Summary: (Criminal Misc: Bail Petition) (a) Criminal Procedure Code, 1898.S.497(1) 3rd proviso (b)—bail grant of—The petitioner was in the judicial lockup for more than three years and for considering bail plea on the ground of statutory delay in conclusion of trial is to be reckoned from the date of arrest of the petitioner. The period which elapsed during proceedings/trial in the wrong forum and thereafter the time/period consumed in appeals could not be counted towards the petitioner as he was pursuing his legal right in all the fora. (b) S.497(1) 3rd proviso (b)—bail grant of—The period of one year or two years, as the case may be, for the conclusion of the trial begins from the date of the detention of the accused and not from the date when the charge was framed and trial commenced. (c) S.497(1) 3rd proviso (b)—bail grant of—The statutory right to be released on bail under 3rd proviso to Section 497, Cr.P.C. is not merely a statutory right but also stands firmly on constitutional guarantees under Articles 4, 9 and 10-A of the Constitution, under which an accused like any other citizen enjoys the protection of law and to be treated in accordance with law. (d) S.497(1) 3rd proviso (b)—bail grant of—The right of accused to be enlarged on bail under the third proviso to Section 497(1) of the Code is a statutory right which cannot be denied under the discretionary power of the Court to grant bail. (Petition was allowed and the petitioner was granted bail in the circumstances)

Summary: Law does not permit the Court to pick and choose a sentence from the entire evidence and base its decision while reading only that sentence in favour of the appellant, in isolation to the remaining evidence available on record. We are sanguine that the Federal and Provincial Governments are conscious of their duty to take necessary steps for implementation of Article 251 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, in the light of directions given by the Supreme Court of Pakistan in case reported as "Muhammad Kokab Iqbal and another vs. Government of Pakistan through Secretary Cabinet Division, Islamabad and others" (PLD 2015 Supreme Court 1210). Most of the witnesses in the Province of Punjab give their evidence in Urdu, which the accused can also easily understand, for the reason, if the evidence of a witness dictated by the Presiding Officer in English is simultaneously translated in Urdu, it shall become convenient for the Presiding Officer to comply with the provisions of Section 360 Cr.P.C. as well. This practice shall definitely reduce the chance of any violation of the right of fair trial given to the parties in terms of Article 10-A of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973. All the learned Judges of Sessions Courts and Special Courts in the Province of Punjab shall ensure that whenever the evidence of a witness is recorded in English, its translation in Urdu shall be reduced into writing simultaneously at the same sitting as well as in the presence of witness(es), accused and the Presiding Officer and then the provisions contained in Section 360, Cr.P.C. shall also be adhered to in letter and spirit so that if any ambiguity in the evidence recorded in English comes on the surface of record, the same can be then and there removed in the light of translation of evidence in Urdu.

Summary: (a) Insurance Ordinance, 2000: ----S. 124(2), S. 118(2)---Crop Loan Insurance---Calamity-hit area---Liability of insurer--- Appeal filed against Insurance Tribunal’s decision awarding Rs.131,000 to respondent for crop loss due to 2014 floods—Respondent had obtained agricultural loan from Zarai Taraqiati Bank (ZTBL), which was compulsorily insured under Crop Loan Insurance Scheme by Adamjee Insurance as per SBP directives—Flood in Moza Maasan led to destruction of crops and livestock—Government of Punjab officially declared the area as "calamity affected" vide Notification dated 25.09.2014—Appellant failed to deny liability with credible evidence and did not prove that the claim had been settled—Insurance Tribunal rightly held respondent entitled to compensation for Kharif 2014 season along with 5% liquidated damages from October 2014 under S. 118(2)—High Court upheld Tribunal’s findings and dismissed appeal. Cited Case: Pakistan through Chairman FBR v. Hazrat Hussain (2018 SCMR 939). (b) Law of Evidence: ----Public documents---Presumption of correctness---Admissibility without formal proof--- Court held that documents issued by public authorities (such as calamity notification) and record from insurance company files are presumed correct unless specifically rebutted—Objection to admissibility of such documents for want of formal proof was rejected—Judicial notice of official notifications permissible under law—Evidence Act and general jurisprudence affirm presumption of accuracy for government-issued notifications and public records. (c) Civil Procedure Code, 1908: ----O. VII R. 11---Application for rejection of claim---Scope--- Appellant’s application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC for dismissal of insurance claim was rightly dismissed—Claim disclosed triable questions requiring evidence—Rule applies only where suit is barred by law on face of pleadings—Tribunal had jurisdiction to proceed and evaluate evidence. (d) Judicial Policy: ----Frivolous departmental appeals---Discouragement by Supreme Court--- Court reminded that public sector entities should avoid routine appeals which waste judicial resources and taxpayer funds—SC guidance in Hazrat Hussain case reiterated—Held, Adamjee Insurance, having failed to conclusively refute liability or produce banking record, had no basis to file appeal merely to delay or deny a small, lawful claim. ----Disposition: Appeal dismissed. Judgment of Insurance Tribunal affirmed. No costs awarded. ----Quote: Availing of loan facility against mortgage of agricultural land, which loan was compulsorily got insured with the Insurance Company by the Bank against paid premium by the insured. The crops were badly affected due to heavy flood upon which it was declared calamity hit area by the government. Insurance claim filed but the Insurance Company denied payment of said claim on the ground that Insurance Policy was obtained through Bank and insured has no right to directly lodge insurance claim. Held that Bank has compulsorily got its advanced amount of loan on payment of premium by the loanee. Thus the said insured person is entitled to receive the insurance claim from the Insurance Company. The appeal of Insurance Company stood dismissed.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan: —-Art. 199 Maintainability of constitutional petition—Alternate remedy—Appeal under S.14 of the Family Courts Act, 1964 was dismissed for non-prosecution—Petitioner invoked constitutional jurisdiction instead of seeking restoration from appellate court—Held, High Court’s jurisdiction under Article 199 cannot be invoked where an efficacious alternate remedy exists—Petitioner was obligated to approach the appellate court with an application for restoration—Extraordinary constitutional jurisdiction is not a substitute for available procedural remedies. Disposition: Petition dismissed as not maintainable; petitioner allowed to approach appellate court for restoration of appeal. ----Cited Cases: • Muhammad Tabish Naeem Khan v. ADJ, Lahore (2014 SCMR 1365) • Muhammad Arshad Anjum v. Mst. Khursheed Begum (2021 SCMR 1145) • PLD 2025 Lahore 249 (Mst. Misbah Iftikhar v. Mst. Aleesa) • Mandihassan alias Mehdi Hussain v. Muhammad Arif (PLD 2015 SC 137) • Ghulam Qadir v. Abdul Wadood (PLD 2016 SC 712) (b) Family Courts Act, 1964: —-Ss. 14, 17, 26; Family Courts Rules, 1965, Rr. 12, 13, 22 Restoration of appeal—Scope—Act and Rules silent on procedure to restore appeals dismissed in default—However, appellate court has inherent power to do so on sufficient cause being shown—Despite exclusion of CPC under S.17, courts may borrow procedural guidance where Act is silent—Dismissal and restoration of appeals not expressly provided, but permissible under inherent jurisdiction to prevent miscarriage of justice—Family Courts not bound by CPC but not barred from applying it analogically. Principle: Absence of express procedure does not preclude appellate forum from restoring appeal under its inherent jurisdiction. (c) Civil Procedure Code, 1908: —-S. 115; Orders IX & XLI Inherent powers—Exclusion under special statutes—CPC not directly applicable to family matters, but courts can invoke its spirit when no express bar exists—Family and appellate courts may draw analogy from CPC to fill procedural gaps—Particularly relevant where statutory silence would otherwise hinder access to justice. Cited Case: Mandihassan alias Mehdi Hussain v. Muhammad Arif (PLD 2015 SC 137) Principle: Even where CPC is excluded, courts retain inherent jurisdiction to dismiss and restore proceedings to prevent abuse of process. (d) Judicial review —-Constitutional bar—Judicial restraint—Exercise of High Court’s constitutional powers is conditional upon absence of alternate adequate remedy—Petitioner failed to seek statutory relief before invoking Article 199—Court reiterated principle of judicial restraint and channeling disputes through proper statutory forums before entertaining constitutional petitions. Principle: Constitutional petitions are not maintainable where procedural or statutory remedies remain unexhausted. ----Quote: An appellate court dealing with an appeal under Section 14 of the Act, 1964 not only is vested with the inherent power to dismiss the appeal for non-prosecution but it can also restore the same on showing sufficient cause by the appellant if his appeal has been dismissed on account of default.

Summary: Law does not permit the Court to pick and choose a sentence from the entire evidence and base its decision while reading only that sentence in favour of the appellant, in isolation to the remaining evidence available on record. We are sanguine that the Federal and Provincial Governments are conscious of their duty to take necessary steps for implementation of Article 251 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, in the light of directions given by the Supreme Court of Pakistan in case reported as "Muhammad Kokab Iqbal and another vs. Government of Pakistan through Secretary Cabinet Division, Islamabad and others" (PLD 2015 Supreme Court 1210). Most of the witnesses in the Province of Punjab give their evidence in Urdu, which the accused can also easily understand, for the reason, if the evidence of a witness dictated by the Presiding Officer in English is simultaneously translated in Urdu, it shall become convenient for the Presiding Officer to comply with the provisions of Section 360 Cr.P.C. as well. This practice shall definitely reduce the chance of any violation of the right of fair trial given to the parties in terms of Article 10-A of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973. All the learned Judges of Sessions Courts and Special Courts in the Province of Punjab shall ensure that whenever the evidence of a witness is recorded in English, its translation in Urdu shall be reduced into writing simultaneously at the same sitting as well as in the presence of witness(es), accused and the Presiding Officer and then the provisions contained in Section 360, Cr.P.C. shall also be adhered to in letter and spirit so that if any ambiguity in the evidence recorded in English comes on the surface of record, the same can be then and there removed in the light of translation of evidence in Urdu.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Limitation to file appeal against acquittal is 30 days ----- (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860) ----Ss. 302(b), 324, 148 & 149—Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), Ss. 417(2-A), 374, 342—Benefit of doubt—Appreciation of evidence—Acquittal—Standard of proof in criminal trial Muhammad Ejaz alias Mithoo Shah and Muhammad Zulqarnain alias Zulli (appellants) were convicted under S. 302(b) PPC—One sentenced to death, the other to life imprisonment—Trial court acquitted co-accused Aamir Shahzad and Mulazim Hussain—On appeal, High Court observed that multiple material discrepancies rendered the prosecution case doubtful: (i) FIR time manipulated and actual time of incident unclear; (ii) complainant did not witness incident but falsely projected as eyewitness; (iii) independent eyewitnesses were chance witnesses from another village and gave no plausible explanation for presence at the scene; (iv) they made material improvements in their testimony not recorded in their earlier police statements; (v) motive remained unsubstantiated and was not directed against the deceased; (vi) medical evidence and recovery did not corroborate ocular version; and (vii) ballistic report excluded possibility of crime empties matching recovered weapons—Held, the prosecution failed to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt—In criminal law, benefit of doubt must be extended to accused even if there is a single reason creating doubt as per settled principles—Conviction and sentences were set aside, and both appellants acquitted—Murder Reference not confirmed. (b) Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 ----Art. 129(g)—Withholding of best evidence—Non-production of injured eyewitness and key witnesses—Adverse inference Despite asserting presence of injured witness (Zia-ur-Rehman), prosecution failed to produce him in court—No explanation offered—High Court drew adverse inference under Art. 129(g) QSO—Non-production of crucial evidence presumed to be detrimental to prosecution. (c) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) ----S. 417(2-A)—Appeal against acquittal—Limitation—Condonation of delay—Scope and bar under Limitation Act, 1908 Complainant’s Criminal Appeal No. 32181/2023 against acquittal of co-accused was filed after a delay of 19 months and 15 days—Held, S. 417(2-A) Cr.P.C. prescribes a 30-day limitation for such appeals—S. 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908, is inapplicable by virtue of S. 29(2) of the Act—No sufficient cause shown for condonation—Appeal and delay application dismissed. (d) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) ----S. 321—Criminal Revision—Enhancement of sentence—Effect of acquittal In light of acquittal of Muhammad Zulqarnain alias Zulli, Criminal Revision No. 32182/2023 filed by complainant for enhancement of sentence became infructuous and was dismissed accordingly. Cited Cases: • Muhammad Ilyas v. Muhammad Abid alias Billa (2017 SCMR 54) • Ghaus Muhammad v. The State (1979 SCMR 579) • Muhammad Ramzan v. The State (2025 SCMR 762) • Naveed Asghar v. The State (PLD 2021 SC 600) • Muhammad Ashraf v. The State (2019 SCMR 652) • Sardar Bibi v. Munir Ahmed (2017 SCMR 344) • Muhammad Nasir Butt v. The State (2025 SCMR 662) • Umer Hayat v. The State (PLD 1995 SC 526) • Mursal Kazmi v. The State (2009 SCMR 1410) • Ayub Masih v. The State (PLD 2002 SC 1048) • Sarfraz v. The State (2023 SCMR 670) • Muhammad Rafique v. The State (PLJ 2011 SC 191) Disposition: – Criminal Appeals No. 57018 & 57020 of 2021 allowed; appellants acquitted. – Murder Reference No. 146 of 2021 answered in the negative; death sentence not confirmed. – Criminal Revision No. 32182 of 2023 dismissed as infructuous. – Criminal Appeal No. 32181 of 2023 dismissed being barred by limitation.

Summary: The incident in this case took place on 12.06.2019, examination in chief of Muhammad Adeel (PW-2) as well as Ghulam Ali (PW-3) was recorded on 20.10.2020. However, cross-examination over Muhammad Adeel (PW-2) was recorded on 16.06.2021, whereas cross-examination upon Ghulam Ali (PW-3) was recorded on 08.06.2021. It is relevant to mention that with the passage of time human memory fails regarding any particular event and the facts cannot be reiterated in the photographic manner, particularly when in this case occurrence took place in the year 2019, examination in chief of PWs was recorded in the year 2020 and cross-examination was conducted in the year 2021. Then, mere slip of tongue of any matter by such witness cannot destroy evidentiary value of their testimony and their evidence cannot be considered unreliable on this score.

Summary: The concept of trust envisages that one person (the settlor), while relying on another (the trustee) and reposing special confidence in him, entrusts property or assets to him. There is a fiduciary relationship between the two in law. In this context, Section 405 PPC defines criminal breach of trust as follows: "405. Criminal breach of trust.? Whoever, being in any manner entrusted with property, or with any dominion over property, dishonestly misappropriates or converts to his own use that property, or dishonestly uses or disposes of that property, in violation of any direction of law prescribing the mode in which such trust is to be discharged, or of any legal contract, express or implied, which he has made touching the discharge of such trust, or willfully suffers any other person so to do, commits criminal breach of trust." The necessary ingredients of criminal breach of trust under the above provision are, (i) the accused must be entrusted with property or dominion over it, and (ii) he must have dishonestly misappropriated the property or converted it to his own use, or disposed of it in violation of the trust. The general punishment is provided under Section 406 PPC, whereas aggravated forms of the offence are addressed under Sections 407 to 409 PPC. 5. The first condition under Section 405 PPC involves three key elements, entrustment, dominion, and property. "Entrustment" refers to the transfer of possession for a specific purpose without conferring ownership. "Dominion" implies control or authority over the property. The term "property" is used broadly and should not be confined to movable assets alone. However, the presence of "entrustment" and "dominion" must be assessed in the context of the relationship between the parties and the nature of the property allegedly misappropriated. Notably, a breach of trust can only occur if the property belongs to someone other than the accused. 6. The ingredients necessary to constitute an offence under Section 408 PPC are not reflected in the contents of the crime report. A master-servant relationship between the complainant and the petitioner, and the question of whether any entrustment of property actually took place, are factual issues that can only be determined after recording of evidence during the trial.

Summary: "Civil servants cannot be given liberty to invoke constitutional jurisdiction of High Court in matters relating to terms and conditions of their service in the garb of challenging laws/notifications, in presence of Article 212 of the Constitution and rider "no other adequate remedy" provided in Article 199 of the Constitution" ---- (a) Constitution of Pakistan ----Arts. 199 & 212—Maintainability—Constitutional petition—Service matters—Challenge to vires of amendments in law, notifications, and service rules by members of Punjab Criminal Prosecution Service—Held, petitioners, being civil servants under the Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974, are barred from invoking jurisdiction of High Court under Article 199 for redress of grievances relating to terms and conditions of service—Exclusive jurisdiction lies with Punjab Service Tribunal under Article 212 of the Constitution—Bar under Article 212 remains applicable even where vires of law, mala fides, or jurisdictional defects are alleged—Constitutional jurisdiction cannot be invoked by merely asserting violation of fundamental rights where matter essentially pertains to service terms—Held further, harmonious interpretation requires enforcement of service-related grievances through tribunal mechanism to preserve uniformity and avoid forum shopping. (b) Punjab Criminal Prosecution Service (Constitution, Functions and Powers) Act, 2006 ----S. 18(2)—Definition of public servant—Scope—Petitioners contended that they are public servants and not civil servants—Held, though prosecutors are declared public servants under S. 18(2) of the Act for purposes of Pakistan Penal Code, their terms of service are regulated under the Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974 and Rules framed thereunder—Thus, they fall within the category of civil servants for the purposes of service jurisdiction—“Public servant” is a broader term that includes civil servants, but not all public servants are civil servants. (c) Service Tribunals Act, 1973 ----S. 4—Jurisdiction—Scope—Held, where a statutory rule, order or notification affects terms and conditions of service of a civil servant, it constitutes a final order challengeable before the Service Tribunal—Petitioner cannot bypass tribunal jurisdiction by challenging vires of rule/law or alleging violation of fundamental rights—Relied on I.A. Sharwani v. Government of Pakistan (1991 SCMR 1041) and Muhammad Hassanullah v. Chief Secretary, Balochistan (2025 SCMR 134). (d) Interpretation of Constitution and Statutes ----Art. 212 vs. Art. 199—Overriding effect—Held, Article 212 is a special provision and overrides Article 199 where service matters are concerned—High Court's jurisdiction is ousted in matters exclusively triable by the Service Tribunal—Attempt to invoke constitutional jurisdiction by terming service grievances as constitutional violations is impermissible—Relied on Ali Azhar Khan Baloch v. Province of Sindh (2015 SCMR 456) and National Assembly Secretariat v. Manzoor Ahmed (2015 SCMR 253). (e) Punjab Criminal Prosecution Service (Conditions of Service) Rules, 2007 ----R. 10—Applicability—Held, recruitment and service conditions of prosecutors are governed under the Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974 through express provision in Rules 2007—Hence, they are civil servants with exclusive remedy before Service Tribunal. Disposition: Petition dismissed. Constitutional petition held not maintainable due to bar under Article 212 of the Constitution. Petitioners directed to seek remedy before Punjab Service Tribunal.