Summary: To constitute the offence of defamation, the prosecutor will have to prove that the imputation or accusation was made with an intention or knowledge or belief as mentioned whereas ingredients of section 499 of Pakistan Penal Code, 1860 according to which the petitioner has to make out a case of: (a) making any imputation concerning the complainant by the accused, (b) that such imputation was made by words spoken or written or by sign or visible representations, and (c) that such imputation was made with the intention of harming or with the knowledge or having reason to believe that it would harm the reputation of the complainant against whom such statement was made.

Summary: S.3,9,13 Defamation Ord 2002:Defamatory letter not brought on record--mere assertion in pleading not sufficient

Summary: PLJ 2007 Peshawar 63 Present Salim Khan J SHAFAQAT - UR - REHMAN - - Appellant versus DAUD - UR - REHMAN and 11 others - - Respondents RFA No 45 of 2006 decided on 2962006 (i) Civil Procedure Code 1908 (V of 1908) - - - - - - OVII R 10 - - Defamation Ordinance 2002 S 8 - - Suit for damages - - Maintainability - - Appellant filed suit for recovery against respondent which was returned to present before proper forum - - Civil revision was also dismissed - - Thereafter the appellant filed another suit for recovery on account of defamation and mental torture against 12 persons and the suit was dismissed on the ground that the notice given to the respondents was time barred - - Assailed - - Plea of the appellant that first suit was instituted on 3172004 but it was returned on 712005 in order to file it in the proper forum in the light of the provisions of the Defamation Ordinance 2002 the order in revision was passed on 262005 while the notice was given on 3062005 which was well within time could not be accepted by High Court while observing that Defamation Ordinance 2002 was promulgated on 1102002 and that the first suit was filed on 3172004 - - Held Person cannot claim the condonation of the period if he did not use the mind properly and did not initiate proceedings at the proper forum with due diligence - - Further held It could not be said that the appellant went to the Court of civil judge in good faith or that he has used due diligence to ascertain the exact Law - - Law is to take its own turn and is to be applied strictly for the ends of justice [P 64] A Sardar Tahir Hussain Advocate for AppellantJudgement Result:R.F.A. dismissed

Summary: (a) Defamation Ordinance, 2002---- ----Ss. 3 & 9---Defamation/libel---Suit by corporate entity/state-owned bank---Maintainability---Zarai Taraqiat Bank Ltd., being a state-owned bank operating as a corporate entity, filed suit for damages on account of allegedly false and defamatory press story---Defamation Ordinance, 2002 does not exclude juristic or corporate persons from its ambit---Corporate entities, including banks, may sue for defamation where false publication harms their business, trade or financial reputation---Suit by corporate entity was maintainable in principle. (b) Defamation Ordinance, 2002---- ----S. 3---Corporate defamation---Strict cumulative test---Requirement---For a corporate entity to succeed in defamation, it must establish that statement lowered its reputation in estimation of right-thinking members of society, was communicated to a third party, was false, was published with requisite fault, and in case of profit-making body such as bank, caused or was likely to cause serious financial loss to its business or commercial reputation---All elements must co-exist; failure to prove any one element is fatal. (c) Defamation Ordinance, 2002---- ----Corporate entity---Serious financial loss---Essential proof---Unlike individuals, corporations cannot rely upon presumption of injury to feelings, ridicule, hatred, dislike or emotional harm---For profit-making bodies, actionable harm must be commercial and financial in nature---Corporation must prove actual or likely serious financial loss resulting from alleged defamatory publication. (d) Defamation Ordinance, 2002---- ----State-owned bank---Alleged defamatory publication---Burden of proof---Appellant established that publication was made and claim remained largely unrebutted before Trial Court, yet failed to produce reliable documentary proof of decline in business, loss of contracts, financial records, quantified loss, or any tangible evidence showing serious financial loss---Mere allegation of reputational harm was insufficient for decree. (e) Defamation Ordinance, 2002---- ----Damages---Corporate plaintiff---Evidence of loss---Where financial harm is pleaded, plaintiff must explain and prove existence and extent of loss through cogent evidence and data from which loss may be computed---No breakup of alleged special damages or explanation of financial loss was provided---Claim for Rs.1 million general damages and Rs.100 million special damages was speculative and exaggerated. (f) Defamation law---- ----Corporate reputation---Commercial reputation and financial interest---Interlinkage---For corporate entities, loss of commercial reputation must be demonstrated through harm to financial interests---Mere assertion that publication caused ridicule, disrepute, hatred, dislike or unjust criticism does not establish actionable corporate defamation unless connected with objective financial injury. (g) Defamation Ordinance, 2002---- ----Freedom of speech and protection of reputation---Balance---Strict requirements in corporate defamation claims prevent powerful entities from weaponizing defamation law to stifle legitimate criticism, reporting or public debate---Courts must apply cumulative test rigorously to avoid chilling effect on public discourse. (h) Defamation Ordinance, 2002---- ----Ex parte proceedings before Trial Court---Effect---Even where defendants were proceeded ex parte and plaintiff’s evidence went unrebutted, Court remained bound to examine whether legal ingredients of corporate defamation and proof of financial loss were established---Unrebutted evidence alone could not justify decree where essential legal elements were missing. (i) Defamation Ordinance, 2002---- ----Quantum of damages---Trial Court decreeing Rs.100,000 only---Appeal for enhancement---Effect---Appellant sought enhancement of damages, contending Trial Court wrongly curtailed claim---High Court held that since suit itself was not proved due absence of serious financial loss/commercial reputational harm, question of enhancement or quantum did not survive. (j) Precedent---- ----Liberty Papers Ltd. v. Human Rights Commission of Pakistan PLD 2015 SC 42---Distinguished---Case concerned registered society and publication specifically mentioning its office bearers active in public sphere, allowing consideration of individual reputational consequences---ZTBL, however, was a commercial state-owned bank and had to prove serious financial loss to commercial reputation---Judgment relied upon by appellant was distinguishable. Cited Case: • Liberty Papers Ltd. v. Human Rights Commission of Pakistan PLD 2015 SC 42 (k) Defamation Ordinance, 2002---- ----Corporate plaintiff---Individual office-bearers---Separate right of action---If allegations directly target individuals connected with their post or position and damage their personal reputation, such individuals may themselves bring proceedings for defamation---Corporate plaintiff cannot base its claim on personal humiliation or injury to feelings. (l) Appeal---- ----Defamation decree in favour of corporate plaintiff---Legal defect---Appellate Court’s power---Although appeal was filed by plaintiff for enhancement of damages, High Court found decree itself legally unsustainable because plaintiff failed to prove corporate defamation---Impugned order and decree were set aside and suit dismissed. Disposition: R.F.A. No.163 of 2010 was dismissed; impugned order and decree dated 08.06.2010 awarding Rs.100,000 damages were set aside; suit filed by ZTBL under Ss.3 and 9 of the Defamation Ordinance, 2002 was dismissed; no order as to costs.

Summary: Bail denied -----(a) Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act, 2016 ---- Ss. 20, 24, 47 --- Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 376(A), 509, 109 & 153 --- Cyber defamation --- Dissemination of false, indecent content on social media against a police official --- Bail declined despite offence not falling under prohibitory clause --- Prima facie material available. Accusation against the petitioner, a YouTuber/V-logger, was that he shared and circulated a video clip via WhatsApp falsely accusing the complainant, a police official, of committing Zina with a lady constable. The video was also shared in various social media groups, causing severe reputational damage and psychological trauma to the complainant and tarnishing the image of the police department. Inquiry conducted by Superintendent of Police confirmed that the allegations were false and that the petitioner and his co-accused were responsible for spreading the defamatory content. Recovery of the petitioner’s phone yielded the video in question, substantiating his involvement. Although offences under Ss. 20 and 24 of PECA, 2016 are bailable and compoundable under S. 47, PECA, and not hit by the prohibitory clause of S. 497, Cr.P.C., courts have held that bail may still be declined in exceptional circumstances where the offence shocks public morality or affects society at large. Petitioner's actions were found to be socially harmful and humiliating, and could lead to psychological breakdown or suicidal ideation in victims. No ground for further inquiry was found. Held, bail is not to be granted as a matter of right where the conduct is heinous, even if the offence is not listed under the prohibitory clause. Petition dismissed. Cited Cases: • Imran Khan v. The State 2020 P.Cr.L.J 1652 • Shameel Ahmad v. The State 2009 SCMR 174 • Sohail Younas v. The State and others 2015 P.Cr.L.J 563 Cited Provisions: • Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act, 2016, Ss. 20, 24, 47 • Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, Ss. 376(A), 509, 109, 153 • Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S. 497 Disposition: Bail petition dismissed.

Summary: Background: The appellants were convicted under Section 500 of the Pakistan Penal Code (PPC) and sentenced to fines and imprisonment for defaming the complainant, who was their former husband (in the case of two appellants). The complainant alleged that the appellants had falsely accused him of zina (adultery) in legal proceedings and in applications submitted to higher authorities. The trial court acquitted some of the accused but convicted the appellants for defamation. The complainant appealed for their conviction under the Offence of Qazf (false accusation of adultery) and sought an enhancement of their sentences. ----Issues: 1- Whether the appellants’ statements constituted defamation under Section 500 PPC. 2- Whether the appellants’ actions amounted to Qazf under the Qazf (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979. 3- Whether the trial court’s conviction of the appellants under Section 500 PPC was legally justified. 4- Whether the appellants acted with malicious intent or in good faith. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: --Defamation (Section 500 PPC): The court found that the essential element of defamation is mens rea or intent to harm. It determined that the appellants acted in good faith to protect their rights rather than with the intent to harm the complainant's reputation. Therefore, their actions fell under the exceptions provided in Section 499 PPC, leading to the setting aside of their conviction under Section 500 PPC. --Qazf (Offence of False Accusation of Zina): The court concluded that the appellants did not commit Qazf, as their statements did not unambiguously accuse the complainant of zina. It emphasized that the required evidence for imposing Hadd punishment, such as a confession or the testimony of two witnesses fulfilling the requirement of Tazkiyah-al-Shahood, was not present. --Lack of Malicious Intent: The court found no evidence of malicious intent, recognizing that the appellants’ actions were driven by a desire to assert their rights. Consequently, the trial court's conviction was not legally justified. --Acquittal of Other Accused and Dismissal of Appeals: The court upheld the trial court’s decision to acquit the other accused, finding no grounds for conviction. The appeals seeking enhancement of the appellants’ sentences and the reversal of the acquittals of other accused were dismissed. ----Citations/Precedents: Muhammad Azam v. Muhammad Iqbal (PLD 1984 SC 95) – Held that the decree passed by the Family Court is binding even upon the Supreme Court. Abdul Waheed v. Asma Jehangir (PLD 2004 SC 219) – Held that the validity of a marriage falls within the exclusive domain of the Family Court, and the High Court should avoid controversy on this subject. PLD 2001-Karachi-115 – Emphasized that intent (mens rea) is a crucial element for constituting the offense of defamation.

Summary: (a) Defamation Ordinance (LVI of 2002)----Ss. 8, 12 & 15---Newspaper defamation---Statutory notice, limitation for suit and limitation for appeal---Maintainability---Scope---Appellants filed two suits for damages on account of allegedly defamatory news items published in a local daily newspaper in July and September 2012, claiming enormous amounts in compensation---In their own Plaints and in affidavits filed in opposition to an application under O.VII, R.11, C.P.C., appellants pleaded (i) that cause of action first arose when the defamatory matter was “edited, published and printed” on the dates in 2012 and (ii) that they were later informed and thus acquired notice/knowledge of such publications on 20.11.2014 when public at Resham Gali, Larkana apprised them of the news items---Appellants further pleaded that statutory legal notices under S. 8 of the Defamation Ordinance, 2002 were dispatched through courier only in April 2015 and suits were instituted thereafter on 28/29.04.2015 and 04.05.2015---Held, that S. 8 of the Ordinance requires that no action shall lie unless, within two months after the publication of the defamatory matter has come to the plaintiff’s notice or knowledge, he has given the defendant a fourteen days’ prior notice in writing specifying the defamatory matter complained of; and S. 12 further requires that the action itself must be brought within six months after the publication came to the notice or knowledge of the person defamed---On appellants’ own pleadings, first cause of action arose on the publication dates in July and September 2012 and, even on their later version, notice/knowledge stood acquired on 20.11.2014, yet statutory notices were admittedly sent in April 2015, well beyond the two-month period from 20.11.2014, and the suits were filed beyond the six-month period from the same date---Appellants’ argument that each subsequent date of “notice/knowledge” created a fresh, independent cause of action and that limitation should run from the last date of such information was repelled as being contrary to the plain language and scheme of Ss. 8 and 12; nothing in the special statute envisaged that each later intimation could revive or extend a time-barred claim or breathe new life into an earlier notice/knowledge of the same defamatory publication---In the absence of an express provision to that effect, limitation could only run from the first date on which the publication came to the plaintiff’s notice/knowledge---Even if the appellants’ own “last knowledge” version (20.11.2014) was accepted as the starting point, statutory notices and suits were still patently beyond the periods prescribed in Ss. 8 and 12---Trial Court, therefore, correctly held the suits to be hopelessly time-barred under the Defamation Ordinance, 2002 and rightly rejected the Plaints. (b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----O. VII, R. 11(d)---Rejection of plaint---Bar of law apparent on face of plaint---Limitation in defamation suits---Mixed question of fact and law or pure question of law---Appellants contended that limitation in the case was a mixed question of fact and law which could not be decided without recording evidence and that the Trial Court erred in rejecting the Plaints at the threshold---Held, that the dates of publication as well as the dates of alleged notice/knowledge and dispatch of legal notices were all expressly pleaded by the appellants in their Plaints and further affirmed in their affidavits in response to the respondents’ application under O.VII, R.11, C.P.C.---Where relevant facts as to publication, notice/knowledge and dispatch of statutory notices are admitted on the face of the record, the question whether the suit meets or violates the statutory limitation becomes a pure question of law and does not require framing of an issue or recording of evidence---In such circumstances, no “disputed question of fact” could be said to arise regarding limitation and the Court was not obliged to allow the parties to lead evidence merely to prove dates already admitted in the plaint---Trial Court was justified in examining the admitted facts against the mandatory requirements of Ss. 8 and 12 of the Defamation Ordinance, 2002 and, finding the actions ex facie time-barred, in rejecting the Plaints under O.VII, R.11(d), C.P.C.---Order of rejection was, therefore, unexceptionable. (c) Defamation Ordinance (LVI of 2002)----Ss. 8 & 12---Limitation---Computation of period---Effect of plaintiff’s own pleadings---Cause of action pleaded to arise both on publication and on later information by public---Whether multiple occasions of knowledge create separate causes of action---Held, that appellants themselves pleaded in their Plaints that cause of action arose firstly when the defamatory material was edited, published and printed in the newspaper on specified dates in July and September 2012 and secondly when, on 20.11.2014, people at Resham Gali, Larkana informed them of such publications---Such averments constituted clear admissions as to the dates on which cause of action accrued and the points in time when the publications came to their notice/knowledge---Appellants’ subsequent attempt to treat every later occasion of “hearing about” or “reading” the same publications as a fresh cause of action, extending limitation from the last such date, was inconsistent with the special limitation regime under Ss. 8 and 12 and was rejected---Period of limitation under the Ordinance runs from the first date on which the publication comes to the knowledge of the person defamed; repeated references or late awareness by different members of the public cannot extend or revive the statutory periods in the absence of express legislative sanction---On admitted facts, therefore, the suits were time-barred both from the publication dates in 2012 and, even on appellants’ own later knowledge date of 20.11.2014, due to failure to issue statutory notice within two months and to institute actions within six months. (d) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)----Ss. 5, 24 & Art. 25---Suit for compensation for libel/defamation and appeal therefrom---Alternative statutory bar under general law---Condonation of delay---Requirement of “sufficient cause”---Appellants’ suits, besides falling foul of the special limitation prescribed under the Defamation Ordinance, 2002, were also found to be beyond time under the general law of limitation, namely S.24 read with Art.25 of the Limitation Act, 1908, which provide that for compensation for libel the period of limitation is one year from the date of publication, or, in the case of an act not actionable without special damage, from the date when the injury results---As the impugned publications were from July and September 2012, the outer limits under the Limitation Act had also long expired by the time the suits were instituted in 2015---In appeals, appellants admittedly filed First Civil Appeals beyond the 30-day period prescribed by S.15 of the Defamation Ordinance, 2002 and sought condonation of three and four days’ delay respectively under S.5 of the Limitation Act on the ground that they had travelled to India and returned shortly before the expiry of limitation, and that due to “oversight” they could not engage counsel in time---Held, that it is a settled principle that the party seeking condonation must show “sufficient cause” covering each and every day of delay and that a valuable vested right accrues in favour of the successful party once the limitation period expires---Appellants, despite being fully aware of the limitation period and having had ample time prior to travel, did not prepare or lodge their appeals before departure, nor did they explain satisfactorily the period after their return till the actual filing date; their vague plea of oversight and travel was held insufficient to constitute “sufficient cause”---On the facts, the appeals, comprising detailed pleadings and voluminous annexures, were prima facie ready for filing earlier, and appellants could even have filed them in person—yet they remained indolent---Delay in filing appeals was thus not condonable and the bar of limitation under S.15 of the Defamation Ordinance, 2002 read with S.5 of the Limitation Act, 1908, stood attracted. (e) Administration of justice----Maintainability at threshold---Duty of Court to examine limitation at outset---Defamation claim hopelessly time-barred---Effect---Court observed that it is under an obligation to examine at the very outset whether an action is maintainable in law, including whether it is barred by limitation; where, as in the present case, even a selective or “pick-and-choose” approach to the facts most favourable to the plaintiff cannot bring the suit within time, permitting such time-barred litigation to proceed would be contrary to the express provisions of Ss.8 and 12 of the Defamation Ordinance, 2002 and would undermine the statutory objective of finality and certainty---Trial Court, therefore, rightly rejected the Plaints as being hopelessly barred by limitation, and Appellate Court, finding no illegality or infirmity in the impugned Orders dated 19.04.2016, affirmed the same---First Civil Appeals Nos.S-04 of 2016 and S-05 of 2016 were consequently dismissed, and parties left to bear their own costs.

Summary: Defamation suits are regulated by special law. The non-compliance of the statutory requirement under Section 8 meant that the defamation claim could not be maintained. The first Appeal was dismissed.

Summary: Defamatory publications. No defense. Stay granted.

Summary: Defamation Ordinance, 2002., Defamation Ordinance, 2002. (Application Dismiss)