Summary: Pending

Summary: The suit filed by SSGC was hopelessly time-barred. Gas Utility Court is not obliged to decide the question of maintainability after its decision on the leave to defend application. Gas Company's allegation that the Defendant-Customer was involved in the theft of gas, no ground to condone limitation..

Summary: Background: MCB Bank Limited filed a civil suit under the ordinary civil jurisdiction of the High Court of Sindh at Karachi against Emadul Hassan, a former employee, for the recovery of a house loan amounting to Rs. 9,196,729. The suit remained pending for 11 years, during which time the Court settled issues, recorded evidence, and was on the verge of final arguments. The Plaintiff-Bank's appeal led to framing two primary issues concerning the maintainability of the suit under the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 (FIO, 2001). -----Issues: 1- Whether finance granted to an employee of a financial institution changes the nature of the transaction, thus affecting the definition of ‘finance’ under the FIO, 2001. 2- Whether the suit should have been filed under the Banking jurisdiction of the FIO, 2001, instead of the ordinary civil jurisdiction of the High Court. -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The court concluded that finance granted to an employee of a financial institution does not change the nature of the transaction, and it falls within the definition of ‘finance’ under the FIO, 2001. Therefore, issue (a) was decided in the negative. The court agreed that the suit should have been filed under the Banking jurisdiction of the FIO, 2001, and issue (b) was decided in the affirmative. Following this, the court examined the broader question of whether the High Court exercising its ordinary civil jurisdiction should proceed with the case or return the plaint to be filed in the Banking Court. The court identified that the claims in the plaint included several heads, some of which might not fall under the definition of "finance" under the FIO, 2001. However, the Plaintiff-Bank's counsel indicated willingness to withdraw those heads not covered by the definition of "finance." The court noted that subject-matter jurisdiction could not be conferred or waived by consent of the parties. Even with the delay in raising the issue of jurisdiction, it remained essential to determine the correct jurisdiction to avoid rendering any decree unenforceable. Based on the nature of the claims and the statutory mandate of the FIO, 2001, the court concluded that the proper jurisdiction for the suit was the Banking Court. The court ordered that the plaint in Suit No. 563/2007 be returned to MCB Bank Limited to file under the jurisdiction of the Banking Court as per the FIO, 2001.

Summary: Plaintiffs prayed for a restraining order, which is a form of equitable and discretionary relief that is to be invoked in the aid of justice and not to aid injustice and favor one party over another. If we do not grant relief, then the subject matter of the suit, which is essentially a family dispute, may well become complicated and potentially frustrate the decree, if any. While a case for stay is made out, which is allowed however the trial court correctly dismissed the Receiver's appointment because receivership is the harshest remedy in civil law

Summary: The Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) had filed a petition against an ad-interim ex-parte order of the Peshawar High Court that had suspended the ECP's notification changing the returning officer for a constituency. The ECP asserted that the change was made on medical grounds and at the returning officer's request, supported by a medical certificate. The respondents did not provide a satisfactory explanation for challenging the change. Due to the court order, the scrutiny of nomination papers scheduled for December 28, 2023, could not take place, affecting the election process.The ECP, represented by Mr. Afnan Karim Kundi, explained that the scrutiny delay was a result of the respondents' legal action. They proposed a revised schedule for the scrutiny process. The court acknowledged the ECP's justifiable reasons for the change and expressed concern over the High Court's ad-interim ex-parte order without the ECP's notice or hearing. The court set aside the order, converting the petition into an appeal, and dismissed the writ petition in the Peshawar High Court.However, recognizing the impact on the scrutiny schedule, the court directed the ECP to undertake the scrutiny of nomination papers, including those of the respondents, based on the provided fresh schedule. The petition was converted into an appeal and allowed accordingly.

Summary: Facts:Muhammad Shafi (Respondent No.1), now represented by his legal heirs, filed a suit in 1993 for specific performance.The suit was decreed against the petitioners' predecessor and others, a decision upheld in subsequent appeals.The petitioners, successors of Malik Ali Akbar, filed an application under Section 12(2) of the CPC in 2016, alleging fraud and misrepresentation.The High Court dismissed this application along with an application for condonation of delay.The petitioners claimed they were unaware of the litigation until 2013 due to wrong address.----Issues:Whether the High Court erred in dismissing the application under Section 12(2) CPC.Whether the petitioners' lack of knowledge of the proceedings constitutes grounds for reopening the case.----Judgment:The Court observed that the previous litigation had reached finality, with judgments and decrees executed.It found the petitioners' plea of wrong address and lack of knowledge unpersuasive, given the extensive legal history and execution of decrees.The Court reiterated that allegations of fraud or misrepresentation must be substantiated and that mere lack of knowledge isn't sufficient grounds for reopening a case.The Court referenced precedents stating that while investigating fraud allegations, the Court isn't obliged to follow the full procedure of a suit.Consequently, the Court declined leave to appeal and dismissed the petition.Disposition:The Civil Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed by the Supreme Court of Pakistan.---Significance:This case emphasizes the high threshold for reopening cases based on allegations of fraud or misrepresentation, particularly when previous litigation has reached finality. It highlights the importance of substantiating such allegations and the discretionary power of the Court in handling such matters.

Summary: Background: The petitioners, managing and production heads of a pharmaceutical company, filed a Shariat Miscellaneous Application seeking to make submissions for hearing three Shariat Miscellaneous Applications filed previously. These applications aimed to set aside orders passed by the Lahore High Court and the Chairman Drug Court, Gujranwala, with a direction to summon a prosecution witness whose name existed in the calendar of witnesses. The petitioners argued that under Islamic justice, all prosecution evidence must be presented to the court. ----Issues: 1- Whether the petitioners' miscellaneous applications are maintainable under Article 203D of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973. 2- Whether the relief sought by the petitioners, pertaining to procedural matters in criminal trials, falls within the jurisdiction of the Federal Shariat Court. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The Federal Shariat Court dismissed the petition for the following reasons: --Non-Conformity with Article 203D: The petitioners' miscellaneous applications did not conform to the requirements of Article 203D, which mandates the examination of laws for repugnancy to Islamic injunctions. The applications sought relief in personam, which is beyond the jurisdiction of the court as defined by Article 203D. --Lack of Specific Impugned Law: The petitioners failed to identify any specific law or provision of law that is repugnant to the injunctions of Islam. The court emphasized that its mandate is to assess laws against the touchstone of the Holy Quran and Sunnah, which was not demonstrated in this case. --Precedent and Legal Context: The court referred to its previous judgment in Criminal Appeal No. 17/L of 2005, emphasizing that the prosecution must present all evidence to the court. However, the relief sought by the petitioners, related to procedural directives for summoning witnesses, did not pertain to a law being repugnant to Islamic injunctions. --Jurisdictional Limits: The relief sought involved setting aside specific court orders and directing the conduct of a criminal trial, which is outside the jurisdiction of the Federal Shariat Court as defined by Article 203D. Such matters are procedural and do not implicate the constitutionality or Islamic conformity of a law. -----Citations/Precedents: Article 203D of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 Criminal Appeal No. 17/L of 2005 MUHAMMAD WASEEM alias KALU vs. THE STATE Decided on 19th November 2005 Reported as 2006 PCr.LJ 364 The court concluded that the petitioners' applications were misconceived and not maintainable under the jurisdictional scope of the Federal Shariat Court, leading to their dismissal.

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)- -S. 221-Charge, framing of-Scope, significance and purpose of framing of charge against an accused explained. Framing of charge is the foundation of trial, with a purpose and object to enable accused to know the exact nature of allegations and the offences with which he is charged, so that he is given reasonable opportunity to prepare his case and defend himself. Similarly, it enables the prosecution to produce relevant evidence in support of its case against the accused in order to prove the charge. Framing of proper charge is, therefore, significant for the court concerned to be cautious regarding the real points in issue, so that evidence could be confined to such points and to reach a correct conclusion. Section 221 of the Cr.P.C. has provided an elaborate procedure for framing of charge. It requires that all material particulars as to time, place, as well as specific name of the alleged offence, if any; the relevant law, its applicable section(s), subsection(s) and clause(s) in respect of which the offence is said to have been committed, shall be mentioned in the charge. Where any particular section of law with which a person is intended to be charged contains several parts, the relevant part of that section which depicts from the police report and the material available on record, should be mentioned therein. It is the responsibility of the Trial Judge to take all necessary and possible steps to ensure compliance of law with regard to framing of proper and unambiguous charge. Steps should also be taken to explain the charge to the accused to a possible extent, enabling him to fully understand the nature of allegations against him. If necessary ingredients of the offences with which the accused is charged, are not mentioned in the charge, or it is framed in an incomplete, defective or vague manner, it might mislead the accused, which would be a failure of justice. It is, however, to be noted that every omission in a charge cannot be regarded as material illegality or irregularity, unless the accused is in fact misled by such error or omission and it has occasioned a failure of justice, as provided by section 225 of the Cr.P.C. (b) Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997)- -Ss. 11-H(i) & (ii) & 11-F(i)-Fund raising for a proscribed organization-Re-appraisal of evidence-Defective and vague framing of charge-Effect-Failure of justice-Trial Court while framing the charge, did not specify as to which of the sub-clause of section 11-H of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 (‘ATA of 1997’) was applicable in the facts and circumstances of the present case-There was no evidence on the record to suggest that the petitioner (accused) was guilty of an offence either under section 11(1)(a) or 11(1)(b) of the ATA of 1997-FIR, the police report and the other material available on the record were insufficient for the Trial Court to frame charge against the petitioner under any of the clauses of section 11-H of the ATA of 1997, yet defective and vague charge was framed under the stated offences, without mentioning in detail the purported act of the petitioner, which constituted an offence-In absence of relevant information and evidence to prima facie constitute an offence, it was incumbent upon the Trial Court to have refrained itself from framing of charge against the petitioner-In the FIR, in the police report, the documents attached therewith and the evidence available on the record, there was nothing to establish that the petitioner was busy in collecting the money, nor was there any allegation with regard to his intent that money recovered from him was the outcome of the donation he collected, and was to be used or had reasonable cause to suspect that it may be used for the purpose of terrorism or by a terrorist or by an organization concerned in terrorism-It was alleged that the petitioner was arrested having a donation book on which name of a proscribed organization was printed and leaves of it contained his signature, along with an amount of Rs.1500/- were recovered from him-Admittedly, the petitioner did not sign any leaf of the book in presence of the witnesses-Moreover, no leaf of it having the alleged signatures of the petitioner was sent to the forensic laboratory for obtaining expert’s opinion to verify the signatures-First Information Report was registered upon an information received by the complainant from DIG CTD, but it too did not disclose commission of the offence under section 11-H of the ATA of 1997, against the petitioner at the relevant time-Rather it was just a presumption and apprehension of the DIG that the petitioner belonged to a proscribed organization Daesh, and collected donations and funding for the said organization and the said money was potentially used in carrying out terrorist activities across the country-Admittedly, neither the DIG nor any officer of DIG’s office participated in the investigation nor did they appear before the Trial Court as a witness, to substantiate the contents of the FIR-There is no detail in the FIR as to the date, time, place and manner of collecting such money by the petitioner, nor his intention or any reasonable cause on his behalf to s uspect that the amount shall be or may be used for terrorist activities- -Before registration of the FIR, the petitioner’s name was included in Fourth Schedule to the ATA of 1997 and he was regularly appearing before the concerned police-Had he indulged in any criminal activity, an FIR could have been registered against him under the relevant provision of law for any of his specific act, but the needful was not done for the reason that the concerned police officials did not find him involved in any such activity-Fact remains that there was lack of ingredients of any of the subsections of section 11-H of the ATA of 1997, the prosecution continued to produce irrelevant evidence in this behalf-Witnesses produced by the prosecution did not establish the commission of an offence, but still the petitioner was held guilty of offences under sections 11H(i) and (ii) of the ATA of 1997 and was sentenced for a period of ten years by the fora below, without specifying the sentence separately for each subsection-This act of the Trial Court had seriously prejudiced the petitioner by convicting him for an offence, which was not committed by the petitioner, nor was it mentioned in the charge framed against him, hence, it was a failure of justice-Petition was converted into appeal and allowed, and accused was acquitted of the charge framed against him. Saleem Akhtar, Addl. P.G. for the State.

Summary: The STATE through Chairman NAB and others-Respondents (Application for Return of Surety) National Accountability Ordinance (XVIII of 1999)- Shamraiz Khan v. The State 2000 SCMR 157 ref.

Summary: Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art.199(1)(a)(i) & (ii)---Supervisory jurisdiction of High Court---Scope---Climate justice----Writ of mandamus for enforcement of climate justice---Judicial review---Scope---Elimination of climate chaos and enforcement of climate justice by the Water and Environment Commission appointed by High Court to compel implementation of actions taken for water reservation and environmental issues in Punjab particularly in Lahore---High Court exercised its ssupervisory jurisdiction with strong commitment of environmental protection and sustainable development by way of proactive measures and enforcement of strict regulations---Substantial and practical steps had been taken to control air pollution and to preserve groundwater---During the winter season those steps largely contributed to lowering Air Quality Index at different places in Lahore and thereby smog was controlled which had initially assumed dangerous proportions---This was an illustration of judicial review in action, and enforcement of climate justice---These actions were beyond mere judgments which adorn law journals and fail to address in actual terms, the climate chaos, which surrounds the inhabitants---In essence, it was a case of continuing mandamus or supervisory jurisdiction where orders of High Court were enforced by a Commission set up to compel implementation---Departments in turn, came back with reports of compliance and further orders were issued for complete climate justice and to protect fundamental rights of persons---Unique tool was employed by High Court which had yielded substantial results and same would not have been possible without the selfless and untiring efforts of the members of the Commission, who had devoted their energies to the monumental task---Counsel of different Departments and Regulatory Authorities had also come on board as friends of the Court and environment to lend a hand in the enterprise---Constitutional petition was adjourned for further proceedings, accordingly. Mrs. Hina Hafeez Ullah Ishaq, Sayed Kamal Ali Haider and Ch. Zulfiqar Ali, Members Judicial Commission. Faiz Ullah Khan Niazi, for counsel for the Petitioner. M. Azhar Siddique, Talaat Farooq Sh. and M. Yasin Hatif, for the Petitioners (in connected petitions) Shazib Masood, for counsel for CBD. Sahibzada Muzaffar Ali and Abdul Hanan, for Lahore Development Authority. Haris Azmat and Maryam Hayat Advocates for respondent-PHA. Mian Irfan Akram and Mohsin Mumtaz, for WASA. Dilnawaz Ahmad Cheema, Mian Ejaz Latif, Rana M. Afzal Razzaq Khan, Ghulam Abbas Haral, Umar Rafiq, Abdul Latif, M. Adeel Ch., Qari Zuhaib ur Rehman Zubairi and Mian M. Waseem, for the Applicants. Asad Ali Bajwa, Deputy Attorney General. Hassan Ejaz Cheema, Assistant Advocate General, M. Nawaz Manik, Director Law, EPA, Touqeer M. Wattoo, Director (Coord.) PDMA, Shahzad Khan, DSP Traffic, Umer Hayat, Law Officer and Ghulam Akhtar, Law Officer. Irfan Sana Ullah Khan Kakar, (in C.M No.74 of 2023). Date of hearing: 29th December, 2023.