Summary: Acquittal granted ---- (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)----S. 376(3) & S. 83----Juvenile accused---Rape---Assessment of criminal capacity---Presumption of doli incapax---Standard of maturity under S.83 PPC---Held, prosecution must establish that child offender understood both the nature and penal consequences of the act---No effort made by trial court or prosecution to assess petitioner's maturity or rebut statutory presumption---Absence of psychological evaluation renders conviction unsafe---Petitioner, aged 13 at time of occurrence, not shown to possess criminal maturity to justify conviction under S.376 PPC---Conviction set aside. The Supreme Court held that Section 83 PPC introduces a rebuttable presumption that a child between ten and fourteen years lacks criminal capacity unless it is proven otherwise. In the instant case, no meaningful inquiry was conducted into the petitioner’s cognitive understanding of the nature or legal consequences of the act. The trial proceeded in a mechanical manner without any psychological assessment, in disregard of Pakistan’s obligations under the UNCRC and the protections envisaged under the Juvenile Justice System Act, 2018. The Court emphasized that in the absence of any rebuttal to the statutory presumption under Section 83 PPC, the conviction was unsustainable. (b) Constitution of Pakistan, 1973----Arts. 25(2), 35----Protection of children---Juvenile justice---State's obligation to protect minors---Interpretation in light of UNCRC and domestic legislation---Held, JJSA, 2018 is not decorative but a binding statutory commitment to treat juveniles with care, dignity, and developmental sensitivity---Children are not little adults---Trial court failed to uphold the reformative purpose of juvenile justice laws. The Court reaffirmed the constitutional duty of the State under Articles 25(2) and 35 to protect children and to enact special provisions for their welfare. Referring to the UNCRC and General Comment No. 24 (2019), the Court stressed that cognitive and emotional immaturity in juveniles necessitates a distinct justice approach. The Juvenile Justice System Act, 2018 was recognized as a substantive law that mandates child-sensitive treatment of juvenile offenders, which was absent in the petitioner’s trial. (c) Criminal trial----Appreciation of evidence---Contradictions in ocular account---Unexplained delay in medical examination---Failure to collect forensic evidence---Held, serious doubts arose due to inconsistent statements of eyewitnesses, contradictions with victim’s testimony, and absence of medical or forensic corroboration---Prosecution failed to establish case beyond reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court observed glaring inconsistencies in the prosecution’s case. Witnesses gave contradictory accounts regarding pursuit of the accused, and the victim’s own testimony negated the claim that she raised cries heard by the eyewitnesses. No independent witness from the locality was produced. The medical examination, conducted 30 hours after the incident, did not reveal injuries usually consistent with minor sexual assault. No semen was found, no potency test conducted, and no circumstantial evidence was recovered. These deficiencies created reasonable doubt entitling the accused to acquittal. (d) Criminal jurisprudence----Benefit of doubt---Presumption of innocence---Held, conviction cannot be sustained solely on heinousness of the charge---When doubts arise from prosecution’s own evidence, accused must be acquitted---Courts below erred by failing to properly evaluate material contradictions. The Court reiterated the foundational principle that the prosecution must prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt. It held that despite the gravity of the offence, the contradictions in evidence, failure to collect supporting material, and lack of legal safeguards for the juvenile rendered the conviction legally unsound. The benefit of doubt must always go to the accused. (e) Juvenile Justice System Act (XXII of 2018)----Ss. 15 & Preamble----Trial of juvenile offenders---Requirement of reformative approach---Improper conduct of trial---Held, child was handcuffed, age not recorded, no psychological inquiry conducted---Such procedural lapses violate the spirit of JJSA and international law---Directions issued for circulation of judgment among all Juvenile Courts. The Supreme Court condemned the handcuffing of the minor and failure to record his age in the charge-sheet, terming it a violation of statutory and constitutional safeguards. It emphasized that all criminal forums must treat age documentation as mandatory. The judgment was directed to be circulated to all Juvenile Courts for strict guidance and compliance. Disposition: Petition converted to appeal and allowed; conviction and sentence set aside; petitioner acquitted of charge and ordered to be released forthwith. Cited Law & Instruments: Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, Ss. 83 & 376(3) Juvenile Justice System Act, 2018, Ss. 15 & Preamble Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, Arts. 25(2), 35 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) General Comment No. 24 (2019) by UN Committee on the Rights of the Child

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan----Arts. 175A, 191A & 184(3)----Supreme Court (Practice & Procedure) Act, 2023----Constitutional Benches (‘CBs’)---Transfer of pending matters---Precedence of Constitution over Supreme Court Rules. ---- Twenty-Sixth Constitutional Amendment altered the judicature by inserting Art.191A, under which Constitutional Benches of the Supreme Court are constituted from Judges nominated by the Judicial Commission of Pakistan (JCP). Sub-Art. (3) vests exclusive jurisdiction in CBs over specified constitutional matters, while sub-Art. (5) provides that all petitions, appeals or review applications in such matters, pending or filed before commencement of the amendment, stand transferred to CBs and “shall only” be heard and decided by them. This automatic transfer operates by force of the Constitution and does not require any judicial order. Where Art.191A(3)–(5) is attracted, benches other than CBs have no jurisdiction in those matters. Any provision of the Supreme Court Rules, 1980, including Order XXVI, r.8, must yield to the constitutional mandate in case of inconsistency. (b) Supreme Court Rules, 1980----O.XXVI, R.8----“As far as practicable”----Fixing review before the same bench---Effect of Art.191A. Order XXVI, r.8 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1980 provides that, “as far as practicable”, a review application shall be posted before the same bench that delivered the judgment sought to be reviewed, to ensure continuity and consistency. This directive is conditioned by practicability. After the Twenty-Sixth Amendment and insertion of Art.191A, only Judges nominated by the JCP can constitute CBs and exercise jurisdiction under Art.184(3) in the specified class of cases. Six members of the original SIC bench were not nominated to the CB; the constitutional committee therefore lacked power to include them. In these circumstances, it was not “practicable” within the meaning of O.XXVI, r.8 to fix the civil review petitions before the same bench, and the constitutional scheme under Art.191A necessarily prevailed. Cited Case: • Dewan Motors (Pvt.) Ltd. PLD 2025 SC 394 (c) Constitution of Pakistan----Art.191A(1)----Judicial Commission of Pakistan----Scope of nomination power---Possibility of restoring original bench constitution. Art.191A(1) empowers the JCP to nominate such Judges of the Supreme Court, and for such term, as it may determine. There is no bar against nominating all Judges, including those who sat on the original bench, even for a limited purpose such as hearing specified review petitions. It was therefore constitutionally possible to request the JCP to expand the panel of nominated Judges to include all members of the original SIC bench, thereby enabling the constitutional committee to reconstitute a bench mirroring the original one and fully giving effect to O.XXVI, r.8 within the constitutional framework. The suggestion to refer the matter to the JCP in this manner, aimed at enhancing public confidence and judicial continuity, was not accepted by the majority of the CB, who chose instead to proceed with the review using only the Judges already nominated. (d) Constitution of Pakistan----Art.188----Supreme Court Rules, 1980, O.XXVI, R.8----Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, O.XLVII, R.1----Review jurisdiction---Grounds---Error apparent on the face of record---Scope. Under Art.188 of the Constitution, as regulated by O.XXVI, r.8 of the Supreme Court Rules and O.XLVII, r.1 CPC, review lies on limited grounds: discovery of new and important matter or evidence not available despite due diligence; mistake or error apparent on the face of the record; or other sufficient reason of a substantial and compelling character. Review is not an appeal in disguise and does not permit re-arguing the case to obtain a different outcome. Correctable error may be factual, constitutional or legal—such as misunderstanding or overlooking crucial facts, misinterpreting constitutional provisions, or misapplying legal rules—where the consequence is serious injustice or miscarriage of justice. The primary responsibility to identify and correct such errors rests with the Judges who rendered the judgment under review. (e) Elections----Constitution of Pakistan----Arts.17, 51(6)(d) & (e)----Election Act, 2017, Ss.2(xxviii), 68----Election Rules, 2017, rr.56, 94----Role of Returning Officers (ROs) and ECP----Party affiliation in nomination papers and Form-33----Refusal of symbol and “independent” status---Effect. For General Elections 2024, candidates filed nomination papers declaring party affiliation or independence. Under s.68 of the Election Act, 2017 read with r.56 of the Election Rules, 2017, ROs were bound to prepare Form-33 strictly on the basis of declarations in nomination papers; neither candidates nor ROs are empowered to alter those declarations once finalized. Thirty-nine candidates had declared themselves as PTI candidates in their nomination papers, yet ROs, relying on an Explanation to r.94 and refusal of a common electoral symbol, treated them as independents in Form-33. This action, adopted later by the ECP in allocation of reserved seats, constituted mis-exercise of jurisdiction, conflicted with Art.17 of the Constitution and s.2(xxviii) of the Act, and infringed constitutional rights of PTI, its candidates and voters to reserved seats under Art.51(6)(d) & (e). Refusal of an election symbol does not disenfranchise a political party nor extinguish its entitlement to reserved seats where candidates have contested as its nominees. The majority finding (with which this opinion concurs) that the 39 returned candidates were PTI-affiliated and that PTI retained its status and rights was therefore in conformity with the Constitution and law and disclosed no reviewable error. (f) Elections----Constitution of Pakistan----Arts.51(6)(d), 63A(1) & 187----Independent returned candidates joining a political party----Jurisdictional limits of “complete justice” power----Error in earlier judgment regarding 41 seats. Forty-one candidates had themselves declared “independent” in their nomination papers and were so reflected in Form-33. They never disputed this status before the ROs, the ECP, the Peshawar High Court, or the Supreme Court, nor did they challenge their subsequent decision to join the Sunni Ittehad Council or SIC’s claim for reserved seats. The contention that “peculiar circumstances” arising from a later Supreme Court judgment had compelled them to file as independents was unsupported by any evidence or appearance on their part, especially as many other candidates, including the 39, had contested as PTI nominees. To that extent, the ROs correctly listed the 41 as independents. After election, the 41 exercised their constitutional right under Art.51(6)(d) by joining SIC. In the original SIC judgment, the majority, invoking Art.187, declared these 41 as independents (which they already were) but further granted them a fresh option to join any political party within fifteen days. This Court has consistently held that once a member is elected as a party candidate or, having been elected independently, joins a party, he cannot subsequently leave that party or join another without attracting Art.63A(1) consequences. No authority, including the Court, can change a candidate’s status contrary to his declared position in nomination papers. Article 187 permits this Court to do complete justice only in matters “pending” before it. No matter concerning re-designation or fresh choice of party for those 41 members was pending, nor had such relief been sought. The majority’s earlier declaration granting them a new option to join another party thus exceeded jurisdiction under Art.187, ignored the scheme of Arts.51(6)(d) and 63A(1), and rested on presumptions unsupported by record—amounting to constitutional, legal and factual error apparent on the face of the record. To that extent, the judgment under review could not be sustained and was liable to be reviewed. (g) Elections----Reserved seats for women and non-Muslims----Proportional representation----Duty of ECP----Effect of RO/ECP illegality on PTI’s share. Under Art.51(6)(d) & (e) of the Constitution, reserved seats must be allocated through proportional representation on the basis of party lists, according to the total general seats secured by each political party from the relevant Province. The ECP was constitutionally obliged to allocate reserved seats in accordance with this system, irrespective of any specific request by a party. By treating the 39 declared PTI candidates as independents and refusing to allocate reserved seats to PTI on that basis, the ROs and ECP deprived the party, its candidates and the electorate of their constitutional entitlement. This illegality warranted correction under Art.187 in the main proceedings and did not furnish any ground for review regarding the 39 seats. (h) Review petitions----Sunni Ittehad Council case----Differing positions within the Bench----Per Jamal Khan Mandokhail, J (separate opinion). In light of the limited scope of review and the findings that (i) the original majority judgment was correct regarding the 39 PTI-affiliated returned candidates, but (ii) disclosed constitutional, legal and factual error in relation to the 41 independent returned candidates, the review petitions were, in the opinion of Jamal Khan Mandokhail, J, to be dismissed to the extent of the 39 seats and allowed to the extent of the 41 seats. The short order dated 27.06.2025, however, records that by majority of 7 Judges the civil review petitions were allowed in entirety, setting aside the impugned majority judgment of 12.07.2024 and restoring the judgment of the Peshawar High Court; Mandokhail, J partly allowed the review (maintaining the original order on 39 seats and reviewing the judgment only to the extent of 41 seats), while two other Judges (Muhammad Ali Mazhar and Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi, JJ) adopted a further distinct course by directing the ECP to undertake a de novo factual examination of all 80 returned candidates for the purpose of allocation of reserved seats. Disposition (per Jamal Khan Mandokhail, J): Civil review petitions partly allowed; majority judgment in the SIC case maintained as to the 39 PTI-affiliated seats but reviewed and set aside as to the 41 independent seats. The short order of 27.06.2025, however, reflects that by majority the review petitions were allowed in full and the Peshawar High Court judgment was restored.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan ---- Art. 184(3), Arts. 199, 17, 218(3), 225 & 187 --- Review jurisdiction of Supreme Court --- Allocation of reserved seats to political parties --- Scope and limitations --- Role of Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) --- Maintainability and scope of judicial review --- Restoration of High Court judgment. Review petitions were filed against the Supreme Court’s majority judgment dated 12.07.2024, which had set aside the Peshawar High Court judgment and directed allocation of reserved seats in favour of the Sunni Ittehad Council (SIC). A reconstituted larger Bench comprising 10 judges, after recusal of one member and earlier dismissal of the petitions by two judges, heard the review petitions. By majority of 7 to 3, the Supreme Court allowed the review petitions, set aside the earlier majority judgment, and restored the judgment of the Peshawar High Court. Consequently, Civil Appeals No. 333 & 334 of 2024 filed by SIC were dismissed. Majority held that allocation of reserved seats required strict adherence to the principles laid down under the Constitution and the Elections Act, 2017, and that the judgment rendered earlier did not withstand judicial scrutiny under review jurisdiction. Justice Jamal Khan Mandokhail partly allowed the review petitions, maintaining allocation of 39 seats but differing on 41 seats, thereby partially departing from the original majority judgment. Justice Muhammad Ali Mazhar and Justice Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi also allowed the review petitions with directions to the Election Commission of Pakistan to conduct a de novo examination of the returned candidates' nomination papers and declarations regarding party affiliation for all 80 seats, and to decide the matter afresh within 15 days. Court observed that questions of fact and affiliation could not be conclusively resolved by the High Court or the Supreme Court in its original or review jurisdiction, hence the matter should be examined by the ECP as the competent authority under the Constitution and relevant laws. Disposition: Civil Review Petitions allowed by majority; earlier judgment dated 12.07.2024 set aside; Civil Appeals dismissed; Peshawar High Court judgment restored; ECP directed to conduct fresh scrutiny for seat allocation within 15 days.

Summary: Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 ("the Act") clearly envisages that any transfer of immovable property made by a party to a pending suit concerning the said property is subject to the outcome of that suit. In this manner, this provision safeguards the litigating parties (the respondent in present case) against transfers designed to frustrate or circumvent the Court's adjudication. However, where the actual possessor or transferee (the petitioners in present case), who acquired possession or title during the pendency of the suit, is excluded from the proceedings, such omission may constitute a fundamental procedural and substantive defect inasmuch as non-joinder of such a necessary party not only violates the principles of natural justice but it also exposes any decree passed in such suit to vulnerability. The decree, in the absence of such a party, cannot conclusively bind the transferee and remains open to challenge on grounds of fraud or collusion, particularly through recourse to Section 12(2), Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 or by way of objections in the execution proceedings. This vulnerability is rooted in Section 52 of the Act itself as enforcement of a decree against the actual possessor?who purchased the property during the suit's pendency?necessarily requires the plaintiff (the respondent in present case) to establish that the decree was not procured collusively or by fraudulent means, therefore, the petitioners were necessary party and the Revisional Court below erred in non-suiting them while delving into merits of the case and undertaking appraisal of evidence available on record while the trial is still pending by observing that there exists a possibility of connivance between the petitioners or their vendors and Eden Developers ? defendants in the main suit and petitioners in the connected matter. Petitions allowed. 350Crl. Appeal- Against Conviction- PPC 1096-24 SAEED AKHTAR VS STATE ETC Mr. Justice Sardar Akbar Ali 26- 06- 2025 2025 LHC 4871 2026 PCr.LJ 105 [Lahore (Rawalpindi Bench)]

Summary: (a) Pakistan Penal Code (XLV of 1860) --- S. 302(b); Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) --- Ss. 382‑B, 374; Evidence evaluation—Delay in FIR, unproved motive, interested witnesses—Sentence recalibration— The deceased was attacked with hatchet and dagger; trial court and High Court affirmed convictions under S. 302(b) PPC and imposed death. Supreme Court noted a nearly ten‑hour delay in lodging the FIR, all eyewitnesses were close relatives, no independent witness supported either occurrence or recoveries, and the motive (a vague “biradari” dispute) remained unsubstantiated. Following settled precedent that absence or failure of motive in a capital case warrants mitigation, the Court upheld guilt but reduced punishment from death to imprisonment for life, extending benefit of S. 382‑B Cr.P.C. (b) International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966 --- Art. 6; ECOSOC Resolution 1984/50—“Most serious crimes” threshold— Pakistan, having withdrawn reservations to Art. 6, is bound to restrict capital punishment to the “most serious crimes” and ensure rigorous procedural safeguards. Death penalty must be “quite exceptional,” and its imposition is disproportionate where motive is unproven and evidential weaknesses subsist. The Court invoked ICCPR principles and UN Safeguards to justify commutation to life imprisonment. (c) Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 --- Arts. 4, 9 & 14—Right to life, liberty and dignity— Reinforcing Shehla Zia v. WAPDA (PLD 1994 SC 693), the Court held that domestic sentencing discretion must align with constitutional guarantees; where evidentiary defects create doubt, preservation of life prevails over capital sanction. (d) Law of Evidence—Interested testimony & recovery— Eyewitnesses were all related to the deceased; no independent corroboration of ocular account or of the alleged recovery of dagger and hatchet. Such circumstances, coupled with FIR delay, generate reasonable doubt and preclude confirmation of death sentence. Disposition: Jail petition converted to appeal and partly allowed: convictions and fine maintained; death sentences of both appellants commuted to life imprisonment with benefit of S. 382‑B Cr.P.C.; appeal dismissed to the extent of compensation/default sentence, allowed only as to quantum of punishment.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan – Art. 190 & Constitutional Duty of Compliance Failure of executive authorities to act upon binding remand orders of the High Court—Scope and implications—Held, a remand order by a superior court is not optional or subject to indefinite administrative suspension—Such orders must be complied with promptly and faithfully—Failure to do so violates the constitutional duty imposed by Art. 190, which mandates all executive and judicial authorities to act in aid of the decisions of the Supreme Court and other superior courts—Unjustified administrative inaction in the face of a valid remand order amounts to systemic non-compliance with judicial authority and undermines the rule of law. (b) Supreme Court Rules, 1980 – O. XX, R.1 – Effect of Pendency of Appeal/Petition Pendency of an appeal, revision, or constitutional petition—Effect on execution of impugned order—Held, mere pendency of proceedings before any court, including the Supreme Court, does not operate as a stay unless an express injunctive order is issued—Reference made to Supreme Court Rules, 1980, O.XX, R.1 and reaffirmed in Rashid Baig v. Muhammad Mansha (2024 SCMR 1385)—Administrative refusal to act on judicial orders citing pendency alone is impermissible and without lawful justification. (c) Administrative Law – Duty of Revenue Authorities to Comply with Judicial Remand Conduct of revenue authorities following remand by High Court—Delay of over a decade in implementation—Held, administrative inertia and disregard of clear judicial instructions constitute a disturbing pattern of non-compliance—Such conduct, especially in absence of any lawful restraint, amounts to a systemic failure in public administration—Court observed with concern that such dereliction continues despite clear judicial pronouncements against it. (d) Public Administration – Institutional Reform and Policy Measures Remedial action—Senior Member, Board of Revenue, Punjab appeared in Court and undertook to issue province-wide policy guidelines directing prompt implementation of remand orders, subject only to valid injunctive orders—Further assured the Court of regular monitoring and submission of compliance status for all pending remanded cases—Court directed finalization and circulation of such policy and required a compliance report with an updated status of all pending remanded matters to be submitted to the Registrar within three months—Held, such institutional reform is essential to uphold lawful governance and the administration of justice. (e) Civil Procedure – Disposition of Infructuous Petitions Remanded matter ultimately decided during pendency of petitions—Order dated 05.11.2024 passed by Deputy Commissioner/District Collector, Bahawalpur placed on record—Held, petitions rendered infructuous—Disposed of accordingly, with binding directions to ensure future compliance in similar cases. Cited Case: • Rashid Baig v. Muhammad Mansha 2024 SCMR 1385 Disposition: Petitions disposed of as infructuous with mandatory direction to issue and enforce policy guidelines for implementation of judicial remand orders and submit compliance report within three months.

Summary: (a) Islamic law --- Gift (Hiba) --- Essentials --- Offer, acceptance, and delivery of possession --- Proof --- Failure to prove valid oral gift --- Effect. Petitioners, legal heirs of deceased Imdad Ali, claimed title to inherited property through alleged oral and registered gift deeds. Supreme Court reaffirmed that a valid gift requires: (i) offer by the donor, (ii) acceptance by the donee, and (iii) delivery of possession. Petitioners failed to plead or prove these elements. Neither the date, time, nor place of the alleged oral gift was provided, nor were any attesting witnesses of the gift transaction produced. No cogent or confidence-inspiring evidence was led to establish offer and acceptance. The petitioners also failed to produce key evidence such as the scribe, marginal witnesses, stamp vendor, sub-registrar, or Patwari to prove the execution and attestation of the registered gift deeds. Consequently, the gift was held to be invalid, and the petitioners' claim was rejected. Cited Cases: • Bilal Hussain Shah v. Dilawar Shah PLD 2018 SC 698 • Khalid Hussain v. Nazir Ahmad 2021 SCMR 1986 • Faqir Ali v. Sakina Bibi PLD 2022 SC 85 • Mst. Ramzanu Bibi v. Ibrahim 2025 SCMR 955 • Barkat Ali v. Muhammad Ismail 2002 SCMR 1938 (b) Law of evidence --- Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 --- Arts. 129(g) & 133 --- Best evidence rule --- Withholding material witnesses --- Adverse inference --- Application. Petitioners failed to produce essential witnesses, including the scribe, attesting witnesses, and relevant revenue officials, raising an adverse presumption under Art. 129(g) of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984. Court held that in cases where a party fails to present the best available evidence, the court is justified in drawing a presumption against that party. Oral claims of gift unsupported by credible documentary or witness testimony were held insufficient. (c) Succession --- Inheritance --- Gift by ancestor to exclusion of daughters --- Burden of proof --- Reason for exclusion must be shown --- Presumption against disinheritance. The Court noted that no reason was given by the petitioners for the exclusion of daughters from the inheritance. In cases involving alleged gifts by a deceased ancestor in favour of male heirs to the exclusion of female heirs, courts must scrutinize the claim with greater care. Absence of evidence showing affection or reward-based motivation for the gift raised strong suspicion. Petitioners bore the heavy burden to justify exclusion, which they failed to discharge. (d) Pleadings and evidence --- Relief beyond pleadings --- Impermissibility --- Case to be proved within bounds of pleadings. Supreme Court reiterated that no party may lead evidence beyond its pleadings. Petitioners did not clearly plead the particulars of the alleged oral gift in their written statements and thus were barred from leading evidence in that regard. Courts below correctly refused to entertain unpleaded facts. Cited Cases: • Zulfiqar v. Shahdat Khan PLD 2007 SC 582 • Combined Investment Ltd. v. Wali Bhai PLD 2016 SC 730 • Saddaruddin v. Sultan Khan 2021 SCMR 642 (e) Limitation Act, 1908 --- Art. 120 --- Declaratory suits --- Right to sue --- When accrues --- Continuing right in suits based on inheritance. Court held that in inheritance-based declaratory suits, the right to sue is a continuing right so long as the plaintiff retains a claim over the property. Where fraud or concealment is alleged, limitation begins from the date of knowledge. Respondents in this case only discovered the fraudulent gift when attempting to obtain a revenue extract in 2009. All three courts below rightly held the suit within time under Art. 120 of the Limitation Act. Cited Case: • Mst. Ramzanu Bibi v. Ibrahim 2025 SCMR 955 (f) Civil procedure --- Concurrent findings of fact --- Scope of interference by Supreme Court --- Principles. The Supreme Court declined to interfere in concurrent findings of three courts below, holding that the judgments were based on proper appraisal of evidence and application of settled legal principles. The petitioners had failed to dislodge those findings through any legal or factual error warranting interference under Article 185(3) of the Constitution. Disposition: Leave refused. Petition dismissed. Judgments of trial court, appellate court, and High Court upheld concurrently.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan ---- Art. 212(3); Service Tribunals Act, 1973 ---- S. 5(3) Service matters—Execution of Tribunal orders—Jurisdiction of FST to implement own decisions—Petitioner-FBR assailed order of Federal Service Tribunal (FST) dated 06.03.2025 whereby the Tribunal directed implementation of its earlier judgment dated 30.07.2015 concerning seniority of Respondent No.1 (officer of 25th CTP)—Held, FST under S. 5(3) of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973 has jurisdiction to execute its own orders—Order dated 06.03.2025 was passed in lawful exercise of that jurisdiction upon remand from Islamabad High Court in W.P. No. 2695/2023—Petition dismissed for not raising any substantial question of law of public importance. (b) Civil Servants—Seniority—Seniority once fixed and promotions granted—Subsequent revision impermissible Seniority determination—Application of amended rules retrospectively—Illegality of retrospective application after promotion—Respondent No.1 (25th CTP officer) was relegated in the 2012 seniority list by applying 2001 amendments to the Occupational Groups and Services (Probation, Training and Seniority) Rules, 1990 retrospectively—Held, seniority must be determined in accordance with rules as they existed at the commencement of probation—Respondent had completed probation and was promoted based on CSS merit and earlier gradation list—Revising seniority post-promotion violated established legal principles—Supported by earlier Supreme Court judgment dated 20.02.2019 in Civil Appeals No. 1219 to 1222/2015 and reaffirmed in Civil Appeals No. 248 to 251/2018. (c) Service Law ---- Doctrine of judgment in rem—Equal treatment to similarly placed civil servants Effect of prior Supreme Court decisions in service matters—Applicability to non-litigants—Judgment in rem—Supreme Court held that the principles laid down in the earlier judgments regarding seniority of civil servants were judgments in rem and not limited to parties in personam—Benefit of such judgment can be extended to similarly placed officers (including Respondent No.1 of 25th CTP) even if not expressly mentioned therein—Reliance placed on Tara Chand v. KW&SB (2005 SCMR 499), Hameed Akhtar Niazi v. Secretary Establishment (1996 SCMR 1185), Khawaja Abdul Hameed Nasir v. NBP (2003 SCMR 1030), Govt. of Punjab v. Sameena Parveen (2009 SCMR 1), and WAPDA v. Abdul Ghaffar (2018 SCMR 380)—Principle of equality under Art. 25 of the Constitution reaffirmed. (d) Occupational Groups and Services (Probation, Training and Seniority) Rules, 1990 ---- R. 7(4) Interpretation of Rule 7(4)—Passing of Final Passing Out Examination (FPOE) in first or second attempt—Effect on seniority—Petitioner argued that under unamended R. 7(4), Respondent’s failure to pass FPOE in first attempt affected seniority—Court rejected the contention—Held, promotions and gradation list were issued by department based on CSS merit, and neither the gradation list nor promotions were ever challenged—Revision of seniority after promotions not sustainable. (e) Disposition Petition dismissed—Impugned FST order upheld—Supreme Court found no illegality or jurisdictional defect in the FST’s implementation order—Petition under Art. 212(3) dismissed vide short order dated 19.06.2025—Reasons recorded in present judgment. Cited Cases: Hameed Akhtar Niazi v. Secretary Establishment, 1996 SCMR 1185 Tara Chand v. Karachi Water & Sewerage Board, 2005 SCMR 499 Khawaja Abdul Hameed Nasir v. National Bank of Pakistan, 2003 SCMR 1030 Govt. of Punjab v. Sameena Parveen, 2009 SCMR 1 WAPDA v. Abdul Ghaffar, 2018 SCMR 380

Summary: Majority Opinion ----- (a) Constitution of Pakistan – Arts. 200(1) & 175A – Transfer vs. Appointment of Judges – Scope and Constitutional Framework Transfer of judges from one High Court to another under Art. 200(1) is a distinct and independent constitutional power vested in the President of Pakistan, separate from the appointment of judges under Art. 175A through the Judicial Commission of Pakistan (JCP)—Held, the two provisions deal with different constitutional functions and do not overlap—Transfer of a judge under Art. 200 does not amount to a fresh appointment and can be exercised within the sanctioned strength of the receiving High Court—Such transfers cannot be questioned on the basis that vacancies should have been filled by the JCP—Constitutional framers intentionally provided for both mechanisms, and the independence of Art. 200 is not contingent upon Art. 175A. (b) Constitution of Pakistan – Art. 200(1) – Procedure for Transfer of High Court Judges – Judicial Safeguards and Executive Role Powers under Art. 200(1) are not unfettered—Transfer must be made with the consent of the judge concerned and after mandatory consultation with the Chief Justices of both High Courts and the Chief Justice of Pakistan—Held, such procedure ensures that the judiciary retains primacy in decision-making—Consent and meaningful consultation are sine qua non for lawful exercise of power by the President—Executive discretion is thereby subject to structured judicial process, preserving the independence of the judiciary. (c) Constitution of Pakistan – Art. 200(1) & Islamabad High Court Act, 2010, S.3 – Applicability to Islamabad High Court – Legislative Interpretation Section 3 of the Islamabad High Court Act, 2010, relates to appointment of judges and does not restrict the application of Art. 200—Held, transfer of judges to the Islamabad High Court is constitutionally permissible and not barred by the statute—Statutory provisions cannot override or curtail express constitutional powers—Interpretation excluding Islamabad High Court from Art. 200 would be repugnant to the constitutional text and intent. (d) Constitution of Pakistan – Art. 200 – Seniority of Transferee Judges – Nature of Transfer (Permanent or Temporary) Seniority disputes arising from inter-High Court transfers are distinguishable from inter se seniority within a single High Court—Held, absence of an All-Pakistan Cadre or unified seniority list creates ambiguity—Court partially remanded the matter to the President of Pakistan to determine the seniority and nature of the transfer (permanent or temporary) after reviewing the transferee judges’ service records—Transfer Notification itself upheld and not declared ultra vires. (e) Constitution of Pakistan – Art. 184(3) – Maintainability and Disposition Petitions under Art. 184(3) were maintainable on account of important constitutional questions concerning the independence of the judiciary, scope of executive authority, and inter-institutional balance—Held by majority (3–2) that impugned Notification No. F.10(2)/2024-A.II dated 1st February 2025 was constitutionally valid—However, matter regarding seniority and nature of transfer remanded to the President—Minority view (Justice Naeem Akhter Afghan and Justice Shakeel Ahmad) allowed the petitions and set aside the impugned Notification. Disposition: By 3–2 majority, constitutional petitions were partially allowed—Notification of transfer was upheld, while issue of seniority and permanence of transferred judges was remanded to the President of Pakistan for determination—Acting Chief Justice of Islamabad High Court to continue in office until final decision. Cited Constitutional Provisions: • Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 – Articles 200, 175A, 184(3) • Islamabad High Court Act, 2010 – Section 3

Summary: Minority Opinion ---- (f) Constitution of Pakistan – Arts. 200(1) & (2), 175A – Transfer of Judges – Permanent vs. Temporary Transfer – Constitutional Limits Minority view—Held, Article 200 of the Constitution does not envisage permanent transfer of High Court judges—Clause (2) is subservient and complementary to Clause (1), and both must be read harmoniously—Permanent transfer bypasses the appointment process under Article 175A and renders it ineffective—Doctrine of Harmonious Construction requires both clauses to operate without conflict or absurdity—The President’s discretion under Article 200 must be exercised temporarily and in accordance with both judicial safeguards and constitutional intent—Impugned notification of 1st February 2025 declared null and void. (g) Constitution of Pakistan – Arts. 2A, 4, 25 & 175A – Independence of Judiciary – Mala Fide Exercise of Discretion – Lack of Due Process Held, the process leading to the transfer of three judges to the Islamabad High Court suffered from lack of transparency, concealment of material facts, and absence of meaningful consultation with relevant Chief Justices and the Chief Justice of Pakistan—Exercise of discretion by the President was mala fide in law and facts, made in undue haste, and not in public interest—Transfer violated the principles of independence of judiciary, equality before law, and due process enshrined under Articles 2A, 4, and 25 of the Constitution. (h) Judicial Commission of Pakistan (Appointment of Judges) Rules, 2024 – Rule 6 – Diversity and Fresh Appointment through JCP Rule 6 of the JCP Rules mandates regional, gender, and religious diversity in appointments—Held, instead of transferring judges, the President ought to have allowed fresh appointments through the JCP to uphold provincial representation in the Islamabad High Court—Permanent transfer circumvented this framework and violated the intended balance of diversity. (i) Intelligence Agencies – Role in Judicial Appointments and Transfers – Constitutional Boundaries Allegations of involvement by intelligence agencies in influencing judicial transfers—Held, such allegations, even if accepted hypothetically, are unconstitutional, as intelligence agencies have no role in the transfer or appointment of judges—Being subordinate to the executive, agencies like ISI cannot interfere with or override constitutional bodies or office holders—Such interference, if true, would be a grave violation of the independence of judiciary and constitutional scheme. (j) Constitutional Adjudication – Principle of Judicial Restraint – Avoidance of Larger Constitutional Questions Held, where a case can be decided on narrower grounds (i.e., unauthorized permanent transfer), it is unnecessary to address broader constitutional questions like oath-taking or inter-se seniority—Court abstained from deciding those issues, reserving them for appropriate future adjudication. Disposition (Minority View): All Constitution Petitions were accepted—Impugned Notification No. F.10(2)/2024-A.II dated 01.02.2025 was declared null, void and of no legal effect—Permanent transfer held unconstitutional and in contravention of Articles 200 and 175A. Cited Constitutional Provisions and Sources: • Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 – Articles 2A, 4, 25, 200, 175A • Judicial Commission of Pakistan (Appointment of Judges) Rules, 2024 – Rule 6 • Lahore Development Authority v. Imrana Tiwana (2015 SCMR 1739) • A.K. Brohi, Fundamental Law of Pakistan • Cooley, Treatise on Constitutional Limitations • Seervai, Constitutional Law of India • Justice Fazal Karim, Judicial Review of Public Actions