Summary: Facts:The petitioner, Tri-Star Industries, has been manufacturing toothbrushes and hairbrushes in Pakistan since 1983, using the trade mark "TRISA" registered in 1985.Tri-Star filed a civil suit in 1997 to restrain respondent No.1, TRISA Burstenfabrik AG, from using the "TRISA" trademark, securing an injunctive order in 1999.Respondent No.1 applied for a similar trademark in 1997, which was advertised in 2000. The petitioner sought an extension to file opposition, which was granted by the Registrar of Trademarks, condoning a 108-day delay.Respondent No.1 challenged this decision, leading to the High Court setting aside the Registrar's decision, prompting this appeal.Issue: Whether the High Court erred in setting aside the Registrar of Trademarks' decision to grant an extension to the petitioner for filing opposition against the trademark registration by respondent No.1.---Holding: The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, upholding the High Court's judgment.---Reasoning:The Supreme Court found no fault with the High Court's judgment, noting that the Registrar of Trademarks must not grant extensions in a mechanical manner without proper justification.The Court emphasized that the law and rules must be followed as prescribed, and any deviations from the prescribed procedures are not permissible.The Court highlighted that the Registrar's power to grant extensions is not automatic and must be exercised with due consideration and within the bounds of the law.The petitioner's failure to provide justifiable reasons for the extension and the Registrar's decision to condone the delay without proper consideration were deemed improper.Conclusion: The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's decision, finding that the Registrar of Trademarks had erred in granting an extension to the petitioner without sufficient justification, and thus the appeal was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused.---- (1) Section 15 of the Trade Marks Act, 1940 and Rule 30 & 76 of Revised Trade Marks Rules 1963. (2) The word ?satisfied? requires mental persuasion with existence of reasonable ground. (3) The Registrar T.M cannot extend time for filing opposition without following the prescribed procedure. (4) If a statute provides for a thing to be done in a particular manner, then it has to be done in that manner.

Summary: (Any Government controlled statutory body (such as Higher Education Commission in this case) cannot be said to be an alter ego of the Government, and thus, would not be governed by Article 149 of the Limitation Act, 1908) The case involved the Higher Education Commission of Pakistan as the petitioner and Allah Bakhsh and others as respondents. The petitioner sought to recover a sum of ?47,012/- and Rs.70,725/- from the respondents based on an unregistered agreement for a scholarship and a registered surety bond.The dispute revolved around whether the petitioner's claim was time-barred. The trial court had dismissed the suit on the grounds of limitation, and the High Court upheld the decision. The primary issue was to determine the applicable limitation period for the petitioner's claim.The High Court ruled that the suit fell under Article 115 and Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1908, both of which prescribed a three-year limitation period from the time the contract was breached or the contingency happened.The petitioner sought leave to appeal against the High Court's decree, arguing that it should have been governed by Article 149 of the Limitation Act, 1908, which allowed a sixty-year limitation period for suits by or on behalf of the Federal Government or any Provincial Government.However, the Supreme Court rejected the petitioner's argument, stating that the Higher Education Commission was a separate legal entity and not an emanation of the Government. Despite being government-owned and funded, the commission had its own defined powers and functions, and its property and employees were not considered part of the Government. Therefore, it did not fall under Article 149 of the Limitation Act, 1908.The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, stating that the suit was rightly dismissed on the grounds of limitation, and the petitioner's appeal was refused.

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908): ----O. IX, R. 13---Application for setting aside ex parte judgment and decree---Limitation---Duty of the court to examine limitation even if not raised as an objection---Suit for possession through pre-emption was decreed ex parte against the petitioners after they failed to appear and cross-examine witnesses---Petitioners filed an application for setting aside the ex parte judgment and decree after an inordinate and unexplained delay, without an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908 for condonation of delay---Held, under Article 164 of the Limitation Act, an application for setting aside an ex parte decree must be filed within 30 days from the date of judgment or from the date of knowledge in cases of non-service of summons---Petitioners were duly served and had initially filed their written statement, making the application time-barred---Supreme Court precedent established that courts must dismiss time-barred applications even if no party raises an objection---Both lower courts had rightly rejected the application on limitation grounds. ----Cited Cases: • Government of N.W.F.P. and others v. Akbar Shah and others (2010 SCMR 1408) • Muhammad Sami v. Additional District Judge, Sargodha and 2 others (2007 SCMR 621) • Faizum alias Toor v. Nander Khan and others (2006 SCMR 1931) • Almas Ahmad Fiaz v. Secretary Government of the Punjab, Housing and Physical Planning Development, Lahore and another (2006 SCMR 783) (b) Limitation Act (IX of 1908): ----S. 3, Art. 164---Duty of court to examine limitation---Even a void order must be challenged within the prescribed limitation period---Petitioners’ application for setting aside the ex parte decree was filed after a considerable delay without a reasonable explanation---Held, each day of delay must be explained for condonation, and failure to do so results in dismissal---The Supreme Court has ruled that even void orders must be challenged within the limitation period---Petitioners’ conduct was held to be negligent and contumacious, justifying rejection of their application. ----Cited Cases: • Saqib Ali v. Government of Punjab and others (2023 PLC (C.S.) 310) • Lal Khan through legal heirs v. Muhammad Yousaf through legal heirs (PLD 2011 SC 657) • Chief Engineer, Gujranwala Electric Power Company (GEPCO), Gujranwala v. Khalid Mehmood and others (2023 PLC 65) • Abid Hussain v. Secretary Ministry of Defence, Government of Pakistan through Chief of Air Staff, Islamabad (2021 SCMR 645) (c) Constitutional Jurisdiction: ----Art. 199---Exercise of discretionary and equitable jurisdiction---Scope of judicial review---High Court’s constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 is discretionary and cannot be exercised as a matter of routine---Held, the petitioners failed to point out any jurisdictional defect or procedural impropriety in the impugned judgments, decrees, or orders---In the absence of a substantial legal question, constitutional jurisdiction cannot be invoked merely to reappraise evidence or reconsider a time-barred claim---Petition was dismissed in limine. ----Cited Cases: • Abdul Rashid v. Pakistan and others (1969 SCMR 141) • Federation of Pakistan and others v. Haji Muhammad Saifullah Khan and others (PLD 1989 SC 166) • Muhammad Maqsood Sabir Ansari v. District Returning Officer, Kasur and others (PLD 2009 SC 28) • Javed Masih and others v. Additional District Judge, Lahore and others (2010 SCMR 795) ----Disposition: Petition dismissed in limine.

Summary: Background: The appeal challenges the judgment of the Peshawar High Court, which allowed the Civil Revision filed by the respondents, set aside the appellate court's decision, and restored the trial court's judgment in favor of the respondents.---Facts: The dispute involves a piece of land in Boni, Tehsil Mastuj, District Chitral, claimed by the respondents based on an unregistered deed from 1978. After a series of trials and appeals, the trial court's decision in favor of the respondents was reinstated by the High Court, leading to this appeal.---Issues:Whether an unregistered sale deed confers title on the respondents.Whether the respondents' suit was barred by time.The status of appellant No. 2 as a bona fide purchaser based on a later registered sale deed.Whether the High Court erred in its judgment by misreading or non-reading of evidence.---Arguments:Appellants argued that the unregistered sale deed did not confer title, the suit was time-barred, appellant No. 2's purchase rights should be protected, and the High Court's judgment was flawed.Respondents maintained that the High Court's well-reasoned judgment was based on a correct appreciation of evidence.Opinion: The Supreme Court held that the respondents' possession and the trial court's repeated decrees in their favor established their rights, despite the unregistered nature of the deed. The Court found no merit in the appellants' arguments regarding time limitation and the bona fide purchaser's rights, citing legal precedents that supported the respondents' possession and rights under the unregistered deed.Holding: The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the High Court's judgment that restored the trial court's decision in favor of the respondents.---Rationale: The Court emphasized the established possession and rights of the respondents under the unregistered deed, the equitable title held by the transferee, and the irrelevance of the statute of limitations in this context. The Court found no legal or factual errors in the High Court's judgment that would warrant a reversal.---Conclusion: The appeal was dismissed, affirming the High Court's decision to restore the trial court's judgment in favor of the respondents, with no order as to costs.

Summary: Background: The petitioner, Abid Jan, challenged the order of the Federal Service Tribunal (FST), Islamabad, dated 18 August 2020, which dismissed his appeal as being time-barred. Jan was dismissed from service on 29 May 2019 and filed a departmental appeal on 28 June 2019. After his departmental appeal remained undecided, he approached the Peshawar High Court, which, recognizing the procedural misstep, converted his writ petition into a service appeal and remitted it to the FST for adjudication, subject to all legal objections.---Issue: The core issue was whether the FST's dismissal of Jan's appeal on the grounds of being time-barred was justified, considering the High Court had converted his writ petition into a service appeal and remitted it to the FST.----Judgment: The Supreme Court converted the civil petition into an appeal and allowed it. The Court set aside the judgment of the FST and remanded the matter back to the FST to decide the appeal afresh, ensuring both parties were given a proper opportunity to be heard.---Reasoning: The Supreme Court observed that the High Court's conversion of the writ petition into a service appeal and its transmission to the FST was intended to preserve the merits of Jan's claim against procedural bars related to time limitations. The Court found that the FST erred in dismissing the appeal on the grounds of limitation without considering the merits of the case and without providing notice to the respondents. The Court also invoked the legal maxim "actus curiae neminem gravabit," emphasizing that no individual should suffer due to the fault or oversight of the Court, and highlighted the duty of the Court to rectify such errors to ensure justice.---Conclusion: The Supreme Court's decision underscores the principle that procedural technicalities should not obstruct substantive justice. By remanding the case back to the FST, the Court ensured that Jan's appeal would be adjudicated on its merits, thereby upholding the principles of natural justice and due process.''When the writ petition was directed to be transmitted to the Federal Service Tribunal by the High Court, the petitioner was not required to file fresh memo of appeal. The doctrine of ex debito justitiae refers to the remedies to which a person is entitled to as of right, as opposed to a remedy which is discretionary. An act of the Court shall prejudice no one. The Court or Tribunal should be conscious and cognizant that nobody should become a victim of injustice as a consequence of their mistake.''

Summary: (Appeal dismissed)The respondent, Mst. Pakistan Bibi, had filed a suit seeking a declaration that she is the owner of a property measuring 122 kanals 5 marlas, which she claimed was given to her as dower (mahr) in the year 1967 through a dower deed (Nikah Nama). The suit also sought correction in the revenue record and a permanent injunction against the defendants from interfering with her possession.The trial court initially decreed the suit in favor of Mst. Pakistan Bibi in 2000, but the appellate court remanded the matter back to the trial court. In subsequent rounds of litigation, the trial court dismissed the suit, and the appellate court upheld the dismissal. Mst. Pakistan Bibi then filed a civil revision before the Peshawar High Court, which allowed the revision, setting aside the judgments and decrees of the lower courts and decreeing the suit in her favor. The present appeal was filed against this decision.The appellant, Pirzada Noor-ul-Basar, argued that Mst. Pakistan Bibi's claim should have been filed before the Family Court as it pertained to dower, and that the Nikah Nama was not an authenticated document. The appellant also contended that the suit was time-barred under the Limitation Act, 1908.The Supreme Court, however, rejected these arguments and upheld the decision of the Peshawar High Court. It found that Mst. Pakistan Bibi had a valid claim to the property as she had been in possession of it and received Ijjara (rent) from tenants for many years. The court also held that the suit was not time-barred under the relevant provisions of the Limitation Act and that the Nikah Nama was a valid document, and the appellant could not challenge its authenticity at this stage.Ultimately, the Supreme Court found no merit in the appeal and dismissed it, affirming the judgment of the Peshawar High Court in favor of Mst. Pakistan Bibi.

Summary: Background: The petitioners challenged the judgment and order dated 30.06.2022 by the Additional District Judge-IX, Peshawar, which allowed the appeal of respondent No.1 and restored his execution petition. The case originally involved a decree passed in favor of Syed Ghulam and others for possession of land by exercising the right of pre-emption under Martial Regulation No.115. Due to financial constraints, an agreement was made transferring the land to Syed Qaim Shah Bukhari, except for 8 jarib. The terms of the agreement were partially fulfilled, leading to further litigation for specific performance of the agreements. ----Issues: 1- Whether the application submitted by the decree holder on 23.07.2019 should be treated as a second petition or a continuation/revival of the first application. 2- Whether the petition is within the period of limitation. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: ---Continuation/Revival of the First Application: The court held that the application submitted by the decree holder on 23.07.2019 should be considered a continuation of the first application rather than a fresh one. The earlier application was dismissed due to the reversal of the decree by the appellate court. However, the subsequent restoration of the decree by the revisional and apex courts meant the original application was never disposed of on its merits under Order XXI of CPC, which governs the execution process. ---Period of Limitation: The court found that for the purpose of execution, the period of limitation starts from the final judgment of the last court in the series of appeals. In this case, the final judgment was by the Supreme Court on 28.05.2018. Therefore, the application filed on 23.07.2019 was within the prescribed limitation period. The petition was dismissed, and the appellate court's decision to restore the execution petition was upheld. ----Citations/Precedents: United Bank Limited vs. Fateh Hayat Khan Tawan & others (2015 SCMR 1335) Amir Begum Vs. Mir Fateh Shah (PLD 1968 Karachi 10) Shiva Shankar Das and others Vs. Mufti Syed Yusuf Hasan (AIR 1934 All 481) Surendra Nath Dutta vs. Mohini Mohan Chakravarty (AIR 1954 Cal 73) Pentapati Chinna Venkanna and others vs. Pentapati Bengararaju and others (1964 AIR 1954, 1964 SCR (6) 251) Sahabzadi Meharunisa and another vs. Mst. Ghulam Sughlan (PLD 2016 SC 358) Muhammad Younas Vs. Pakistan Post through Divisional Superintendent, Sialkot (2021 CLC 126)

Summary: (a) Qanoon-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 –– ----Arts. 46, 64 & 95 – Leading evidence by attorney – Evidentiary value – Admissibility of testimony by an attorney-holder – Suit for specific performance based on oral and written agreements, where the plaintiff did not appear as a witness and instead relied on an attorney-holder to testify – Held, an attorney-holder cannot depose for the principal regarding facts of which the principal alone has personal knowledge and is required to be cross-examined – If an attorney has not personally witnessed or participated in the transaction, their testimony is inadmissible – Plaintiff’s non-appearance warranted an adverse inference under the principle that a party who withholds best evidence must suffer consequences – Trial court rightly disregarded attorney-holder’s testimony in the absence of the plaintiff’s own evidence – Appeal dismissed. Cited Cases: • Syed Haji Abdul Wahid and another v. Syed Sirajuddin (1998 SCMR 2296) • Mst. Shahnaz Akhtar and another v. Syed Ehsan ur Rehman and others (2022 SCMR 1398) • Maan Kaur (Dead) by LRs v. Hartar Singh Sangha (2010 SCC 512) (b) Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882) –– ----S. 54 – Effect of unregistered agreements to sell – Rights of the parties – Agreements to sell must be registered to confer any title or interest in immovable property – Held, under S. 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, a sale of immovable property valued above one hundred rupees must be made through a registered document – Plaintiff’s reliance on unregistered agreements (Exh.P-3 and Exh.P-5) was legally untenable as such documents do not create or transfer ownership rights – Non-registration rendered the agreements unenforceable, and no title could be claimed on their basis. Cited Cases: • Muhammad Iqbal and others v. Mst. Baseerat and others (2017 SCMR 367) (c) Registration Act (XVI of 1908) –– ----S. 49 – Effect of non-registration – Held, as per S. 49 of the Registration Act, 1908, an unregistered document cannot be used to establish, declare, or transfer any legal title in immovable property – Plaintiff did not produce any evidence proving a legal impediment to registering the agreements – Mere possession, without a registered instrument, did not create ownership rights – Appeal dismissed as unregistered agreements were legally ineffective. (d) Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882) –– ----S. 53-A – Protection under doctrine of part performance – Scope – Plaintiff invoked S. 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, claiming that possession was handed over in part performance of the agreement – Held, S. 53-A does not exempt an agreement from mandatory registration but only protects a party from eviction if they have taken possession under a valid contract – Provision can be used as a shield but not as a sword to establish ownership – In absence of a validly registered document, no enforceable right was created in favor of the plaintiff. Cited Cases: • Shrimant Shamrao Suryavanshi and another v. Pralhad Bhairoba Suryavanshi (2002 SCC 676) (e) Qanoon-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 –– ----Burden of proof – Sale consideration – Absence of evidence – Plaintiff failed to prove that the sale price was paid, as there was no record of bank transactions, property sales, or any financial dealings establishing the alleged payment – Held, in the absence of documentary proof of payment, mere oral assertions were insufficient to establish ownership – Failure to prove financial capability to purchase the property weakened the plaintiff’s case. (f) Administration of justice –– ----Limitation – Lapse of time – Suit for specific performance filed after a significant delay of 17 years from the first agreement and 12 years from the second agreement – Plaintiff provided no justification for the delay or evidence of any attempts to enforce her alleged rights earlier – Held, specific performance being an equitable relief cannot be granted when a party fails to act diligently – Delay in filing weakened the credibility of the claim. Cited Cases: • Liaqat Khan v. Falak Sher (PLD 2014 SC 506) • Sheikh Akhtar Aziz v. Mst. Shabnam Begum and others (2019 SCMR 524) • Arif Shah v. Abdul Hakeem Qureshi (PLD 1991 SC 905) (g) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877) –– ----Discretionary nature of specific performance – Relief of specific performance is not an absolute right but a discretionary remedy – Held, courts must assess whether enforcing a contract would be just and equitable – Plaintiff failed to meet legal standards for specific performance due to non-registration of agreements, absence of evidence of sale consideration, and unexplained delay – Court rightly exercised its discretion to refuse the relief sought. Cited Cases: • Muhammad Riaz Hussain v. Zahoor Ul Hassan (2021 SCMR 431) • Mussarat Shaukat Ali v. Safia Khatoon (1994 SCMR 2189) (h) Islamabad Capital Territory –– ----Protection of immovable property – Authority of CDA – CDA directed to take possession of the suit property within 15 days to prevent further unlawful occupation – CDA to preserve the property, clear outstanding utility dues, and restrict any title changes until legal heirs are formally declared – Held, state is obligated under Article 24 of the Constitution to protect private property from illegal claims and encroachments. Disposition: Appeal dismissed – CDA directed to take possession of property – Legal heirs directed to establish inheritance rights through competent court – No ownership rights conferred to the appellant.

Summary: Background: The petitioner filed a constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan, challenging an appellate court's order that restored the execution petition filed by respondent No.3. The respondent, who had filed a suit for recovery of dower, initially received an ex-parte judgment awarding partial recovery. This decision was overturned by the appellate court, and upon further appeal, the High Court granted the respondent full recovery rights. Despite this, the petitioner contested the execution petition filed by respondent No.3 on grounds of limitation, which the executing court upheld. However, the appellate court later allowed the respondent’s appeal and restored her execution petition, prompting the current petition from the petitioner. -----Issues: 1- What is the applicable limitation period for filing an execution petition to recover a dower decree? ----2- Was the appellate court justified in condoning the delay and allowing the respondent’s appeal? -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: --Limitation for Execution of Dower Decree: The court held that, under the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964, no specific limitation applies to family matters, including the execution of a dower decree. In line with precedent (e.g., Syed Muhammad vs. Mst. Zeenat), a wife’s right to dower during the subsistence of marriage does not expire. Therefore, her execution petition could not be dismissed based on time-bar, as the law permits recovery of dower without strict time constraints. --Delay Condonation by the Appellate Court: The court found that the appellate court acted within its jurisdiction in condoning the delay. As the respondent submitted a delay condonation application with a supporting affidavit that went unchallenged, it was deemed true. In family law cases, courts prioritize substantial justice over technicalities, allowing flexibility in procedural timelines where the merits of the case so demand. The petition was dismissed, affirming that the respondent’s execution petition is timely and should proceed without limitations or undue procedural obstacles. -----Citations/Precedents: NEMATULLAH KHAN vs. ADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE AND OTHERS (2022 YLR NOTE 21) KHUDADAD vs. SYED GHAZANFAR ALI SHAH ALIAS S. INAAM HUSSAIN AND OTHERS (2022 SCMR 933) MUHAMMAD SHARIF & OTHERS vs. MCB BANK LIMITED AND OTHERS (2021 SCMR 1158) HAJI WAJDAD vs. PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT THROUGH SECRETARY BOARD OF REVENUE GOVERNMENT OF BALOCHISTAN, QUETTA AND OTHERS (2020 SCMR 2046) STATE BANK OF PAKISTAN THROUGH GOVERNOR AND ANOTHER vs. IMTIAZ ALI KHAN AND OTHERS (2012 SCMR 280) LT. COL. NASIR MALIK vs. ADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE, LAHORE AND OTHERS (2016 SCMR 1821) SYED MUHAMMAD vs. MST. ZEENAT & OTHERS (PLD 2001 SC 128) MAQSOOD PERVAIZ CHAUDHRY vs. MST. NOSHEEN CHAUDHRY & OTHERS (PLD 2019 LAHORE 102) PROVINCE OF PUNJAB THROUGH COLLECTOR AND OTHERS vs. MUHAMMAD FAROOQ AND OTHERS (PLD 2010 SC 582) MST. YASMEEN BIBI vs. MUHAMMAD GHAZANFAR KHAN AND OTHERS (PLD 2016 SC 613) CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITY vs. PROVIDENCE AVIATION (PVT) LTD. (2000 CLC 1722) MANAGER, JAMMU & KASHMIR, STATE PROPERTY IN PAKISTAN vs. KHUDA YAR (PLD 1975 SC 678)

Summary: The main issue in the case was the commencement of the period of limitation for a mortgagor to redeem a mortgaged property. The petitioner argued that the period of limitation should start from the date of creation of the mortgage, while the lower courts and revenue authorities determined that it should start from the date of expiry of the mortgage term. The Supreme Court referred to Article 148 of The Limitation Act, 1908, which provides for the period of limitation for a mortgagor to redeem a mortgage. The court noted that the commencement of the period of limitation depends on the terms of the mortgage agreement. The court outlined three scenarios: when a specific date is fixed for payment, when the mortgage is for a fixed period without a specific date of expiry, and when neither a specific date nor a term is fixed. In the present case, the mortgage was created on 21.07.1935 for a fixed term of twenty years. The court concluded that the cause of action for the mortgagors to redeem the mortgage would accrue from the date of the expiry of the fixed term, and the limitation period of sixty years would commence thereafter. As the mortgagors filed their claim within the stipulated period of limitation, the court dismissed the petitions and refused leave.