Summary: (a) West Pakistan Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1962 --- Ss. 2 & 2‑A; Shariat Application Act, 1948— Limited life‑estates under Punjab custom—retrospective abolition—Section 2‑A (inserted 1983) declares that male heirs who took agricultural land under custom before 15‑3‑1948 are deemed absolute owners as if inheritance had opened under Islamic law; conversely, a female donee holding a “limited” estate under earlier custom becomes full owner and the property thereafter devolves according to Sharia. Held, mutation No. 1616 (20‑05‑1990) in favour of Mst. Ghulam Zohra’s husband and children was lawful; appellants, claiming through the collateral Mohammad Yousaf, acquired no share. Cited cases: Haider v. Murad PLD 2012 SC 501; Mst. Farida Khatoon v. Dr. Masood Ahmed Butt 2009 SCMR 464. (b) Islamic Law—Wills (waṣiyyat)—Power of testamentary disposition— (i) A Muslim may bequeath only up to one‑third of his estate without heirs’ consent (Hadaya; Fatawa‑e‑Alamgiri). (ii) A condition that the legatee shall hold merely for life “until death” derogates from absolute ownership and is void; the bequest operates as an outright transfer. Applying these principles, Kala Khan’s 1934 will in favour of his daughter Mst. Ghulam Zohra, though couched as a life interest, vested absolute title in her; she could validly alienate the property inter vivos and, on death in 1988, it devolved exclusively upon her heirs (respondents Nos. 2‑5). (c) Customary succession—Ancestral versus acquired land—Onus— Custom applies only to ancestral property. Appellants neither pleaded nor proved that the land was ancestral; documentary record showed it was self‑acquired by the testator. Customary reversionary rights, therefore, could not be invoked. (d) Law of Evidence—Pedigree‑table—Probative value— A pedigree table (Exh. P‑16, Exh. D‑6) is at best a weak piece of evidence and must be corroborated. Failure to adduce independent proof that “Faqeer son of Qasim” (the nearer collateral) pre‑deceased the propositus fatally undermined appellants’ claim that Muhammad Yousaf was the last surviving male heir. (e) Civil litigation—Appellate and revisional review—Scope— Concurrent findings of the first appellate court and High Court that appellants had no title were based on correct appreciation of evidence and law; Supreme Court will not disturb such findings absent a jurisdictional defect or miscarriage of justice. Disposition: Appeal dismissed; High Court judgment dated 17‑05‑2012 and appellate decree dated 22‑10‑2001 affirmed; trial‑court decree set aside.

Summary: (a) Muslim Family Laws – Maintenance – Scope and Components – Medical Expenses as Part of Maintenance - Maintenance for wife and children—Scope—Held, the term ‘maintenance’ in Muslim family law is not limited to food, clothing, and shelter but has a wider connotation and includes all necessary components for the wellbeing of dependents—Medical expenses, including those for childbirth and treatment of minor children, fall within the broader definition of maintenance—Interpretation limiting maintenance to a narrow set of heads would defeat the protective intent of Islamic and statutory family law—Such view affirmed by prior jurisprudence including Humayun Hassan and Haseen Ullah—Courts held that maintenance must cater to contemporary physical, mental, and educational needs of dependents within the financial capacity of the husband. (b) Family Courts – Jurisdiction and Judicial Review – Interference with Concurrent Findings - Enhancement of maintenance allowance and medical expenses—Effect—Held, Family Court and Appellate Court had rightly enhanced child’s maintenance and medical allowance considering welfare and current social realities—High Court dismissed constitutional petition finding no legal infirmity—Supreme Court declined to interfere with concurrent findings supported by law—Petitioner's argument that “medical treatment” is not a component of maintenance was held to be without merit and contrary to settled law. (c) Islamic Law – Quranic Injunctions – Maintenance as a Religious and Legal Obligation - Role of husband under Islamic law—Held, Quranic command and Hadith make it the religious obligation of men to maintain their wives and children appropriately—Qur’anic verse declares men as protectors and maintainers of women, based on physical and financial responsibility—Maintenance encompasses necessary expenses to ensure dependents live with dignity, including medical care—This religious obligation aligns with the expanded judicial interpretation under statutory Muslim family law. Disposition: Civil petition dismissed; leave to appeal refused. Impugned orders of Family Court, Appellate Court, and High Court upheld.

Summary: (a) Gift—Presumption of good faith in transactions between husband and wife—Burden of proof ---- Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, Art. 129 ---- In transactions involving husband and wife, particularly where the wife is a housewife with limited exposure to financial and legal matters, the presumption of good faith in human transactions is reinforced. In the present case, where a husband challenged the validity of a gift mutation in favor of his wife, alleging fraud, the burden of proof rested heavily on him to establish the particulars of the alleged fraud. Mere allegations without disclosing specific details such as time, place, and manner of fraud were held insufficient to shift the burden onto the wife. (b) Gift by husband to wife—Standard of proof—Onus of proof in cases involving housewives ---- Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. VI R. 4 ---- A wife, especially one who is a housewife, is not required to prove a gift from her husband with the same standard of proof as other donees, given the social context where inter-spousal gifts are presumed to be made in good faith. The burden of disproving the transaction and proving fraud rested with the husband, who failed to provide sufficient particulars as required under O. VI R. 4, CPC, which mandates the specific pleading of fraud and misrepresentation. (c) Fraud—Pleading requirements—Non-disclosure of particulars—Effect ---- Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. VI R. 4 ---- Allegations of fraud must be specifically pleaded, with particulars such as time, place, and nature of misrepresentation. In the absence of such details, the plea of fraud is legally untenable. In the instant case, the husband alleged that the wife fraudulently obtained a gift mutation with the connivance of revenue officials but failed to provide specific details, rendering his claim legally deficient. (d) Revenue record—Presumption of truth—Gift mutation—Challenge by donor ---- Land Revenue Act ---- Entries in revenue records enjoy a presumption of truth, albeit rebuttable. A donor who voluntarily executes a gift and allows it to be recorded in revenue records cannot later challenge it on vague allegations of fraud without producing substantial evidence. In this case, once the gift mutation was recorded, the husband could not successfully challenge it without strong, compelling evidence of fraud, which he failed to provide. (e) Validity of oral gift—Divestment of possession by husband in favor of wife—Requirement ---- Islamic Law ---- Under Islamic law, when a husband gifts property to his wife, actual divestment of possession is not a strict requirement, as long as the wife holds the property through the husband. The wife’s possession through her husband is deemed constructive possession, sufficient to fulfill the legal requirement of a valid gift. (f) Necessary parties—Non-joinder of revenue officials in fraud allegations—Effect ---- Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. I R. 10 ---- Where a party alleges fraud in collusion with government officials, failure to implead the alleged officials as necessary parties renders the suit defective. In this case, the husband alleged that the wife conspired with revenue officials to fraudulently obtain the gift mutation but failed to implead the revenue officials, rendering the suit not maintainable in light of Sikandar Hayat v. Sughran Bibi (2020 SCMR 214). (g) Appellate Court judgment—Revisional jurisdiction of High Court—Scope of interference ---- Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S. 115 ---- Although appellate judgments are generally given preference over trial court decisions, the High Court, in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction, is duty-bound to rectify legal errors. In this case, the Appellate Court erred by shifting the burden of proof onto the wife without first requiring the husband to establish his claim of fraud, making its judgment perverse and legally unsustainable. Disposition: Civil revision allowed. The judgment and decree of the Appellate Court were set aside, and the judgment of the Trial Court dismissing the husband’s suit was restored.

Summary: (a) Succession Act (XXXIX of 1925) ----Ss. 372, 376 & 383—Revocation of succession certificate—Scope and grounds—Certificate granted to widow of deceased police official (declared “Shaheed”) challenged by his mother and minor daughters—Earlier revocation dismissed but remanded by High Court for reconsideration of parties’ Sharai shares—Held, subsequent “Sharai Fatwa” relied upon by trial court failed to distinguish between property owned by deceased during his lifetime and posthumous governmental compensation—Compensation granted after martyrdom is not part of *Tarka* (estate) and thus not heritable property—Mother of deceased not entitled to any share therein—Trial and appellate courts misconstrued the legal position; orders of revocation unsustainable. (b) Islamic Law ----Inheritance—Tarka—Definition—Assets accruing after death of a person (such as ex-gratia or compensation payments by the Government) do not constitute *Tarka*; only property existing during the deceased’s lifetime passes to heirs—Sharai Fatwa dated 1-6-2023 reaffirmed that compensation after martyrdom falls outside inheritance—Earlier Fatwa set aside as it was issued without full factual context. (c) Minor’s property—Protection of rights ----Where minors’ shares already secured through a property purchased by their maternal uncle (though unregistered), Court recorded his undertaking to safeguard minors’ legal and legitimate rights—Direction issued accordingly. (d) Succession proceedings—Remand—Scope ----When earlier remand order required framing of issues and ascertainment of Sharai shares, compliance must remain confined to those directions; trial court could not extend its determination beyond scope of inheritance law and include non-heritable compensatory grants. Disposition --- Civil revision allowed. Orders dated 24-07-2019 (revocation allowed) and 07-08-2021 (appeal dismissed) set aside. Succession Certificate No. 56/2015 dated 19-11-2015 issued to the petitioner (widow of Shaheed) restored. Mother not entitled to share in post-death compensation. Maternal uncle of minors held responsible for protection of their shares. No order as to costs.

Summary: (a) Mohammadan (Islamic) Law (Hanafi) ----Qur’an, Sūrah An-Nisā’ (4:11 & 4:12); D.F. Mulla, Principles of Mohammadan Law, paras. 61, 63 & 65---Classes of heirs---Sharers and residuaries---Deceased left widow, daughter and a surviving brother; no son---Widow and daughter held “sharers” (one-eighth and one-half respectively) and brother held “residuary” entitled to residue---Distribution affirmed on 24-share grid: widow 3/24, daughter 12/24, brother 9/24---Findings of appellate court determining shares upheld; no misreading or non-reading shown. (b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) ----S. 115---Civil revision---Scope---Interference with concurrent/appellate findings is not warranted absent jurisdictional defect, illegality or material irregularity---Appellate court’s decree granting declaration/partition in favour of respondents (legal heirs of deceased’s brother) found in accord with Qur’anic injunctions and settled Hanafi principles; revisional challenge failed. (c) Property already alienated—registered sale deed ----Effect on shares of residuary---A portion of the estate had been sold by petitioners through a registered sale deed prior to the suit---Share of the brother (residuary) not to be diminished by such alienation---Final order left the cancellation of the registered sale deed intact as per the appellate decree. Disposition --- Civil Revision dismissed. Appellate court’s determination of shares sustained (widow 3/24; daughter 12/24; brother 9/24). Cancellation of the registered sale deed kept intact. Parties to bear their own costs.

Summary: (a) Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1935 & 1962 ----Inheritance---Limited ownership of widow under custom---Devolution of property on death of widow---Scope and effect---Widow shown as full owner in revenue record---Reversion of property to legal heirs of deceased husband---Petitioners, being legal heirs of deceased Muhammad Ayub, filed a suit claiming that his widow, Mst. Bibi Hawa (later shown as Mst. Hashmat Bibi), was entered as a limited owner under prevailing custom and that upon her death, property should have devolved upon Ayub’s legal heirs under Islamic law---Mutation No. 2844 (dated 05.06.1983) had transferred full ownership to legal heirs of the widow, to the exclusion of other legal heirs of Muhammad Ayub---Held, under prevailing Riwaj before the promulgation of the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1935, a widow inherited as limited owner, and on her death, the property reverted to the husband’s legal heirs---After promulgation of the Shariat Act, the widow became full owner only to the extent of her Islamic share---Property in dispute was wrongly mutated to her legal heirs as though she owned the entire share of her deceased husband, which was contrary to law. (b) Civil Procedure Code, 1908 ----S. 115---Revisional jurisdiction---Concurrent findings of courts below---Misreading and non-reading of evidence---Interference justified---Trial court and appellate court concurrently dismissed petitioners’ suit without appreciating material on record, including entries in Jamabandis and the implications of customary and Islamic inheritance laws---High Court held that both lower courts misread the evidence and wrongly applied estoppel and limitation, necessitating revisional interference. (c) Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 ----Art. 112(2)---Judicial notice of custom---Court may take judicial notice of well-established custom having the force of law---No need to prove customary limitation of widow’s rights in each case where settled precedent exists. **(d) Estoppel---Scope---Petitioners not estopped from asserting legal entitlement merely due to non-objection to compensation received by legal heirs of widow---Such acquiescence did not negate their claim under Islamic law, particularly when only 16 marlas of property were acquired, and petitioners admitted entitlement of respondents to widow’s Shari share. (e) Limitation Act, 1908 ----Art. 120---Continuous possession---Refreshing cause of action---Wrong entries in revenue record---Effect---Where plaintiffs remain in continuous possession and only a portion of the land is acquired or claimed adversely, recurring entries constitute continuing wrongs and refresh the cause of action---Petition held not barred by limitation. **(f) Relief---Correction of mutation---Declaratory relief---Civil court and revisional court have jurisdiction to mould relief even if mutation is not specifically challenged, where necessary to give effect to declaratory findings---Earlier inheritance mutation (No. 2844) in favour of legal heirs of widow set aside and direction issued for fresh mutation as per Shariah shares. Cited Cases: • Maqbool Ahmad v. Fazal-i-Haq 2012 SCMR 917 • Additional Settlement Commissioner (Land), Sargodha v. Muhammad Shafi PLD 1971 SC 791 • Fayyaz Hussain v. Haji Jan Muhammad 2018 SCMR 698 • Salamat Ali v. Muhammad Din PLD 2022 SC 353 • Saadat Khan v. Shahid ur Rehman PLD 2023 SC 362 • Muhammad Akhtar v. Mst. Manna 2001 SCMR 1700 • Samar Gul v. Mohabat Khan 2000 SCMR 974 Disposition: Revision allowed. Judgments of trial and appellate courts set aside. Mutation No. 2844 declared void to the extent of excess inheritance. Petitioners declared entitled to Shari shares. Revenue record to be corrected accordingly. Preliminary decree passed with liberty to seek final decree.

Summary: (a) Islamic Law --- Inheritance of spinster Muslim female --- Succession rights of uterine brother vs. stepbrothers --- Applicability of Quranic injunctions --- Article 227 of the Constitution of Pakistan. Petitioner (Manzoor Ahmad) was the uterine brother of deceased Mst. Nooran, a Muslim spinster who died issueless. Trial and appellate courts had wrongly decreed the suit in favour of stepbrothers (sons of deceased's paternal uncle), holding them entitled to share in the estate. The High Court reversed these findings, holding that under Islamic law, only the uterine brother (born of same mother) inherits the entire estate of an issueless spinster female in the absence of closer heirs. The Court emphasized that under Article 227 of the Constitution and Quranic verses (Surah An-Nisa, Ayat 7–11, 176), all Muslims are bound to adhere to settled principles of succession, and the shares prescribed therein are conclusive. (b) Evidence Law --- Admissibility of documentary evidence --- Invalid mode of tendering --- Production by counsel without witness --- Effect. The respondents/plaintiffs had produced key documents (Jamabandi, mutation No. 294, death certificate of deceased) during counsel’s statement, without producing a competent witness to tender or verify them. The Court held this method of exhibiting documents to be inadmissible and devoid of probative value. Reliance was placed on PLD 2021 SC 715 and 2023 SCMR 730, reiterating that proper evidentiary procedure requires documents to be brought on record by a party through a witness, with an opportunity for cross-examination by the opposing party. (c) Inheritance Law --- Date of death --- Disputed death certificate --- Burden of proof --- Effect of failure to prove falsity of mutation. The respondents failed to prove their claim that deceased Nooran died in 1998 (before the death of their father), relying solely on an unverified death certificate. The petitioner successfully established through oral and circumstantial evidence that Nooran died in 2001, after their father's death, thereby excluding the respondents from succession. Furthermore, their previous appeal before DDOR challenging inheritance mutation No. 294 had already been dismissed. Absence of credible evidence rendered the respondents’ claim baseless. (d) Civil Procedure Code, 1908 --- S. 115 --- Revisional jurisdiction --- Concurrent findings by courts below --- Interference by revisional court --- When justified. Although the trial and appellate courts had concurrently ruled against the petitioner, the High Court found their findings on core issues (issues 1–3) to be perverse, suffering from misreading, non-reading of evidence, and misapplication of Islamic law. The Court invoked its revisional powers under Section 115, C.P.C., to reverse concurrent findings, citing settled precedent that such intervention is justified where findings are patently illegal or contrary to established law. Disposition: Civil revision allowed. Judgments and decrees of trial and appellate courts set aside. Petitioner’s suit for declaration decreed. Respondents’ suit dismissed.

Summary: ''On 29-04-2024, the LHC held that the mother, despite her previous waiver of custody rights, is entitled to regain custody of her minor son as the mother has a preferential right to custody of children under Muslim personal law up to a certain age. ''Custody of minor child; Difference between 'Walayat' and 'Hizanat' ---- Issues:Whether the mother, despite her previous waiver of custody rights, is entitled to regain custody of her minor son.The applicability of Muslim personal law regarding the custody (Hizanat) of children, particularly in the context of the mother's natural right to custody up to a certain age.The proper jurisdiction for resolving the custody dispute and the impact of previous legal proceedings on the current petition.Holding/Reasoning/Outcome:The Lahore High Court, Bahawalpur Bench, ruled in favor of the petitioner, recognizing the mother's preferential right to custody under Muslim law. It was determined that the mother's waiver of custody rights was not legally binding, allowing her to reclaim her right to custody. The court ordered interim custody to be granted to the mother, subject to the final determination by the Guardian Court, where the custody proceedings were pending and scheduled for 15.05.2024.Citations/Precedents:Mst. HASEENA BIBI versus ABDUL HALEEM and others (PLD 2024 Supreme Court 291)Mst. RAZIA REHMAN versus STATION HOUSE OFFICER and others (PLD 2006 Supreme Court 533)Miss HINA JILANI, DIRECTOR OF A.G.H.S. LEGAL AID CELL Versus SOHAIL BUTT (PLD 1995 Lahore 151)RAHIMULLAH CHOUDHURY versus MRS. Sayeda HELALI BEGUM AND OTHERS (1974 SCMR 305)Mst. ZOHRA BEGUM Versus Sh. LATIF AHMAD MUNAWWAR (PLD 1965 (W.P.) Lahore 695)MAHMOODA KHATOON versus Syed ZAINUL HASNAIN RIZVI (PLD 1958 (W.P.) Karachi 150)Mst. QURAT-UL-AIN versus STATION HOUSE OFFICER, POLICE STATION SADDAR JALALPUR JATTAN, DISTRICT GUJRAT and others (2024 SCMR 486)Raja MUHAMMAD OWAIS versus Mst. NAZIA JABEEN and others (2022 SCMR 2123)Muhammad Rafique v. Muhammad Ghafoor (PLD 1972 Supreme Court 6)

Summary: Background: The petition, along with nine other related petitions, challenged certain provisions of the Family Courts Act, 1964. The central issue revolved around whether a decree for maintenance, when the amount awarded was less than Rs.5000 per month per person, was appealable. The petitioners argued that if the aggregate sum awarded exceeded Rs.5000, even though individually each amount was below this threshold, an appeal should still be allowed. They also questioned the constitutionality of certain provisions of the Family Courts Act after the insertion of Article 10-A (right to a fair trial) into the Constitution. ----- Issues: ----- 1)Whether a decree for maintenance less than Rs.5000 per month per person is appealable if the cumulative amount exceeds Rs.5000? -----2) Whether the ouster of appeal under Sections 14(2)(b) and (c) of the Family Courts Act, 1964, violates the constitutional right to a fair trial under Article 10-A? ----- Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: ----- Non-Appealability of Maintenance Decrees under Rs.5000 Per Month (per person): The Court held that the amount specified in Section 14(2)(c) of the Family Courts Act applies to each individual plaintiff. The legislature's intent was clear in making decrees non-appealable when the maintenance awarded to each individual is less than Rs.5000 per month. The Court refused to read the words "in aggregate" or "in total" into the statute, concluding that the right to appeal is only barred when the individual amount is less than Rs.5000 per month. ----- Constitutionality of Section 14(2)(b) and (c): The Court ruled that the provisions of the Family Courts Act do not violate Article 10-A of the Constitution. Article 10-A guarantees the right to a fair trial and due process but does not mandate an automatic right to appeal. The Court referenced international and domestic precedents, asserting that the absence of an appellate right in specific limited cases, such as maintenance below Rs.5000, did not amount to a violation of fundamental rights. ----- Repugnancy to Islamic Injunctions: The petitioners’ argument that the ouster of the appeal provision was against Islamic injunctions was rejected. The Court noted that only the Federal Shariat Court has the jurisdiction to declare a law repugnant to Islam under Article 203D of the Constitution. ----- Annual Increase in Maintenance: Regarding Section 17A(3), which provides for an automatic annual increase in maintenance, the Court held that this increase does not render a decree appealable under Section 14(2)(c) because the increase operates by law after the judgment. ----- Legal Aid: The Court directed the Government of Punjab to operationalize the Punjab Legal Aid Agency to assist indigent persons, particularly women and children, in family matters. ----- Citations/Precedents: Federation of Pakistan through Ministry of Finance and others v. M/s. Noori Trading Corporation (Pvt.) Ltd. (1992 SCMR 710) Hudabiya Engineering (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Interior (PLD 1998 Lahore 90) Shrin Munir and others v. Government of Punjab (PLD 1990 SC 295) Tayyaba Yunus v. Muhammad Ehsan and others (2010 SCMR 1403) Abid Hussain v. Additional District Judge, Alipur, District Muzaffargarh and another (2006 SCMR 100) Central Government of Pakistan v. Suleman Khan and others (PLD 1992 SC 590) Uzin Export Import Enterprises For Foreign Trade, Karachi v. Union Bank of Middle East Ltd. (PLD 1994 SC 95) Sarfraz v. Additional District Judge and 5 others (2017 YLR 1684) Gul Zaman v. Deputy Commissioner/Collector Gwadar (2024 SCMR 481)

Summary: ''Maintenance encompasses not only basic necessities but also expenses necessary for the mental and physical well-being of a minor including educational expenses'' ---- The SCP delved into the scope of the term "maintenance" and whether a Muslim father is under an obligation to pay the expenses incurred on education of his daughter/children or whether maintenance of child includes educational expenses? The court referred to various legal definitions and sources, including Black's Law Dictionary, Section 369 of the Principles of Muhammadan Law, and the dictionary meaning of "maintenance." It concluded that maintenance encompasses not only basic necessities but also expenses necessary for the mental and physical well-being of a minor.The judgment further explored the legal framework of maintenance under Islamic law, emphasizing that providing for a child's education is part of a father's obligation. It cited Quranic verses and Islamic principles to support this view.Additionally, the judgment referred to international law, particularly the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC). Article 27 of the UNCRC recognizes a child's right to a standard of living adequate for their development, including education. Pakistan ratified the UNCRC, withdrawing its reservation, making the commitment to uphold these rights absolute.The judgment concluded that it is in the best interests of the child to include educational expenses within the concept of maintenance. Respondent No.4, an unmarried daughter, was pursuing higher education, and the court found that the petitioner had the means to provide for her educational expenses.In light of these considerations, the court upheld the judgment of the Appellate Court, ruling that the granted maintenance amount of Rs. 25,000 per month for Respondent No.4's education was neither excessive nor unjustified. The court dismissed the petition, finding it devoid of merit and refusing leave to appeal. rel. PLD 1970 SC 75