Summary: The petitioner is a Hajj Group Operator. For below the par services, it was penalized with refunding each and every Hajj. The appeal has also been dismissed. Hence this writ.

Summary: Summary Pending

Summary: Petitioner Shehryar Afridi files this Writ from confinement against his father detention of 30 days.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan ----Arts. 9, 10, 16, 17, 19 & 184(3) Preventive detention—Fundamental right to liberty—Judicial scrutiny—Scope and limits of executive authority—Constitutional safeguards against arbitrary detention—Principle of proportionality—Rule of law—Government's discretionary power to detain individuals under the Maintenance of Public Order Ordinance, 1960 (MPO) must conform to constitutional principles—Fundamental right to liberty, enshrined in Art. 9 of the Constitution, is inviolable unless restricted by due process—Art. 10 provides safeguards against arbitrary detention, ensuring detainees are informed of reasons, allowed legal representation, and produced before a magistrate—Preventive detention, as an exception to these rights, must be exercised with extreme caution—Detaining authority must substantiate its subjective satisfaction with sufficient material—Court held that mere suspicion or executive convenience cannot justify curtailment of liberty—Principle of proportionality demands that any restriction on fundamental rights must be the least intrusive means to achieve the objective—Courts have inherent power of judicial review under Art. 184(3) to strike down detention orders issued in contravention of constitutional safeguards—Impugned detention orders were found to be unlawful as no substantive material was presented to justify preventive detention—Petitions allowed, and detention orders set aside. Cited Cases: Pakistan Muslim League (N) v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2007 SC 642) In Re Suo Motu Constitutional Petition (1994 SCMR 1028) Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto v. President of Pakistan (PLD 1998 SC 388) Begum Shorish Kashmiri Case (PLD 1969 SC 14) Federation of Pakistan v. Mrs. Amatul Jalil Khawaja (PLD 2003 SC 442)​ (b) Preventive Detention ----West Pakistan Maintenance of Public Order Ordinance, 1960—Scope and limitations Preventive detention under Section 3 of the MPO—Judicial review—Requirement of objective satisfaction—Executive's power to detain individuals must be based on tangible and reasonable grounds—Supreme Court and High Courts have repeatedly emphasized that preventive detention cannot be used as a tool against political dissent—Historical misuse of preventive detention laws in Pakistan to suppress political opposition noted—Courts must ensure that detention orders pass the test of reasonableness and necessity—In the absence of verifiable material justifying detention, such orders are liable to be struck down—Court observed that invocation of Section 3 of the MPO against political opponents raises serious concerns regarding abuse of executive authority—Preventive detention should only be exercised in exceptional circumstances where there is clear and immediate danger to public order—Detention orders in the present case failed to meet this threshold and were declared ultra vires the Constitution. Cited Cases: Ghulam Jilani v. Government of West Pakistan (PLD 1967 SC 373) Mir Abdul Baqi Baloch v. Government of Pakistan (PLD 1968 SC 313) Liaquat Ali v. Government of Sindh (PLD 1973 Karachi 78) Haroon Farooq v. Federation of Pakistan (2023 LHC 1450)​ (c) Fundamental Rights—Right to Protest ----Arts. 9, 16, 17, 19—Protest and public order Right to peaceful assembly and protest—State’s obligation to ensure balance between maintaining public order and protecting fundamental rights—Art. 16 guarantees the right to assemble peacefully—Art. 17 ensures the right to form associations and participate in political activities—Art. 19 protects freedom of speech and expression—State action restricting these rights must be proportional and the least restrictive measure available—Court relied on the Faizabad Dharna Case (PLD 2019 SC 318) to reaffirm that the right to protest is a constitutional right that cannot be arbitrarily curtailed—Any restriction must be justified by concrete evidence showing a credible threat to public order—Court found that the detaining authorities in the present case failed to demonstrate such justification—Detention orders were struck down. Cited Cases: Faizabad Dharna Case (PLD 2019 SC 318) Mian Ali Asghar v. Government of Punjab (2020 CLC 157) Pakistan Muslim League (N) v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2007 SC 642)​ (d) Rule of Law—Judicial Review ----Arts. 4, 9, 10, 175—Judicial scrutiny of executive action Judicial review of preventive detention—Principles of natural justice—Burden of proof on detaining authority—Superior courts have repeatedly emphasized that preventive detention cannot be arbitrary or based on political considerations—Detaining authority must present substantive material justifying satisfaction for issuing detention orders—Court reiterated that rule of law requires executive decisions to be subject to judicial scrutiny—Arbitrary detention violates the constitutional guarantee of due process and access to justice under Art. 10A—Court applied strict scrutiny standard and found that the impugned detention orders did not meet constitutional and legal requirements—Orders declared null and void. Cited Cases: Al-Jehad Trust v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 1996 SC 324) Munir Hussain Bhatti v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2011 SC 407) Pakistan Muslim League (N) v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2007 SC 642)​ (e) Separation of Powers—Executive Overreach ----Arts. 90, 99—Delegation of power to executive authorities Limits on executive discretion—Scope of delegation of powers—Court observed that the delegation of detention powers under the MPO from provincial governments to district magistrates lacks constitutional validity—Excessive delegation of power to lower executive functionaries raises concerns about abuse—Court held that provincial and federal governments must establish clear guidelines to ensure that preventive detention is exercised in accordance with constitutional safeguards—Failure to do so results in executive overreach, warranting judicial intervention—Detention orders passed by district authorities were deemed unconstitutional and set aside. Cited Cases: Lahore Development Authority v. Imrana Tiwana (2015 SCMR 1739) Federation of Pakistan v. Mustafa Impex (2016 SCMR 447)​ Disposition Petitions allowed—Impugned detention orders set aside—Government directed to ensure that preventive detention laws are not used as instruments of political suppression—Court emphasized that all future detention orders under the MPO must be based on concrete and verifiable evidence—State authorities instructed to respect constitutional rights while ensuring public order.

Summary: Acquittal granted ---- Issue(s):The propriety of framing charges under the ATA of 1997 against the petitioner.Whether the evidence presented and the procedure followed in the case justified the charges and subsequent conviction of the petitioner.-----Holding: The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the judgments of both the Trial Court and the High Court.----Reasoning:----Defective Charges: The Supreme Court found the charges framed against Shahid to be vague and lacking specificity regarding the alleged offenses under the ATA of 1997. The Court noted the importance of framing precise charges to inform the accused of the nature of allegations and to focus the trial on relevant evidence.----Insufficient Evidence: The Court observed that the evidence and the FIR did not substantiate the charges against Shahid, specifically under Section 11-H of the ATA of 1997, which deals with fundraising for terrorism. The FIR and subsequent investigations failed to concretely link Shahid to the collection of funds with the intention or knowledge that they would be used for terrorism.----Procedural Flaws: The Court highlighted procedural irregularities, such as the failure to document the spy's information in writing and the lack of forensic analysis of the alleged signatures of Shahid in the donation book. These flaws cast doubt on the reliability of the evidence against Shahid.----Quality of Evidence: The Supreme Court emphasized the need for high-quality evidence in cases involving serious offenses like terrorism, which was lacking in Shahid's case. The Court criticized the practice of implicating individuals based on weak or speculative evidence.----Disposition: The convictions and sentences against Zain Shahid were set aside, and he was acquitted of all charges. The Supreme Court ordered his immediate release unless required in another case.---Quote: ''Framing of charge is the foundation of trial; section 221 of Cr.P.C. provides an elaborate procedure for framing of charge; it is the responsibility of the Trial Judge to take all necessary and possible steps to ensure compliance of law with regard to framing of proper and unambiguous charge; if necessary ingredients of the offences with which the accused is charged, are not mentioned in the charge, or it is framed in an incomplete, defective or vague manner, it might mislead the accused, which would be a failure of justice.''

Summary: Background:Mumtaz Ali, the appellant, was indicted in Accountability Court-I, Sukkur, for misappropriation of government funds under Section 9 of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 (NAO, 1999). He was convicted by the Accountability Court and sentenced to ten years of rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs.61,79,238. After an appeal, the High Court reduced his sentence to the period already served but maintained the conviction and the fine. As part of the bail conditions, Mumtaz Ali had deposited the entire fine amount with the Supreme Court's Assistant Registrar.----Issues:Whether the deposited fine amount should be returned to the appellant or remain with the National Accountability Bureau (NAB).Whether the appellant's son, acting as surety, should be discharged from liability.----Holding:The Court dismissed the application for the return of surety and directed the Office to hand over the Defense Savings Certificates to the NAB for encashment of the liability determined by the NAB Court and affirmed by the High Court. Any excess amount after encashment would be refunded to the applicant after adjusting the liability/fine.----Citations/Precedents:Shamraiz Khan vs. The State (2000 SCMR 157)State and others vs. Muhammad Kaleem Bhatti and others (PLJ 2020 SC (Cr.C.) 225)----Key Points:The appellant voluntarily deposited the fine amount as part of the bail conditions, not as surety.The fine amount was determined by the NAB Court and affirmed by the High Court, making it a confirmed liability.The provisions of Section 33-E of the NAO, 1999 govern the recovery of fines, which is not controlled by Section 70 of the PPC.Imprisonment in default of payment of fine does not absolve the liability to pay the fine.Any excess amount after encashment of Defense Savings Certificates would be refunded to the applicant.The Court held that the deposited amount should be handed over to the NAB for encashment, and any excess amount would be refunded to the applicant after adjusting the liability/fine.

Summary: Background:This case involves multiple civil appeals (Nos. 26-K to 38-K of 2021) against a common judgment dated 08.04.2021 by the Sindh High Court, Karachi, which dismissed various constitutional petitions related to the regularization of services. The appellants, initially appointed on a contract basis as Deputy District Attorneys and other positions, sought regularization under the Sindh (Regularization of Adhoc and Contract Employees) Act, 2013. Despite fulfilling the criteria and being in service, their regularization was not processed, prompting them to approach the High Court. The High Court, while dismissing their petitions, also declared the 2013 Act ultra vires (beyond the powers) without the appellants challenging the Act?s validity.----Issues:Whether the appellants, being contractual employees, were entitled to regularization under the Sindh (Regularization of Adhoc and Contract Employees) Act, 2013.Whether the Sindh High Court could declare the 2013 Act ultra vires without it being directly challenged and in the absence of any aggrieved parties challenging its validity.------Holding/Reasoning:The Supreme Court found that the Sindh High Court had overreached its jurisdiction by declaring the 2013 Act ultra vires when the appellants had not challenged the Act's validity. The Supreme Court emphasized that the High Court does not possess suo motu jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution similar to the Supreme Court's under Article 184(3). The judgment by the High Court affected the rights of numerous employees already regularized or under consideration for regularization without giving them an opportunity to be heard, violating Article 10-A of the Constitution, which guarantees the right to a fair trial and due process.The Supreme Court held that the High Court should have confined its decision to whether the appellants were entitled to regularization under the 2013 Act, rather than delving into the validity of the Act itself. The Supreme Court underscored the principle that courts should aim to uphold laws rather than striking them down, ensuring not to overstep their jurisdictional bounds.-----Citations/Precedents:Dr. Imran Khattak v. Ms. Sofia Waqar Khattak, establishing limits on judicial jurisdiction.Jahanzaib Malik v. Balochistan Public Procurement Regulatory Authority, on the High Court's lack of suo motu jurisdiction.Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif and others v. Muhammad Habib Wahab Al-Khairi and others, regarding the High Court's jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution.Raja Muhammad Nadeem v. The State and another, Mian Irfan Bashir v. The Deputy Commissioner, Lahore and others, and M/s Sadiq Poultry (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, all reinforcing the High Court's lack of suo motu jurisdiction and the principle of judicial restraint.

Summary: (a) Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)- -S. 133(1)-Reference-Documents, consulting of-Principle-Undisputed public documents can be looked at by High Court while deciding Reference application sand can take notice of such documents in any case. (b) Regulation of Generation, Transmission and Distribution of Electric Power Act (XL of 1997)- -Ss. 17, 21(2) & 35-Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001), Ss. 113, 122 & 133(1)-Reference-Transmission license-Sale and purchase of electricity-Amendment of assessment-Applicant/National Transmission and Dispatch Company (NTDC) was licensed by National Electric Power Regulatory Authority to transmit electricity from Generation Companies (GENCOs) to Distribution Companies (DISCOs)- - Dispute was with regard to charging of minimum tax on turnover-Validity-There was no difference in the functions of Central Power Purchasing Agency (Guarantee) Limited (CPPA-G) as it existed now and functions performed by CPPA of NTDC prior to 03-06-2015-CPPA-G was incorporated as a special purpose vehicle and was tasked with administering a Market Settlement System for commercial transactions envisaged by agreement-DISCOs remained principal and primary obligor in respect of payments and obligations of purchaser (a DISCO in a particular case) towards seller or supplier (GENCOs) under the power purchase agreement-NTDC merely recovered the Use of System Charges and similarly CPPA-G was entitled to market operation fee while operating Market Settlement System-DISCOs were paying minimum tax on turnover including purchase price of electricity-Electricity which was purchased from GENCOs by DISCOs was made liable to minimum tax on the turnover of DISCOs and FBR did not demand that tax from NTDC as well-Purchase of electricity was not done firstly by NTDC and thereafter NTDC did not sell electric power to DISCOs at inflated price-Authorities did not produce any evidence to such effect-NTDC would be falling in breach of its transmission license if it were to engage in such a business-High Court set aside the orders passed by Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue-Reference was allowed accordingly. PSO v. CIT 2018 SCMR 894 and PLD 1985 SC 109 ref. (c) Regulation of Generation, Transmission and Distribution of Electric Power Act (XL of 1997)- -S. 21(2)-Transmission license-Scope-Grant of transmission license is distinct and separate from issuance of distribution license-Distribution company in whose favour license has been issued has exclusive right to provide distribution services and to make sales of electric power to the consumers.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: ----Ss.376 & 383---Police official---Succession certificate---Death on duty---Compensation amount---Tarka---Scope---Petitioner/widow of Shaheed police official was aggrieved of inclusion of name of mother of deceased in succession certificate pertaining to compensation amount awarded on death in line of duty---Validity---Compensation granted to a person after his death does not fall within the definition of Tarka---Mother of deceased could not claim any share in compensation amount---High Court in exercise of revisional jurisdiction set aside order passed by Lower Appellate Court and restored that of Trial Court, excluding name of mother of deceased from succession certificate for amount in question---Revision was allowed accordingly. Jamil Shah for Petitioner. Munir Ahmed Kakar for Respondent No. 1. Allauddin Kakar, Assistant Advocate General for Respondents Nos. 2 to 4. Date of hearing: 22nd December, 2023. NAZEER AHMED LANGOVE, J.--- This petition is directed against the order dated 24th July 2019, passed by the learned Senior Civil Judge-I Quetta with powers of District Judge Quetta (in revocation application No.04/2016), and order dated 7th August 2021, passed by the learned Additional District Judge-II, Qetta (in appeal No.02/2020), with the prayer to set aside the orders passed by the courts below and to dismiss respondents Nos. 1, 5 and 6's application for revocation of succession certificate No. 56/2015, dated 19th November 2015.