Summary: i. Agreement to sell does not create any right of ownership in favour of a party unless and until the conditions mentioned therein are fulfilled and acted upon by both the parties. ii. Grant of decree in cases of specific performance of an agreement is a discretion and the Court is not bound to grant such relief nevertheless such discretion of the Court should not be arbitrary and must be based on reasonable grounds guided by the judicial principles. iii. Where reasonable time and several opportunities have been provided to a party by the Court and if even thereafter such direction is not complied then the defaulting party has to suffer for the same. iv. In a suit for specific performance of an agreement, a plaintiff is required to deposit the outstanding sale consideration amount in the court whenever it is so directed by the Court and in case of any default in this regard, the plaintiff has to suffer for the same as such exercise is required to prima facie establish that the plaintiff is capable, ready and willing to perform its part of obligations), wherein, in a suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell, a plaintiff succeeded to establish that it was the defendant who prevented him from performance of his part of obligation and if he also demonstrates his ability and readiness to perform the commitment undertaken by him in the contract then he would be entitled for the grant of decree. v. Both the parties of an agreement to sell are bound to perform their part of obligations) and in case of failure of either of the party the defaulting party has to suffer for the penal consequences mentioned in the said agreement. vi. Time is to be considered as essence of the contract if the following three conditions are fulfilled firstly, that there must be terms and conditions containing the obligations of the parties, secondly, time must be fixed for the performance of the said obligation(s) and thirdly, there must be penal consequences for non-performance of the said obligations) within the fixed / stipulated time mentioned in the agreement.

Summary: i. In cases of inheritance amongst siblings, the plaintiff is only required to prove two facts firstly, his/ their relationship with the common predecessor and with the defendants and secondly, that the suit property was or is part of the legacy, whereas, in such suit if the defendant has taken any plea of dis-inheritance on the basis of any instrument of transfer then, such defendant has to prove such mode of transfer through the required standard of proof. ii. In cases of inheritance, if any legal heirs has taken the plea of a gift mutation in his favor then such legal heir has not only to prove the valid execution of the gift mutation but he has also to prove original incident of gift to the effect that as to when, where and in whose presence their predecessor made an offer of gift of the suit property, its acceptance by such legal heir and of course, delivery of exclusive possession to him. iii. As per the legal requirement of Article 17 read with 79, of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, any document which is required by law to be attested by two attesting witnesses then no legal worth could be attached to such document, unless and until both those witnesses are produced in support of the same or at least to establish on record their non-production of being dead etc. iv. The production of a scriber of a deed as a witness, unless he has signed the document as a witness of the deed would not absolve the beneficiary of the said document from production of both the marginal witnesses of such deed. v. In cases amongst the legal heirs from a common predecessor, the possession of an heir is to be considered as possession on behalf of all other co-heirs and as such every co-heir is to be considered as in possession of each inch of such property. vi. Whenever, the authenticity of a document is challenged by a party on the basis of fraud or misrepresentation, then, the onus to prove such documents lics on the beneficiary and the said onus could not be shifted to the person who has challenged the same. vii. Where the two courts below are at variance then the High Court in its revisional jurisdiction has to see that as to finding of which of the Court are based on proper appraisal of evidence and no preference could be given to the finding of the appeal court being a higher forum.

Summary: i. Consolidation of suits/petitions is a judicial tool to promote procedural and judicial economy, ensure consistency in judgments and prevent the abuse of process of the Court. ii. Whenever there is common parties and overlapping issues in multiple proceedings pending before various Courts of law then it is not only permissible but also necessary to consolidate those proceedings. iii. Courts are not only empowered but they must encourage to exercise their discretion qua consolidation of the suits in the interest of justice, even if the parties are not agree for the same, as such consolidation would foster judicial efficiency and avoid conflicting judgments and would help in upholding the integrity of the judicial process and would also prevent the abuse of process of law. iv. Where in a writ petition order and judgment of special tribunals / forum are under challenged then the writ petitioner is required for getting a favourable decision to show that the fora below lack the jurisdiction or they have not properly exercised their jurisdiction or they have illegally exercised their jurisdiction.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan – Arts. 3, 4, 8(1), 9, 38 & 2-A – Socio-Economic Rights – State Obligation to Ensure Food Security and Farmers’ Welfare: Failure of executive authorities to protect farmers’ interests and regulate wheat prices—Held, State has a constitutional obligation under Articles 3, 4, 9, and 38 to eliminate exploitation, ensure fundamental dignity, and secure socio-economic justice, especially for vulnerable segments like small-scale farmers—Post-harvest policy shift in wheat pricing without corresponding input control, despite existing constitutional mandates, was observed to have caused setbacks to farmers, defeating the spirit of Articles 2-A and 38—Court emphasized that food (wheat) being a staple necessity, must be accessible and its production fairly incentivized. (b) Punjab Price Control of Essential Commodities Act, 2024 – Ss. 4 & 6 – Regulatory Duty to Fix Wheat Price: Regulatory mechanisms for essential commodities—Held, Price Control Council is mandated under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act of 2024 to fix, regulate, and review prices of essential commodities like wheat—Court held that discontinuation of minimum support price mechanism without effective alternative safeguards failed to meet the statutory purpose of preventing artificial price hike and ensuring fair compensation to growers. (c) Public Policy – Constitutional Review of Executive Pricing Decisions: Scope of judicial interference in pricing policy—Held, while the judiciary respects the trichotomy of powers and does not annul executive policy absent illegality, it retains constitutional duty to ensure that policies align with fundamental rights and principles of policy enshrined in the Constitution—Court found that the executive policy on wheat for 2024–25 lacked constitutional sensitivity and failed to uphold principles of socio-economic justice for low-income farmers. (d) Agricultural Pricing – Indicative vs. Actual Market Price – Judicial Review of Economic Impact: Disparity between cost of production and market price—Court noted that the cost of production for wheat in 2024–25, based on government-verified data, significantly exceeded the market selling price—Held, indicative price above Rs. 4,000/40 kg contrasted with market recovery of Rs. 2,000/40 kg—Such disparity, without state intervention, results in economic exploitation and discourages wheat cultivation—Court held respondents failed to demonstrate that their policy ensured profitability or fulfilled statutory or constitutional mandates. (e) Fundamental Rights – Integration of International Practices with Constitutional Guarantees Adoption of international best practices—Scope—Held, while integration of global pricing norms is not prohibited, such policy shifts must be gradual, transparent, and constitutionally compliant—Sudden withdrawal of support price regime during harvest season without protective mechanisms violates Article 4 (right to be treated in accordance with law) and undermines the economic rights protected under Articles 9 and 38. Cited Cases: • Constitutional Petition No. 52 of 2013 (2014 SCMR 329) • Ikram Bari v. National Bank of Pakistan (2005 SCMR 100) • Executive District Officer (Revenue) Khushab v. Ijaz Hussain (2011 SCMR 1864) • Senior General Manager Pakistan Railways v. Muhammad Pervaiz (2024 SCMR 581) • Shehri v. Province of Sindh (2001 YLR 1139) Disposition: Petition disposed of with direction to respondents No. 3 and 4 to implement the Punjab Price Control of Essential Commodities Act, 2024 in accordance with its objectives and the discussed constitutional provisions. No order as to costs.

Summary: (a) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), S. 12—Specific performance—Essential prerequisites—Clean hands doctrine—Misstatement in pleadings—Equitable relief rightly denied- Vendee filed suit for specific performance of agreement to sell dated 17.02.2009. He claimed to have paid Rs. 200,000 as part payment; however, no mention of earnest money was made in the agreement to sell. Moreover, during testimony, the vendee contradicted his own pleadings. The Supreme Court held that the vendee had misstated material facts and approached the court without clean hands. Relief of specific performance being discretionary in nature could not be granted in such circumstances. Held: Party seeking equity must come with clean hands; false pleadings disentitle relief. Cited Case: Justice Khurshid Anwar Bhinder v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2010 SC 483) (b) Contract Act (IX of 1872), S. 55—Specific performance—Time as essence of contract—Express stipulation—Failure to perform within agreed time fatal to relief sought Agreement to sell fixed 31.10.2010 as deadline for payment and execution. The vendee failed to pay full consideration within stipulated period despite having over 20 months. The Supreme Court emphasized that the express terms of the agreement, including forfeiture clause and deadline, showed that time was the essence of the contract. Delay rendered vendee disentitled to relief. Held: Where time is expressly stipulated as essence and performance not rendered within such time, suit for specific performance must fail. Cited Cases: • Fazal-ur-Rehman v. Ahmed Saeed Mughal (2004 SCMR 436) • Mussarat Shaukat Ali v. Sofia Khatoon (1994 SCMR 2189) (c) Equity—Contract for sale of immovable property—Commercial character—Escalating property values—Equitable jurisdiction to be exercised cautiously Court noted that the suit property was commercial in nature and real estate prices were constantly escalating. In such cases, courts should exercise equitable jurisdiction for specific performance with caution, particularly where delay in performance would unjustly enrich one party. Held: Equity does not aid a party whose default, delay or misrepresentation would lead to injustice. (d) Civil Procedure—Appellate and revisional jurisdiction—High Court’s interference—Concurrent findings reversed—Proper consideration of law and fact The trial and appellate courts decreed the suit in favour of the vendee. However, the Supreme Court held that both courts below failed to appreciate legal and factual issues regarding misrepresentation and time-bound performance. The High Court correctly reversed the concurrent findings and dismissed the suit. Held: Revisional jurisdiction rightly exercised where lower courts misconstrued law and overlooked material facts. Disposition: Appeal dismissed. Judgments and decrees of trial and appellate courts set aside by High Court were upheld. No order as to costs.

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) — S. 302(b), S. 324, S. 337-D, S. 544-A — Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 302, 324, 337-D — Evidence Act (I of 1872), Art. 129(g) Benefit of doubt — Material contradictions between ocular and medical evidence — Delayed FIR — Dishonest improvements and unreliable witness testimony — Acquittal on same evidence — Consequences thereof — Appellants were convicted under Ss. 302(b), 324, 337-D, PPC for the murder of one Waqar Shah Bukhari and injury to Ali Asghar (PW) — Conviction was primarily based on ocular account of complainant (PW-14) and injured witness (PW-15) — Held, presence of both PWs at the scene was doubtful due to unexplained four-hour delay in lodging FIR despite prior police knowledge of injuries and hospital arrival — Contradictions noted between medical evidence and oral testimony regarding location and nature of injuries — Ocular account failed to align with blackening found on entry wound, suggesting shorter firing range than alleged — Delay of three days in recording Section 161 Cr.P.C. statement of injured witness remained unexplained, further eroding credibility — Witnesses made significant dishonest improvements not present in original police statements — Recovery of pistols and ballistics evidence was deemed inconsequential due to lack of independent attesting witnesses and the non-exclusive nature of recovery — Motive not established; deceased had no prior enmity — Non-production of natural eyewitnesses justified adverse inference under Art. 129(g) of QSO, 1984 — Inconsistent and improbable testimonies rendered prosecution case doubtful — Conviction set aside and appellants acquitted. Held, single circumstance creating reasonable doubt is sufficient for acquittal; in present case, multiple circumstances rendered prosecution version unreliable. Cited Cases: • Mehmood Ahmed v. The State (1995 SCMR 127) • Altaf Hussain v. The State (2019 SCMR 274) • Abdul Ghafoor v. The State (2022 SCMR 1527) • Muhammad Nawaz v. The State (2024 SCMR 1731) • Mst. Saima Noreen v. The State (2024 SCMR 1310) • Abdul Khaliq v. The State (1996 SCMR 1553) • Noor Muhammad v. The State (2020 SCMR 1049) • Muhammad Rafique alias Feeqa v. The State (2019 SCMR 1068) • Khial Muhammad v. The State (2024 SCMR 1490) • Muhammad Ijaz alias Billa v. The State (2024 SCMR 1507) (b) Criminal trial — Ocular account and medical evidence — Conflict — Legal consequence Where the site plan, eyewitness account, and medical findings contradict one another, such conflict weakens prosecution’s case — In present case, blackening on entry wound was inconsistent with claimed 8-foot distance between shooter and victim — Prosecution failed to bridge this discrepancy — Medical evidence discredited the version furnished by the complainant and injured eyewitness, thus making their statements untrustworthy. Held, contradiction between ocular and medical evidence is fatal to prosecution’s case unless plausibly explained. Cited Cases: • Riasat Ali v. The State (2024 SCMR 1224) • Muhammad Idrees v. The State (2021 SCMR 612) • Muhammad Hanif v. The State (2023 SCMR 2016) (c) Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 — Art. 129(g) Withholding of best evidence — Adverse presumption — Witnesses named in FIR and shown as attesting witnesses to key recoveries, including Majid Ali Shah and Malik Barkat Ali, were not produced at trial without justification — Held, prosecution deliberately withheld best available evidence — Adverse inference drawn against prosecution. Cited Cases: • Lal Khan v. The State (2006 SCMR 1846) • Muhammad Rafique v. The State (2010 SCMR 385) (d) Criminal Revision — Enhancement of sentence — When not warranted Where prosecution case is riddled with contradictions, unreliable witness statements, weak motive, inconclusive forensic evidence, and missing corroboration, revision for sentence enhancement cannot be entertained — In present case, revision petition for enhancement of sentence was held to be without merit and dismissed accordingly. Held, enhancement of sentence is not permissible where conviction itself is doubtful and lacks reliable evidentiary foundation.

Summary: Held that the integrity and sanctity of judicial proceedings form the bedrock of the justice system. The authenticity of judicial orders is not a matter of procedural formality?it is the very essence of rule of law. No person?natural or juristic?can be permitted to forge, manipulate, or misuse judicial orders for personal or institutional gain. The Courts are not mere dispute-resolution forums; they are vested with the solemn duty to uphold the public confidence in the administration of justice. Any assault on the credibility of their proceedings strikes at the very soul of justice and cannot be tolerated under any circumstance. The judicial process cannot and shall not be permitted to be reduced to an arena of strategic deceit. Judicial orders carry the imprimatur of the rule of law, and any tampering therewith strikes at the very heart of the institutional integrity. When such tampering is committed and benefit thereof is drawn in a commercial context, the act transcends the bounds of private fraud and becomes a direct assault on the public interest in relation to the function of the judiciary. Therefore, this Court is under a duty not merely to resolve disputes, but to protect the authenticity of its own record and the confidence that litigants and society repose in it. Further held that the newly engaged counsel for the petitioner company has conducted himself with candour by expressly conceding that he finds no ethical or legal ground to justify the fraudulent conduct of his client?petitioner company, and has accordingly tendered an apology on its behalf. While this professional stance is appreciated, it must be underscored that such an apology, however gracefully made, cannot become basis to persuade the Court to overlook deliberate and intentional fraud committed on behalf of the petitioner company. The process of administration of justice cannot be compromised through post-facto contrition when the offence strikes at the integrity of the judicial process itself. In present case, the gravity of the fraud committed on behalf of the petitioner company transcends private regret and demands institutional response.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: (Against the judgment / order dated 09.12.2020 passed by the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Service Tribunal, Peshawar in Appeal No. 367 of 2019). Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art. 10-A---Due process and fair trial---Civil service---Misconduct , allegation of---Departmental inquiry, conducting of---Scope---Right of cross-examination, denial of---Effect---Termination/ removal from service---Scope and effect---Petitioner (Naib Qasid in the Excise and Taxation Department) was terminated following proceedings initiated on an anonymous complaint received against him---In the present case, three witnesses were examined, but concededly, no opportunity was afforded to the petitioner/servant to cross-exame such witnesses during the inquiry proceedings to defend the charges or to prove his innocence---Under all Civil Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, either federal or provincial, an infallible and watertight procedure is already provided for conducting departmental inquiries, and sanguine to the philosophy/principle of natural justice and due process of law, a right of cross-examination is recognized as an inalienable and undeniable right---Furthermore, if said valuable right is repudiated, it will amount the strangulation and deprivation of the well-entrenched right of defense, despite this right being provided for in all Civil Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules unequivocally and distinctly---Au fait, prior to appointing an inquiry officer, the competent authority should have ensured, with due diligence, that the person so appointed is familiar with and sentient to the rudimentary rules of inquiry---Primary objective of conducting departmental inquiry is to grasp whether a clear-cut case of misconduct is made out against the accused or not---The guilt or innocence is founded on the end result of the inquiry---In a regular inquiry, it is a precondition that an even-handed and fair opportunity should be provided to the accused and if any witness is examined against him then a fair opportunity should also be afforded to cross-examine the witnesses---In a departmental inquiry on the charges of misconduct, the standard of proof is that of balance of probabilities or preponderance of evidence---Where any authority regulates and performs its affairs which requires the compliance of the principles of natural justice then it should have been adhered to inflexibly---Supreme Court set-aside the removal from service order of the petitioner, remanding the matter to the competent authority to conduct a de novo inquiry into the allegations of misconduct after providing ample opportunity of defence to the petitioner---Civil petition was converted into an appeal and was allowed accordingly. Federation of Pakistan through Chairman Federal Board of Revenue FBR House, Islamabad and others v. Zahid Malik 2023 SCMR 603 and Ghulam Murtaza Sheikh and another v. The Chief Minister, Sindh and others 2024 SCMR 1757 ref. Ahmad Ali, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner. Zahid Yousaf, Advocate-on-Record along with Muhammad Shoaib, Superintendent for Respondents. Date of hearing: 1st July, 2025.