Summary: Cr.P.L.As. Nos. 48-K to 51-K of 2025, decided on 5th June, 2025. (Against the order dated 18.02.2025 passed by the High Court of Sindh, Karachi in Cr. Revision Application Nos. 35 to 38 of 2025). Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997)--- ----S. 14(2)---Judge, Anti-Terrorism Court---Judicial Strictures---Expunction of remarks---Principle---Appellant was a judicial officer who was aggrieved of remarks against him, passed by Division Bench of High Court in the judgment in question---Validity---Petitioner only sought expunction of stricture, which had nothing to do with merits of the decision of High Court---High Court was required to evaluate whether the passage complained of was reprehensible; its preservation on record would cause disparagement to the credit of petitioner; and its expunction would not affect the judgment or order on merits---Before passing any stricture on demeanour and career of petitioner, Division Bench of High Court should have given him an opportunity to submit his comments/report---No such opportunity was provided to him by Divisional Bench of High Court before passing order in the Court---Even in the case of some lapses found to be surfacing on part of the judicial officer, the order or report could be sent to Chief Justice for taking action on administrative side through the Confidential Branch---Supreme Court set aside the remarks/directions made in relevant paragraph of order in question which were essentially structured on oral motion of Acting Prosecutor General; were unjustified, and made without probing into the issue and without calling for comments from the Presiding Officer or without even affording him a right of audience---Appeal was disposed of. Braj Kishore Thakur v. Union of India and others (1997) 4 SCC 65; (2001) 3 SCC 54; Miss Nusrat Yasmin v. Registrar, Peshawar High Court, Peshawar and others PLD 2019 SC 719; Aijaz Ahmed Tunio v. The State PLD 2021 SC 752; Hasnain Raza and another v. Lahore High Court, Lahore and others PLD 2022 SC 7; Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Law and Justice Islamabad v. Muhammad Hamid Mughal PLD 2024 SC 515; 2023 SCP 293 and Justice Khurshid Anwar Bhinder and others v. Federation of Pakistan and another PLD 2010 SC 483 ref. Syed Ghulam Shabbir Shah, Advocate Supreme Court assisted by Irtafa-ur-Rehman, Advocate High Court for Petitioner. Muntazir Mehdi, Acting Prosecutor General and Siraj Ali Chandio, Additional Prosecutor General for the State. Saleem Akhtar Buriro, Additional Prosecutor General/Advocate-on-Record for the State. Zulfiqar Ali, Public Prosecutor for the State. Danish Qureshi, SHO, AVCC for the State. Muhammad Ali, Inspector for the State. Sibtain Mehmood, Additional Advocate General on Court's Call. Zain-ul-Abideen, Advocate Supreme Court for the Complainant. Mrs. Abida Parveen Channar, Advocate-on-Record assisted by Mustafa Mamdani, Iftikhar Shah, Jahanzaib Aftab and Umair Usman, Advocates for the Complainant. Nemo for the Accused. Date of hearing: 5th June, 2025.

Summary: (a) Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)--- ----S. 221(1)---Deemed assessment---Scope---Deemed assessment order is nothing other than the transmutation by legal fiction of the return created as a matter of fact by taxpayer into assessment order of Commissioner as a matter of law---Very use of deeming provision meant ipso facto that it does not fall in the category of orders that are both as a matter of fact and of law the creation of Commissioner---Any mistake in return, made as a matter of fact by taxpayer, cannot become [at any rate for purposes of section 221(1)] as a matter of law, the mistake of the Commissioner such that he can amend the deemed assessment order by rectifying it---Between taxpayer and Commissioner the mistake always lays where, and by whom, in fact it was made, i.e., the taxpayer. (b) Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)--- ----S. 120(1)(a) & 120(1)(b)---Deeming provision---Effect---Two distinct deeming provisions are contained in sections 120(1)(a) and 120(1)(b) of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001---Two provisions are directly, and intimately, linked and occur with an immediateness that is instantaneous but such immediacy is not simultaneity---Two clauses apply consecutively, the one following the other in the sequence set out in the provision---Word "and" which links the two must be understood in such sense---It does not only mean that both clauses apply to the return---It establishes also the order in which they occur---That is the very (and only) basis for the "imagining" required by section 120(1)(a) of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 and having so imagined, the subsection moves immediately to section 120(1)(b) of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001---Return is deemed to be an assessment order issued to taxpayer on the date the return is filed---Again, there is as a matter of fact no such thing---Yet, by alchemy of the deeming provision, it must be imagined to be so and this second deeming is then bolstered by the words "for all purposes of this Ordinance"---Provision of section 120 (1) of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, requires first that it be imagined that the Commissioner did something that in fact he did not do, i.e., "made" an assessment and then, him having so acted, requires secondly that the return be imagined to be an order on the assessment so made and issued to the taxpayer on the very date it was filed. (c) Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)--- ----Ss. 120(1) & 221(1)---Rectification of mistake apparent on the face of record---Deemed assessment---Amendment---Jurisdiction of Commissioner---Authorities contended that deeming assessment order issued under section 120(1) of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, was within the jurisdiction of Commissioner under section 221(1) of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001---Validity---Inevitable corollary of the "state of affairs" brought about by the first deeming, i.e., the making of an assessment of taxable income and the tax due, was that the Commissioner was to be deemed to have applied his mind to the material before him, which was nothing other than the return---To conclude otherwise would be to impermissibly "cause or permit your imagination to boggle"---Such assessment (and that could be regarded as another inevitable corollary of the "state of affairs" required to be imagined) would be whatever was contained in the return, i.e., mistakes and all---Return having passed through sieve of first deeming then became, in terms of the second deeming, an assessment order deemed to have been issued by the Commissioner to the taxpayer---It followed that the two deeming provisions, when were taken together and properly applied, would result in an assessment order "passed" by the Commissioner within the meaning, and for purposes, of section 221(1) of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001---Supreme Court set aside the order passed by High Courts as determination made by High Courts on the question of jurisdiction was not correct---Supreme Court remanded the tax references to High Court which would be deemed pending in respective High Courts and questions of law raised therein would be decided in accordance with law---Appeal was disposed of. Mehreen Zaibun Nisa v. Land Commissioner Multan and others PLD 1975 SC 397; Pak Leather Crafts Limited v. Al-Baraka Bank Pakistan Limited 2022 SCMR 1868 and Dr. Abdul Nabi v. Executive Officer, Cantonment Board, Quetta 2023 SCMR 1267 rel.

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----S. 497---Control of Narcotic Substances Act (XXV of 1997), S. 9(c)---Possession of narcotic substances---Bail, grant of---Further inquiry---Allegation against the accused-petitioner was that 1225 grams charas was recovered from his possession---Tentative assessment of the material available on record reflected that the alleged recovery was effected from thickly populated area, yet, no independent witness was associated with the recovery proceedings, despite the location being frequented by the general public---Non-association of private mashirs in such circumstances undermined the credibility of the prosecution case---Additionally, no video recording or photographic evidence of the recovery proceedings had been placed on record, despite the availability of technology and the statutory expectation of transparency under such circumstances---Furthermore, it was an admitted position that the petitioner was a physically disabled person, which raised a reasonable doubt with respect to his active participation in the alleged offence---In the totality of these factors, the case against the petitioner appeared to be one of further inquiry as contemplated under S.497(2), Cr.P.C.---In cases hinging solely on police testimony, particularly where the legal consequences were severe, the benefit of doubt must be afforded to the accused, even at the bail stage---Bail petition was allowed, in circumstances. Khan Asfandyar Wali v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2001 SC 607; Muhammad Abid Hussain v. The State 2025 SCMR 721; Zahid Sarfaraz Gill v. The State 2024 SCMR 934 and Muhammad Arshad v. The State 2022 SCMR 1555 rel. (b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----S. 497---Bail---Observations of the Court---Scope---Observations/findings made in bail order aretentative in nature and shall not prejudice the Trial Court in determining the matter on merits. Waqar Ali Phulpoto for Petitioner. Aftab Ahmed Shar, Additional Prosecutor General Sindh for the State. Date of hearing: 5th June, 2025. Order Abdul Hamid Bhurgri, J .--- Through this petition, the petitioner has prayed for grant of post arrest bail in the Crime No.43/2025 for offence punishable Under Section 9(c) of the Sindh Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 2024 (hereinafter it will be referred as Act, 2024) of PS Setharja, District Khairpur. 2. While Section 35(1) of the Act, 2024, creates a statutory bar on the grant of bail by the ordinary criminal courts, such restriction does not curtail the constitutional jurisdiction of this Court under Article 199 of the Constitution. The availability of constitutional remedy is well-recognized in cases where the statutory framework either expressly bars or effectively denies access to judicial relief, particularly where fundamental rights, including the right to liberty and fair trial under Articles 9 and 10-A, are implicated. It is now firmly settled through judicial pronouncements that in circumstances where no alternate or efficacious remedy exists due to a legislative embargo, the High Court, in exercise of its constitutional jurisdiction, may examine and grant appropriate relief. Section 35(1) of the Act, 2024 reads as under:- "Notwithstanding anything contained in sections 496 and 497 of the Code, the bail shall not be granted to an accused person charged with an offence under this Act". 3. Accordingly, in view of the bar imposed under section 35(1) of the Act, 2024 mentioned supra, this petition is found to be maintainable Under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973. Reliance is placed on the judgment of the Honourable Supreme Court in case of Khan Asfandyar Wali v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2001 SC 607). 4. As per the contents of the FIR dated 04.05.2025, the complainant, ASI Sain Bux, along with his subordinates PCs Atta Hussain, Majid Ali, and DPC Mureed Hussain, departed the police station for routine patrolling at 1100 hours, as recorded under entry No.07 of the daily diary. Upon completion of patrol duties across various locations, the police party arrived at Touqeer Abad stop, where they observed an individual with an apparent disability in his right leg, holding a black plastic shopper. Upon sighting the police party, the said individual exhibited signs of nervousness, which aroused suspicion, leading to his apprehension at approximately 1130 hours along with the black shopper. Due to the unavailability of private witnesses at the scene, PCs Atta Hussain and Majid Ali were duly appointed as official mashirs. Upon initial inquiry, the individual disclosed his identity as Shahzado. A search of the recovered shopper revealed five pieces of charas, which, including the shopper, were found to weigh 1225 grams and were sealed on the spot. A subsequent personal search of the accused resulted in the recovery of two currency notes of Rs.100/- each from his right-side pocket. The mashirnama of arrest and recovery was prepared by the complainant in the presence of the appointed mashirs. Thereafter, the accused, along with the recovered narcotics and seized currency, was transported to the police station, where the instant FIR was formally lodged. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the petitioner, being physically disabled in his right leg, has been falsely implicated by the police with mala fide intent and ulterior motives. He submitted that although the alleged recovery took place in a densely populated area, no independent local person was cited either as a mashir or witness, thereby rendering the prosecution's version doubtful and meriting further inquiry. He, therefore, prayed for the grant of bail, invoking the broader interests of justice. 6. Conversely, the learned Additional Prosecutor General, Sindh, vehemently opposed the petition and urged for its outright dismissal on the ground that the petitioner was apprehended red-handed, and a substantial quantity of contraband was recovered from his exclusive possession. It was thus submitted that the petitioner is not entitled to the concession of bail. 7. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and examined the record with circumspection. 8. A tentative assessment of the material available on record reflects that the alleged recovery was effected from thickly populated area. Yet, no independent witness was associated with the recovery proceedings, despite the location being frequented by the general public. The non-association of private mashirs in such circumstances undermines the credibility of the prosecution case. Additionally, no video recording or photographic evidence of the recovery proceedings has been placed on record, despite the availability of technology and the statutory expectation of transparency under such circumstances. Reliance is placed upon the cases of Muhammad Abid Hussain v. The State (2025 SCMR 721) and Zahid Sarfaraz Gill v. The State (2024 SCMR 934). 9. Furthermore, it is an admitted position that the petitioner is a physically disabled person, which raises a reasonable doubt with respect to his active participation in the alleged offence. In the totality of these factors, the case against the petitioner appears to be one of further inquiry as contemplated under Section 497(2) Cr.P.C. It is a well-entrenched principle that in cases hinging solely on police testimony, particularly where the legal consequences are severe, the benefit of doubt must be afforded to the accused, even at the bail stage. Reliance is placed on the case of Muhammad Arshad v. The State (2022 SCMR 1555). 10. In view of the above tentative evaluation of evidence, this petition is allowed, and the petitioner is admitted to post-arrest bail, subject to furnishing solvent surety in the sum of Rs.1,00,000/- with a P.R bond in the like amount to the satisfaction of the Additional Registrar of this Court. 11. Needless to observe, the foregoing findings are tentative in nature and shall not prejudice the trial Court in determining the matter on merits. 12. Above are the reasons of our short order of even date. JK/S-57/Sindh Petition allowed.

Summary: (Writ Petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan) 1. Application for visitation rights by paternal grandparents during pendency of the family suit filed by mother/wife whereas, the father of minor is living abroad. Application allowed by the Judge Family Court, whereas, District Court in family appeal set aside the said order.---- Held ---- Schedule made under Section 5 of the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964, prescribed “custody of the children and the visitation rights of parents to meet them” in clause 5. It has thus become clear that the family court, during pendency of a family suit, even without any petition for the guardianship of minor, can grant visitation rights to parents. There is no distinction that the benefit of clause 5 of Schedule is only for wife and not for husband. In other words, nothing is provided in the Schedule requiring a father to file a petition for guardianship before seeking visitation rights during pendency of a family suit. Such built-in powers are equally available to parents as well as grandparents as the term ‘parent’ in the Family Court Act 1964 extends beyond its literal meaning, especially when grandchildren are entitled to inheritance from grandparents and vice-versa, because the grandfather is also called a “father”. Allah Almighty referred the term father for grandfather in Holy Qurán in Sura al-Hajj and Sura an-Nisa. 2. As the grandfather is called a “father” and the grandmother is called a “mother” in the Holy Qurán, and they are included in the inheritance, which indicates that the status of grandparents is similar to parents. 1988 SCMR 538 relied. (The constitutional petition filed by petitioners/grandparents was allowed and they were held entitled for visitation rights of their grandson)

Summary: The ratio of this judgment also reiterates that the High Court may exercise its writ jurisdiction despite the availability of an alternative remedy, particularly when the impugned order is without lawful authority or tainted by mala fides, bias, or oppressive conduct. Similarly, it is settled principle that the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution is exercised to provide prompt relief in cases where the illegality or impropriety of the challenged action can be clearly established without the need for detailed inquiry or recording of evidence. However, if the matter involves complex or disputed questions of fact that require evidence to be recorded, such issues fall within the domain of courts with plenary jurisdiction, and the High Court cannot decide such factual controversies under Article 199. In the present case, there is no requirement for a detailed inquiry or recording of evidence, as the controversy can be resolved on the basis of the available record, thereby justifying the invocation of the writ jurisdiction of this Court. Furthermore, the general rule is that if a statutory remedy like appeal, review, or revision is available, a person should use that before approaching the High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution. However, this rule is not an absolute bar to the Court's jurisdiction-it simply guides its use. In exceptional cases, such as when an order is void or passed without jurisdiction, the High Court can still exercise its constitutional powers even if the alternative remedy was not used. Similarly if a statutory functionary acts mala fide or in a partial, unjust and oppressive manner, the High Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction has power to grant relief to the aggrieved party. Thus, in light of the above, the writ petition is maintainable, as the failure of the respondents to fulfill their statutory duties has been challenged on the ground that they allowed the alleged construction of a ramp for car parking in violation of the Building Bye-Laws, thereby infringing the petitioners fundamental rights to free movement and to life. The bye-laws clearly state that a ramp can only be constructed within the compulsory open space. In this case, no such space is shown towards Fasih Street. Hence, the construction of a ramp without the requisite open space, as mandated by the Building Byelaws, cannot be allowed. It is a well-settled principle of law that when a statute prescribes a specific manner for performing an act, it must be carried out in that prescribed manner alone, and not in any other way. No individual is above the law, and the law must be followed in both letter and spirit. These bye-laws reflect the wisdom of the legislature and carry the mandate of the public, which must be respected and enforced. In light of the violations observed due to misinterpretation and misapplication of the Building Bye-Laws, particularly allowing the illegal construction of ramps in the absence of compulsory open space, the following guidelines are hereby proposed for strict implementation: 1. The Building Authority, in coordination with the local administration, shall conduct a comprehensive survey of all buildings within the jurisdiction within three months. 2. The purpose of this survey shall be to identify structures and features (such as ramps, entrances, projections) that have been constructed in violation of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Model Building Bye-Laws, 2017. 3. During the inspection, particular attention must be paid to the availability and use of Compulsory Open Space as defined in Clause 1.2.17 of the Bye-Laws. 4. It must be ensured that no ramps or entrances are constructed in locations where no COS is provided. 5. Wherever structures (including ramps, entrances, and balconies) are found to be constructed in violation of approved site plans or without the required COS, the Authority shall: a. Remove or demolish such structures; b. Seal or block unauthorised entrances; c. Restore the status of the building in compliance with the original, approved plan. d. All expenses incurred m the removal of such encroachments or related structures shall be borne by the violators and recovered accordingly as arears of the land revenue. 6. Stem disciplinary action shall be taken against officers, officials, or engineers who have granted unlawful approvals or failed to enforce the Bye-Laws properly. 7. A public notice shall be issued advising all building owners and developers to review their building plans and ensure compliance with the Bye-Laws within one month. 8. A reasonable compliance period (e.g., 30 days) shall be granted before enforcement action begins. 9. Handwritten or unsigned notations on building plans, which are not approved through proper legal procedure, shall not be accepted as valid. 10. All approvals must be in strict accordance with the Bye- Laws, and no deviation shall be permitted unless formally amended through legal means. 11. A monitoring cell shall be established within the Building Authority to regularly inspect new constructions. 12. This cell shall maintain monthly reports of compliance and submit the same to the relevant supervisory departments. 13. It is reiterated that it is not mandatory for every citizen to approach the courts in such matters. The primary duty lies with the Building Authority and local administration to uphold the law and ensure that violations are addressed proactively.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan ---- Art. 199, Art. 10-A, & Art. 2010 --- High Court’s disposal of service-related Constitution Petitions by applying earlier decision mutatis mutandis without affording opportunity of hearing to the Government—Maintainability—Petitioners (Province of Sindh and others) assailed the judgment of the High Court of Sindh, Sukkur Bench, which had disposed of multiple Constitution Petitions by extending the benefit of an earlier order passed in C.P. No.D-1435 of 2023 without hearing the petitioners or allowing them to file comments—Petitioners contended that the recruitment processes were based on different advertisements with distinct terms and conditions issued by various departments across different time periods and could not be treated identically—Supreme Court held that before applying the doctrine of mutatis mutandis, the Court must examine whether the earlier order is factually and legally compatible with the case in hand—Observed that each case must be decided on its own merits and the impugned order, based solely on factual grounds of an earlier decision and devoid of legal enunciation, was not binding under Art. 201 of the Constitution—Violation of due process and fair hearing as envisaged under Art. 10-A was also noted—High Court had failed to appreciate the differences in advertisements, departmental procedures, and lack of codal formalities, and passed the order in a “slipshod” manner. (b) Constitutional Jurisdiction ---- Art. 199---- Limitations of High Court under writ jurisdiction in adjudicating disputed factual controversies in recruitment matters—Held, High Court in constitutional jurisdiction is not mandated to conduct an elaborate inquiry into disputed facts or record evidence—However, a just decision can be reached where admitted or available documents suffice to assess legality of executive actions—Court referred to principle laid down in Special Secretary-II (Law & Order), Home & Tribal Affairs Department v. Fayyaz Dawar (2023 SCMR 1442) and Dr. Sher Afgan Khan Niazi v. Ali S. Habib (2011 SCMR 1813), emphasizing that writ remedy is reserved for situations where illegality of executive action is demonstrable without complex fact-finding—High Court, in the present case, overstepped its bounds by conclusively determining the respondents’ entitlement without examining competing documentary evidence or giving a chance for rebuttal. (c) Service Law ---- Sindh Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion & Transfer) Rules, 1974 ---- R. 5(1) ---- Recommendations of District Recruitment Committee (DRC)—Whether confer vested right of appointment—Held, recommendation or issuance of offer letter by DRC does not in itself create a legally enforceable or vested right in favour of applicants unless codal formalities are completed and recruitment is duly approved by competent authority—Legitimate expectancy cannot override statutory requirements—Contention that appointments were made based on DRC recommendations and subsequently terminated without due process, to be examined by High Court on merits. (d) Latin Legal Maxims ---- Meaning, application, and scope of “mutatis mutandis” ---- Expression “mutatis mutandis”—Scope and applicability—Held, expression denotes “with necessary changes having been made”—Refers to application of a legal rule or judicial decision to a different factual matrix after suitable modifications—Court explained that it is not to be confused with “ceteris paribus” and requires case-by-case evaluation—Relied on definitions from Black’s Law Dictionary, Jowitt’s Dictionary, Oxford Law Dictionary, Bouvier’s Dictionary, Cambridge Dictionary, and Collins Dictionary—Reiterated Pakistani and foreign case law on the term including Muhammad Sharif v. The State (PLD 1999 SC 1063), Vasudev Anant Kulkarni v. Executive Engineer (1995 ACJ 97), Ashok Service Centre v. State of Orissa (1983 2 SCR 363), and R. v. Gauthier ([1977] 1 SCR 441)—Held that High Court erred in applying earlier order blindly without determining its contextual fit with the facts of each petition. (e) Practice and Procedure ---- Remand for decision on merits ---- Remand of petitions for fresh adjudication—Supreme Court converted all Civil Petitions into appeals and set aside the impugned orders—Directed High Court to decide all Constitution Petitions afresh on merits, after affording full opportunity of hearing to both sides—Ordered parties to exchange documents and file necessary pleadings in advance—High Court to consider, inter alia, differences in advertisements, departments, recruitment procedures, and compliance with codal formalities without being influenced by the order passed in CP No.D-1435 of 2023. (f) Constitution of Pakistan ---- Art. 184(3) ---- Effect of absence of legal principle in earlier High Court ruling on its binding nature—Held, the order passed in CP No.D-1435 of 2023 was fact-specific, contained no principle of law or ratio decidendi, and thus could not operate as a binding precedent—Mere administrative convenience or factual similarity does not justify universal application of a past order—Judicial comity under Art. 201 applies only where legal principles have been laid down. (g) Disposition ---- Petitions barred by limitation—Condonation allowed—Delay in certain petitions condoned in view of connected matters being within time. Petition in CPLA No. 182-K/2025 dismissed as not pressed—Province of Sindh had no grievance against order in CP No.D-1435 of 2023 regarding recruitment in Department of Empowerment of Persons with Disabilities. All remaining Civil Petitions converted into appeals, allowed, and remanded to High Court for fresh adjudication in accordance with law. Cited Cases: Special Secretary-II (Law & Order), Govt. of KPK v. Fayyaz Dawar, 2023 SCMR 1442 = 2023 SCP 199 Dr. Sher Afgan Khan Niazi v. Ali S. Habib & others, 2011 SCMR 1813 Muhammad Sharif v. The State, PLD 1999 SC 1063 Vasudev Anant Kulkarni v. Executive Engineer, 1995 ACJ 97 (India) Ashok Service Centre v. State of Orissa, 1983 2 SCR 363 (India) R. v. Gauthier, [1977] 1 SCR 441 (Canada)

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan – Art. 4; Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) – S. 151 – Read with Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 – Arts. 87, 88 & 90 – Certified copy – Right to access public documents – Conditional order passed by High Court suspending operation of decree – Office refused to issue certified copy for non-compliance of condition – Validity of refusal. Office of the Court refused issuance of certified copy of conditional interim order dated 21.04.2025, on the ground that the appellant had not complied with the condition of depositing 50% decretal amount and furnishing surety bond for the remaining amount. The Court held that once such a conditional order granted interim relief with immediate effect, the refusal to issue a certified copy on the premise of potential misuse or non-compliance of condition was unjustified. Certified copies of public documents, including court orders, are governed by Articles 87, 88, and 90 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, which confer both the right to receive certified copies and the presumption of genuineness upon them. Unless a certified copy is refused under rules due to a defective or incompetent petition—which was not the case here—the Office cannot withhold issuance on apprehensions. “Subject to deposit of 50% of the decretal amount and submission of surety bond with regard to the remaining amount… operation of the impugned judgment and decree shall remain suspended in the meanwhile.” The Court clarified that the stay order had immediate effect and would automatically cease only upon failure to comply within 60 days. Thus, in the interim period, the order remained valid, and withholding its copy would cause prejudice to the applicant in execution proceedings. (b) Court Practice and Procedure – Lahore High Court Rules and Orders – Vol. V, Chap. 5, Parts A & B – Issuance of certified copies – Conditional orders – Interpretation and discretion of office – Applicability of bail bond analogy – Legality of administrative practice. The Deputy Registrar contended that, per previous office practice, conditional orders like bail-granting orders were not issued unless surety conditions were fulfilled. The Court rejected this analogy as flawed, holding that each conditional order must be interpreted in light of its own language. Where the Court does not condition effectiveness upon compliance but grants interim effect subject to future compliance, such orders are operative immediately and hence, copies must be issued. The refusal by the Office was found to be an unreasonable administrative action lacking statutory basis or legal justification. Cited case: Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corporation [(1948) 1 KB 223] – Wednesbury unreasonableness Dr. Akhtar Hassan Khan and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others (2012 SCMR 455) (c) Administrative Law – Judicial review – Wednesbury principle – Office's refusal to issue certified copy – Whether justiciable ---- The Office’s refusal was found subject to judicial scrutiny under the test of Wednesbury unreasonableness. The Court held that the decision was based on an irrational interpretation of the order and lacked legal backing. Administrative practices must align with statutory rules, and public officials cannot create informal barriers to procedural rights. Once the Court had not stayed the operation of its own order or prohibited its certified copy from being issued, the Office had no discretion to deny it. (d) Civil Procedure – Execution proceedings – Effect of non-availability of certified stay order – Prejudice to party. Non-issuance of certified copy of an operative stay order could prejudice the applicant in execution proceedings as the Executing Court may proceed under the impression that no interim relief had been granted. Such omission would defeat the very object of the stay and render the interim protection illusory during the grace period provided for compliance. (e) Disposition – Application declared maintainable – Certified copy of conditional order dated 21.04.2025 directed to be issued – Office allowed to note non-compliance, if necessary. Application was allowed. Office was directed to issue the certified copy of the order dated 21.04.2025. If deemed necessary, an endorsement may be made on the certified copy that the condition imposed therein had not yet been complied with as of the date of issuance.

Summary: Acquittal granted ---- (a) Criminal trial ---- Ss. 302(b), 390 & 398, P.P.C. --- Acquittal on benefit of doubt --- Identification parade flawed --- Recovery of weapon not trustworthy --- Conviction reversed Petitioners were convicted by the trial court under Ss. 302(b) and 398, P.P.C., and sentenced to death and imprisonment, respectively, for committing a robbery and murder in a shop. Their conviction was upheld by the Islamabad High Court and the death sentence confirmed. However, the Supreme Court reversed the convictions and acquitted both petitioners, extending benefit of doubt due to material infirmities in the prosecution case. Held, identification parade was vitiated as the accused’s photographs were taken in police custody prior to identification, violating the requirements of a lawful identification procedure. Furthermore, the identification parade did not mention the roles played by each accused in the occurrence, which rendered it devoid of evidentiary value in light of Article 22 of the Qanoon-e-Shahadat Order, 1984. [Relied on: Mehboob Hassan v. Akhtar Islam 2024 SCMR 757; Abdul Hayee v. State 2025 SCMR 281; Abdul Qadeer v. The State 2024 SCMR 1146]. (b) Criminal trial ---- Identification parade ---- Role attribution mandatory --- Defective parade cannot be basis of conviction Held, that for identification evidence to be reliable, each identifying witness must not only correctly identify the accused but also assign the specific role allegedly played by them during the incident. In the present case, witnesses identified the accused without narrating their respective roles, and the Magistrate (PW-10) failed to follow standard judicial procedures, including the omission of separate certificates for each accused. The entire identification exercise thus stood vitiated and devoid of probative value. (c) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S. 103 ---- Recovery of weapons --- Lack of independent corroboration --- Possibility of foisting not ruled out --- Evidentiary value compromised Both petitioners were arrested the day after the incident and later allegedly led to the recovery of .30 bore pistols on their pointation. However, no independent witnesses, including the cattle shed owner or locals, were associated with the recoveries, nor were disclosure memos properly prepared. This lack of transparency led to strong doubts about the authenticity of the recoveries. The chain of custody was broken, and the prosecution failed to explain inconsistencies in the recovery timeline and witnesses’ versions. (d) Evidence Act (I of 1872), S. 45 --- Forensic report --- Positive ballistic match --- Cannot stand alone without credible recovery --- Evidentiary weight Though the pistol recovered from petitioner Muhammad Ramzan matched the crime empties according to the NFSA report, the Court held that such expert evidence cannot sustain a conviction if the foundational recovery is itself untrustworthy or appears to be foisted. Forensic evidence, while corroborative, must be anchored in a credible recovery process to retain its probative force. In absence of independent attestation or lawful procedure, even a positive expert report loses significance. (e) Qanoon-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 --- Art. 22 --- Identification evidence --- Must be based on first-hand knowledge and proper role description --- Evidence discarded Held, that an identification test without role attribution is against settled legal standards. In the present case, witnesses simply identified the petitioners without specifying actions taken during the crime. Such evidence, unsupported by clear, consistent testimony or procedural compliance, cannot be relied upon in a criminal trial. (f) Penal Code (XLV of 1860), S. 302(b) --- Murder trial --- CCTV footage relied upon by trial court --- Not sufficient to identify accused --- Backside-only footage inadmissible for facial recognition Held, that the CCTV footage showed only the back of the alleged assailant and did not depict facial features. The footage, therefore, lacked evidentiary utility for identification purposes and could not support the conviction. (g) Criminal law --- Benefit of doubt --- Duty of prosecution to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt --- Where doubt arises, benefit must go to accused Held, prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. Doubts arising from contradictions in recovery timeline, absence of role-specific identification, and lack of independent evidence rendered the case unreliable. The trial and appellate courts misread and misappreciated the evidence. Disposition: Petitions converted into appeals and allowed; convictions and sentences set aside; petitioners acquitted by extending benefit of doubt.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan: ----Arts. 10-A & 191A Judicial conduct—Due process—Natural justice—Right to fair hearing—High Court passed adverse remarks against Presiding Officer of Anti-Terrorism Court (ATC) without affording any opportunity to respond or be heard—Remarks based solely on oral assertions of Acting Prosecutor General that father of accused remained in chamber of judge before remand order was changed—No written complaint or affidavit filed—Held, adverse remarks passed without notice or inquiry were in breach of fundamental rights guaranteed under Art. 10-A of the Constitution—Principles of natural justice apply equally to judicial officers—Remarks expunged—Constitutional Bench jurisdiction under Art. 191A was held not to be attracted as matter did not involve interpretation of Constitution, constitutionality of law, or Article 184/185/186 jurisdiction—Transfer applications to Constitutional Bench dismissed as frivolous. (b) Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 (XXVII of 1997): ----Ss. 13(2), 14(2), 19(1) & 21-E Presiding Officer and Administrative Judge of ATC—Jurisdiction and powers—Appointment—Petitioner was appointed as Presiding Officer and designated as Administrative Judge, ATC, Karachi Division—Orders passed by him refusing physical remand and directing judicial custody based on accused’s complaint of maltreatment, and directing constitution of Joint Investigation Team (JIT)—High Court set aside these orders and observed that constitution of JIT was beyond authority of Administrative Judge under S.19(1), which vests such power in Government—Held, powers under S.13(2) and S.21-E must be exercised within statutory boundaries—However, procedural irregularities alone did not justify passing strictures without hearing the judge. (c) Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898: ----Ss. 435 & 439 Revision jurisdiction—Scope—High Court may call for records and examine correctness, legality or propriety of orders passed by inferior criminal courts—However, findings regarding impropriety or misconduct must be based on verifiable evidence and due process—High Court acted beyond jurisdiction by issuing directions and passing adverse remarks without due inquiry—Expungement of remarks directed. (d) Judicial Accountability and Conduct—Strictures against judicial officers—Scope and limitations: High Court’s directions in Paragraph No.14 of impugned order inviting administrative action against ATC judge held unjustified and in disregard of binding precedents—Judicial condemnation without notice creates irreparable stigma on judicial officer’s reputation—Condemnation without affording opportunity violates settled law—Superior Courts must act as mentors, not censors—Ref: Miss Nusrat Yasmin v. Registrar, PHC (PLD 2019 SC 719), Aijaz Ahmed Tunio v. State (PLD 2021 SC 752), Hasnain Raza v. LHC (PLD 2022 SC 7)—Doctrine of stare decisis re-emphasized—Deviation from binding precedent undermines uniformity and legal certainty—Ref: Federation v. Muhammad Hamid Mughal (PLD 2024 SC 515), Justice Khurshid Anwar Bhinder v. Federation (PLD 2010 SC 483). (e) Administrative Remedy—Judicial strictures—Proper recourse: In case of perceived misconduct or error by a judicial officer, proper course is to refer matter to Chief Justice on administrative side via confidential note—Open-court adverse remarks should be avoided—Even if expunged later, they leave permanent reputational harm—High Court failed to follow Supreme Court’s guidelines on discipline and comity. ---Disposition: Criminal Petitions converted into appeals—Transfer applications dismissed—Without disturbing Notifications dated 26.02.2025 and 27.02.2025 (regarding change of Administrative Judge), the directions and adverse remarks contained in Paragraph No.14 of the High Court’s impugned order dated 18.02.2025 were expunged.

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) – O. VI, R. 17 – Amendment of Pleadings – Principles for Grant or Refusal – Inordinate Delay and Prejudice to Opponent Held, although courts have wide discretion under Order VI Rule 17 CPC to allow amendments at any stage of proceedings, such discretion must be exercised judiciously and not where the amendment is sought with mala fide intent, causes prejudice to the other party, or alters the nature of the suit—Amendment application filed after nearly ten years, without plausible explanation, to insert a key factual assertion regarding the place of an alleged oral agreement, was rightly refused—Such belated insertion, if allowed, would disturb the litigation landscape, prejudice the opposing party, and potentially shift the entire factual framework—Delay, while not always fatal, becomes determinative when used tactically to rectify weaknesses in pleadings or overcome evidentiary obstacles—Petitioner’s conduct did not merit equitable relief—Court reaffirmed that diligence and bona fides are essential for invoking O. VI, R. 17 CPC. [Cited: PLD 2013 SC 239, PLD 2003 SC 688, 2003 SCMR 542, PLD 1985 SC 345, 2015 SCMR 1698, PLD 1978 SC 242, PLD 2001 SC 518, 2016 SCMR 1621] (b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) – O. VI, R. 17 – Amendment Introducing New Fact – Legal Threshold and Bona Fides Held, the proposed amendment sought to insert a new fact regarding the location of the oral agreement forming the basis of a suit for specific performance—Such insertion, being central to the dispute, could not be treated as a mere clarification or typographical correction—Court distinguished cases allowing amendment to correct accidental errors or formal omissions—Amendments that impact the root of the controversy require heightened scrutiny—Mere procedural permissibility does not override substantive fairness. [Cited: PLD 2001 SC 518, 2016 SCMR 1621] (c) Civil Law – Amendment of Pleadings – Equitable Relief – Litigant Conduct Held, the petitioners’ consistent delays, repeated adjournments, and failure to lead evidence over a decade showed lack of diligence and a pattern of procedural abuse—Amendment brought at such stage was deemed tactical and aimed at reshaping the factual matrix—Such conduct disentitles a party from equitable relief under procedural law—Court emphasized that fairness, integrity of proceedings, and prejudice to the other side must guide decisions under O. VI, R. 17 CPC. Disposition: Leave to appeal refused—Petition dismissed—Judgment of Lahore High Court dated 11.03.2025, disallowing the amendment and restoring trial court’s dismissal order, upheld. Cited Authorities: Ghulam Nabi v. Sardar Nazir Ahmed (1985 SCMR 824) Muhammad Akram v. Altaf Ahmad (PLD 2003 SC 688) Abaid Ullah Malik v. ADJ, Mianwali (PLD 2013 SC 239) Mst. Noor Khatoon v. Muhammad Shafi (2003 SCMR 542) Mst. Ghulam Bibi v. Sarsa Khan (PLD 1985 SC 345) Secretary Govt. of West Pakistan v. Kazi Abdul Kafil (PLD 1978 SC 242) Sardar Naseem Khan v. Returning Officer (2015 SCMR 1698) Qamar-ud-Din v. Muhammad Din (PLD 2001 SC 518) Dausa v. Province of the Punjab (2016 SCMR 1621)