Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan ----Arts. 51(6)(d)(e), 106(3)(c), 187, 188 & 225—Elections Act, 2017, Ss. 57, 60, 62, 64, 66, 67, 98 & 104—Elections Rules, 2017, R.94 (Explanation)—Reserved seats—Allocation of reserved seats for women and non-Muslims—Powers and jurisdiction of Election Commission of Pakistan—Scope of judicial review—Interpretation of constitutional provisions. The Supreme Court held that the scheme of the Constitution and election laws for elections to reserved seats is identical in principle to that governing general seats. Nomination papers must be filed, scrutinized, and lists of candidates for reserved seats must be submitted by political parties in accordance with constitutional timelines. Since the Sunni Ittehad Council (SIC) neither contested the general election as a political party nor submitted any list of candidates for reserved seats before the Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP), it was not entitled to any allocation of reserved seats. The unanimous dismissal of SIC’s appeals before the Supreme Court in 2024 had attained finality; therefore, SIC had no standing to reopen or contest the issue in review. (b) Constitution of Pakistan ----Art. 187—“Complete justice”—Scope—Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court—Limits. Article 187 is not a stand-alone provision and can be invoked only when the Court is properly seised of a lis under Articles 184, 185, 186 or 188 of the Constitution. The provision does not authorize the Court to legislate or grant relief to a person not before it, or to extend jurisdiction beyond the pleadings. The majority in the impugned judgment (PLD 2025 SC 67) had erred by granting relief to the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), which was neither a party to the proceedings nor had sought such relief. Substitution of constitutional text for subjective notions of equity or political preference constitutes a reviewable error apparent on the face of the record. (c) Constitution of Pakistan ----Arts. 51, 106, 187 & 225—Elections Act, 2017, Ss. 66 & 67—Certificates of party affiliation—Validity. Certificates of party affiliation issued under Section 66 of the Elections Act, 2017, by the purported Chairman of PTI were held to be a nullity as his election was not recognized under the law; consequently, candidates filing such certificates were to be treated as independents under Section 67(2) of the Act. (d) Constitution of Pakistan ----Art. 225—Elections Act, 2017—Challenge to election results—Mandatory procedure—Effect of non-observance. The Court reaffirmed that any grievance against the decision of Returning Officers or election results must be pursued under the procedure prescribed by Article 225 of the Constitution and the Elections Act, 2017. PTI and its candidates, having failed to challenge the Returning Officers’ orders declaring them independents, could not later claim that their seats be treated as PTI seats. (e) Constitutional law ----Review jurisdiction—Scope—Error apparent on the face of the record—Grounds. A review lies when a judgment is based on an erroneous assumption of material facts, contravenes a provision of law, departs from settled construction of the Constitution, or renders a constitutional provision inoperative for affected persons. Relief granted to a non-party, alteration of constitutional timelines, or exercise of legislative power in the guise of adjudication amounts to such an error warranting review. (f) Courts and jurisdiction ----Functus officio—Special bench for clarifications—Legality. Upon pronouncement of a judgment, all members of the Court become functus officio. The majority in the impugned judgment had constituted itself into a special bench for issuing further directions and clarifications; such constitution was unprecedented and contrary to law. After acceptance of the review petitions and setting aside of the impugned judgment, that self-constituted bench and its subsequent clarifications stood annulled. (g) Constitution of Pakistan ----Art. 27-A, C.P.C.—Notice to Attorney-General—Constitutionality of rules. Explanation to Rule 94 of the Election Rules, 2017, could not have been struck down without prior notice to the Attorney-General for Pakistan as mandated by Order XXVII-A, C.P.C. The question of validity of the said Explanation was left open to be decided in appropriate proceedings after such notice. (h) Review petitions—Maintainability—Parties entitled to seek review—Authority of ECP to file review petition. The Court held that review petitions filed by political parties and individuals directly affected by the impugned judgment were maintainable. The Election Commission of Pakistan, being the constitutional body responsible for superintendence of elections, possessed the right to seek review where a question of law affecting its jurisdiction and future conduct of elections was involved. (i) Constitutional law ----Doctrine of separation of powers—Judicial restraint—Observations. The Court emphasized that judicial power must not transgress into the legislative domain. Relief granted beyond the pleadings and in disregard of express constitutional mandates undermines the constitutional scheme and the separation of powers. (g) Disposition— By a majority of seven judges (Amin-ud-Din Khan, Senior Judge; Musarrat Hilali; Naeem Akhter Afghan; Shahid Bilal Hassan; Muhammad Hashim Khan Kakar; Aamer Farooq; and Ali Baqar Najafi, JJ.), all Civil Review Petitions were allowed; the impugned majority judgment dated 12.07.2024 (PLD 2025 SC 67) was set aside; Civil Appeals Nos. 333 and 334 of 2024 filed by the Sunni Ittehad Council were dismissed, and the judgment of the Peshawar High Court dated 25.03.2024 was restored. Justice Jamal Khan Mandokhel partly allowed the review petitions to the extent of forty-one seats. Justices Muhammad Ali Mazhar and Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi allowed the review petitions with directions to the ECP to undertake a de novo exercise regarding affiliation of all eighty returned candidates and decide allocation of reserved seats within fifteen days. Cited Cases: • Suba v. Fatima Bibi 1996 SCMR 158 • Pakistan v. Fecto Belarus Tractors Ltd. PLD 2002 SC 208 • Managing Director SSGC v. Ghulam Abbas PLD 2003 SC 724 • Muhammad Siddiqul Farooq v. The State 2010 SCMR 198 • Dr. Raja Aamer Zaman v. Omar Ayub Khan 2015 SCMR 1303 • Basharat Ali Khan v. Muhammad Akbar 2017 SCMR 309 • Justice Qazi Faez Isa v. President of Pakistan PLD 2022 SC 119 • Nadia Naz v. President of Pakistan 2023 PLC (C.S.) 1353 • Supreme Court Bar Association v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2024 SC 1199 • Inter Quest Informatics Services v. Commissioner of Income Tax 2025 SCMR 257.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan ----Arts. 142, 184, 270-A, Fourth Schedule (Entries 2 & 50), Eighteenth Amendment—Legislative competence—Levy and collection of tax on immovable property—Jurisdiction of Federation and Cantonment Boards—Effect of constitutional amendments. Tax on immovable property, including tax on annual rental value, has historically been a provincial subject. The legislative competence to levy, charge, or recover such tax was never vested in the Federation except during the Martial Law period through the promulgation of the *Cantonments (Urban Immovable Property Tax and Entertainment Duty) Order, 1979 (P.O. 13 of 1979)*. The Sindh High Court, tracing legislative history from the Government of India Act, 1935 to the Constitution of 1973, held that after the restoration of the Constitution in 1985 and the 18th Amendment, the subject of property tax reverted exclusively to the Provinces. Consequently, the Federation and all Cantonment Boards lacked competence to impose any such tax, the field being expressly excluded from the Federal Legislative List (Entry 50) and reserved for the Provinces under Art. 142(c). (b) Constitutional law ----Art. 270-A—Validation of laws enacted during Martial Law—Scope and limitation—Protection of Presidential Orders—Applicability of Benazir Bhutto case. Presidential Orders issued between 1977 and 1985 were granted temporary protection under Art. 270-A and the Seventh Schedule but lost their efficacy after the restoration of the Constitution and the 18th Amendment. Following the principle laid down in *Benazir Bhutto v. Federation of Pakistan* (PLD 1988 SC 416), laws protected by Art. 270-A could not override the Constitution or survive beyond the cut-off date. The Court reaffirmed that P.O. 13 of 1979, enacted when the Constitution was in abeyance, stood eclipsed and could not continue to authorize taxation in cantonment areas after constitutional restoration. (c) Cantonment Act, 1924 ----Ss. 60, 80, 106 & 109—Scope—Taxation powers of Cantonment Boards—Requirement of federal sanction and publication—Effect of August 2023 amendment. Section 60 empowers Cantonment Boards to impose only those taxes which may lawfully be imposed by a municipality in the province and only with the *previous sanction of the Federal Government* and publication in the official gazette. In the absence of an existing provincial levy, such power cannot be exercised. The 2023 amendment inserting the term “fee” into Section 60 did not expand the scope to authorize new levies; fiscal statutes must be strictly construed. Moreover, as per *Mustafa Impex v. Government of Pakistan* (PLD 2016 SC 808), prior sanction of the Federal Cabinet, not a Division, is mandatory. The amendment delegating such sanction to a Division was held inconsistent with democratic and constitutional principles. (d) Constitutional interpretation ----Entry 2, Fourth Schedule—Not a taxing entry—Entry 50 exclusive field—Distinction between taxes and fees. Entry 2 of the Fourth Schedule, often cited by Cantonment Boards, is a general administrative entry concerning federal subjects and does not include power to tax. Taxing entries are exhaustively enumerated from 43 to 53. The levy under discussion being a charge on immovable property clearly falls under Entry 50, which, post-18th Amendment, excludes immovable property from federal jurisdiction. Argument that the levy was a “fee” under Entry 54 or S.200 of the Cantonment Act was also rejected as the exhaustive list of permissible fees therein does not cover annual rental value of property, and the principle of *quid pro quo* was not satisfied. (e) Provincial legislation ----Sindh Urban Immovable Property Tax Act, 1958—Continuity and supremacy—Applicability to cantonment areas. The Sindh Urban Immovable Property Tax Act, 1958, enacted prior to the 1979 Presidential Order, remains the governing statute for property tax within the province, including cantonment areas. Following *Pakistan v. Province of Punjab* (PLD 1975 SC 37) and *Gulzar Cinema v. Cantonment Board* (PLD 1978 Kar. 500), cantonment areas located within a province are subject to provincial taxation statutes, as they do not constitute federal territory. (f) Fiscal jurisprudence ----Distinction between tax and fee—Purpose of levy—Cantonment funds—Effect of routing revenue. The fact that amounts collected were deposited into Cantonment Funds under Ss.106–109 of the Cantonment Act does not alter the nature of the levy. A tax remains a tax regardless of the fund in which it is credited. Reliance on *Workers Welfare Fund* and *GIDC* cases was misplaced, as those levies were upheld as fees due to specific quid pro quo mechanisms, which are absent here. (g) Discrimination and equality before law (Arts. 25 & 77) ----Differential taxation between municipalities and cantonments—Classification—Validity. Different rates of taxation for identical properties situated across municipal and cantonment boundaries were held discriminatory and violative of equal protection principles. A uniform regulatory framework under provincial supervision was necessary to prevent arbitrary classifications and ensure parity in valuation and assessment. (h) Disposition— Petitions allowed. It was declared that— (i) After the Eighteenth Amendment, the Federation and Cantonment Boards have no competence, power, or jurisdiction to levy, charge, impose, or recover any tax on immovable property, including tax on annual rental value. (ii) The Province of Sindh alone has legislative and fiscal authority over the subject. (iii) All amounts collected under the impugned levy since the 18th Amendment are liable to accounting and reconciliation by the provincial government. (PLD 1975 SC 37; PLD 1978 Kar. 500; PLD 1988 SC 416; PLD 2016 SC 808; 2022 Peshawar 46; 2023 SCMR — Cantonment Board case, 13.10.2023, followed).

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 ----Art. 184(3)---Art. 175E(4)---Art. 10A---Art. 90---Art. 40---Suo motu proceedings---Transfer to Federal Constitutional Court---Scope of original jurisdiction Murder of Pakistani journalist abroad---Suo motu taken by Supreme Court under Art.184(3)---Matter transferred after Constitution (Twenty-Seventh Amendment) Act, 2025---Held, proceedings concerned ensuring fair, independent and transparent investigation; right to fair trial under Art.10A extends to investigation stage and requires collection of evidence holistically, including material supporting defence as well as prosecution---However, court’s role is limited and cannot extend to continuous monitoring or supervision of investigation, particularly where no allegation of impropriety in investigation is pressed and the concern relates mainly to pace owing to coordination with another sovereign State. (b) Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 ----S. 4(1)(l)---Definition of “investigation”---Collection of evidence by police officer/authorized person (other than Magistrate)---Judicial restraint Court supervision of investigation---Limits---Held, investigation is a statutory inquisition for collection of evidence by police; continuous court control/supervision not contemplated and generally impermissible---Conduct and manner of investigation not to be scrutinized under constitutional jurisdiction as it amounts to interference and substitution of police function; courts and police perform complementary, not overlapping, roles---Exceptional circumstances for interference confined to limited categories (e.g., habeas corpus, mala fide investigation, lack of jurisdiction/excess of authority) and grievances may be pursued before competent forums. Cited Cases: • Ajmeel Khan v. Abdur Rahim, PLD 2009 SC 102 • Malik Shoukat Ali Dogar v. Ghulam Qasim Khakwani, PLD 1994 SC 281 • Fahad Ahmed Gulzar v. ASI/IO Saeed Mahroof, 2025 PCrLJ 1140 (c) Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 ----Art. 10A---Fair trial and due process---Investigation stage---Independence and transparency Fair trial---Commencement from investigation---Held, Art.10A protection begins from inception of investigation, requiring independent investigator and enabling environment free from undue pressure---Nevertheless, court’s continuous oversight may prejudice accused and undermine fairness of procedure; judicial monitoring of investigation therefore disfavoured. (d) Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 ----Art. 90---Executive authority of Federation---State’s obligation to protect citizens’ rights---Government measures abroad Federal Government’s role---Diplomatic and investigative steps---Held, Federal Government, acting through executive authority, undertook measures including constitution of Special Joint Investigation Team (SJIT), liaison with foreign authorities, engagement with prosecutorial offices in Kenya and facilitation through Ministry of Foreign Affairs---Court noted no objection by any party to SJIT or fact-finding process/method, and no allegation of impropriety; primary concern related to pace due to need for coordination with another sovereign State. (e) Mutual Legal Assistance (Criminal Matters) Act, 2020 ----Ss. 2(1)(c), 4, 7---Central authority (Secretary, Ministry of Interior)---Request to foreign state---Admissible evidence and cooperation Mutual legal assistance framework in Pakistan---Held, 2020 Act provides statutory mechanism for MLA in criminal matters through designated central authority empowered to make requests to foreign authorities for investigation/proceedings---Request made to Kenya and agreement executed; once MLA process invoked, central authority exercises powers relating to request under the Act, and investigation proceeds within the statutory framework, reducing scope for judicial interference. (f) Kenya Mutual Legal Assistance Act, 2011 ----Ss. 5, 6---Kenyan central authority (Office of Attorney General)---Handling foreign requests Bilateral cooperation---Held, Kenya maintains corresponding statutory framework empowering its central authority to act on MLA requests---Where both States possess legal frameworks and are coordinating under MLA, courts ought not to interfere when law and investigation are taking their due course and sovereign processes are engaged. (g) Constitutional law and foreign policy ----Art. 40---Principles of policy---International forums---Separation of functions Direction to pursue international fora---Held, judicial orders directing State to raise matter in international forums would encroach upon foreign policy domain and interfere with ongoing MLA-based investigative process; handling of foreign relations is for Federal Government/MoFA to determine what is appropriate in international context; issue left to executive’s judgment, with note that recourse could be considered if need arises. (h) Criminal law ----Pakistan Penal Code, 1860---Ss. 302/34---FIR registered in Pakistan for murder abroad---Inter-state coordination Registration of FIR and domestic steps---FIR registered under sections 302/34 PPC at P.S. Ramna, Islamabad as produced before Supreme Court---SJIT constituted to investigate and coordinate with Kenyan counterparts; court noted ongoing diplomatic and legal steps including warrants and MLA cooperation, without making findings on merits of evidence so as not to prejudice any future trial. Disposition: Suo moto proceedings disposed of; all pending applications disposed of; Court declined to keep proceedings pending for continuous supervision/monitoring of investigation and declined to issue directions concerning international fora, noting MLA process and diplomatic coordination underway; legal heirs left at liberty to approach courts/forums of competent jurisdiction in case of specific grievance (Suo Moto Case No. 3 of 2022, heard 14.01.2026).

Summary: a) Constitution of Pakistan ----Arts. 175E(1), 184(1) & 199---Original jurisdiction in disputes between Governments---Scope---Mischaracterization of dispute as inter se between Federal and Provincial Governments---Writ petition dismissed by High Court for want of jurisdiction on premise that dispute lay between two Governments attracting original jurisdiction of Supreme Court under Art.184(1)---Held, Constitution recognizes only Federal and Provincial Governments; dispute between a federal statutory corporation and a provincial department does not, by itself, constitute a “dispute between two Governments”---Original jurisdiction under Art.184(1) (now under Art.175E(1) after 27th Constitutional Amendment) attracted only where parties are Governments in constitutional sense---High Court erred in declining jurisdiction merely on basis of nomenclature and concession made at bar. Cited Cases: • Pakistan Railways v. Karachi Development Authority 2003 SCMR 563 (b) Evacuee Trust Properties (Management and Disposal) Act, 1975 ----Ss. 3(1), 3(2) & 4(2)(s)---Status and legal personality of Evacuee Trust Property Board---Body corporate---Power to sue and be sued---Board constituted by Federal Government but statutorily recognized as separate juristic person with perpetual succession and common seal---Expressly empowered to institute and defend suits and proceedings in courts of law---Held, Board was proper litigating entity in matters concerning evacuee trust property and could not be equated with Federal Government for purposes of constitutional jurisdiction. (c) Constitution of Pakistan ----Art.199---Writ jurisdiction of High Court---Effect of misdescription of parties---Petitioner described as “Central Government through Chairman, Evacuee Trust Property Board”---Held, no constitutional entity known as “Central Government”; misdescription in memo of parties could not divest High Court of jurisdiction otherwise vested under Art.199---Jurisdiction determined by substance of dispute and legal status of parties, not by erroneous nomenclature or concessions made by counsel. (d) Administration of justice ----Concession at bar---Jurisdiction---Principle---Concession or admission by counsel on question of law or jurisdiction not binding on court---Jurisdiction cannot be conferred or taken away by consent, waiver or erroneous concession---High Court obliged to independently determine its jurisdiction on constitutional and statutory footing. Disposition: Petition converted into appeal; appeal allowed; impugned order dated 17.04.2024 set aside; case remanded to Lahore High Court, Lahore for fresh decision in accordance with law, preferably within three months. (C.P.L.A. No. 1451-L/2024, order dated 09.12.2025)