Summary: (a) Constitutional Law – Election Commission’s Authority – Intra-Party Elections Under Article 218(3) and Article 219(e) of the Constitution of Pakistan, the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) is responsible for ensuring free and fair elections, including intra-party elections as required under Section 208 of the Elections Act, 2017. The Court reaffirmed that intra-party elections must be held periodically, fairly, and transparently, providing all party members an equal opportunity to contest for any political office. The Supreme Court upheld the ECP’s authority to scrutinize and adjudicate intra-party elections, rejecting the argument that the ECP lacked jurisdiction in such matters. (b) Political Parties – Non-Compliance with Election Laws – Consequences The Supreme Court found that Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) failed to hold transparent intra-party elections, as required under Section 208 of the Elections Act, 2017. The ECP had previously granted multiple extensions for PTI to conduct elections, but the party failed to comply. The Court upheld the ECP’s order dated 22 December 2023, declaring PTI ineligible to obtain an election symbol under Section 215(5) of the Elections Act, 2017, as a consequence of non-compliance. The Court emphasized that election symbols are a statutory privilege, not an absolute right, and non-compliance with election laws results in legal consequences. (c) Jurisdiction – Parallel Proceedings in Multiple High Courts – Forum Shopping The Court held that forum shopping is impermissible, ruling that PTI improperly filed writ petitions in both the Peshawar High Court (PHC) and the Lahore High Court (LHC) regarding the same matter. The Supreme Court declared that once a party elects to pursue a case in one court, it cannot simultaneously seek relief in another court with concurrent jurisdiction. Since WP No. 81171/2023 was already pending before a five-member bench of the LHC, the filing of WP No. 6173-P/2023 in the PHC was held to be misconceived and non-maintainable. (d) Electoral Process – Burden of Proof for Conducting Elections The Supreme Court ruled that merely producing a certificate of intra-party elections does not establish their validity if credible challenges arise. In this case, fourteen PTI members filed complaints asserting that elections were not held, which the Court found could not be dismissed without due verification. The Court emphasized that political parties must provide prima facie evidence of a fair electoral process. It also noted that failure to conduct intra-party elections leads to authoritarian control within parties, contradicting democratic principles. (e) Constitutional Validity – ECP’s Role in Ensuring Democracy The Supreme Court rejected observations by the PHC that Section 215(5) of the Elections Act, 2017, which disqualifies non-compliant parties from receiving election symbols, was "absurd". The Court emphasized that the ECP’s oversight of intra-party elections is essential for upholding democracy, preventing dictatorship within political parties, and ensuring internal democratic processes. The Supreme Court reiterated that the ECP had passed similar orders against 13 other political parties, refuting PTI’s claims of victimization. Disposition: Appeal allowed. The Supreme Court set aside the PHC’s judgment in WP No. 6173-P/2023 and upheld the ECP’s order of December 22, 2023, declaring PTI ineligible for an election symbol due to non-compliance with Section 208 of the Elections Act, 2017.

Summary: Fugitive Status: Moonis Elahi was accused of being a fugitive from the law due to pending criminal cases, particularly FIR No. 149/2023 and FIR No. 364/2023. These cases were registered at Police Stations Mangowal and Jalalpur Jattan in District Gujrat.Questionable Signatures: Doubts were cast upon the authenticity of the signatures on his nomination papers.Timing of Consent: There were concerns about the timing and consistency of Moonis Elahi's consent to his nomination. His consent was recorded on December 20, 2023, in Spain, while the proposer and seconder of his candidacy did so on December 21, 2023.Alleged Fraud: Allegations of fraudulent practices in relation to the nomination papers were raised.Asset Concealment: Moonis Elahi was accused of failing to disclose certain assets and the possession of an additional passport.To support its decision, the judgment meticulously cited various legal principles and precedents:Proclaimed Offender Status: The judgment referenced the principle that a proclaimed offender, as Moonis Elahi was declared, had no right of audience in court unless they surrendered themselves. This was grounded in a Division Bench judgment of the Balochistan High Court.Importance of Power of Attorney: The judgment highlighted the significance of correctly executed powers of attorney, asserting that Moonis Elahi's power of attorney had not been authenticated as required by law.Code of Civil Procedure: Reference was made to the Code of Civil Procedure, particularly Order III Rules 1 & 2, which permit recognized agents to act on behalf of principals in legal matters.Limitations of Agent Testimony: The judgment clarified that acts performed by an agent on behalf of a principal could not be admitted as evidence in matters about which only the principal had personal knowledge.Scope of Judicial Review: The judgment cited the Let.- Gen. (R) Salahuddin Tirmizi v. Election Commission of Pakistan PLD 2008 Supreme Court 735 case, emphasizing that judicial review in election matters was confined to cases where an order lacked lawful authority, was coram non judice, or was mala fide.

Summary: Detailed judgement of order 2024 SCP 13 ---- Issue:Whether PTI's failure to conduct intra-party elections as per the Elections Act, 2017, and ECP's directives renders it ineligible to obtain an election symbol.Holding:The Supreme Court held that PTI?s failure to conduct intra-party elections makes it ineligible for an election symbol under the Elections Act, 2017.Reasoning:Intra-Party Elections:The Court emphasized the significance of intra-party elections for democratic functioning within political parties, as mandated by the Elections Act, 2017.Role of ECP:The ECP is constitutionally entrusted with ensuring democratic practices in political parties, including enforcing intra-party elections.PTI?s Non-Compliance:PTI?s disregard for ECP's repeated directives for intra-party elections was seen as a violation of democratic principles and the Elections Act.Jurisdiction and Authority of ECP:The Supreme Court recognized the ECP?s authority to enforce election laws and its jurisdiction over political parties? internal democratic processes.Legal Precedents and Principles:The Court referred to previous decisions and legal principles emphasizing the importance of internal democracy in political parties, including cases from other jurisdictions that highlight the significance of primary elections.Validity of the Elections Act:The Court upheld the provisions of the Elections Act, 2017, as a valid legal framework governing political parties? internal elections.Disposition:The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the PHC?s judgment, and upheld the ECP?s decision that declared PTI ineligible to obtain an election symbol due to its failure to conduct intra-party elections.Key Citations and Precedents Referenced:The Elections Act, 2017Workers? Party Pakistan v Federation of Pakistan, PLD 2012 Supreme Court 681Benazir Bhutto v Federation of Pakistan, PLD 1989 Supreme Court 66Salahuddin Tirmizi v Election Commission of Pakistan, PLD 2008 Supreme Court 735Muhammad Hanif Abbasi v Imran Khan Niazi, PLD 2018 Supreme Court 189Relevant U.S. Supreme Court decisions emphasizing the importance of primaries in the democratic process.

Summary: The background of the case reveals that Afridi was apprehended by police officials outside the Peshawar High Court on 11th January 2024. Despite efforts to secure his release, the police denied having him in custody. The petitioner contends that Afridi is a political worker for the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) and a candidate in the upcoming General Elections. The arrest was deemed illegal, carried out without jurisdiction, and possibly with malafide intent.On 11th January 2024, a preliminary hearing resulted in the Advocate General being put on notice, with instructions to produce Afridi before the court. Afridi was subsequently presented in court. The Assistant Advocate General (AAG) explained that Afridi's arrest was due to a misunderstanding regarding his involvement in a criminal case. The AAG referenced an order from the District & Sessions Judge, Kohat, which inferred that an earlier court order had expired since Afridi failed to appear before the court as required.The petitioner's counsel argued that a previous High Court order (No.6009-P of 2023) had restrained the police from taking any action against Afridi, which is why he didn't appear for the transit bail. The High Court noted that Afridi, a lawyer and political candidate, was arrested despite an order preventing adverse action against him. The court acknowledged the Advocate General's efforts in ensuring Afridi's production and found that his detention was illegal.The court emphasized the constitutional protection of liberty and due process under Articles 4, 9, and 10 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973. The judgment stressed that depriving a person of liberty without legal justification is a serious matter and violative of law, justice, and fair play.As Afridi was not required for any criminal case, the court ordered his immediate release and prohibited any future actions against him that are not in accordance with law. The petition was converted into a contempt of court petition, and respondents No.1 & 2 were directed to submit a reply within ten days. The case was scheduled for re-listing on 18th January 2024.

Summary: (a) Sindh Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion & Transfer) Rules, 1974 ----R. 11-A—Appointment on deceased quota—Eligibility of legal heir—Mandatory consideration by department—Delay in processing—Effect. Rule 11-A of the Sindh Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion & Transfer) Rules, 1974 provides that where a civil servant dies during service, one of his children shall be provided employment in BPS-1 to BPS-10 in the same department if otherwise eligible. The rule is clear and mandatory in nature, conferring a legitimate right on the surviving legal heir to be considered for appointment, subject to fulfillment of qualifications. Delay in processing or administrative inaction cannot defeat such right once the application is filed within policy terms. (b) Constitutional law ----Art. 4 & Art. 25—Fundamental rights—Right to fair treatment and equality before law—Obligation of public functionaries. The conduct of the respondent department, which failed to act on the petitioner’s application for over a decade despite repeated communications, was held contrary to the principles of fairness, justice, and equality under Arts. 4 and 25 of the Constitution. Government departments are bound to act fairly, promptly, and in accordance with law when dealing with citizens’ rights, particularly those arising from compassionate employment provisions. (c) Service matter ----Appointment against deceased quota—Belated consideration—Whether application time-barred—Effect. The objection that the petitioner’s father died in 2003 and that his application was delayed was rejected. The Court held that the petitioner had applied in 2008 within the policy framework and the delay was entirely attributable to official apathy. Once the petitioner applied within the prescribed policy period, the department was under a continuing obligation to process and decide the case in accordance with law. (d) Administrative law ----Non-filing of comments by respondents—Apathy and neglect—Consequences. The respondent department failed to submit comments despite repeated opportunities. Such inaction demonstrated administrative negligence and disregard of judicial proceedings. The Court observed that government officials cannot evade their statutory duty by simply pleading “policy matters” without substantiating their stance through record. (e) Public service recruitment ----Deceased quota—Consideration for suitable post—Scope of discretion. While the petitioner had sought appointment as Junior School Teacher (JST), the Court directed that he be considered for *any suitable ministerial post* commensurate with his qualifications, provided he fulfilled eligibility requirements under relevant recruitment rules and policies. The discretion to select a suitable post must be exercised fairly, in accordance with Rule 11-A and the law declared by the Supreme Court on the subject. (f) Directions and compliance ----Chief Secretary and Secretary Education Department—Obligation to implement Court’s directive—Timeline for compliance. The Chief Secretary, Government of Sindh, and Secretary, School Education & Literacy Department were directed to ensure compliance of this order in letter and spirit within 30 days. They must evaluate petitioner’s eligibility for appointment against the deceased quota, complete all codal formalities, and issue appointment orders if found suitable. (g) Disposition— Constitutional petition allowed. Respondent departments directed to consider the petitioner’s case for appointment against the deceased quota strictly in accordance with Rule 11-A of the Sindh Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion & Transfer) Rules, 1974 and Supreme Court precedents on the subject. Compliance to be reported within 30 days. Held— (i) Rule 11-A creates a mandatory obligation to provide employment to one eligible child of a deceased civil servant. (ii) Delay attributable to administrative neglect cannot deprive the petitioner of his lawful right. (iii) Petition allowed; directions issued for consideration and compliance.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan ----Arts. 142, 184, 270-A, Fourth Schedule (Entries 2 & 50), Eighteenth Amendment—Legislative competence—Levy and collection of tax on immovable property—Jurisdiction of Federation and Cantonment Boards—Effect of constitutional amendments. Tax on immovable property, including tax on annual rental value, has historically been a provincial subject. The legislative competence to levy, charge, or recover such tax was never vested in the Federation except during the Martial Law period through the promulgation of the *Cantonments (Urban Immovable Property Tax and Entertainment Duty) Order, 1979 (P.O. 13 of 1979)*. The Sindh High Court, tracing legislative history from the Government of India Act, 1935 to the Constitution of 1973, held that after the restoration of the Constitution in 1985 and the 18th Amendment, the subject of property tax reverted exclusively to the Provinces. Consequently, the Federation and all Cantonment Boards lacked competence to impose any such tax, the field being expressly excluded from the Federal Legislative List (Entry 50) and reserved for the Provinces under Art. 142(c). (b) Constitutional law ----Art. 270-A—Validation of laws enacted during Martial Law—Scope and limitation—Protection of Presidential Orders—Applicability of Benazir Bhutto case. Presidential Orders issued between 1977 and 1985 were granted temporary protection under Art. 270-A and the Seventh Schedule but lost their efficacy after the restoration of the Constitution and the 18th Amendment. Following the principle laid down in *Benazir Bhutto v. Federation of Pakistan* (PLD 1988 SC 416), laws protected by Art. 270-A could not override the Constitution or survive beyond the cut-off date. The Court reaffirmed that P.O. 13 of 1979, enacted when the Constitution was in abeyance, stood eclipsed and could not continue to authorize taxation in cantonment areas after constitutional restoration. (c) Cantonment Act, 1924 ----Ss. 60, 80, 106 & 109—Scope—Taxation powers of Cantonment Boards—Requirement of federal sanction and publication—Effect of August 2023 amendment. Section 60 empowers Cantonment Boards to impose only those taxes which may lawfully be imposed by a municipality in the province and only with the *previous sanction of the Federal Government* and publication in the official gazette. In the absence of an existing provincial levy, such power cannot be exercised. The 2023 amendment inserting the term “fee” into Section 60 did not expand the scope to authorize new levies; fiscal statutes must be strictly construed. Moreover, as per *Mustafa Impex v. Government of Pakistan* (PLD 2016 SC 808), prior sanction of the Federal Cabinet, not a Division, is mandatory. The amendment delegating such sanction to a Division was held inconsistent with democratic and constitutional principles. (d) Constitutional interpretation ----Entry 2, Fourth Schedule—Not a taxing entry—Entry 50 exclusive field—Distinction between taxes and fees. Entry 2 of the Fourth Schedule, often cited by Cantonment Boards, is a general administrative entry concerning federal subjects and does not include power to tax. Taxing entries are exhaustively enumerated from 43 to 53. The levy under discussion being a charge on immovable property clearly falls under Entry 50, which, post-18th Amendment, excludes immovable property from federal jurisdiction. Argument that the levy was a “fee” under Entry 54 or S.200 of the Cantonment Act was also rejected as the exhaustive list of permissible fees therein does not cover annual rental value of property, and the principle of *quid pro quo* was not satisfied. (e) Provincial legislation ----Sindh Urban Immovable Property Tax Act, 1958—Continuity and supremacy—Applicability to cantonment areas. The Sindh Urban Immovable Property Tax Act, 1958, enacted prior to the 1979 Presidential Order, remains the governing statute for property tax within the province, including cantonment areas. Following *Pakistan v. Province of Punjab* (PLD 1975 SC 37) and *Gulzar Cinema v. Cantonment Board* (PLD 1978 Kar. 500), cantonment areas located within a province are subject to provincial taxation statutes, as they do not constitute federal territory. (f) Fiscal jurisprudence ----Distinction between tax and fee—Purpose of levy—Cantonment funds—Effect of routing revenue. The fact that amounts collected were deposited into Cantonment Funds under Ss.106–109 of the Cantonment Act does not alter the nature of the levy. A tax remains a tax regardless of the fund in which it is credited. Reliance on *Workers Welfare Fund* and *GIDC* cases was misplaced, as those levies were upheld as fees due to specific quid pro quo mechanisms, which are absent here. (g) Discrimination and equality before law (Arts. 25 & 77) ----Differential taxation between municipalities and cantonments—Classification—Validity. Different rates of taxation for identical properties situated across municipal and cantonment boundaries were held discriminatory and violative of equal protection principles. A uniform regulatory framework under provincial supervision was necessary to prevent arbitrary classifications and ensure parity in valuation and assessment. (h) Disposition— Petitions allowed. It was declared that— (i) After the Eighteenth Amendment, the Federation and Cantonment Boards have no competence, power, or jurisdiction to levy, charge, impose, or recover any tax on immovable property, including tax on annual rental value. (ii) The Province of Sindh alone has legislative and fiscal authority over the subject. (iii) All amounts collected under the impugned levy since the 18th Amendment are liable to accounting and reconciliation by the provincial government. (PLD 1975 SC 37; PLD 1978 Kar. 500; PLD 1988 SC 416; PLD 2016 SC 808; 2022 Peshawar 46; 2023 SCMR — Cantonment Board case, 13.10.2023, followed).

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan ----Art. 199(1)(a)(ii), Arts. 7 & 78; Fourth Schedule, Part-II, Entry 6; Fourth Schedule, Part-I, Entry 30 Maintainability—Stock exchange as “person performing functions in connection with the affairs of the Federation”—Held, Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSX) is a voluntary corporate entity and not a statutory creation; the 2012 Act corporatizes/demutualizes/integrates existing exchanges but does not establish PSX as a State instrumentality; mere regulatory oversight by SECP does not convert PSX’s commercial activities into sovereign/public functions; PSX does not utilize or receive public funds and any charges/penalties accrue as its income and are not credited to the Federal Consolidated Fund under Art. 78—Consequently, PSX is not amenable to writ under Art. 199(1)(a)(ii). Cited Cases: • Pakistan Stock Exchange Ltd. v. Province of Sindh, 2024 CLD 580 • Al-Jehad Trust v. Federation of Pakistan, PLD 1997 SC 84 (b) Securities laws—nature of “regulations” and penalties ----Stock Exchanges (Corporatization, Demutualization and Integration) Act, 2012; Securities Act, 2015, Ss. 2(x), 2(xlvi), 2(xlix), 2(lv), 5, 7, 11, 160 & 161 Statutory “regulations” under the 2015 Act are those made by SECP; PSX’s “regulations” are internal instruments governing its marketplace and do not confer statutory power to impose penalties; no appeal lies under S. 161 against PSX-imposed measures; such amounts are not statutory exactions but form part of PSX’s income distributed per corporate law—PSX therefore not performing sovereign/regulatory functions of the State. Cited Cases: • Pakistan Stock Exchange Ltd. v. Province of Sindh, 2024 CLD 580 (c) Judicial review—scope of “person” and “functions” ----Art. 199(1)(a)(ii) read with Art. 199(5) Even where a respondent qualifies as a “person,” judicial review lies only if the impugned act was performed in connection with the “affairs” of the Federation/Province/local authority; PSX’s privately funded, profit-maximizing operations and internal disciplinary regime do not satisfy that test. Cited Cases: • Al-Jehad Trust v. Federation of Pakistan, PLD 1997 SC 84 • Pakistan Stock Exchange Ltd. v. Province of Sindh, 2024 CLD 580 (d) Necessary party—SECP ----Art. 199(1)(a)(ii) SECP impleaded without any “act done,” “proceeding taken,” or order passed against the petitioner in the arbitral matter—No cause of action or maintainable prayer made out—SECP neither a necessary nor a proper party. (e) Arbitration—alternative remedy and Kompetenz-Kompetenz ----PSX Rule Book (Chapter 18: Investors’ Claims, Securities Brokers’ Disputes and Arbitration Regulations) Ongoing institutional arbitration provides an adequate and efficacious remedy; objections on limitation and tribunal jurisdiction fall within the arbitral tribunal’s Kompetenz-Kompetenz and must be decided in that forum; constitutional writ not ordinarily invocable to interdict pending arbitration absent exceptional grounds, none shown. (f) Constitutional benches—post-26th Amendment framework ----Arts. 175, 175-A, 199(1)(a)(ii) & 202-A; Constitution (Twenty-sixth Amendment) Act, 2024 Court records that reasons are rendered by the Constitutional High Court for the short order dated 13.11.2024; applying the “dominant relief” test, Art. 199(1)(a)(ii) governed the petitioner’s prayer for declarations (“without lawful authority,” “of no legal effect”), thus falling within the High Court’s constitutional jurisdiction to issue reasons for the earlier short order. (g) Disposition --- Constitutional petition not maintainable; writ does not lie against PSX; no grounds made out against SECP; parties relegated to the agreed arbitral mechanism under PSX Regulations; petition dismissed vide short order dated 13.11.2024—present judgment contains reasons.

Summary: The primary issue was that his seconder was not a registered voter in his constituency, a crucial requirement under Section 60 of the Election Act 2017. Saeed Ullah sought several reliefs in his petition, including setting aside the impugned order, accepting his nomination papers, declaring him a qualified candidate for the 2024 General Elections in PK-56 Mardan, and providing an opportunity to replace the name of the seconder in his nomination papers in the interest of justice.During the proceedings, the court considered significant legal precedents. First, the case of "Mudassar Qayyum Nahra Vs. Election Tribunal, Punjab, Lahore and others" (2003 MLD 1089 Lahore) was cited, which underscored that an unqualified proposer or seconder for nomination papers could lead to their rejection, and such a defect could only be rectified by substituting the nomination papers. Second, "Nadeem Shafi Vs. Tariq Shuiq Butt and others" (PLD 2016 SC 944) reaffirmed the importance of having proposers and seconders who are registered voters in the relevant constituency. This case emphasized that such a defect in nomination papers is of substantial nature and cannot be rectified at a later stage. Lastly, "Rana Muhammad Tariq Vs. Rana Shaukat Mahmood" (PLD 2007 Supreme Court 277) stressed that the duty imposed on qualified electors to propose or second a candidate is mandatory and not directory, emphasizing the significance of adhering to this requirement as stated in section 12(1) of the Representation of the People Act, 1976. In conclusion, the Peshawar High Court upheld the rejection of Saeed Ullah's nomination papers, citing these legal precedents and the mandatory nature of having qualified proposers and seconders. Consequently, the court dismissed the writ petition based on these considerations.

Summary: The primary legal issue in this case revolved around the interpretation of the "dual membership" clause in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Local Government Act, 2013 (KPLGA, 2013), specifically Section 85, which states that elected officials in local councils must resign from their existing office before contesting any political office. This provision was found to be in line with Article 63(1)(p) of the Constitution of Pakistan, which disqualifies individuals from being elected if they are disqualified under any law in force.The petitioner's argument was centered on whether Section 85 of the KPLGA, 2013, should be applicable to disqualify respondent No. 5 from contesting the General Election in 2024. Several legal precedents were cited to support this position, including the Lahore High Court's judgment in the case of Fozia Khalid vs. Election Appellate Tribunal, Lahore (PLD 2018 Lahore 895), which upheld the "resign to run" principle, preventing elected officials from contesting elections without resigning from their current office. The Supreme Court of Pakistan also upheld this principle in a subsequent order.Furthermore, the Balochistan High Court's judgment in Ghulam Akbar Lachi vs. Returning Officer for NA 270 and the Islamabad High Court's decision in Zahid Naseem vs. Election Commission of Pakistan confirmed the application of disqualification under provincial laws to the eligibility of candidates.In conclusion, the Peshawar High Court held that respondent No. 5's failure to resign as Mayor of Tehsil Gumbat District Kohat when filing his nomination papers made him subject to the "dual membership" bar as per Section 85 of the KPLGA, 2013, and Article 63(1)(p) of the Constitution. Consequently, the court upheld the rejection of respondent No. 5's nomination papers, setting aside the judgments of the Election Appellate Tribunal, Peshawar, and restoring the order of the Returning Officer dated December 29, 2023. As a result, respondent No. 5 was disqualified from contesting the General Elections in 2024 for constituencies PK-90 Kohat-I and NA-35 Kohat.

Summary: Ss. 2 & 3—Criminal Law Amendment (Special Court) Act, 1976 (XVII of 1976), S. 4—Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 6 & 199—Trial for high treason—Judgment of Special Court—Territorial jurisdiction of Lahore High Court—Scope The respondent, a former Chief of Army Staff, was convicted and sentenced to death by the Special Court. The Lahore High Court, through its impugned judgment, allowed a writ petition filed before it and set aside the judgment of the Special Court. The High Court, among other findings, held that initiating proceedings against the respondent for high treason was ultra vires, unlawful, coram non judice, and beyond the constitutional mandate. -------- Legality—The primary grievance raised and the relief sought in the respondent’s writ petition related to acts and proceedings conducted by the Special Court in Islamabad. Under Article 199(1)(a)(ii) of the Constitution, only the Islamabad High Court had territorial jurisdiction over such matters. The Lahore High Court assumed jurisdiction not vested in it, violating the constitutional framework. Despite Supreme Court directives to continue the trial, the Lahore High Court exercised writ jurisdiction under Article 199 to set aside the proceedings of the Special Court, including its final judgment. Lahore High Court Bar Association v. General (Retd.) Pervez Musharraf 2019 SCMR 1029 ref. The acts and proceedings undertaken by the Special Court in Islamabad could only be challenged before the Islamabad High Court. The respondent, instead of pursuing his grievance before the appropriate forum, filed a petition in the Lahore High Court, which entertained the matter without jurisdiction. Government of Pakistan v. Special Court PLD 2020 Isl. 82 ref. --------Art. 199—Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. II, R. 2—Territorial jurisdiction of a High Court—Scope The primary object of the petition, i.e., the main grievance and ultimate relief sought, determines the territorial jurisdiction of the High Courts. If the relief pertains to an act or proceeding within the jurisdiction of a particular High Court, no other High Court can assume jurisdiction. Splitting claims and seeking relief from multiple High Courts regarding the same cause of action is prohibited under Order II, Rule 2, C.P.C. Relief regarding federal actions and acts pursuant to such actions must be sought in one petition and adjudicated by the High Court having territorial jurisdiction over both. --------Sandalbar Enterprises v. Central Board of Revenue PLD 1997 SC 334; Amin Textile Mills v. Federation of Pakistan 1998 SCMR 2389; Sethi and Sethi v. Federation of Pakistan 2012 PTD 1869 and Province of Punjab v. Shehzad Anjum 2024 SCMR 766 ref. --------High Treason (Punishment) Act, 1973 (LXVIII of 1973), S. 2—Criminal Law Amendment (Special Court) Act, 1976 (XVII of 1976), S. 12(3)—Constitution of Pakistan, Arts. 6 & 199—Trial for high treason—Maintainability of writ petition—Availability of alternate remedy The High Court’s writ jurisdiction cannot be invoked where an adequate, alternate remedy exists under the law. Section 12(3) of the Criminal Law Amendment (Special Court) Act, 1976, provides an appeal mechanism to the Supreme Court against a Special Court’s judgment. The respondent bypassed this remedy and sought relief under writ jurisdiction, which is impermissible under the doctrine of exhaustion of remedies. A party must utilize the remedies provided under the relevant law before invoking writ jurisdiction. --------Imran Khattak v. Sofia Waqar Khattak 2014 SCMR 122; Tariq Transport Company v. Sarghodha-Bhera Bus Service PLD 1958 SC (Pak.) 437; Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax/Wealth Tax v. Punjab Beverage Company 2008 SCMR 308 ref. --------S. 9—Trial in absentia—Lahore High Court declared Section 9 ultra vires the Constitution—Legality Section 9 of the Criminal Law Amendment (Special Court) Act, 1976, allows the trial of an accused in absentia under specific circumstances, such as willful absence or behavior impeding justice. The Lahore High Court declared Section 9 unconstitutional, stating that trials in absentia are impermissible. However, the respondent was not "aggrieved" under Article 199(1)(a) or (c) of the Constitution and had not challenged the entire provision of Section 9. The High Court’s declaration lacked reasoning and was legally unjustified. --------Lahore High Court Bar Association v. General (Retd.) Pervez Musharraf 2019 SCMR 1029 ref. --------S. 3—Constitution and reconstitution of Special Court—Applicability of Mustafa Impex judgment The Lahore High Court invalidated the Federal Government’s actions, including the filing of a complaint and constitution of the Special Court, relying on the Mustafa Impex judgment (PLD 2016 SC 808). However, the principle in Mustafa Impex is not retroactive and applies only from the date of its pronouncement. The constitution and reconstitution of the Special Court predated this judgment and complied with the legal framework. Actions taken after Mustafa Impex also adhered to its principles. Thus, the High Court’s findings were contrary to the law. --------PMDC v. Muhammad Fahad Malik, 2018 SCMR 1956 ref.----- The case pertains to the legality of the Lahore High Court's decision that annulled proceedings and conviction of General (Retd.) Pervez Musharraf by a Special Court for high treason under Article 6 of the Constitution. The Lahore High Court's judgment was challenged on grounds of lack of territorial jurisdiction and its misapplication of the law, especially with respect to precedents set by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court examined whether the High Court had jurisdiction and acted within the bounds of constitutional and legal principles. ------- Issues: ------- 1) Did the Lahore High Court have territorial jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition against the acts and proceedings of the Islamabad-based Special Court? ------- 2) Was the exercise of writ jurisdiction under Article 199 justified in the presence of an alternate adequate remedy of appeal? ------- 3) Did the Lahore High Court violate precedents and directions of the Supreme Court in setting aside the Special Court's proceedings? ------- 4) Was the Lahore High Court correct in declaring Section 9 of the Special Court Act ultra vires the Constitution? ------- 5) Did the High Court exceed its jurisdiction by deciding on the merits of the high treason charges? ------- Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: Lack of Jurisdiction: The Supreme Court held that the Lahore High Court lacked territorial jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution. The acts and proceedings of the Special Court, located in Islamabad, fell exclusively within the territorial jurisdiction of the Islamabad High Court. ------- Alternate Remedy: The High Court’s exercise of writ jurisdiction was unwarranted as the respondent had an adequate remedy of appeal under Section 12(3) of the Special Court Act, which was ultimately availed. ------- Violation of Precedents: The Supreme Court noted the Lahore High Court’s disregard for binding precedents, including prior Supreme Court judgments, undermined judicial propriety. ------- Section 9 of the Special Court Act: The declaration of the entire Section 9 as ultra vires was unwarranted and lacked justification. The Supreme Court reaffirmed its earlier decision in Lahore High Court Bar Association validating trials in absentia under certain conditions. ------- Merits of the Case: The Lahore High Court improperly delved into the substantive issue of whether General Musharraf committed high treason, usurping the jurisdiction of the Special Court and appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. ------- Outcome: The Supreme Court set aside the Lahore High Court’s judgment, holding it unconstitutional and without jurisdiction. The petitions were converted into appeals and allowed. ------- Citations/Precedents: Sindh High Court Bar Association v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2009 SC 879): Declared the Proclamation of Emergency Order, PCO, and Oath Order of 2007 unconstitutional. Nadeem Ahmed v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2010 SC 1165): Reaffirmed the invalidity of actions taken under the PCO. Moulvi Iqbal Haider v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2013 SC 507): Directed inquiry and trial under Article 6 for high treason. Abdul Hameed Dogar v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2016 SC 607): Limited the Special Court’s authority to associate suspects. Lahore High Court Bar Association v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2019 SC 645): Validated trial in absentia under Section 9 of the Special Court Act. Mustafa Impex v. Government of Pakistan (PLD 2016 SC 808): Mandated Federal Cabinet approval for actions by the Prime Minister. PMDC v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2018 SC 189): Limited retrospective application of Mustafa Impex. Sandalbar Enterprises (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Central Board of Revenue (1997 SCMR 1131): Defined territorial jurisdiction of High Courts. Amin Textile Mills Ltd. v. Central Board of Revenue (1992 SCMR 1652): Emphasized dominant relief determining territorial jurisdiction. Sethi and Sethi v. Collector of Customs (1985 CLC 324): Addressed relief-seeking in territorial jurisdiction. Articles 189 and 190 of the Constitution: Establish binding authority of Supreme Court judgments on all judicial and executive authorities.