Summary: Limitation--- ----Significance---Conduct of party---Intention of prolonging litigation---Costs, imposition of---Statute of limitations is not a trivial technicality; it stands as a cornerstone legal principle designed to ensure fairness and finality in legal proceedings---Once period of limitation expires, valuable rights accrue to the other party by operation of law and such right cannot be taken away lightly---In the present case ,Constitutional petition was filed being aggrieved by an order of the Appellate / District Court, by which Civil Revision Application was dismissed as being time barred and five (5) orders of the Trial Court were upheld ;however, four out of the five orders were time-barred and the Revision Application had become infructuous regarding the fifth order (as decree had been executed by handing over possession of suit-property)---Even the present constitutional petition, was affected by laches---This was due to its submission nearly four years after the issuance of the first four orders and more than one year after the fifth order---Petitioners' lackadaisical attitude demonstrated lack of seriousness and suggested an intent merely to entangle and embroil the respondents in prolonged, obdurate litigation, especially since most of the original siblings had expired---It seemed that the petitioner was pursuing baseless and vexatious litigation, akin to flogging a dead horse---Constitutional petition was dismissed, with costs of Rs. 35,000/-, in circumstances. SKB-KNK Joint Venture v. Water and Power Development Authority 2022 SCMR 1615; Musarat Parveen v. Muhammad Yousaf 2023 SCMR 1665 and Chief Executive Officer NPGCL v. Khalid Umar Tariq 2024 SCMR 518 ref. Fareed Ahmed for Petitioner. Nemo for Respondents. Date of hearing: 27th May, 2024.

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) ----O.VII, R.11—Rejection of plaint—Repetitive and vexatious applications—Abuse of process of law Petitioner’s second application under O.VII, R.11, C.P.C. in a suit for malicious prosecution was dismissed with costs for being identical to his earlier application under the same provision and another under S.21, General Clauses Act, 1897 r/w S.13 of Defamation Ordinance, 2002—Earlier orders had attained finality and could not be re-agitated—Repeated filing of similar applications held to be frivolous and intended merely to delay proceedings; such conduct constitutes misuse of the process of law—Concurrent findings of Trial and Revisional Courts warranted no interference. (b) Limitation Act (IX of 1908) ----Art.120—Limitation in suits for malicious prosecution—Mixed question of fact and law Determination of limitation in a claim for malicious prosecution depends upon factual inquiries and legal evaluation—Properly triable only after recording of evidence—Trial Court rightly declined to reject plaint summarily on limitation grounds. (c) Defamation Ordinance, 2002 ----Ss.8, 12 & 13—Distinction between defamation and malicious prosecution Underlying suit sought damages for malicious prosecution and not defamation under Defamation Ordinance, 2002—Contentions regarding limitation and exclusive jurisdiction under the Ordinance held misconceived—Courts below correctly found the Ordinance inapplicable to the controversy. (d) Constitution of Pakistan (1973) ----Art.199—Constitutional jurisdiction—Scope of interference High Court’s jurisdiction under Art.199 confined to correcting jurisdictional or constitutional errors—No such infirmity or violation found—Concurrent orders of lower courts based on sound reasoning; interference declined. (e) Practice and procedure ----Vexatious litigation by an advocate party-in-person—Imposition of costs Petitioner, an Advocate, repeatedly filed frivolous applications after settlement of issues, demonstrating a pattern of obstinate and abusive litigation—Courts are empowered to discourage such conduct through imposition of realistic costs—Costs of Rs.35,000 imposed, payable to the Sindh High Court Clinic within fourteen days. Cited cases: None reported. (g) Disposition — Petition dismissed with costs of Rs.35,000/-, to be deposited with the Sindh High Court Clinic within fourteen (14) days—All pending applications dismissed accordingly.

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (V of 1908) —O.VII, R.11—Rejection of plaint—Scope—Plaint for specific performance of oral agreement—Maintainability—Admitted oral agreement and pleaded part-performance—Effect— Suit for specific performance based on oral sale agreement was rejected under O.VII, R.11, C.P.C. for lack of written contract and limitation bar—Held, where oral agreement and part-payment are admitted by defendant in written statement and legal notice, plaint cannot be rejected solely for lack of written terms—Court must treat averments in plaint as true and assess maintainability accordingly—Rejection of plaint in such case constitutes material irregularity—Order of lower courts set aside. (b) Limitation Act, 1908 —Art. 113—Specific performance—Limitation—Starting point—No fixed date for performance—Refusal of performance— Held, where no date is fixed for performance in oral agreement, limitation under Art. 113 begins from date plaintiff has notice of defendant’s refusal—Legal notice dated 12.05.2018 constituted clear refusal—Suit filed on 06.05.2019 was within prescribed three-year period—Findings of lower courts based on incorrect application of limitation law—Rejection of suit on this ground was erroneous. (c) Contract Act, 1872 & C.P.C., 1908 —Ss. 29 & 10—Oral agreements—Uncertain terms—Pleading of general facts—O.VI, R.12— Court observed that an oral agreement need not recite all terms in detail in the plaint—Where contract arises from conversations or conduct, general pleading is permissible—Omission to state witness names or specific performance date not fatal—Ambiguity in pleadings may be cured by seeking further particulars under O.VI, R.5, C.P.C., rather than rejecting suit at threshold. Disposition: Revision Allowed—Judgment and decree of Appellate and Trial Courts set aside—Plaint reinstated—Matter remanded for trial on merits—Application under O.VII, R.11 dismissed. Cited Case Law: Haji Abdul Karim v. Messrs Florida Builders (Pvt.) Ltd., PLD 2012 SC 247 Siraj Din v. Mst. Khurshid Begum, 2007 SCMR 1792 Shoukat Ullah v. Adil Tiwana, 2021 SCMR 56 Ghulam Nabi v. Muhammad Yaqub, PLD 1983 SC 344 Jaiwanti Bai v. Amir Corporation, PLD 2016 Sindh 498

Summary: (a) Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Consumer Protection Act, 1997—S. 13(2)—Limitation—Ten-day period for filing complaint—Scope of discretion in proviso—Complaint against inflated electricity bill— Complainant challenged an electricity bill issued on 20.07.2022, payable by 05.08.2022—Complaint was filed on 03.08.2022—Consumer Court dismissed complaint as time-barred under S.13(2), KPK Consumer Protection Act, 1997—High Court held that the lower court erred in ignoring the cause of action (i.e., the disputed bill), which arose shortly before filing the complaint—Earlier disconnection in 2020 was not the basis of grievance—Further held that limitation must be assessed in light of the discretion granted in the first proviso to S.13(2), which allows condonation for sufficient cause. Held, summary rejection on limitation grounds without considering discretion under proviso to S.13(2) amounts to jurisdictional error—Consumer protection laws must be interpreted in favor of legitimate consumer rights. (b) Consumer Protection—Purpose and interpretation—Beneficial legislation— KPK Consumer Protection Act, 1997 is a beneficial statute aimed at protecting consumers and ensuring fair commercial practices—Such statutes must be interpreted liberally to extend protection and access to remedy, not deny it on technicalities. Held, consumer courts must adhere to liberal construction of procedural provisions like limitation to prevent miscarriage of justice—Dismissal of complaint without adjudication on merits frustrates the statutory object. Disposition: Appeal Allowed—Impugned order set aside—Case remanded to Consumer Court, Nowshera for decision on merits in accordance with law—Parties directed to appear as and when summoned.

Summary: Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Property) Act (XII of 1957)--- ----Ss.25(2)(l) & 25(2)(s)---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), S.19 & First Sched. Art. 148---Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), Ss.42 & 54--- Declaration of title---Redemption of land mortgaged to a non-Muslim lady, who left the country at the time of partition in the year 1947---Non-issuance of notice to mortgagor to redeem the property---Effect---Limitation period, commencement of---Possession of the petitioners was not disputed---Federal Government terming the suit property as evacuee property transferred it in favour of Federal Government and then to a person respectively, who later on transferred it in favour of predecessor of respondents---Mortgage came to knowledge of the petitioners, when predecessor of the respondents instituted a suit against petitioners alleging to be the owners of the suit property, which prompted the petitioners to file a declaratory suit for redemption of the suit property--- Trial Court dismissed the suit treating it to be barred by time under Art. 148 of Limitation Act, 1908---Appellate Court upheld the judgment and decree of Trial Court on the ground that it was not clear that non-Muslim lady had left the country after 1947, therefore, petitioners were required to have asked for redemption of the property within a period of sixty years---Validity---Such determination of the Appellate Court was completely against the record and did not have any relevance to the present controversy for the reason that if such argument of the Appellate Court was accepted then there was no occasion for the Federal Government to have declared the suit property as evacuee and transferred it in the year, 1990, therefore, Appellate Court had dismissed the appeal on wrong premises---Powers under S.25(2)(l) of Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Property) Act, 1957, were delegated to the Deputy Rehabilitation and Assistant Rehabilitation Commissioner to issue notice to local mortgagors to redeem the property within one month failing which the property would be liable to be auctioned under S.25(2)(s) of the Act, but the petitioners were not given any notice, as such, from the acknowledgment of the right of redemption, a fresh period of limitation would be computed for the exercise of such right in terms of S.19 of the Limitation Act, 1908---Thus, if the period of limitation was counted from the year, 1947, still the suit of the petitioners was not barred by time---After the acknowledgement of the rights of the petitioners vide letter Memo dated 08.12.1959, a fresh period of limitation would be computed for exercise of such rights in terms of S.19 of the Limitation Act, 1908 and as such, from the year, 1959 too, the suit of the petitioners was not barred by time---Both the Courts below had failed to consider the question of limitation in its true perspective, as suit filed by petitioners for redemption was well within time in terms of Art.148 of the Limitation Act, 1908, therefore, Civil revision was allowed and judgments and decrees passed by the Courts below were set-aside and the suit of the petitioners was decreed as prayed for accordingly. Muhammad Hanif and another v. Ghulam Rasool through LRs and others 2005 SCMR 1004 rel. Altaf Ahmad for Petitioners. Shams-ul-Haq for Respondents. Date of hearing: 13th May, 2024.

Summary: ---Issues:Whether the limitation period for the redemption of property should be computed from the acknowledgment of the right of redemption.Whether the petitioners' suit was barred by the limitation period prescribed under the law.----Holding/Reasoning/O

Summary: Limitation Act ( IX of 1908 )--- ----S. 3, First Sched., Arts. 61 & 62---Suit for recovery, filing of---Limitation---Law of limitation cannot be considered merely as a formality, but the same is required to be observed and taken into consideration being mandatory in nature---Purpose behind law of limitation is to help the vigilant and not the indolent and helping hand could not be extended to a litigant having gone into a deep slumber or having become forgetful of his right---It is provided by S.3 of the Limitation Act, 1908, that, subject to the provision of Ss.4 to 25, every suit instituted, appeal preferred and application made after the period of limitation prescribed therefore shall be dismissed, although limitation has not been set up as a defence---Section 3 of the Limitation Act, 1908, is couched in mandatory form and entails penalty of dismissal of suit if instituted after the period of limitation prescribed in the First Schedule of the Limitation Act, 1908---Any person may have an enforceable right but if he fails to enforce such a right within time stipulated by law, then such right becomes unenforceable---Point of limitation, even if not pressed or taken, the Court is under obligation to ensure that the question of limitation is scrutinized, for such question deals with assumption of jurisdiction to grant relief---Period of limitation of three years is provided under Arts.61 & 62 in the First Schedule of the Limitation Act, 1908, for suit relating to money payable to the plaintiff for money paid for the defendant, and for money payable by defendant to the plaintiff for money received by the defendant for the plaintiff's use---In both cases, the limitation starts from the time when the money is either paid or the money is received and the period of limitation for the said purpose is three years---Assertions of the plaintiff's evidence were very clear that an amount of Rs. 1,236,000/- Qatari Riyals was given to the defendant in the year 1984, whereas an amount of Rs. 2,10,00,000/- was given to the defendant in the year 1993---Said amount was demanded for the last time through a Jirga which was conducted in the year 2009, whereas the suit was brought before the court in the year 2018, which was obviously beyond the period of limitation---Despite the fact that the said amount was due against the defendants/appellants, however, in view of the clear bar provided under S.3 of the Limitation Act, 1908, no decree could be passed in favour of the plaintiff against defendants/appellants--- Thus, Trial Court had incorrectly dealt with the period of limitation from the date when the same was demanded through the office of Home Department of the Province---Therefore, the suit filed by the plaintiff against the defendants / appellants must fail on the point of limitation---High Court set-aside impugned judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court ; consequently, the suit of the plaintiff against the appellants stood dismissed on the point of limitation---Appeal, filed by defendant, was allowed, in circumstances. State Bank of Pakistan through Governor and another v. Imtiaz Ali Khan and others 2012 SCMR 280; Ghulam Sarwar v. Amir Hussain and 3 others 2004 SCMR 944; Lahore Development Authority v. Mst. Sharifan Bibi and another PLD 2010 SC 705; Shahid Pervaiz alias Shahid Hameed v. Muhammad Ahmad Ameen 2006 SCMR 631 and Hakim Muhammad Buta and another v. Habib Ahmad and others PLD 1985 SC 153 ref. Zia-ur-Rehman Tajik for Appellants. Nasirullah Khan for Respondent. Date of hearing: 2nd May, 2024.

Summary: Background:Muhammad Nawaz (Appellant) filed a suit for possession through specific performance of an agreement to sell dated October 17, 1993, against Muhammad Ilyas and others (Respondents). The agreement was originally made with Muhammad Hussain, the deceased predecessor of Respondents No. 1 to 5, concerning tenancy rights on state land acquired under the Grow More Food Scheme. After Muhammad Hussain?s death, disputes arose among his legal heirs and the heirs of the original allottee, leading to litigation that concluded with a decree favoring Hussain's heirs. Subsequent to the decree, the appellant approached the respondents to execute the 1993 sale agreement, but they refused, prompting the suit. The trial court ruled in favor of the appellant, but the appellate court reversed this decision, leading to the current second appeal.----Issues:Whether the agreement to sell from 1993 was valid and enforceable against the respondents.Whether the suit was barred by limitation.Whether the second appeal is maintainable under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome:The Lahore High Court dismissed the second appeal, upholding the appellate court's decision to reject the specific performance claim. The court found several issues with the appellant's case:The appellant failed to prove conclusively that Muhammad Hussain had indeed purchased the stamp paper for the 1993 agreement, casting doubt on the authenticity of the agreement.The appellant, a revenue Patwari, did not present any evidence of departmental permission to purchase the disputed property or disclose his source of income for the transaction.The possession of the disputed property was with the respondents, not the appellant, suggesting that the full sale consideration might not have been paid as claimed.The suit was determined to be barred by limitation, having been filed long after the death of Muhammad Hussain in 1995 and beyond three years from the relevant decree in 2007 favoring Hussain's heirs.The court emphasized that the scope of the second appeal is limited to substantial legal errors or procedural defects that could have influenced the outcome, none of which were applicable in this case.----Citations/Precedents:Article 113 of the Limitation Act, 1908 - Specifies a three-year period for filing suits of specific performance from the date the cause of action arises.Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Limits the grounds for second appeals to substantial legal or procedural errors.----Case Law:Amjad Ikram v. Mst. Asiya Kausar and others (2015 SCMR 1)Madan Gopal and others v. Maran Bepari and others (PLD 1969 SC 617)Muhammad Nawaz through LRs. v. Haji Muhammad Baran Khan through LRs. and others (2013 SCMR 1300) - These cases support the principle that appellate findings, unless manifestly erroneous, should be preferred over trial court findings.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan: ----Article 25---Equality before law---Discrimination in granting back benefits--- The appellant, a reinstated judicial officer, alleged gross discrimination in the denial of back benefits for the intervening period, despite similarly placed colleagues being granted such benefits---The Tribunal held that the denial of back benefits in the appellant's case was a violation of the equality clause under Article 25 of the Constitution, as the respondent failed to provide justification for the discriminatory treatment. (b) Punjab Civil Service Law---Back benefits for reinstated civil servants---Principle of law--- The appellant, reinstated into service from the date of dismissal, was entitled to back benefits for the intervening period during which he was not employed for gain---The Tribunal reaffirmed that when an illegal dismissal is overturned, reinstatement must include consequential relief, including salary and benefits for the intervening period, unless it is proven that the employee was gainfully employed---Reliance placed on PLD 1970 SC 415, 2015 SCMR 77, and 2021 SCMR 962. (c) Limitation---Overcoming procedural impediments in service matters--- The Tribunal held that the plea of limitation could not bar the appellant’s legitimate claim for back benefits, particularly when a judicial precedent establishes entitlement---Reliance placed on Abdul Hameed v. WAPDA (2021 SCMR 1230). -----Disposition: Appeal allowed; respondent directed to calculate and provide the financial back benefits to the appellant in light of the case law.

Summary: Background:This case involves a civil revision filed by Sabir Ali challenging the dismissal of his objection petition by lower courts. The core of the dispute dates back to a judgment and decree from 1988 (and its amendment in 1991) in favor of the predecessors of the respondents, regarding possession of land measuring 1257 Kanals 10 Marlas. Despite multiple execution petitions by the decree holders over the years, Sabir Ali argued that the latest execution petition, filed more than 20 years after the decree, was barred by time and hence not maintainable.---Issues:Whether the execution petition filed by the decree holders more than 20 years after the initial decree was time-barred.Whether the orders passed by the executing court on various dates were final orders, and if the latest execution petition could be treated as a continuation of the original proceedings.---Holding/Reasoning/Outcome:The Lahore High Court held that the third execution petition filed by the decree holders was not a fresh application but a continuation of the earlier execution petitions. The court found that previous petitions were either suspended or consigned to the record room due to circumstances beyond the decree holders' control, such as the non-deposit of the process fee or incorrect implementation of court orders regarding the transfer of possession.The court referenced several precedents indicating that as long as no final order disposing of an execution petition has been judicially passed, a subsequent application for execution can be considered a continuation of the original proceedings. Given that the decree holders' rights determined by the court had not been satisfied, their continued pursuit to enforce the decree was justified.Thus, the civil revision petition by Sabir Ali was dismissed, affirming the decisions of the lower courts.----Citations/Precedents:Article 181 of the Limitation Act, 1908: Pertains to the time limit for the execution of a decree.Section 48 of C.P.C.: Sets a six-year outer limit for the execution of a decree.Rana Kent Malaviya and another Vs Satya Narain Malaviya (A.I.R. 1938 Allahabad 552): Discusses what constitutes a 'final order'.Krishnamachari Vs. Chengalraya Naidu (A.I.R. 1940 Madras 281): Similar discussion on final orders.Venlappa and others Vs Lakshmi Kant Rao (A.I.R 1956 Hyderabad 07) and MUHAMMAD UMER KHAN versus MUQARRAB KHAN and another (PLD 1976 Peshawar 43): Related to continuation of execution petitions.UNITED BANK LIMITED vs. FATEH HAYAT KHAN TAWANA and others (2015 SCMR 1335): Discusses when an execution petition can be considered a continuation of a previous one.