Summary: (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-------S. 302(b)---Qatl-i-amd---Juvenile Justice System Ordinance (XXII of 2000), S.7---Qatl-iamd---Age of accused, determination of--- Accused was charged for committing murder ofbrother of the complainant---Trial Court sent a letter to the Medical Board for determinationof age of the accused---Subsequently, on direction of the Trial Court, Medical Board, afterexamining the accused, issued a certificate, according to which his age was about 17 years---Validity---Once it was brought to the knowledge of the Trial Court that the accused was achild under S. 2(b) of the Juvenile Justice System Act, 2018, his trial was to proceed under S.4 thereof rather than under ordinary law---Conviction and sentences of the accusedtantamounted to throwing him in prison with adults in violation of S.16 of Juvenile JusticeSystem Act, 2018---Section 16 of the Act provided that the accused being juvenile could notbe awarded death; similarly accused could not be ordered to labour etc. in view of theclear bar contained under the law, which was applicable to the facts and circumstances ofthe present case---Trial Court had wrongly awarded death punishment to the accused---Appealwas allowed and accused was acquitted by setting aside conviction and sentence awarded bythe Trial Court, in circumstances.(b) Criminal trial-------Circumstantial evidence---Scope---If the case was based on circumstantial evidence, theprosecution was to ensure that the circumstances from which the inference of guilt wasdrawn, had been firmly established---Circumstances must have unerringly pointed towardsthe guilt of the accused and when taken cumulatively, same should form a chain so complete,that it must demonstrate in all probabilities that the crime was committed by the accused.Sheikh Muhammad Amjad v. State PLD 2003 SC 704 rel.(c) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-------S. 302(b)---Qatl-i-amd---Appreciation of evidence---Last seen evidence---Scope---Accused was charged for committing murder of brother of the complainant---Last seenevidence had been furnished by one witness---Said witness had stated that on the day ofincident he was present with deceased in his house---Accused asked the deceased to go toplace "P"---Deceased took his car and went while witness was left at cemetery and accusedand deceased went away---Said story narrated by witness had neither been corroborated fromthe FIR nor from the statement of the accused recorded under S. 164, Cr.P.C., nor theprosecution produced any other corroborating evidence in that behalf---Version of saidwitness was an afterthought and seemed concocted and fabricated one---If the witness hadseen the accused on the very first day of missing the deceased he would have definitelydisclosed before the police and he had inquired from the accused about the whereabouts ofthe deceased but he did not lodge the report on the first day rather his statement was recordedby the police after three days from missing of the deceased---Statement of said witness didnot find any support from alleged confessional statement of the accused and other piece ofevidence---Belated statement of witness regarding last seen of the deceased in the companyof the accused was unbelievable and not trustworthy---Appeal was allowed and accused wasacquitted by setting aside conviction and sentence recorded by the Trial Court, incircumstances.(d) Criminal trial-------Last seen evidence---Evidentiary value---Last seen evidence was the weakest type ofevidence unless corroborated by the other strong pieces of evidence---Punishment of capitalcharge could not be based on evidence of last seen.(e) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-------S. 302(b)---Qatl-i-amd---Appreciation of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Accused wascharged for committing murder of brother of the complainant---Complainant alleged in hisreport that deceased was kidnapped for ransom and accused demanded Rs. 25,00,000/- forhis release---Record revealed that neither the complainant informed the police aboutreceiving of a phone call for ransom demand nor lodged the report in respect of the deceased---Complainant lodged the report on 16.12.2013 when the dead body of the deceased waslying in civil hospital---Even otherwise, the complainant did not collect the record of thetelephone from which he received call, neither he approached the police for collecting theCall Data Record about receiving calls---Witnesses, who were allegedly sitting with thecomplainant at the time of receiving call also did not inform the police or Levies Force aboutreceiving of the said call---Record was silent as to what was the occasion for the saidwitnesses to have been present with complainant at the time of call from the unknownperson---No explanation whatsoever had been rendered by the prosecution---Alleged call forransom, in circumstances, appeared to be fabricated and cooked story, simply because novoice data of the phone call was either by the police or Levies Force or produced by thecomplainant party---Testimony of the said witness was neither truth-worthy nor confidenceinspiring---Appeal was allowed and accused was acquitted by setting aside conviction andsentence recorded by the Trial Court, in circumstances.Azeem Khan and another v. Mujahid Khan 2016 SCMR 274 rel. (f) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-------S. 302(b)---Qatl-i-amd---Appreciation of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Delay of aboutmore than two days in lodging FIR---Effect---Occurrence took place on 14.12.2013 and theFIR was lodged on 16.12.2013 at 10:00 pm.---Record revealed that the complainant knewabout the occurrence on 14.12.2013---Complainant in his report as well as in his statementstated that on 15.12.2013 when they came to know that juvenile accused was at his home,they met him who was very nervous and could not satisfactorily answer about thewhereabouts of the deceased, therefore, they handed him over to police, whereby accuseddisclosed that he and absconding accused put the deceased to death on account of nonpayment of ransom and threw his body---Statements of complainant and InvestigatingOfficer revealed that the accused was handed over to Levis Force on 15.12.2013 and theInvestigating Officer stated that when police handed over the accused to him they told thatthe accused was involved in murder of deceased meaning thereby that the complainant andInvestigating Officer and the Police Officials of police were having knowledge about missingof the deceased and his murder on 15.12.2013 but despite that the complainant did not lodgethe report and he lodged the report on 16.12.2013 at 10:00 p.m.---Lodging of the FIR withsuch delay had not been plausibly explained by the prosecution as well as complainant,which created reasonable doubt in the prosecution case---Appeal was allowed and accusedwas acquitted by setting aside conviction and sentence recorded by the Trial Court, incircumstances.Mehmood Ahmad and 3 others v. The State and another 1995 SCMR 127 rel.(g) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-------S. 164---Confessional statement of accused---Procedure---Before recording theconfessional statement of the accused, the Judicial Magistrate was to observe all themandatory precautions as per High Court Rules and Orders and Procedure, so that all signsof fear inculcated by the investigation agency in the mind of the accused were to be shed out.Azeem Khan and another v. Mujahid Khan 2016 SCMR 274 rel.(h) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-------S. 302(b)---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S. 164---Juvenile Justice SystemOrdinance (XXII of 2000), S. 2(b)---Qatl-i-amd---Appreciation of evidence---Recordingstatement of juvenile accused---Scope---Accused was charged for committing murder ofbrother of the complainant---Record showed that the accused was arrested on 15.12.2013before lodging the FIR, which was registered on 16.12.2013 and produced him before theJudicial Magistrate on 23.12.2013---Accused, being a minor, was provided no opportunity ofcounselling neither by his guardian nor by a lawyer---Judicial Magistrate did not state asingle word in his statement as well as in the certificate issued by him that either any offerwas made to the appellant for counselling---Judicial Magistrate did not comply in letter andspirit the procedure of recording judicial confession---Judicial Magistrate did not explain tothe accused that who he was and even he was not told that he would not be handed over to police after his confession---Indeed, the Judicial Magistrate after recording the confession,handed over the accused to the same levies officials, who produced him for purpose ofjudicial remand---Said fact was also confirmed by Investigating Officer, who conductedinvestigation of the case---Confession of the accused was not voluntary, in circumstances---Confession of the minor was to be assessed on the same touchstone as to statement of a childwitness---Child witness was brought to the dock by relatives while on the contrary childaccused was brought to the court by Police Officials for recording his confessional statementand possibility of tutoring and police fear was always there---Record further transpired thatthe police and Levies Force wrongly confined the accused before lodging of the FIRwithout taking remand from the concerned Judicial Magistrate---Requisite care andvigilance had not been taken by the Judicial Magistrate before recording confessionalstatement of the appellant---Appeal was allowed and accused was acquitted by setting asideconviction and sentence recorded by the Trial Court, in circumstances.Hashim Qasim and another v. The State 2017 SCMR 986; State through AdvocateGeneral Sindh, Karachi v. Farman Hussain and others PLD 1995 SC 1; Abdul Haleem v. TheState 1984 PCr.LJ 611 and Abdul Hameed v The State PLD 1980 Pesh. 25 rel.(i) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-------S. 164---Confessional statement---Delay in recording confessional statement---Effect---Confessional statement recorded with delay of eight days after the arrest of accused---Such adelay having not been plausibly explained by the prosecution, could not be accepted asconfidence inspiring against the accused.Naqeebullah's case PLD 1978 SC 21; Khalid Javed and another v. The State 2003SCMR 1419; Shoukat Saeed v. The State PLD 1978 Quetta 1 and Patoo and another v. TheState 2012 MLD 1358 rel.(j) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)-------S. 164---Confessional statement of accused---Scope---Conviction could not be based onlyon the confessional statement of the accused unless the prosecution was able to substantiateits case against the accused by trustworthy and inspiring evidence.Muhammad Ismail and others v. The State 2017 SCMR 898 rel.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Dying declaration is a weaker type of evidence that the evidence subjected to cross-examination, but conviction can be based on the same, as such declaration is made in extremity, when the party is at the point of death and when every hope of his world is gone.case of single accused, minor discrepancies would not be helpful because appellant absconded and arrested after long time and with the passage of time such discrepancies would bound to occur.

Summary: Article 25 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973.a) Equality doctrine requires similar treatment among similarly placed, but do not require identical treatment or applicability of same laws and rules to all classes of people.b) unless vires of rules of recruitment are challenged, requirement for a job reproduced in advertisement can not be challenged.

Summary: Bail granted --- The petitioner, has filed for post-arrest bail in a case involving FIR registered at Police Station Saddar Hasilpur, District Bahawalpur. The charges against the petitioner include offenses under sections 302, 201, and 34 PPC. The court acknowledged that there is no eyewitness to the alleged crime and that the prosecution relies on statements from witnesses who claim to have seen the petitioner and co-accused with the deceased. The court observed that the co-accused Sharjil Liaqat has already been granted bail, and there is no distinction in the evidentiary material between the cases of the petitioner and Sharjil Liaqat. The court tentatively assesses that the petitioner deserves bail due to the similar roles played by him and Sharjil Liaqat. The court emphasized that mere involvement in a heinous offense is not sufficient grounds for denying bail. Consequently, the court granted post-arrest bail to the petitioner, subject to the conditions of furnishing bail bonds and providing sureties.

Summary: Bail granted---The petition, submitted under section 497 Cr.P.C., sought post-arrest bail in connection registered at Police Station Uch Sharif, District Bahawalpur, concerning offenses under sections 376 and 365-B PPC. The allegation against Muhammad Yousaf was that he committed rape against Ruqaya Bibi (the complainant) after abducting her. The court observed that the delay in reporting the alleged abduction and rape, the existence of a valid Nikah between the petitioner and the complainant, and the contradictory versions presented in the FIR and other documents raised doubts about the reliability of the evidence. The court emphasized that disputes involving marriage should be decided by Family Courts, and criminal courts should await the outcome of the family court proceedings. The court granted post-arrest bail to Muhammad Yousaf, a previous non-convict, with the case deemed one of further inquiry into the petitioner's guilt. Bail was subject to furnishing bonds of Rs. 500,000 with two sureties each, to the satisfaction of the trial court.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan ----Arts. 4, 9, 10A, 13(a) & 199--- Fundamental right to liberty—Preventive detention under Section 3 of the West Pakistan Maintenance of Public Order Ordinance, 1960 (MPO)---Judicial review of executive action—Petitioner challenged the detention order passed by Deputy Commissioner, Multan, under S.3, MPO, detaining the father of the petitioner on the ground of his alleged past criminal activities—Contention raised that impugned order violated constitutional protections under Arts. 4, 9, and 10A, as it was passed without application of independent mind and without substantive evidence—Held, that liberty is a fundamental right, and no person shall be deprived of it except in accordance with the law—Art.10A guarantees the right to a fair trial, and any executive order infringing this right must be scrutinized—Detention based on mere past criminal record, without any present material demonstrating imminent threat to public order, is unconstitutional—Court, under Art.199, has the power to review such orders and strike them down if found lacking legal justification—Impugned order was declared unconstitutional and was set aside. Cited Cases: • Abdul Latif Shamshad Ahmad v. District Magistrate, Kasur (1999 P Cr. L J 2014) • Mrs. Arshad Ali Khan v. Government of Punjab (1994 SCMR 1532) • Abdul Rasheed Bhatti v. Government of Punjab (PLD 2010 Lahore 484) (b) Preventive Detention—Scope and Judicial Review ----S.3, West Pakistan Maintenance of Public Order Ordinance, 1960--- Preventive detention—Judicial review—Requirement of objective satisfaction—Burden of proof on detaining authority—Held, that preventive detention is an exceptional measure meant to prevent imminent threats to public safety, not to be used as a punitive measure for past criminal activities—Detaining authority must demonstrate with substantive material that the detenu is currently engaged in or preparing to engage in activities prejudicial to public order—Mere reference to past criminal cases is not sufficient to justify preventive detention—Court observed that impugned order was based solely on a report from the City Police Officer (CPO), Multan, and lacked independent reasoning by the Deputy Commissioner—Such orders, based on conjecture and without material evidence, violate constitutional protections and are liable to be struck down. Cited Cases: • Mst. Sana Jamil v. Government of Punjab (2016 P Cr. L J 424) • Syed Mubbashar Raza v. Government of Punjab (PLD 2015 Lahore 20) • Liaqat Ali v. Government of Sindh (PLD 1973 Karachi 78) (c) Public Order vs. Law and Order ----Interpretation of “public order” in preventive detention cases---Distinction between public order, law and order, and security of the State---Held, that preventive detention under S.3, MPO, is only justified when an individual poses an immediate and significant threat to public order—Public order refers to disturbances affecting society at large, not individual criminal conduct—Court reiterated that “law and order” concerns individual acts, whereas “public order” relates to broader societal disruption—Allegations against the petitioner’s father were general in nature, and no cogent evidence was produced to show that his actions were prejudicial to public safety—Held, that registration of past criminal cases, without specific allegations of recent unlawful activity, does not warrant preventive detention—Impugned order was found to be excessive and lacking legal justification. Cited Cases: • Mrs. Arshad Ali Khan v. Government of Punjab (1994 SCMR 1532) • Faizabad Dharna Case (PLD 2019 SC 318) (d) Absence of Evidence—Violation of Due Process ----Burden of proof on detaining authority—Subjective satisfaction must be based on tangible evidence---Held, that executive authorities must substantiate their decision to detain an individual under preventive detention laws—In the present case, apart from the CPO’s report, no independent material was placed before the Deputy Commissioner to justify detention—Mere apprehension or suspicion, without any tangible proof of involvement in anti-State activities or incitement to violence, is insufficient to justify deprivation of liberty—Court emphasized that preventive detention must meet strict legal requirements and should not be used as a tool for arbitrary imprisonment—Impugned order was declared illegal and set aside. Cited Cases: • Abdul Rasheed Bhatti v. Government of Punjab (PLD 2010 Lahore 484) • Munir Hussain Bhatti v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2011 SC 407) (e) Principle of Fair Trial and Double Jeopardy ----Arts. 10A & 13(a), Constitution of Pakistan, 1973--- Preventive detention based on past criminal cases—Violation of fair trial principles—Double jeopardy—Held, that a person facing trial in criminal cases cannot be detained under preventive detention laws based on the same allegations—Such detention amounts to double jeopardy, violating Art.13(a) of the Constitution—Art.10A guarantees the right to due process, and executive action that undermines this right is unconstitutional—Court reaffirmed that an accused person must be tried through due process of law, and preventive detention cannot be used as an alternative to criminal prosecution—Detention of the petitioner’s father, solely based on his past criminal record, was held to be in violation of constitutional protections and was struck down. Cited Cases: • Abdul Rasheed Bhatti v. Government of Punjab (PLD 2010 Lahore 484) (f) Executive Overreach and Limited Government ----Arts. 90, 99, Constitution of Pakistan, 1973--- Judicial review of executive discretion—Misuse of preventive detention laws—Held, that executive authorities must exercise their power within constitutional and legal limits—Preventive detention laws must not be used arbitrarily, and courts have the duty to intervene where fundamental rights are violated—Deputy Commissioner’s order lacked independent reasoning and was based solely on police reports, which is insufficient justification for curtailing personal liberty—Court reiterated that excessive delegation of detention powers to administrative authorities must be subject to strict judicial scrutiny to prevent misuse—Detention orders lacking lawful basis are liable to be struck down. Cited Cases: • Lahore Development Authority v. Imrana Tiwana (2015 SCMR 1739) • Federation of Pakistan v. Mustafa Impex (2016 SCMR 447) (g) Disposition Impugned detention order found illegal, arbitrary, and without lawful justification—Preventive detention must be based on substantive grounds affecting public order rather than past criminal charges—No reasonable apprehension of public disorder established—Impugned order set aside—Petition allowed, and detenu ordered to be released forthwith unless required in any other case.

Summary: The appeal was filed under Section 48 of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997. The appellant sought to summon the record of entry, maintained at Police Station New Multan, related to rent deeds, along with the Moharir of the police station, as defense evidence. The trial court had dismissed the application, but the High Court allowed the appeal, stating that the record had prima facie relevance to the allegations against the accused. The court emphasized the accused's right to a fair trial under Article 10-A of the Constitution and directed the trial court to issue the process for summoning the requested evidence.

Summary: ----Art. 199---Constitutional petition---Pre-mature---Scope---Prohibition on use of plasticbags---Petitioners, being members of Technical Working Group, filed constitutional petitionand contended that the objections raised by them were not considered by t

Summary: (a) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)-------Ss. 42 & 54---Suit for declaration and permanent injunction---Limitation---Allegation offraud---Proof---Procedure---Contention of plaintiff was that he was owner of suit property---Suit was dismissed by the Trial Court---Validity---Evidence produced on behalf of plaintiffdid not substantiate his claim---When a party had alleged fraud then he/she had to prove theallegations and mere verbal assertion would not be beneficial---Present suit was time barred---Plaintiff had failed to rebut evidence produced on behalf of defendants---Wherepresumption of truth was attached to a document then same could not be discarded unlessproved otherwise by convincing and cogent evidence---Evidence produced on behalf ofplaintiff was self contradictory and non-confidence inspiring---Plaintiff had not produced anywitness of purchase of suit property---Defendants had not produced any evidence butplaintiff was bound to prove his case on the strength of his own evidence and he could notget any benefit from the shortcoming and weakness of defendants' side---Findings recordedby the Trial Court were based on proper appreciation of evidence on record---Appeal wasdismissed in circumstances.