Summary: (a) West Pakistan Land Revenue Act (XVII of 1967)---- ----S. 42----Oral gift----Mutation of inheritance----Scope----Plaintiff (respondent) claimed that his late father had orally gifted his entire estate to him, and the gift mutation was duly attested before the Revenue Officer----Defendant (petitioner), step-sister of the plaintiff, contested the claim, asserting her right to her Shari share in the inheritance----Trial Court dismissed the suit, holding that the alleged oral gift was the result of undue influence exerted by the plaintiff’s mother over the deceased father----District Judge and Judicial Commissioner reversed the decision and decreed the suit in favor of the plaintiff----Held, that the oral gift was doubtful due to contradictions in witness statements regarding delivery of possession----Gift mutation was previously canceled by the Assistant Collector, and neither the deceased father nor the plaintiff/respondent challenged the cancellation for several years----Under Shari principles, a female heir cannot be deprived of her inheritance without clear evidence of a valid transfer----Review allowed, and inheritance mutation restored in favor of the petitioner. (b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---- ----S. 114 & O.XLVII, R.1----Review of judgment----Scope----Judicial Commissioner failed to properly evaluate the evidence and overlooked key facts, including the deceased father's inaction regarding the alleged gift mutation during his lifetime----Omission to apply judicial mind to material aspects resulted in a miscarriage of justice----Held, that review was justified to correct the legal error, as the petitioner had been unjustly deprived of her rightful share in the inheritance. ----Cited Cases: • Noor Muhammad v. Mst. Karim Bibi (PLD 1959 (W.P.) Lahore 932) • Ghulam Akram v. Syed Shabbir Hussain Shah (PLD 1986 SC (AJ&K) 56) ----Disposition: Review petition allowed. Judgment of Judicial Commissioner and District Judge set aside. Trial Court’s judgment restored, recognizing the petitioner’s inheritance rights.

Summary: (a) Islamic Law – Gifts (Hiba) ---Principles of valid gift---Essential conditions---Scope---Under Islamic law, a valid gift (Hiba) requires (i) a clear and unequivocal declaration by the donor, (ii) acceptance by the donee, and (iii) delivery of possession. In the present case, the donor made a valid oral gift in favor of the donee (his wife), later confirmed through a registered deed. The court observed that when the donor and donee reside together in the gifted property, physical departure by the donor is not mandatory; an overt act indicating the intention to divest control suffices. The principle was affirmed in Abid Hussain v. Muhammad Yousaf [PLD 2022 SC 395] and Riaz Ullah Khan v. Asghar Ali [2004 SCMR 1701]. (b) Property Rights ---Challenge to a gift by legal heirs---Spes successionis (expectation of inheritance)---Scope---The petitioner (legal heir) lacked standing to challenge the validity of the gift made by the deceased donor during his lifetime. As observed in Abrar Ahmed v. Irshad Ahmed [PLD 2014 SC 331], presumptive heirs have no rights over the property until the donor’s death, and acts of the donor during his lifetime bind the heirs. (c) Civil Procedure – Constitutional Jurisdiction ---Scope of constitutional petition---Judicial independence---A constitutional petition challenging the decision of a trial court and seeking inquiry against a judge is unwarranted where alternative legal remedies are available. Constitutional jurisdiction cannot be invoked to bypass the statutory framework or appellate processes. The High Court rightly dismissed the petition, as dissatisfaction with a judicial decision does not justify invoking extraordinary jurisdiction. (d) Judicial Procedure ---Concurrent findings of lower courts---Scope of interference---The courts below unanimously found the gift to be valid based on evidence of the declaration, acceptance, and delivery of possession. The Supreme Court reiterated that it does not interfere with concurrent findings unless they are perverse, arbitrary, or capricious, which was not the case here. ------ Disposition: Both petitions dismissed as meritless. Impugned judgment dated 06.04.2021 and impugned order dated 17.08.2023 upheld.

Summary: (a) East Bengal State Acquisition and Tenancy Act, 1950 (XXVIII of 1951) – ----S. 96—Pre-emption—Preferential right of co-sharer by inheritance—Scope—Petitioner, a co-sharer by inheritance, and other co-sharers by purchase separately applied for pre-emption of the same land—Trial Court granted pre-emption to petitioner, holding that he had a superior right over co-sharers by purchase—Appellate Court reversed the decision, holding that petitioner’s application was barred by limitation and suffered from defect of parties—Held, that as a co-sharer by inheritance, the petitioner had a preferential right to pre-emption under the law—Appellate Court misapplied legal provisions by ignoring material evidence regarding limitation—Petitioner’s pre-emption claim restored. (b) East Bengal State Acquisition and Tenancy Act, 1950 (XXVIII of 1951) – ----S. 96(4)—Limitation period for pre-emption—Computation—Petitioner received notice of pre-emption proceedings on 28-6-1964 and filed his application on 21-7-1964—Appellate Court held that he had knowledge of the sale on 8-2-1964 due to a land dispute and thus dismissed his claim as time-barred—Held, that mere presence at a disputed site does not establish knowledge of sale—Petitioner’s unchallenged testimony and process-server’s report confirmed that he learned of the sale only upon receiving notice—Application was within time—Appellate Court’s findings set aside. (c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) – ----S. 115—Revisional jurisdiction—Exercise by High Court—Erroneous finding of fact—Scope—Appellate Court misread witness testimony, ignored material evidence, and failed to consider legal principles governing limitation—Held, that revisional interference was justified where findings were based on misinterpretation of evidence and resulted in grave injustice—High Court set aside appellate decision and restored petitioner’s right to pre-emption. ----Disposition: Rule made absolute; petitioner’s claim for pre-emption allowed.

Summary: (a) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)-- --Art. 1,44 --- Adverse possession --- Co-sharer --- Ouster --- Adverse entry and non participation in the profits of the property would not amount to an ouster of co -sharer --- Wrong mutation confers no right in property as Revenue record is maintained only for purposes of ensuring realization of land revenue --- Co sharers /co-owners are not obliged to file a suit to seek a declaration to the effect that a mutation had wrongly been sanctioned--Suit filed, due to denial of rights of the co-sharer, for declaration would be within time and the Revenue Authorities on it success of such suit would be required by law to correct the Wrong mutation.--[Co-sharer. ] Haji v. Khuda Yar P L D 1987 S C 453; Anwar Muhammad and others v. Shard Din and others' 1983 S C M R 626; Najabat and others v. Saban Bibi and others P L D 1982 S C 187 ref. Mst.. Muqbool Jan alias Mst.'Manzara v. Faqir Mohammad - Civil petition for Leave to Appeal No. 37-P of 1969 distinguished. (b) Precedent--- ---Supreme Court --- Law declared in the subsequent decisions by the Supreme Court will govern the present case. (c) Muhammadan Law-- --- Inheritance --- Co-sharer --- Rights of females- --Brother cannot legally claim "adverse possession" against his sister and much less "ouster".-[Co-sharer]. Khitab at Hajjatul- Wada ref. (d) Muhammadan Law-- --- Inheritance --Co-sharer --- Rights of females-'---Heir in possession has to be considered to be in constructive possession of the property on behalf of the heirs in spite of his exclusive possession --Possession of the brothers thus would be taken to be the possession of their sisters, unless there is an express repudiation of the claims of the sisters by the brothers. Hyder Khan v. Chanda Khan 5011 C 691 (All.) ref. (e) Muhammadan Law--- . -- , Inheritance --- Co-sharer --- Rights of females --- Express repudiation and ouster- Mere omission to pay profits does not in itself constitute ouster., and still less so, when 'something, though not the whole, is paid --Partition among the males without reference to the female heirs does not mean much in shape of ousting the females from their rights. There cannot be ouster without a demand and a refusal, or without a clear declaration brought home to the knowledge of the co-sharers that lesser profits were being paid because the others were being ousted from the remainder of the share. A mere omission to pay profits does not in itself constitute ouster, and still less so, when something, though not the whole, is paid. The mere partition among the males without reference to the female heirs does not mean much in the shape of ousting them from their rights. Circumstances may exist in which an inference of knowledge can be drawn, or in which the laches or negligence of the co-owners is so great that knowledge will, be presumed but a case of that type would have to be exceptional. The law does not penalise a co- owner who relies on the honesty of his co-sharer, and therefore ordinarily the mere fact that he does not-take the trouble to assert his rights as he may be entitled to, would not justify an inference of ouster. Mohammad Aminuddin v. Md. Abdur Rahman 1941 N L J 467 ref. (f) Muhammadan Law-- --- Inheritance --- Co-sharer --- Adverse possession --- Rights of females- Pardanashin Muslim lady --Different considerations apply from those that apply between adult males even as regards adverse possession where one is concerned with pardanashin Muslim female --- In the case of adult males if the possession is neither obtained by force nor by fraud nor in secret, it does not matter that it is in fact not known' to the person against whom adverse position is alleged---]Law is satisfied if that person would have known had he been acquainted with what was going on in the worried- -An case of Purdanashin Muslim female it is necessary to find not mere adverse possession but ouster. Mst. Fardosjahan Begam v. Kazi Shafluddin AIR 1942 Nag. 75 ref. (g) Muhammadan Law-- --- Inheritance --- Co-sharers---Adverse possession --- Rights of females --- Claims of co-owners/inheritors when they are males and females together, the former seeking a Tight on the basis of adverse possession and ouster against the latter cannot possibly be accepted. (h) Muhammadan Law-- --- Inheritance --- Opening of, inheritance --- Rights of females --- Principles -- Muslim's estate vests immediately on his death in his or her heirs --- Brother, father, husband, son or vice versa, does not or cannot intervene as an intermediary. As soon as an owner dies, succession to his property opens. There is no State intervention or clergy's intervention needed for the passing of the title immediately, to the heirs. Thus it is obvious, that a Muslim's estate legally and juridically vests immediately on his death in his or her heirs and their rights respectively come into separate existence forthwith. The theory of representation of the estate by an intermediary is unknown to Islamic Law of inheritance as compared to other systems. Thus there being no vesting of the estate of the deceased for an interregnum in any one like an executor or administrator, it devolves on the heirs automatically, and immediately in definite shares and fraction. It is so notwithstanding whether they (the heirs) like it, want it, abhor it, or shun it. It is the public policy of Islamic law. It is only when the property has thus vested in the heir after the succession opens, that he or she can alienate it in a lawful manner. About the vesting of the property in a Muslim heir, if the State, the Court, the clergy, the executor, the administrator does not intervene, no other body intervenes on any other principle, authority, or relationship-even of kinship. Thus the brothers, the father, husband, son or vice versa, does not or cannot intervene as an intermediary. (i) Muhammadan Law-- --- Inheritance --- Rights of females --- Brother trying, though illegally -as if a guardian-in-inheritance, of a sui juris sister, on allegedly "moral" basis to oust her is prohibited by Islam--- Females cannot be treated so in Pakistan --- Import or application of any foreign' system or common law or law of nature in preference to law in Pakistan is not possible in present constitutional and legal system of Pakistan. Mohammad Bashir's case PLD 1982 S C 139 ref. Haji Nizam's case PLD 1976 Lah. 930 approved. (j) Muhammadan Law- --- Inheritance --- Views of non-Muslims on law of inheritance in Islam and position of females in it quoted. [pp. 13,14] L, M, N, 0, P & Muslim Law by Saksena, 2nd Edn., pp. 98-101, 3rd Edn., Chap. XV, Sec.1; F.B.Tyabji; Jones Works, Vol. VIII, p. 204; S.V. Fitzgerald on Muslim Law p. 20 and Macnaghtens on Principles and Precedents of Muslim Law ref. (k) Roman Law --- Position of females in Roman Law. (l) English Law -- --- Position of a married woman under English Law. (m) Hindu Law-- --- Status of a female under Hindu Law as compared to status under Islamic law. (n) Islamic Jurisprudence--- --- Status of wife in Islam --- Wife's position under Muhammadan Law compared with other systems of law --- Woman occupies the best position as regards her legal status and no other system of law stands any comparison to the Islamic system in this respect. Saksena on Muslim Law,- 3rd Edn., pp. 136 to 139 ref. (o) Muhammadan Law--- --- Inheritance --- Devolution of property takes place through inheritance immediately without any other intervention. (p) Islamic Jurisprudence--- --- Injunctions of Islam relating to women, their rights, duties and status detailed. Sayings of Muhammad (p.b.u.h.), Edited and Translated by Mirza Abul Fadl and published by the National Hijra Centenary Committee with Foreword by late Mr. A.K. Brohi ref. (q) Islamic Jurisprudence--- --- Public policy --- Recognition and enforcement of law of inheritance by the State agencies including the Courts, vis-a-vis, the female heirs, is a matter of public policy in Islam --- Relevant laws, therefore, need to be reinterpreted under the new light. (r) Muhammadan law- --- Inheritance --- Relinquishment against public policy --- Claim -of brothers of a female co-sharer that their sister had relinquished her share in the property inherited by her was based on the facts that they had spent money on two marriages arranged by them for their sister as there was intervening divorce; that they also spent money in a murder case wherein they were involved on account of said divorce and some amount for maintaining her for about rive years --- Such relinquishment by a female, held, was opposed to "public policy" as understood in Islam --- Relinquishment in question even if proved against female, would be against public policy --- Female's action in agreeing to the relinquishment (though denied by her) being against public policy the very act of agreement and contract constituting relinquishment was void. (s) Contract Act (IX of 1872)-- --- S. 23---Public policy --- Theory that only the rules of common law of England vis-a-vis, public policy were relevant as they were codified in the provisions following S. 23 therefore only they were brought under the umbrella of S. 23, is no more acceptable --- In Pakistan Constitutional set up, with the Objectives Resolution being its part, new situations with new principles of public policy with Islamic Ethos/spirit would have to be defined and applied. EA. Evans' case PLD 1964 SC 536 and Syed Sibtain Fazli's case PLD 1964 SC 337 ref. Atlas Industrial and Trading Corporation, Kar. and another v. Dr. Jalil Asgher PLD 1970 Kar. 241 approved. Sultan Textile Mills (Karachi) Ltd., Karachi v. Muhammad Yousu Shamsi PLD 1972 Kar. 220 not approved. (t) Contract Act (IX of 1872)-- --- Ss. 25, 23 & 16 --- Relinquishment of her inheritance by a female co-sharer without consideration --- Such relinquishment having been declared void being against public policy under S. 23 of the Contract Act cannot be revived and given life merely because it suffered from another serious infirmity and such infirmity could not be overcome by a resort to exceptions given in S.25 of the Act- - Presumption would be that relinquishment was not on account of natural love but on account of social constraints. Section 25 of the Contract Act, 1872 declares all those agreements void which are without consideration except for the exceptions created by the law itself, Amongst the exceptions it is provided that whenever the agreement is expressed in writing and is registered and is made on account of natural love and affection between the parties standing in a near relation to each other or whenever it is promised to compensate wholly or in part, a person who has already voluntarily done something for the promisor, or something which the promisor was legally compelled to do, in such like cases the agreement would be enforcible contract. Firstly, the contract which has been declared void under section 23 of the Contract Act cannot be and given life-, merely because it suffered from another serious infirmity; and which other infirmity could be overcome by a resort to the aforementioned exceptions. Secondly, it might be very rare that a male co-heir would relinquish his right for a female heir. Experience shows that it has always been the reverse. The flow of love cannot be so unnatural. Therefore, the rules devised by the Privy Council for the Parda Nasheen ladies as contracting parties and the one referred to above emanating from the public policy, would lead to another principle: that in cases like the present one there will be a pre-emption otherwise namely that it was not on account of natural love butt on account, of constraints that "relinquishment" has taken place. Similarly the second exception would also be not attracted as the presumption would be that such easy devices are always coined to justify relinquishment by females in favour of males. In the present case it appears to be jugglery that brothers claimed that the relinquishment by the sister was in consideration of what. they claim to have done in her two marriages as also for her maintenance. And in addition, what again could be only a jest, that they 'Spent some money on a criminal case which they had to right on account of her being divorced by her First husband. All these claims are against the teachings of Islam --- Injunctions in the holy Quran and the Saying-, of the Holy Prophet (P.B.U.H.), wherein emphasis has been laid again and again on the best possible concern for and treatment of female relations. On questions of public policy, morality (Section 23), lack of consideration (Section 25) and undue influence (Section 16) vis-a,-vis Parda Nashin ladies it has to be reiterated and recapitulated that: Firstly the relinquishment by the respondent, if any, is against public policy and morality, which concepts are to be decided on the basis of Islamic teachings and principles. The female could not opt or contract out of this protection. Hence the act of relinquishment was void and ineffective. Her ' inheritance, having accrued in her favour on her father's death remained intact at all the relevant times. Secondly the question of lack of consideration loses much of its relevance on account of the firstly above. But had it been not so, the so-called exceptions in Section 25 not being applicable in the context of Islamic rules and teachings, would not have saved the disputed relinquishment. Thirdly the relinquishment as such having been annulled, the same could not in this case operate as an ordinary alienation under the existing law for two amongst other reasons: One, the so-called relinquishment of accrued inheritance, is neither recognised in Islamic law of transfers nor is it treated as a "transfer under the Transfer of Property Act. If at all the nearest form being of 'gift', none of its essential conditions are satisfied in a relinquishment", so-called. If it is intended to be a gift, the latter's essentials would have to be gone through on principle and also as legal necessity. It cannot be by way of 'relinquishment' simpliciter. Another form of alientation in this context would be by way of family settlement/arrangement; which it might be argued is permissible in Islam. It is a very important aspect of the controversy, but a very vital condition regarding existence of a bona ride family dispute to be resolved or bona fide difficulty to be surmounted through means, is lack in this case. Moreover the case law on this point might require re-examination on the touch-one of 'what has, been discussed above. Two, even if all the conditions for a valid transfer under the existing set and systems of laws, after the due accrual of inheritance are satisfied, the protection afforded by Section 16 of the Contract Act against undue influence, to Parda Nashin ladies and others similarly placed parties and entrenched in the case-law as also available under the Islamic Law would require so many conditions to be satisfied, Admittedly in such like cases the burden of proof is upon the alienee. The presumption exists regarding undue influence on prima facie satisfaction regarding inter se position of the parties and the state and status of the alienor. This and other issues discussed and answered in this summarization will, it is clarified, in no way detract from the findings on the touchstone of Islamic principles, including those of public policy and morality, which would remain the main ratio in the case. Mst. Hamida Begum v. Mst. Murad Begum and others P L D 1975 S C 624 ref. (u) Muhammadan Law-- --- Inheritance --- Co-sharer --- Adverse possession --- Rights of female --- Brothers of a female co-sharer were required by law to protect the property rights of their sister if ever they came into possession of the land in any capacity Where the brothers alleged voluntary relinquishment by their sister, well known rules for establishing adverse possession, particularly the one relating to hostility, would not be established --- One who is enjoined with the protection of the other's property cannot lay claim adverse to the interests and rights of that other who owns it. (v) Muhammadan Law-- ---Inheritance --- Co-sharer --- Adverse possession--- Estoppel or waiver --- Plea of ouster would be untenable when its essential component, the plea of adverse possession was not available against a sister. (w) Islamic Jurisprudence --- Status of women in Islam --- Decadence which fell upon the prestigious position held in Islam by women and their rights as to status and property and some remedial measures highlighted. Muzaffar Khan v. Mst. Roshan Jan and others PLD 1984 SC 394 and the Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Law and Parliamentary Affairs, Islamabad v. Muhammad Ishaque and another PLD 1983 SC 273 ref. (x) Muhammadan Law ----Inheritance --- Rights of females --- Scope --- Scope of, rights of inheritance of females is so wide and their thrust so strong that it is the duty of the Courts to protect and enforce them, even if the legislative action for this purpose of protection in accordance-with Islamic Jurisprudence is yet to take its own time.

Summary: (a) Representation of the People Act (LXXXV of 1976)--- ----Ss. 12(2)(f) & 76A---Nomination papers, rejection of---Non-disclosure of Bank account and properties belonging to spouse---When the case record established that returned candidate neither submitted statement regarding assets of his spouse nor disclosed one of his Bank accounts at the time of filing nomination papers, the Election Tribunal should not have dismissed the election petition on the grounds that mens rea was not proved and that Government exchequer had not suffered any loss on account of such non-disclosure--Supreme Court declared election of returned candidate as void. From perusal of record, it transpired that at the time of submitting his nomination papers, an amount of Rs.25,28,893.90/-, was available in one of candidate's Bank accounts, which fact was not disclosed by him in his nomination papers. For all practicable purposes, the account was operative and the returned candidate, for reasons best known to him, deliberately did not mention the same in his nomination papers. Malik Muhammad Sameen Khan v. Returning Officer 2012 CLC 820 and Hassan Nawaz v. Election Commission of Pakistan 2013 CLC 1101 distinguished. Khaleefa Muhammad Munawar Butt v. Hafiz Muhammad Jamil Nasir 2008 SCMR 504 and Muhammad Jamil v. Munawar Khan PLD 2006 SC 24 ref. While submitting the nomination papers, the returned candidate had not submitted statement regarding assets of his spouse as required under section 12 of the Representation of the People Act, 1976. Election Tribunal, without taking into consideration such aspect of the case, dismissed the election petition merely on the ground that mens rea was not proved and further the government exchequer had not suffered any loss on account of non-disclosure by the returned candidate. Such finding of the Election Tribunal was against the spirit of law and as such called for interference. Supreme Court declared election of returned candidate as void in circumstances. (b) Islamic law--- ----Inheritance---Custom of surrendering inherited share by female legal heirs in agricultural land to male legal heirs---Such custom was not only against injunctions of Islam but also violative of the Constitution and the law---Courts should not take notice/consider any such custom. ------ (c) Customary Practices – Female Legal Heirs ----Surrender of inherited agricultural land—Observation by the Election Tribunal regarding customary practices in rural Punjab where female heirs surrender their inherited rights to male heirs—Held, such customs, if any, are against the injunctions of Islam, the law, and the Constitution of Pakistan—Courts must not take cognizance of such practices. (d) Disposition ----The appeal was allowed—Respondent’s election was declared void for non-compliance with Section 12 of the Act, 1976—The Supreme Court expunged the Election Tribunal’s observations regarding customary practices among female heirs in rural Punjab.

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)—Order XL, Rule 1: Appointment of Receiver—Principles for exercise of discretion Appointment of Receiver to manage disputed property pending litigation—Held, the power to appoint a Receiver is discretionary, harsh, and should be exercised sparingly and with caution—Such an order must be justified by the existence of emergency, danger, or risk of irreparable loss—Bona fide occupants or co-sharers cannot be deprived of possession unless the property is partitioned, and the specific share is allocated—In the instant case, the petitioners, whose shares had already been determined by the Supreme Court, could not be deprived of possession in favor of respondents whose rights were yet to be adjudicated. ----Cited Cases: Sardar Wali Muhammad v. Sardar Muhammad Iqbal Khan (PLD 1975 Lah. 492) Muhammad Usman v. Muhammad Shahbaz (2007 MLD 1121) (Shahzadi) Sharif Sultana v. (Brig.) Shahzada Sher Muhammad Jan (PLD 1958 Lah. 288) Mst. Mariyam v. Mst. Khtoon Bai (2005 YLR 3265) (b) Inheritance under Islamic Law—Determination of shares: Inheritance of estate devolved under Islamic law—Held, the shares of certain heirs of late Fateh Din had been conclusively determined by the Supreme Court, while the shares of other potential heirs remained to be adjudicated—The pending determination of the respondents’ rights did not justify their request for a Receiver to manage the property—Co-sharers in possession could not be displaced until final adjudication. ----Cited Cases: Mst. Baigan v. Muhammad Anwar (Supreme Court judgment dated 22.02.1999) (c) Constitutional Jurisdiction—Scope and grounds for interference: Challenge to the appointment of Receiver under constitutional jurisdiction—Held, orders of the trial and appellate courts were contrary to settled legal principles governing the appointment of Receiver and thus liable to be set aside—Constitutional jurisdiction is justified where lower courts exercise discretion arbitrarily or without adherence to legal principles. ----Cited Cases: Sardar Wali Muhammad v. Sardar Muhammad Iqbal Khan (PLD 1975 Lah. 492) ----Disposition: Constitutional petition allowed. Orders dated 06.06.2024 and 22.07.2024 of the trial and appellate courts appointing a Receiver were set aside as illegal and without jurisdiction. Application for appointment of Receiver deemed declined. Trial court directed to decide the suit within four months.

Summary: Distant kindred are not entitled to inherit property in presence of sharers or residuaries. (a) Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 ---Arts. 199 & 185(3)--- Inheritance law---Entitlement of paternal aunt and distant kindred to inheritance of deceased property---Interpretation of Islamic Law (Muhammadan Law)---Petitioner (distant kindred) challenged the inheritance rights of the deceased's paternal aunt---Legal determination of proximity in degree under Islamic inheritance principles. The case concerned the inheritance of property owned by Allah Bakhsh (deceased), who was unmarried and issueless. Upon his death, his mother (respondent No. 2), paternal aunt (respondent No. 1), and petitioner (a distant kindred, grandson of Allah Bakhsh's paternal great-grandfather) claimed rights to his estate. The property was initially transferred via Mutation No. 22 dated 26.12.1985 to the mother of the deceased and later corrected by Mutation No. 47 dated 18.09.1991, giving the petitioner the remaining share as residuary. However, the paternal aunt contested the inheritance, claiming precedence over the petitioner due to her closer degree of relation. (b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) ---S. 115--- Revisional jurisdiction---Concurrent findings of trial court and appellate court upheld based on correct interpretation of Islamic inheritance principles. The trial court decreed that the mother of the deceased was entitled to 1/3rd of the inheritance, while the remaining 2/3rd was equally divided between the paternal aunt and the petitioner, treating both as distant kindred. On appeal, the findings were upheld, and the petitioner’s claim that the paternal aunt was excluded under Muhammadan Law was dismissed as misconceived. (c) Islamic Inheritance Law (Muhammadan Law) ---Proximity in degree--- Rule of exclusion in inheritance---Nearer heirs in degree exclude remoter heirs. The courts determined that the paternal aunt, being closer in degree to the deceased than the petitioner, was entitled to a share of the inheritance. The petitioner’s contention that he should inherit as a residuary, excluding the paternal aunt, was rejected based on the principle that nearer relatives in degree have precedence. ----Disposition: The civil revision petition filed by the petitioner was dismissed. The judgments and decrees passed by the trial court and appellate court were upheld, affirming the inheritance distribution: 1/3rd to the mother, and the remaining 2/3rd equally divided between the paternal aunt and the petitioner.

Summary: Under Section 115 CPC, 1908--- Suit for declaration---Inheritance of a deceased Muslim owner and share of his Non-Muslim (disbeliever/Qadiani) heirs--- Declaration of Qadiani as non-Muslim under Article 260(3) of Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 and its retrospective effect--- Section 2 of Muslim Personal Law Shariat Application Act, 1937---A non-Muslim (Qadiani person) is not entitled to inherit any share from the estate of his Muslim relative as successor or predecessor as the case may be and that the provisions of Article 260(3) of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 are applicable retrospectively. ----- **(a) Inheritance Laws—Non-Muslims’ Entitlement to Muslim Estates. A non-Muslim cannot inherit from the estate of a deceased Muslim under Islamic law. This principle was affirmed based on Sahih Muslim (Hadith 4140) and the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Acts of 1937 and 1948. The court held that Ghulam Qadir, a Qadiani by faith, was not entitled to inherit his Muslim father Natho's estate, as his faith disqualified him from being a legal heir under Shariah. **(b) Application of Constitutional Provisions—Retrospective Operation of Article 260(3), Constitution of Pakistan, 1973. The court held that Article 260(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan, which declares Qadianis as non-Muslims, is declaratory and applies retrospectively. It simply affirmed an existing Shariah position that non-Muslims cannot inherit from Muslims. This view aligns with Muhammad Ashraf v. Mst. Niamat Bibi (PLD 1981 Lahore 520), which characterized the Second Constitutional Amendment of 1974 as declaratory of pre-existing Shariah law. **(c) Inheritance Mutations—Non-Disclosure of Faith. Non-disclosure of Ghulam Qadir's Qadiani faith at the time of inheritance mutation in 1954 rendered the mutation invalid. The court emphasized that admitted facts, such as Ghulam Qadir's faith, require no further proof, as per Mst. Nur Jehan Begum through LRs v. Syed Mujtaba Ali Naqvi (1991 SCMR 2300). **(d) Jurisdictional Review—Concurrent Findings of Fact. The High Court declined to interfere with the concurrent findings of the trial and appellate courts, which upheld the invalidation of the inheritance mutation. The court held that no jurisdictional defect or material irregularity was pointed out by the petitioners, in line with the principle in Mst. Zaitoon Begum v. Nazar Hussain (2014 SCMR 1469). **(e) Shariah Compliance—Canon of Quran and Sunnah. The court reaffirmed that inheritance of Muslim estates is governed by the Quran and Sunnah. Non-Muslims, including Qadianis, are excluded from inheriting Muslim estates, consistent with Islamic jurisprudence and personal law enactments. ------ Disposition: Civil Revision No. 3843/2014: Dismissed. The judgments and decrees of the Civil Judge (17.07.2012) and Additional District Judge (06.09.2014) were upheld. No Costs: No orders were issued regarding costs. ------ Cited Cases and References: Mst. Nur Jehan Begum through LRs v. Syed Mujtaba Ali Naqvi (1991 SCMR 2300) Mst. Rehmat and others v. Mst. Zubaida Begum and others (2021 SCMR 1534) Muhammad Ashraf v. Mst. Niamat Bibi (PLD 1981 Lahore 520) Mst. Zaitoon Begum v. Nazar Hussain (2014 SCMR 1469) Sahih Muslim, Hadith 4140

Summary: ----Distant kindred are not entitled to inherit property in presence of sharers or residuaries. (a) Inheritance – Islamic Law – Residuary vs. Distant Kindred – Distribution of Estate of Deceased: Unmarried and Issueless Male. Residuary Rights in Inheritance – Paternal Aunt vs. Paternal Grandson. In a case concerning the inheritance of an unmarried and issueless male (Allah Bakhsh, deceased), the Lahore High Court examined the claims of a paternal aunt (Mst. Wasso Mai) and a paternal grandson (Ghulam Hassan) regarding their respective shares. The petitioner argued that after granting one-third share to the mother (Mst. Bhako) as a sharer, the remainder of the estate should devolve entirely upon him as a residuary, excluding the paternal aunt. The trial court and appellate court held that both the paternal aunt and the paternal grandson were distant kindred and divided the remaining two-thirds share equally. The petitioner contested this interpretation of inheritance laws. Legal Principle: Under Islamic inheritance law, after satisfying the sharer's portion, the residuary inherits the remaining estate, and distant kindred are excluded if a residuary exists. Disposition: The petitioner’s argument was centered on misinterpretation of residuary rights under Islamic law. (b) Islamic Inheritance Law – Rights of Sharers and Residuaries – Preference in Lineage: Residuary Entitlement Over Distant Kindred – Misapplication by Lower Courts. The Lahore High Court addressed the distinction between residuary heirs and distant kindred under Islamic inheritance law. After allocating one-third share to the mother (a sharer), the remaining estate of Allah Bakhsh (deceased) should have been devolved upon the residuary (Ghulam Hassan, the paternal grandson) rather than being shared equally with the paternal aunt (Mst. Wasso Mai). The trial and appellate courts incorrectly treated both claimants as distant kindred, contrary to established principles of inheritance law. Legal Principle: A residuary heir takes precedence over distant kindred after sharers' rights are satisfied. Disposition: Misinterpretation of the residuary principle warranted interference in the lower court judgments. (c) Mutation Entries – Declaratory Suit – Validity of Inheritance Mutations: Correction of Mutation – Rightful Heirs under Islamic Law. The petitioner challenged the validity of two inheritance mutations (Mutation No. 22 dated 26.12.1985 and Mutation No. 47 dated 18.09.1991) concerning the estate of Allah Bakhsh (deceased). The mutations were initially in favor of the mother (Mst. Bhako) and later corrected to include the petitioner. The trial court and appellate court, however, ruled in favor of the paternal aunt (Mst. Wasso Mai), granting her an equal share with the petitioner. The petitioner argued that the mutations incorrectly represented inheritance principles under Islamic law. Legal Principle: Mutation entries must reflect the rightful heirs' entitlements under Islamic inheritance law. Disposition: Misapplication of inheritance principles rendered the mutation adjustments erroneous. (d) Evidence in Inheritance Disputes – Pedigree Table – Degree of Relationship: Admissibility and Interpretation of Pedigree Evidence. The pedigree table (Exh. P2) presented in evidence clarified the lineage and degree of relationship among the heirs. It established that Ghulam Hassan was a paternal grandson, while Mst. Wasso Mai was a paternal aunt of the deceased. The court reviewed whether the degree of proximity favored one over the other under Islamic inheritance principles. Legal Principle: Pedigree evidence must be interpreted in light of Islamic inheritance law, prioritizing residuaries over distant kindred. Disposition: The degree of relationship was misinterpreted by the lower courts. (e) Procedural Irregularities – Ex-Parte Proceedings – Right to Fair Hearing: Ex-Parte Orders and Representation of Parties. The Court noted procedural aspects, including an ex-parte order against respondent No. 2 (Mst. Bhako) and the appearance of counsel for other respondents despite prior ex-parte orders. Representation and procedural fairness were reviewed in the context of the substantive inheritance dispute. Legal Principle: Ex-parte proceedings must not prejudice substantive legal rights if representation is effectively made. Disposition: Procedural irregularities did not outweigh the need for correcting substantive misinterpretation of inheritance laws. ----Disposition: The Court acknowledged that the lower courts misapplied the principles of Islamic inheritance law, particularly regarding the rights of residuaries and distant kindred. The matter was decided in favor of the petitioner, granting him the remaining two-thirds share of the estate after allocating one-third to the mother (Mst. Bhako). Petition Allowed. Judgments of Lower Courts Set Aside.

Summary: Under Section 115 CPC, 1908--- Suit for declaration---Inheritance of a deceased Muslim owner and share of his Non-Muslim (disbeliever/Qadiani) heirs--- Declaration of Qadiani as non-Muslim under Article 260(3) of Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 and its retrospective effect--- Section 2 of Muslim Personal Law Shariat Application Act, 1937---A non-Muslim (Qadiani person) is not entitled to inherit any share from the estate of his Muslim relative as successor or predecessor as the case may be and that the provisions of Article 260(3) of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 are applicable retrospectively. (a) Constitution of Pakistan: ----Art. 260(3) Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937----Inheritance by Non-Muslims from a Muslim Deceased----Retrospective Application of Constitutional Provisions. The petitioners challenged the validity of inheritance mutation No.203 dated 09.12.1954, where their predecessor-in-interest, Ghulam Qadir, inherited property from his father, Natho, a Muslim. It was an admitted fact that Ghulam Qadir was a Qadiani by faith and did not disclose this fact at the time of mutation. The Court held that under Islamic Shariah, a non-Muslim cannot inherit property from a deceased Muslim. Additionally, Article 260(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, which declares Qadianis as non-Muslims, is declaratory and operates retrospectively, affirming the pre-existing position under Islamic law. ----Cited Cases: Muhammad Ashraf v. Mst. Niamat Bibi (PLD 1981 Lahore 520) Mst. Nur Jehan Begum v. Syed Mujtaba Ali Naqvi (1991 SCMR 2300) Mst. Rehmat v. Mst. Zubaida Begum (2021 SCMR 1534) (b) Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937: ----Inheritance----Application of Shariah Principles----Scope and Authority. The Court observed that the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937, mandates that inheritance matters among Muslims must be decided according to Islamic Shariah. The estate left by a deceased Muslim cannot be inherited by a non-Muslim heir. This principle was reinforced through subsequent legislation and judicial pronouncements. (c) Declaratory Legislation: ----Retrospective Operation----Article 260(3) of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973. The Court held that the Second Amendment to the Constitution of Pakistan, 1974, which declared Qadianis as non-Muslims, is declaratory in nature and operates retrospectively. This amendment affirmed the already existing position under Islamic law, and its retrospective application was deemed lawful. (d) Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (CPC): ----S. 35-A----Frivolous Litigation----Special Costs. The Court ruled that the petitioners failed to point out any illegality, material irregularity, or jurisdictional defect in the judgments of the trial and appellate courts. Concurrent findings of fact, being well-founded and supported by evidence, cannot be interfered with in revisional jurisdiction unless a clear error of law or jurisdiction is demonstrated. ----Cited Case: Mst. Zaitoon Begum v. Nazar Hussain (2014 SCMR 1469) (e) Disposition The civil revision was dismissed, with the judgments and decrees of the trial and appellate courts upheld. Petition Dismissed.