mere agony, unfortunate pain and helplessness---It is the duty of every court to implement the enforced laws and to decide the disputes in accordance therewith, rather than on the basis of compassion---Any relief granted on the touchstone of subjective standards of leniency and compassions, rather than the law, cannot be sustained. Sundas and others v. Khyber Medical University through V. C. Peshawar and others 2024 SCMR 46 and Superintendent of Police, Headquarters, Lahore and others v. Ijaz Aslam and others 2024 SCMR 1831 rel. POSCO International Corporation through Authorized Officer v. RIKANS International through Managing Partner/Director and 4 others PLD 2023 Lah. 116 ref. Mubashir Rehman Chaudhary for Appellants. Faisal Zaffar for Respondents. Date of hearing: 4th March, 2025.

Summary: (Against the order/judgment dated 30.09.2020 passed by the Islamabad High Court, Islamabad, in Crl. A. No. 613 of 2012). (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b) & 302(c)---Qatl-i-amd---Re-appraisal of evidence---Ocular account---Visual distance---Limitations of human eye---Benefit of doubt---Accused was convicted under section 302 (b), P.P.C. for qatl-i-amd and sentenced to imprisonment for life on four counts---Validity---In cases involving witness testimony, prosecution must establish credibility and reliability of its witnesses---Distance from which witnesses claimed to have observed the incident with graphic details was critical in assessing truthfulness and ability of their accounts---General rule is that at a distance of 500 meters (half a kilometer), even individuals with excellent visual acuity would struggle to discern specific details of an event, particularly when incident involves rapid moments, or if it occurs in an area that is not well lit or has obstructions that could hinder vision---Eyesight of a man, even under optimal conditions, is not designed for sustained observations of minute details at such a distance---Claim of witnesses was not only a tall claim but also one that was too far-fetched to be accepted by a prudent mind-- -No independent corroboration to ocular account furnished by three eye-witnesses was produced by the prosecution---Burden of proof laid with prosecution and it was required to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt---There was reasonable doubt regarding credibility of witnesses, primarily due to physical impossibility of observing incident from the stated distance, given the acknowledged limitations of human vision---There was insufficient evidence to support claims of prosecution regarding witnesses' ability to observe the incident from a distance of half a kilometer---Supreme Court extended benefit of doubt to accused, set aside conviction and sentence awarded to him and acquitted him from all charges ---Appeal was allowed. A study by Nyman, Lampinen, Antfolk, Korkman, and Santtila (2019) published in Journal of Law and Human Behavior rel. (b) Criminal trial--- ----Eye-witness, evidence of---Evidence disbelieved to the extent of co-accused persons---Effect---If eye-witnesses are disbelieved against some accused persons who were attributed effective roles, then same eye-witnesses cannot be believed against another accused person attributed a similar role unless such eye-witnesses receive independent corroboration regarding the other accused person. Iftikhar Hussain v. State 2004 SCMR 1185 rel. . Fakhar Hayat, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Appellant. Nemo for the State. Shaukat Hayat, Advocate Supreme Court for the Complainant. Date of hearing: 4th March, 2025.

Summary: (a) National Database and Registration Authority Ordinance, 2000 ----S. 18 & S. 47; MoI Notification dated 19-04-2017 (blocked-CNIC SOPs)—Cancellation/impounding power—“Reason to believe”—Scope---CNIC previously issued to petitioner No.1 and MNICs/CNICs issued to her husband and father-in-law established a continuous chain of identity; passport also issued on the basis of CNIC—In absence of any allegation or proof under S. 18(2)(a)–(d) (ineligibility, multiple cards on same eligibility, obliteration/tampering, or forgery), NADRA could not refuse issuance of corrected CNIC or renewal—Pre-1978 documentary requirements in MoI SOPs (land record, domicile, pedigree, employment certificate, educational certificates, passport, arms/driving licence, MNIC etc.) may apply to blocked-CNIC cases, but were inapplicable where CNICs had already been lawfully issued and no S. 18 basis was invoked or established—“Reason to believe” must rest on tangible evidence; mere insistence on SOP formalities cannot defeat extant statutory protections. (b) Constitution of Pakistan ----Art. 199—Constitutional petition—Mandamus—Where Zonal Board recommended and respondent No.3 approved correction of date of birth, NADRA’s subsequent delay/refusal to issue corrected CNIC and to renew petitioner No.2’s CNIC was unjustified—Writ jurisdiction competently invoked to enforce performance of a legal duty arising under the Ordinance, 2000 and the approval already granted. (c) Administrative law—Presumption of regularity; burden on authority ----Prior issuance of CNICs/MNIC and passport carries presumption that statutory requirements were observed; unless rebutted through the S. 18 process (notice and proof within clauses (a)–(d)), NADRA must honour existing entitlements and approvals—No adverse presumption lies against the citizen where the department’s own records support identity and eligibility. Disposition --- Petition allowed. Respondents Nos. 2 and 3 directed to issue corrected CNIC to petitioner No.1 (as already approved) and to renew petitioner No.2’s CNIC without delay. Copy to DG NADRA, Balochistan, for compliance.

Summary: (a) Criminal trial— ----Benefit of doubt—Principles—Single circumstance creating doubt—Effect— If a single circumstance creates reasonable doubt in the prosecution case, the accused is entitled to acquittal—In the present case, several discrepancies and procedural lapses cumulatively created serious doubt about the prosecution's version—Held, benefit of doubt must go to the accused as a matter of right, not of grace—Conviction set aside and accused acquitted accordingly. (b) Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997— ----S. 7(ff)—Possession of explosives—Proof of ownership and connection with recovered material—Burden—Scope— Petitioner was seated as a pillion rider on a motorcycle driven by co-accused (since acquitted)—Explosive material was recovered from a shopping bag tied with the motorcycle, not held by petitioner—Prosecution witnesses made dishonest improvements during trial, contradicting the FIR which stated that the bag was affixed to the motorcycle—No evidence produced to prove ownership of the motorcycle or the explosives—Held, petitioner could not be connected with possession of explosive substance in absence of direct or circumstantial proof—Conviction unsustainable. (c) Evidence— ----Safe custody and chain of custody—Failure to prove—Effect— Prosecution failed to produce Moharrar Maal Khana to establish safe custody and proper transmission of recovered explosive substance—Such omission undermined the integrity of the evidence—Held, chain of custody not proved—Benefit of this lapse must go to the accused. ----Disposition: Appeal allowed; conviction and sentence set aside; petitioner acquitted and ordered to be released.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Bail granted --- (a) National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 ----S. 17; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, Ss. 497 & 498 Bailability after amendments—Applicability of Cr.P.C. to NAO trials—Held, following wholesale amendments to NAO, offences under NAO are now bailable; by virtue of S.17 NAO the Cr.P.C. applies mutatis mutandis to NAO proceedings—Consequently, post-arrest and pre-arrest bail are to be governed by Ss. 497 and 498 Cr.P.C., to be first sought before the Trial Court and thereafter before appellate fora—Direct resort to constitutional jurisdiction for bail in NAO matters is no longer the necessary route. (b) Constitution of Pakistan ----Arts. 4, 9 & 10-A Fair trial and due process—Delay in conclusion of criminal trials—Prolonged pre-trial detention—Held, “delay” is antithetical to fair trial and due process; inordinate, unexplained delay for no fault of accused attracts constitutional protections to life, liberty, and fair trial—Earlier jurisprudence condemned day-to-day-trial mandates being ignored in NAO matters and recognized release where statutory timelines are frustrated; principle reaffirmed. Chairman NAB v. Nasrullah (PLD 2022 SC 497) relied upon. (c) Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 ----S. 497, third proviso—Statutory bail as of right Nature of relief and pre-conditions—Held, statutory bail on ground of delay is not discretionary; once the limbs of the third proviso are satisfied, bail follows as of right unless the delay is attributable to the accused or persons acting on their behalf, or the excepted categories (hardened/dangerous criminals, prior convicts for death/life offences, terrorism) apply—Period thresholds: exceeding one year for non-capital offences; two years for capital—Accrual of right cannot be defeated on considerations outside the provisos. Muhammad Usman v. The State (2024 SCMR 28) followed. (d) Criminal procedure—Assessment of delay on facts ----S. 497, third proviso—NAO references—Case management Applicants incarcerated about 18 months; no delay attributable to them—Reference filed 18-07-2023; charge framed 15-08-2023; three witnesses partly examined—Supplementary reference filed 17-01-2024; amended charge 21-02-2024 necessitating re-recording—There are 43 accused and 208 witnesses; with separate cross-examinations, practical completion within near time is implausible—Direction to conclude within six months would be ineffectual given stage of proceedings—Keeping accused incarcerated further would risk constitutional violation; statutory right to bail triggered. (e) Bail—Heinousness of offence—White-collar crime ----S. 497 Cr.P.C. Heinousness not a standalone ground to refuse statutory bail—Legislative scheme even permits statutory bail in capital offences upon delay; NAO maximum sentence (14 years) does not alter the statutory entitlement—Purpose of bail is to secure attendance at trial; where evidence is predominantly documentary and investigation is complete, risk of tampering is minimal—Speculative fears of absconsion cannot defeat a crystallized statutory right; adequate surety and conditions can mitigate flight risk. Dr. Asim Hussain v. The State (2017 PCr.LJ 631), State (ANF) v. Muhammad Asim Khan (2022 YLR Note 64 Sindh), Hasnain Mustafa v. The State (2019 SCMR 1914) referred. (f) Practice and procedure—NAO prosecutions ----Case structuring and delay Court observed NAB’s practice of arraying numerous accused and voluminous witness lists renders trials “never-ending”; emphasized prosecutorial case-management: include only most responsible persons, rely on strongest documentary proof, and minimize witnesses to ensure effective, expeditious trials. (g) Application of third-proviso limbs on record ----S. 497 Cr.P.C. (i) Offences not punishable with death—Satisfied. (ii) Continuous detention exceeding one year with trial unconcluded, and no delay attributable to accused—Satisfied. (iii) Not previously convicted for death/life offences; not hardened/dangerous; not terrorism accused—Satisfied. Result: entitlement to bail as of right. Cited cases: • Chairman NAB v. Nasrullah PLD 2022 SC 497 • Muhammad Usman v. The State 2024 SCMR 28 • Shahid Umar v. Chairman NAB 2019 PCr.LJ 370 • Dr. Asim Hussain v. The State 2017 PCr.LJ 631 • State (ANF) v. Muhammad Asim Khan 2022 YLR Note 64 (Sindh) • Hasnain Mustafa v. The State 2019 SCMR 1914 (g) Disposition — Applications allowed—Post-arrest bail granted to Mukhtiar Ali Chandio, Tabish Ali Shah Hussaini, Saood-ul-Haq and Muhammad Adnan Rasheed under S. 497 (third proviso) Cr.P.C., subject to furnishing solvent surety of Rs. 1,500,000 each with PR bonds in the like amount to the satisfaction of the Additional Registrar—Ministry of Interior directed to place applicants’ names on the ECL and ensure immediate compliance—No comment on merits; Trial Court to proceed strictly in accordance with law.

Summary: Acquittal granted---(a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860), S. 302(b)— ----Murder—Ocular evidence—Witnesses claiming to observe incident from long distance—Evidentiary value—Scientific limitation of human vision—Effect— Eye-witnesses claimed to have seen a quadruple murder from a distance of approximately half a kilometer—Held, such claims were scientifically implausible—Supreme Court cited modern research establishing that even individuals with normal or above-average eyesight cannot reliably identify culprits or observe specific details beyond 40 meters—Testimonies made from such an extended distance, unsupported by visual clarity, were considered unreliable—Benefit of doubt was extended on this basis—Conviction set aside. ----Reference: • Nyman, Lampinen, Antfolk, Korkman & Santtila (2019), Law and Human Behavior Journal • Iftikhar Hussain v. State 2004 SCMR 1185 (b) Criminal trial— ----Benefit of doubt—Unreliable ocular account—Acquittal of co-accused—Lack of corroboration—Effect— Three co-accused with similar roles had been acquitted in separate proceedings—Held, where eye-witnesses were disbelieved against co-accused attributed effective firing, same testimonies could not be relied upon against appellant without independent corroboration—No such corroboration forthcoming in the case—Supreme Court reiterated settled law that consistent discrediting of witnesses in respect of one accused undermines their reliability for others similarly placed—Appeal allowed. (c) Evidence— ----Credibility of witnesses—Burden of proof—Requirement of proving prosecution case beyond reasonable doubt—Effect of scientific evidence— Witness credibility was undermined by scientific and legal standards demonstrating the physical impossibility of perceiving detailed occurrences from 500 meters—Held, prosecution failed to discharge burden of proof—Where circumstances raise doubt in the minds of reasonable persons, benefit must be extended to the accused—Conviction not sustainable. ----Disposition: Appeal allowed; conviction and sentence set aside; appellant acquitted and ordered to be released.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: (a) Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997: ----S. 9(c)---Possession of narcotics---Recovery of 12 kilograms of charas concealed in vehicle---Conviction maintained, sentence reduced---Accused was apprehended with 12 kilograms of charas hidden in a secret cavity under the second seat of a Toyota Hiace vehicle---Prosecution witnesses, including the complainant and recovery officials, consistently deposed regarding the recovery---Ten representative sample parcels were collected and sent for chemical analysis, confirming the substance to be charas---However, trial court failed to de-seal and exhibit case property in open court in terms of proper evidentiary protocols, raising procedural concerns---Held, while conviction was sustainable on available evidence, sentence of life imprisonment was disproportionate given the absence of prior criminal record and infirmities in procedural handling of case property---Sentence reduced to period already undergone. Cited case: Ameer Zeb v. The State PLD 2012 SC 380 (b) Criminal trial: ----Exhibition of case property---Mandatory requirement---Failure to de-seal parcel and exhibit recovered packets of contraband in open court---Held, trial court presumed contents of sealed parcel (Exh.P1) contained narcotics without de-sealing or marking individual packets in public view---Such presumption undermines evidentiary value---Proper exhibition of case property in open court is essential for identification and reference throughout proceedings and appellate review. Cited cases: • Amjad Saddique v. The State 2016 PCrLJ 1800 (Lahore) • Aziz Ullah v. Muhammad Haneef PLD 2018 Lahore 132 (c) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898): ----S. 342---Failure to confront accused with chemical examiner’s report---Held, non-confrontation of material evidence (i.e., forensic report confirming presence of charas) with the accused in statement under S. 342, Cr.P.C., is a procedural lapse---While not fatal in light of other corroborative evidence, such lapse must be considered in determining appropriateness of sentence. (d) Narcotic recovery---Chain of custody and compliance: ----Sample dispatch and forensic confirmation---Held, sample parcels were promptly separated, sealed, and dispatched to chemical examiner the following day---Chain of custody and integrity of samples remained intact---Chemical examiner confirmed presence of charas in all ten sample parcels---Prosecution's chain-of-custody compliance was adequate and supported conviction. (e) Criminal trial: ----Conscious possession---Failure to establish ownership of vehicle---Accused was driving vehicle at the time of interception but no documentary evidence produced to establish his ownership or direct connection with vehicle or secret cavity where narcotics were found---Held, while accused’s custody of vehicle supported inference of knowledge, prosecution’s failure to investigate vehicle ownership weakened proof of conscious possession. **(f) Sentencing---Mitigation---First offender---Quantum of sentence---Accused had no previous criminal record and prosecution failed to connect him with alleged drug kingpin Momin Khan---Held, sentence of life imprisonment not justified in absence of aggravating factors or proven conspiracy---Appellant’s sentence reduced to term already undergone including default imprisonment on fine. ---Disposition: Appeal dismissed as to conviction---Sentence reduced to period already undergone.