Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), Ss. 561-A, 265-K & 249-A—Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 365-B, 494, 496-A, 420, 468, 471, 109 & 34— —Acquittal—Scope of inherent jurisdiction—Petition for acquittal during trial—Maintainability— Petitioners sought acquittal under S.561-A, Cr.P.C. after rejection of earlier application under S.265-K, Cr.P.C.—Held, final challan had been submitted, charge was framed, and trial was underway with prosecution witnesses yet to be examined—Main accused were absconding and recovery of vehicle used in commission of alleged offence had been effected from petitioners’ premises—Court observed that criminal trials should ordinarily proceed to conclusion on merits, and extraordinary jurisdiction under Ss. 265-K or 561-A should not be invoked when trial has commenced—Preemptive acquittal of some accused may prejudice the prosecution case against absconding co-accused—Petition dismissed. Principle: Where trial has commenced, the Court should refrain from short-circuiting proceedings through premature acquittal under inherent or statutory provisions. (b) Criminal Trial—Multiple accused—Effect of acquitting some accused during trial—Prejudice to prosecution— Two co-accused had absconded and their trial was yet to be conducted—Held, in cases involving multiple accused, allowing acquittal of some accused at an early stage could adversely affect prosecution of others—Prosecution had listed around 20 witnesses—Premature acquittal would obstruct evaluation of collective liability under Ss.34 & 109, P.P.C.—Court must adopt cautious approach in such cases. Principle: Acquittal of one accused during pendency of trial may prejudice case of co-accused, particularly when trial is incomplete and evidence is yet to be recorded. (c) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S. 561-A—Scope—When not to be invoked— S.561-A, Cr.P.C. confers inherent powers to secure ends of justice or prevent abuse of process—However, such powers are not a substitute for trial and must be exercised sparingly—Held, where factual controversy exists and trial is in progress, accused must be tried in accordance with law—Assessment of guilt or innocence should be left to trial court after full evidence is led. Held, petition under S.561-A dismissed as misconceived. Petition dismissed.

Summary: (a) Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947 (FERA): ---Ss. 23(3), 23(6)--- Initiation of proceedings without requisite complaint by the State Bank of Pakistan---Quashing of proceedings--- The proceedings against the applicant were quashed as the mandatory requirement under Section 23(6) of FERA for a written complaint by an authorized officer of the State Bank of Pakistan was not fulfilled. Evidence revealed that the complaint was filed on the instructions of the FIA rather than independently by the State Bank, and the individual who filed the complaint was not authorized under the applicable law at the time. ----Cited Cases: State v. Imam Bakhsh (2018 SCMR 2039) Ikramullah v. The State (2015 SCMR 1002) (b) Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 (Cr.P.C.): ---S. 249-A--- Acquittal during trial on grounds of legal infirmities---Lack of evidence--- The applicant was acquitted under Section 249-A Cr.P.C. as the prosecution failed to provide any substantive evidence linking him to the alleged hawala transactions. The FIA admitted that it had no evidence connecting the applicant to the transactions beyond blanket allegations. (c) Double Jeopardy: ---Non-applicability of double jeopardy in subsequent proceedings by authorized agency--- While quashing the proceedings initiated by the FIA, the court clarified that the decision does not bar the State Bank of Pakistan from initiating fresh proceedings against the applicant, provided they comply with the mandatory provisions of FERA. Double jeopardy would not apply as the earlier proceedings lacked lawful authority. ----Cited Cases: Mst. Razia Sultana v. The State (2019 SCMR 1300) (d) Judicial Independence: ---Reprimands against judicial officers---Impact on judicial decision-making---** The court observed that reprimands against judicial officers for their decisions, where reasons are provided, adversely impact judicial independence and the dynamism of judges. Judicial officers at all levels deserve respect, and differences in opinion should not lead to undue criticism. -----Disposition: Application allowed. Proceedings arising out of FIR No. 51 of 2015 quashed for lack of lawful authority. The State Bank of Pakistan may initiate fresh proceedings if deemed necessary.

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (Cr.P.C.): ----S. 561-A—Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 19—Freedom of Speech—Quashing of Criminal Proceedings—Scope and Limitations. The applicant, a journalist and YouTube content creator, uploaded a video that allegedly defamed Axact (Pvt.) Ltd. A private complaint was filed under Sections 499, 500, 502-A, and 505, P.P.C. before the trial court, which took cognizance. The applicant sought quashing of the proceedings under Section 561-A, Cr.P.C. The High Court held: Scope of Section 561-A, Cr.P.C.: While a High Court should not ordinarily exercise its inherent jurisdiction under Section 561-A, Cr.P.C. unless alternate remedies under Sections 249-A or 265-K, Cr.P.C. are exhausted, it may do so in exceptional cases to prevent abuse of court process or secure the ends of justice. Freedom of Speech (Article 19, Constitution of Pakistan, 1973): Freedom of speech is a cornerstone of a free society. Courts are duty-bound to protect this right against unwarranted encroachments. Restrictions on free speech must meet specific constitutional thresholds: undermining the glory of Islam, national security, public order, morality, contempt of court, or incitement to offense. Prima Facie Deficiency in Complaint: The complaint failed to establish how the video content defamed Axact or caused any damage. Additionally: No evidence of authorization from Axact’s board or general body to initiate criminal proceedings. The complainants were two unidentified employees of a subsidiary company without clear standing. The complaint appeared vague and lacked substantive evidence of harm. Unnecessary Litigation: Courts must prevent misuse of legal processes, especially where fundamental rights, such as freedom of speech, are at stake. The court observed that the complaint appeared more as a conflict of egos than a genuine criminal grievance and emphasized resolving such disputes through mediation instead of criminal proceedings. Disposition: Proceedings arising from the complaint were quashed under Section 561-A, Cr.P.C. ----Cited Law: Criminal Procedure Code, Sections 561-A, 249-A, 265-K Pakistan Penal Code, Sections 499, 500, 502-A, 505 Constitution of Pakistan, Article 19 ----Cited Cases: FIA v. Syed Hamad Ali Shah (C.P. 1257 of 2020) Muhammad Farooq v. Ahmed Nawaz Jagirani (PLD 2016 SC 55)

Summary: Background: The petitioner filed a writ petition under Article 44 of the AJ&K Interim Constitution, 1974, seeking relief against the orders passed by the Additional Sessions Judge Mirpur and the Civil Judge/Magistrate 1st Class Court No.II, Mirpur. An FIR was lodged against the respondents (accused) under Sections 489-F, 419/420 APC. The police submitted a challan to the trial court on April 16, 2011. While the case was at the stage of recording evidence, the accused filed an application under Section 249-A of Cr.P.C., which was allowed, resulting in their acquittal on July 27, 2016. The petitioner filed a revision petition before the Additional Sessions Judge, Mirpur, on October 10, 2016, which was dismissed on September 11, 2017. ----Issues: 1- Whether a revision petition was competent before the Additional Sessions Judge, Mirpur, against the acquittal order of the Civil Judge/Magistrate 1st Class Court No.II, Mirpur. 2- Whether the Additional Sessions Judge, Mirpur, committed any illegality in dismissing the revision petition. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The High Court dismissed the writ petition, holding that the revision petition filed before the Additional Sessions Judge, Mirpur, was incompetent because an appeal, not a revision, was the appropriate legal remedy. Under Section 439 (5) of the Cr.P.C., where an appeal lies and no appeal is brought, no proceedings by way of revision shall be entertained at the instance of the party who could have appealed. The petitioner should have filed an appeal against the acquittal order instead of a revision petition. The Additional Sessions Judge, Mirpur, correctly dismissed the revision petition as incompetent, adhering to the relevant provisions of the Cr.P.C. and the legal precedents. No violation of rules or departure from the law was pointed out by the petitioner's counsel during the course of arguments, and therefore, the writ jurisdiction of the High Court could not be invoked. ----Citations/Precedents: Relevant Provision: Section 439 (5) of the Cr.P.C. Case Law References: The judgment does not specifically cite other case laws but refers to the dictum laid down by superior courts regarding the competence of revision petitions and appeals.

Summary: Background: This case involves a petition filed by the accused under Section 561-A of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cr.P.C.), challenging two previous judicial decisions. The first order, dated 16.04.2022, was made by a Magistrate in Gojra, rejecting the petitioner's application under Section 249-A Cr.P.C. for acquittal. The second order, dated 15.08.2022, was passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Gojra, upholding the Magistrate’s decision. The petitioner had been charged under Section 25-D of the Telegraph Act 1885, based on an FIR filed in 2020, alleging that he made threatening calls to the complainant. ----Issues: 1- Whether the charge under Section 25-D of the Telegraph Act was groundless. 2- Whether the Compact Disc (CD) provided by the prosecution was admissible as evidence without proper forensic examination. 3- Whether the acquittal of the co-accused influenced the validity of the charges against the petitioner. 4- Whether the trial should be quashed under Section 249-A Cr.P.C. due to lack of probability of conviction. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The court found that the prosecution’s evidence was insufficient to sustain the charges. The Compact Disc (CD), the primary evidence against the petitioner, was not forensically analyzed to verify its authenticity. Moreover, the police did not seize the mobile phones allegedly involved in the threatening calls, which could have been critical for corroborating the evidence. The court further noted that the co-accused had already been declared innocent, and the complainant did not challenge their exoneration. Given the lack of substantial evidence and the failure to meet the criteria established by precedent regarding the admissibility of audio recordings, the court quashed the trial proceedings and acquitted the petitioner of all charges under Section 249-A Cr.P.C. ----Citations/Precedents: Ishtiaq Ahmed Mirza v. Federation of Pakistan, PLD 2019 Supreme Court 675 Member (Administration), Federal Board of Revenue v. Mian Khan, PLD 2021 SCMR 1077 Muhammad Rafique v. State, 2014 SCMR 1698 Nasrullah alias Nasro v. The State, 2017 SCMR 724

Summary: (1) A complete & comprehensive procedure of a complaint filed under section 133 Cr.P.C enunciated and highlighted.2) A Court of law or any authority who is seized of any Judicial or quasi judicial proceedings and whose interim order has been challenged before the higher Court/forum shall not stopped the regular proceedings in the main case unless & until such pending proceedings are stayed by the higher forum though a specific & clear order.3) All Judicial forums are constitutionally bound to take the proceeding pending before them to its logical conclusion with full application of mind. -----Background: The appellant filed a criminal appeal under Section 417 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (CrPC), challenging the acquittal of the respondents by the Judicial Magistrate, Buner. The respondents were acquitted under Section 249-A CrPC in a case registered under Sections 452, 506, 337 L(ii), and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code (PPC). The case stemmed from allegations of criminal intimidation, firing to terrorize the complainant's son, and assaulting the complainant with knives and sticks, resulting in injuries. The dispute arose from a disagreement over cutting trees. -----Issues: 1- Whether the trial court's acquittal of the respondents under Section 249-A CrPC was lawful and justified. -----2- Whether the trial court denied due process by failing to record essential prosecution evidence. -----3- Whether the trial court prematurely acquitted the respondents without hearing key witnesses, including the doctor and Investigating Officer. -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: --Premature Acquittal: The trial court entertained the respondents' application under Section 249-A CrPC midway through the trial, acquitting them without recording the statements of crucial prosecution witnesses, including the doctor who examined the injuries and the Investigating Officer. The court’s decision was deemed hasty and contrary to the principles of justice. --Violation of Due Process: Article 10A of the Constitution of Pakistan, which guarantees the right to a fair trial, was cited. The appellant/complainant was denied the opportunity to fully prosecute his case, as the trial court failed to procure essential evidence. The court emphasized that it is the duty of the Public Prosecutor and the court to ensure the attendance of official witnesses for recording their statements. The trial court’s reliance on assumptions and presumptions, without allowing the prosecution to present all its evidence, violated the complainant's fundamental rights. --Role of the Trial Court: The trial court has a responsibility to assess the evidence impartially and not to resort to shortcuts. By failing to record evidence critical to the prosecution’s case, the trial court's decision lacked legal sustainability. --Outcome of the Appeal: The Peshawar High Court observed that the acquittal under Section 249-A CrPC was premature and not in accordance with law. The acquittal order dated 15.07.2021 was set aside, and the case was remanded for completion of the trial after recording the necessary evidence, ensuring compliance with due process. -----Citations/Precedents: Section 249-A CrPC: Provides for acquittal if, at any stage of the case, the evidence presented is insufficient for conviction. The court highlighted that this provision must not be applied prematurely or without recording essential evidence. Article 10A of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973: Recognizes the right to due process and a fair trial as a fundamental right, which was violated in this case.

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898): —S. 249-A—Acquittal by trial court—Appellate jurisdiction—Rehearing of criminal acquittal appeal—Scope. The applicant sought rehearing of a criminal acquittal appeal dismissed on merits due to non-appearance of the appellant and his counsel. The Court held that once an acquittal appeal is dismissed on merits after examining the record, a request for rehearing amounts to seeking a review of the earlier decision, which is not permissible. The appellate court does not have inherent jurisdiction to recall or review an order passed on merits. (b) Practice & Procedure—Judicial Efficiency: —Adjournment requests—Abuse of judicial process—Effect. The Court strongly condemned the practice of lawyers seeking adjournments on flimsy grounds, observing that such conduct erodes public confidence in the legal system and delays the administration of justice. The counsel’s failure to appear on multiple hearings, including on the date of final disposal, was noted as an abuse of procedural safeguards. It was emphasized that the right of appearance must be exercised diligently, and frequent adjournments cannot be allowed to disrupt the expeditious disposal of cases. (c) Legal Ethics—Professional Conduct of Lawyers: —Obstruction of court proceedings—Role of bar associations—Consequences. The Court criticized the conduct of the applicant’s counsel, who was involved in organizing strikes and blocking court entrances while simultaneously seeking adjournments. Such actions were deemed a direct obstruction of justice. The Court reiterated that lawyers, as officers of the court, have a duty to ensure smooth functioning of the judicial system rather than contributing to its delay. (d) Constitutional Law—Right to Speedy Trial: —Delays in adjudication—Impact on litigants. The Court underscored that the right to a speedy trial is a fundamental right of litigants, and unnecessary adjournments deprive individuals of justice. It was noted that repeated delays, particularly in criminal cases, result in prolonged pre-trial detention and unjustified hardships for accused persons. Judicial discipline demands that frivolous adjournments be discouraged, and where necessary, heavy costs should be imposed to deter the misuse of procedural privileges. (e) High Court Rules & Administrative Powers: —Regulation of adjournments—Role of Chief Justice & procedural framework. The Court pointed out that while rules of procedure for adjournments in the Balochistan High Court had not been formally framed, it remains the prerogative of the Chief Justice to regulate court business. Adjournment applications should be placed before the relevant judges or the Chief Justice for consideration rather than being entertained arbitrarily by the registrar’s office. The importance of structured judicial administration to prevent undue delays was emphasized. ----Disposition: Application for rehearing dismissed. The Court directed strict adherence to judicial discipline to curb unwarranted adjournments.

Summary: The appellant, Muhammad Tariq, filed the case against eight respondents alleging that they trespassed into a house and caused injury to the appellant. During the proceedings, the appellant submitted an affidavit at the bail stage and made statements before the Magistrate indicating a compromise with the respondents. However, the trial court accepted an application filed by the respondents under section 249-A Cr.P.C., based on statements made by the complainant during bail and remand stages, without issuing notice to the appellant. The appeal raises important legal questions regarding the validity of acquitting the accused solely based on statements made during pre-trial stages and whether a person can be acquitted in a non-compoundable offense on the grounds of compromise. The judgment discusses the legal framework concerning the compounding of offenses under section 345 Cr.P.C., distinguishing between compoundable offenses and non-compoundable offenses. It emphasizes that offenses under section 337-A PPC fall under the category of offenses requiring court permission for compounding. Legal precedents such as Tariq Mehmood's Case and Muhammad Akram's Case are cited to illustrate that compromises made during pre-trial stages cannot be accepted without court permission when the prosecution is pending. Furthermore, the judgment highlights the legislative intent behind the bifurcation of compoundable offenses and underscores the need for courts to ensure the genuineness and validity of compromises, particularly in cases involving societal interests or heinous offenses. The judgment concludes that the trial court erred in acquitting the respondents based on compromised statements made during pre-trial stages and sets aside the acquittal order, remanding the matter for further trial proceedings in accordance with the law. The judgment also emphasizes established legal principles regarding appeals against acquittals, stating that while appellate courts generally refrain from disturbing acquittal orders, they may intervene if the order is patently illegal or based on erroneous considerations.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan ----Art. 199— Constitutional petition—Quashing of FIR—Scope and limitations—Petitioners sought quashing of FIRs registered under Section 25-D of the Telegraph Act, 1885 and Sections 354, 506, 337-H(2), and 34, P.P.C.—Held, that Article 199 of the Constitution affords a discretionary and summary remedy which is not meant for determination of disputed facts or factual controversies requiring recording of evidence—Where FIRs disclose commission of cognizable offences, constitutional jurisdiction cannot be invoked to quash the same—Remedy under Article 199 cannot be used to obstruct or preempt investigation and trial—Such intervention by High Courts has consistently been deprecated by the superior judiciary—Jurisdiction under Article 199 must be exercised only where no adequate alternate remedy is available— Cited Cases: • Amir Jamal v. Malik Zahoor-ul-Haq 2011 SCMR 1023 • Muhammad Younas Khan v. Government of N.W.F.P. 1993 SCMR 618 • Mst. Kaniz Fatima v. Muhammad Salim 2001 SCMR 1493 • Muslimabad Cooperative Housing Society Ltd. v. Mrs. Siddiqa Faiz PLD 2008 SC 135 • President, All Pakistan Women Association v. Muhammad Akbar Awan 2020 SCMR 260 (b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) ----Ss. 63, 190, 249-A & 551— Alternative remedies—Exhaustion of statutory avenues before invoking writ jurisdiction—Accused person seeking quashing of FIR must first avail statutory remedies—Held, that a person aggrieved by registration of an FIR has multiple remedies: (i) before the Investigating Officer, (ii) before supervisory police officers under Section 551, Cr.P.C., (iii) before a Magistrate under Section 63, Cr.P.C. for discharge, (iv) under Rule 24.7 of the Punjab Police Rules, 1934, (v) before a Magistrate under Section 190, Cr.P.C., and (vi) acquittal under Section 249-A, Cr.P.C.—Only after exhaustion of such remedies can constitutional jurisdiction be invoked. Cited Case: • Qaisar Mahmood v. Muhammad Sham PLD 1998 Lahore 72 **(c) Criminal Procedure—Investigation— ----Quashing of FIR— Disputed questions of fact—Scope of interference by High Court—Held, that investigation of criminal offences falls within the exclusive domain of the Investigating Officer and the Trial Court—High Court, in its writ jurisdiction, cannot act as a fact-finding forum or interfere in ongoing investigations—Where FIRs contain allegations attracting cognizable offences, any interference at pre-trial stage is unwarranted and amounts to judicial overreach—Such interference has been disapproved in multiple precedents— Cited Cases: • Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmad AIR 1945 PC 18 • Shahnaz Begum v. Judges of the High Court of Sindh and Baluchistan PLD 1971 SC 677 • Brig. (Retd.) Imtiaz Ahmad v. Government of Pakistan 1994 SCMR 2142 • Col. Shah Sadiq v. Muhammad Ashiq 2006 SCMR 276 • Dr. Ghulam Mustafa v. The State 2008 SCMR 76 • Ajmeel Khan v. Abdur Rahim PLD 2009 SC 102 (d) Constitution of Pakistan ----Art. 10-A— Fair trial—Direction to Investigation Officer—Petitioners urged the Court to direct the Investigating Officers to conduct investigation in a fair and impartial manner—Held, that Investigation Officers are legally bound to investigate fairly and transparently—Court expressed confidence that Investigating Officers shall proceed without fear or favour and in accordance with law to protect petitioners' rights under Article 10-A of the Constitution. Disposition: Petitions dismissed—High Court declined to quash FIRs in constitutional jurisdiction—Held that factual controversies and ongoing investigations are beyond the scope of Article 199—Petitioners advised to pursue statutory remedies and let investigation and trial take their lawful course.

Summary: The petitioner was accused of conducting illegal kidney transplants that led to the deaths of two patients. The FIR was registered under sections 9, 10, and 11 of the Transplantation of Human Organs and Tissues Act, 2010, and section 109 PPC. The petitioner argued that the FIR could not be registered without a complaint from the Monitoring Authority or an aggrieved person as per section 14(2) of the Act. Additionally, the petitioner contested the authority of the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) to conduct the investigation. The court clarified that the registration of an FIR and the taking of cognizance by a court are separate processes. While section 14(2) of the Act governs the court's cognizance, it does not prohibit reporting the offense to the police or initiating an investigation. The court also cited a precedent "INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT BANK OF PAKISTAN and others v. Mian ASIM FAREED and others" (2006 S C M R 483) emphasizing that the registration of an FIR and taking cognizance are distinct concepts. Regarding the FIA's authority, the court noted that the Ministry of Interior had authorized the agency to investigate offenses under the Transplantation Human Organ and Tissue Act 2010. Ultimately, the court dismissed the petition, stating that the power to quash an FIR should be exercised sparingly. The petitioner was advised to avail himself of remedies under section 249-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure if he believed he was falsely implicated.