Summary: (a) Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984--- ----Arts. 17 & 79---Agreement to sell---Proof through attesting witnesses---Mandatory requirement---Suit for specific performance was founded upon alleged agreement to sell dated 22.09.2000 relating to immovable property---Defendants specifically denied execution of said agreement---Held, that where a document is required by law to be attested, its execution must be proved through attesting witnesses in accordance with Arts.17 and 79 of Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, unless absence of such witnesses is satisfactorily explained---Production of attesting witnesses is mandatory and failure to comply renders document legally unproved. Cited Cases: • Rafaqat Ali and others v. Mst. Jamshed Bibi and others 2007 SCMR 1076 • Ainuddin and others v. Abdullah and another 2019 SCMR 880 (b) Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984--- ----Arts. 17 & 79---Agreement to sell---Non-production of marginal witnesses---Effect---Plaintiff relied upon agreement to sell but failed to produce marginal witnesses of the document---No explanation was furnished for their non-production despite serious denial of execution by defendants---Held, that failure to produce most natural witnesses to the transaction struck at the root of plaintiff’s case---Agreement to sell could not be treated as proved in accordance with law. Cited Case: • Mst. Hajyani Bar Bibi through L.R. v. Mrs. Rehana Afzal Ali Khan and others PLD 2014 SC 794 (c) Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984--- ----Art. 17(2)(a)---Power of attorney and agreement concerning immovable property---Instrument creating financial obligations---Attestation---Requirement---Agreement to sell and powers of attorney relied upon by plaintiff related to immovable property and created financial obligations---Held, that such documents fall within ambit of Art.17(2)(a) of Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 and must be attested and proved in accordance with Arts.17 and 79 thereof---A document not proved through prescribed legal mode cannot form basis of decree for specific performance. Cited Cases: • Maqsood Ahmad and others v. Salman Ali PLD 2003 SC 31 • Hafiz Tassaduq Hussain v. Muhammad Din through Legal Heirs and others PLD 2011 SC 241 (d) Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984--- ----Art. 129(g)---Withholding of best evidence---Adverse presumption---Agreement to sell denied by defendants---Plaintiff failed to produce marginal witnesses and gave no explanation for such omission---Held, that adverse presumption under Art.129(g) of Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 would arise against plaintiff that had marginal witnesses been produced, they would not have supported his stance---Plaintiff failed to discharge burden of proof. (e) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)--- ----Specific performance---Equitable and discretionary relief---Proof of contract---Requirement---Relief of specific performance is not granted as a matter of right merely because it is lawful to do so---Court must examine facts, conduct of parties, delay, surrounding circumstances and whether contract has been proved in accordance with law---Held, that where alleged agreement to sell itself remained legally unproved, plaintiff was not entitled to discretionary relief of specific performance. Cited Case: • Liaqat Ali Khan and others v. Falak Sher and others PLD 2014 SC 506 (f) Specific performance--- ----Agreement to sell not proved---Third-party rights---Effect---Plaintiff alleged prior agreement to sell and full payment of consideration, whereas defendants asserted lawful subsequent transfer through chain of title and bona fide purchase without notice---Record reflected that third-party rights had already been created through transfer duly recognized by Capital Development Authority---Held, that in presence of legally unproved agreement and intervening third-party rights, equitable relief of specific performance could not be granted. (g) Civil suit--- ----Specific performance, possession and permanent injunction---Foundation of claim legally unproved---Effect---Entire claim of plaintiff rested upon agreement to sell dated 22.09.2000---Marginal witnesses were not produced, execution was denied, and mandatory evidentiary requirements were not satisfied---Held, that Courts below failed to properly appreciate mandatory requirements of Arts.17 and 79 of Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 and erroneously decreed suit despite fundamental defects in plaintiff’s evidence. (h) Civil proceedings--- ----Concurrent findings below---Interference by Supreme Court---Mandatory evidentiary requirements ignored---Trial Court decreed suit, Appellate Court dismissed appeal, and High Court dismissed civil revision---Supreme Court held that plaintiff failed to prove alleged agreement to sell in accordance with mandatory provisions of Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984---Where Courts below proceed on a document not legally proved, interference by Supreme Court is warranted. Disposition: Petitions were converted into appeal and allowed. Judgments of Trial Court, Appellate Court and Islamabad High Court were set aside. Suit instituted by plaintiff/respondent No.1 for specific performance, possession and permanent injunction stood dismissed. Parties were left to bear their own costs.

Summary: (a) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)--- ----Ss.8 & 42---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.115---Constitution of Pakistan, Art.172---Title dispute over property between former Ruler of Swat and Provincial Government---Present civil revision arose out of concurrent dismissal of the petitioners’ suit and appeal regarding suit property---Petitioners claimed to be legal heirs of the former Ruler of Swat and sought declaration, correction of revenue entries, injunction and possession while the respondents asserted Provincial Government ownership under the settlement record---Held: It was mentioned in the relevant notification that while the buildings were owned by the State of Swat, the land beneath them was the exclusive ownership of the Rulers of Swat---Mere possession as a licensee could not be considered as a proof of ownership of the Provisional Government---Respondents were required to justify the correctness of the revenue record through independent and reliable evidence but they failed to produce any record of lawful acquisition of the suit property---Concurrent judgments of the courts below suffered from misreading and non-reading of evidence and were not sustainable in law---Suit of the petitioners was decreed as prayed for---Civil revision was allowed, in circumstances. Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa through Secretary Home and TAs and others v. Noorani Gul through LRs 2022 SCMR 1428 rel. (b) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art.172---Escheat---Unclaimed / ownerless property---The government has the right to take ownership of an unclaimed or ownerless property---It occurs when an individual dies or disappears with no will and no heirs and his property remains unclaimed for a considerable prolonged period of time. (c) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)--- ----Ss.8 & 42---Possession---Mere possession does not confer title. (d) Mutation--- ----Long-standing entries---Proof---Mere reliance on long-standing entries is of no avail when correctness and legality of those entries through independent, cogent and unimpeachable evidence is not proved. (e) Fraud--- ----Limitation---Fraud vitiates most solemn proceedings and thus period of limitation would not be an embargo upon justifiable claim directed against fraud---When the very foundational transaction is based on fraud and mala fide, the subsequent superstructure built thereon cannot be allowed to stand and ultimately collapses. Muhammad Rasheed v. Muhammad Ismail 2024 CLC 1451 and Mst. Nawab Bibi through LRs v. Hakim Ali and others 2024 CLC 895 ref. (f) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----S.115---Revisional jurisdiction of the High Court---Concurrent findings, interference in---Scope---High Court has got ample powers to upset concurrent findings of courts below. Nazim ud Din and others v. Sh. Zia ul Qamar and others 2016 SCMR 24 rel. Asghar Ali along with Nisar Ahmad, General Attorney for Petitioners. Haq Nawaz Khan, Addl: A.G for official Respondents. Date of hearing: 2nd March, 2026.

Summary: (a) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964)----Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199----Dowry and bridal gifts---Recovery of alternate value of dowry articles---Scope of constitutional jurisdiction---Petitioner/wife challenged concurrent family court judgments whereby trial court had granted 30% alternate value of dowry articles but appellate court had set aside even that relief---Held, dowry articles and personal belongings of a wife remain her exclusive property and, where not returned in specie, she may claim their alternate value, subject to proof of existence, entrustment and retention---Appellate Court failed to appreciate material admissions and surrounding circumstances, including respondent/husband’s own stance that household articles were available in the house and his admission that no traditional dowry was given at the time of marriage, coupled with his assertion that he purchased various household luxuries during matrimony---Where original financial details were withheld by husband and wife’s bank record showed regular withdrawal of her salary for household consumption, presumption operated in favour of wife’s contribution---Appellate Court had, therefore, misdirected itself in discarding claim in toto merely on ground that wife had not produced her parents or further documentary proof. (b) Dowry and Bridal Gifts (Restriction) Act (LXXVIII of 1976)----Ss. 2 & 5---Dowry---Meaning and legal status---Property given to bride before or after marriage by her parents in connection with marriage constitutes dowry, excluding inherited property---Wife has absolute right in her dowry and bridal gifts---Any property rights available to a woman cannot be restricted, controlled or limited, and every gift becomes her exclusive property---There is no legal bar to a wife purchasing household articles herself after marriage and claiming them as dowry articles within the meaning of law, if such articles were acquired in connection with marriage and matrimonial home. Reliance placed on Ghulam Rasool v. Family Court 1991 CLC 1696 and Syeda Mehwish v. Additional District Judge, Islamabad (West) 2018 CLC 1337. (c) Family proceedings---Proof of dowry articles---Nature of evidence required---Strict rules of evidence---Held, wife’s solitary statement may be sufficient to prove existence of dowry items in a recovery suit, and oral testimony can substantiate a dowry claim because Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 does not apply in its strict sense to family proceedings---There is no rigid formula requiring receipts, shopkeepers’ details or production of parents in every case---Determination depends upon facts of each case and overall probabilities emerging from evidence. Reliance placed on Aziz-Ur-Rehman v. Mst. Bibi Jameela 2020 CLC 380 and Shafique Sultan v. Mst. Asma Firdous 2017 SCMR 393. (d) Dowry articles---Valuation of used household goods---Principles---Held, valuation of dowry articles is to be made case to case with reference to nature, quality, user period and prevailing market conditions---Judge, Family Court cannot adopt a bare rule of thumb without objective criteria---For assessing alternate value of used household articles, relevant factors include: present and past market value; years of use; average life of article; sentimental value attached to item; need to account for replacement at current price where article remains with husband; online market sources and auction platforms for valuation; reasonable depreciation; inflation and consumer price data; and average market prices supplied by parties---Used item may generally be considered at half price, but not below that level, unless marital breakdown occurred within first one or two years, in which case value may be considered around 80% in view of inflation and taxation---Family Court may use modern scientific tools, data, websites and market applications without requiring expert evidence in every case. Reliance placed on Mst. Ayesha Shaheen v. Khalid Mehmood 2013 SCMR 1049; Muhammad Zahid v. Mst. Ghazala Mazhar 2014 CLC 895; Mst. Samreen Bibi v. Judge Family Court PLD 2015 Lahore 504; and Haji Muhammad Nawaz v. Samina Kanwal 2017 SCMR 321. (e) Matrimonial property---Assets acquired during subsistence of marriage---Vehicle purchased in husband’s name---Claim of wife on basis of contribution---Islamic jurisprudence, comparative jurisprudence and equitable principles---Petitioner/wife claimed that vehicle bearing Registration No. AAK-478, Suzuki Cultus, though standing in husband’s name, was acquired with her financial contribution including initial seed money---Held, such asset required consideration not merely as dowry but as matrimonial property---Though under existing Pakistani law a wife does not automatically acquire ownership in husband’s assets merely by marriage, proprietary interest may still be established through proof of contribution, partnership, trust, gift or joint acquisition---Non-financial contributions such as homemaking, childcare and domestic management possess economic significance and can justify recognition of beneficial interest in assets accumulated during marriage---Marriage operates as a cooperative partnership and there should be no bias in favour of sole titled money-earner against homemaker or child-carer. (f) Islamic law---Marriage and property rights---Separate ownership of spouses---Legislative competence to protect women’s matrimonial rights---Held, under classical Islamic jurisprudence husband and wife remain distinct legal persons with separate property rights; wife retains control over her own property and does not, by marriage alone, become owner of husband’s property, nor does husband acquire wife’s property automatically---However, Islamic law does not prohibit legislation for protection of women in respect of matrimonial property where justice and prevention of hardship so require---Concepts of mut‘at al-talaq, maslahah, ijtihad and compensation for women’s contribution provide room for development of protective legal norms---Silence of classical law on community or matrimonial property does not bar modern legislation safeguarding women from post-divorce destitution and exploitation. (g) Comparative jurisprudence---Recognition of marital partnership and non-financial contribution---Held, in a number of jurisdictions including Malaysia, Indonesia, Iran, Egypt, Turkey, Jordan, Syria, Libya, Brunei, United Kingdom, United States and Canada, courts and legislation recognize direct and indirect contributions of spouses in distribution of matrimonial assets---Homemaking and childcare are treated as contributions of equal worth to financial input in appropriate cases---Principles of constructive trust, unjust enrichment, equitable distribution and community property regimes demonstrate a broader modern trend that marriage is an economic partnership and domestic contribution materially aids acquisition and preservation of wealth---Such comparative experience may legitimately guide development of family law principles in Pakistan. (h) Women’s rights---Constitutional protection---International obligations---CEDAW---Held, Pakistan, having ratified the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), is under an obligation to reconsider its legal framework so as to eliminate discrimination against women in matters concerning ownership, acquisition, management and disposition of property, including consequences of dissolution of marriage---Equal protection of women, particularly homemakers and working wives, requires meaningful legal and policy safeguards in respect of assets acquired during marriage. (i) Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199---Writ jurisdiction---Limits on enhancement of relief---Held, High Court in constitutional jurisdiction does not ordinarily reappraise evidence to enhance relief granted by trial court---Although appellate court had erred in law and fact by denying wife’s rights altogether, High Court could not itself enhance trial court’s award from 30% to a higher quantified share on writ side---Proper course was to set aside both judgments and remand matter to Family Court for fresh decision after hearing parties and applying correct legal principles. (j) Recommendations/observations---Legislative reform---Nikahnama---Protection of wife’s property rights---High Court observed that every wife who cohabits with husband during subsistence of marriage should be deemed to have contributed, through domestic labour, childcare and household management, to establishment and maintenance of matrimonial home and family welfare---Recommended that Government initiate comprehensive legislation for equitable distribution of assets acquired during marriage, with enhanced protection for working wives and recognition of homemaker’s contribution---Further observed that Nikahnama may be amended, or appropriate condition inserted in existing form, to record agreement regarding equal division of property acquired after marriage, so as to better protect matrimonial property rights of women. Petition was allowed, judgments and decrees of Family Court and Appellate Court were set aside, and matter was remanded to Family Court for fresh decision after hearing parties, to be decided within two months.

Summary: (a) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)---- ----Specific performance of agreement to sell---Discretionary and equitable relief---Continuous readiness and willingness---Petitions arose out of three interconnected civil proceedings concerning same immovable property and two competing agreements to sell dated 16.04.2014 and 03.06.2016---Supreme Court held that relief of specific performance, though statutorily recognized, was not granted as a matter of right but rested in equity and judicial discretion---Person seeking such relief was required to plead and prove that he had been continuously ready and willing to perform his part of the contract---Readiness and willingness was not a mere formal requirement but foundational to equitable relief, as the Court could not compel performance of reciprocal obligations unless satisfied that the claimant himself had adhered to the discipline of the contract---Held, plaintiff seeking specific performance must establish continuous readiness and willingness through pleadings, conduct and reliable evidence, failing which the foundation for equitable relief becomes unsustainable. Cited Cases: • Messrs DW Pakistan (Private) Limited, Lahore v. Begum Anisa Fazl-I-Mahmood and others 2023 SCMR 555 • Ijaz Ul Haq v. Mrs. Maroof Begum Ahmed and others PLD 2023 SC 653 • Muhammad Yaqub v. Muhammad Nasrullah Khan and others PLD 1986 SC 497 • Narinjan v. Muhammad Yunus AIR 1932 Lah 265 (b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---- ----First Sched., Appendix “A”, Form 47---Suit for specific performance---Pleading readiness and willingness---Requirement not an empty technicality---Supreme Court held that plaint in a suit for specific performance must conform to Form 47 of Appendix “A” to the First Schedule of C.P.C. and must contain a clear assertion that plaintiff “has been and still is ready and willing specifically to perform the agreement” on his part---Plaintiff must plead readiness and willingness in clear and specific terms and then prove the same by convincing evidence---Readiness must relate to contract as actually executed, including timelines and conditions, and must continue from inception of obligation until institution of suit---In the present case, plaint did not contain the categorical averment mandated by Form 47 and absence of clear continuous assertion weakened the very foundation of the claim for specific performance. Cited Cases: • Messrs DW Pakistan (Private) Limited, Lahore v. Begum Anisa Fazl-I-Mahmood and others 2023 SCMR 555 • Ijaz Ul Haq v. Mrs. Maroof Begum Ahmed and others PLD 2023 SC 653 • Muhammad Yaqub v. Muhammad Nasrullah Khan and others PLD 1986 SC 497 (c) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)---- ----Specific performance of agreement to sell---Balance sale consideration---Tender, deposit or proof of financial capacity---Buyer’s primary obligation---Supreme Court held that in a contract for sale of immovable property the vendee’s core reciprocal obligation is payment of balance sale consideration---Readiness and willingness cannot be established in abstraction or by mere assertion; it must be reflected through objective acts showing financial capacity and preparedness to perform---Preparation of pay order, cashier cheque, segregation of funds, bank guarantee, bank statement, or prompt deposit in Court are evidentiary indicators of bona fide readiness---Though deposit of sale consideration at the time of filing suit is not an inflexible statutory precondition, failure to tender or otherwise demonstrate availability of funds materially affects the plaintiff’s claim---Where no credible material shows that buyer secured or tendered consideration in terms of agreement, Court may draw adverse inference regarding bona fides. Cited Cases: • Nazar Hussain and another v. Syed Iqbal Ahmad Qadri 2022 SCMR 1216 • Inayatullah Khan and others v. Shabir Ahmad Khan 2021 SCMR 686 • Muhammad Yousaf v. Allah Ditta and others 2021 SCMR 1241 • Mst. Noor Jehan and another v. Saleem Shahadat 2022 SCMR 918 • Muhammad Jamil and others v. Muhammad Arif 2021 SCMR 1108 • Hamood Mehmood v. Mst. Shabana Ishaque and others 2017 SCMR 2022 • Muhammad Shafiq Ullah and others v. Allah Bakhsh through LRs 2021 SCMR 763 (d) Contract Act (IX of 1872)---- ----S. 51---Reciprocal promises---Agreement to sell immovable property---Vendor’s obligation to execute sale deed dependent upon vendee’s readiness to pay balance sale consideration---Supreme Court held that obligations of vendor and vendee in sale of immovable property are ordinarily reciprocal and interdependent---Vendor cannot be compelled to execute and register sale deed unless vendee first establishes through pleadings and proof that he was ready and willing to perform his corresponding obligation to pay balance sale consideration---Court while exercising jurisdiction in suit for specific performance must examine mutuality of obligations and determine whether claimant has satisfied pre-requisite of demonstrating his own readiness to perform. Cited Case: • Mst. Samina Riffat and others v. Rohail Asghar and others 2021 SCMR 7 (e) Contract Act (IX of 1872) / Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)---- ----Time as essence of contract---Sale of immovable property---Express contractual stipulation---Effect---Although time is not ordinarily treated as essence in transactions of immovable property, parties are competent to expressly stipulate otherwise---Where agreement prescribes definite time for payment and provides consequence for default, Court must give effect to contractual terms settled between parties---Equitable jurisdiction of Court does not extend to rewriting bargain or diluting express stipulations relating to timelines and forfeiture---In present case, agreement dated 03.06.2016 specifically required balance sale consideration to be paid on or before 15.01.2017; obligation was neither contingent nor deferred but formed core reciprocal promise of vendees---No tender of balance amount was made within stipulated time, no pay order, bank guarantee, bank statement or segregated funds were shown, and no immediate deposit was made in Court upon institution of suit---Deposit made only after Court direction and substantially beyond contractual deadline could not retrospectively cure absence of readiness and willingness at material time. Cited Cases: • Fazal Ur Rehman v. Ahmed Saeed Mughal and others 2004 SCMR 436 • Muhammad Jamil v. Muhammad Arif 2021 SCMR 1108 (f) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)---- ----Specific performance---Belated deposit of balance consideration---Effect---Courts below treated subsequent deposit of balance sale consideration, made pursuant to Court direction after expiry of stipulated period, as sufficient to cure earlier default---Supreme Court held that such approach was contrary to settled principles---Jurisprudence did not equate belated compliance with continuous readiness and willingness---Court was required to examine whether plaintiff had secured, tendered or demonstrated availability of consideration on the due date fixed by contract and whether such readiness continued thereafter without interruption---Failure to conduct such inquiry amounted to overlooking a material legal requirement governing grant of specific performance---Record did not satisfactorily establish that respondents fulfilled essential precondition of continuous readiness and willingness; therefore decree for specific performance could not be sustained. (g) Administration of justice---- ----Concurrent findings of fact---Interference by Supreme Court---Misreading/non-reading of evidence and violation of settled principles---Although concurrent findings are not ordinarily disturbed, interference is warranted where findings result from misreading or non-reading of material evidence or are contrary to settled principles governing equitable relief---Courts below failed to properly examine absence of timely tender, absence of financial proof, absence of immediate deposit in Court, defective pleadings under Form 47 C.P.C., and contractual stipulation making time material for payment---Concurrent judgments therefore could not be maintained. Cited Cases: • Habib Ur Rehman and others v. Abdul Karim through LRs 2025 SCMR 1262 • United Bank Limited through its President and others v. Jamil Ahmed and others 2024 SCMR 164 / 2024 PLC 50 SC • Muhammad Nawaz alias Nawaza and others v. Member Judicial Board of Revenue and others 2014 SCMR 914 • Abdul Hameed and others v. Khalid and others 2007 SCMR 938 • Mst. Saadat Sultan and others v. Muhammad Zahur Khan and others 2006 SCMR 193 • Muhammad Aslam v. Mst. Ferozi and others PLD 2001 SC 213 • Muhammad Akhtar v. Mst. Manna and 3 others 2001 SCMR 1700 (h) Specific performance---- ----Earlier agreement dated 16.04.2014---Agreement already cancelled by competent Court---Finality of judgment---No decree for specific performance sustainable---Petitioner Muhammad Imran sought possession through specific performance of agreement dated 16.04.2014---Courts below dismissed his suit, appeal and Regular Second Appeal---Supreme Court held that agreement sought to be specifically performed had already been cancelled by Court of competent jurisdiction due to non-payment of balance sale consideration within stipulated time, in terms of contractual conditions---Such determination was not assailed further and had attained finality---No decree for specific performance could legally be sustained on basis of such cancelled agreement---Petition was devoid of merit and leave was refused. Disposition: Petitions for leave to appeal in C.P.L.A. Nos. 3649 and 3650 of 2025 were converted into appeals and allowed; impugned judgments of courts below were set aside; suit for specific performance filed by respondents No.3 and 4 on basis of agreement dated 03.06.2016 was dismissed; suit for cancellation of agreement filed by petitioners/respondents was decreed; suit instituted by Muhammad Imran in C.P.L.A. No.3639 of 2025 for specific performance on basis of agreement dated 16.04.2014 was dismissed and leave refused; earnest money paid under agreements dated 16.04.2014 and 03.06.2016 was ordered to be returned by respective recipients to concerned payers within thirty days from date of judgment.

Summary: Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Initial Appointment to Civil Posts (Relaxation of Upper Age Limit) Rules, 2008--- ----Rr. 3(i), Table, Serial No.(ii) & (iii) & 4, proviso---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 175F(1)(c)---Initial appointment---Upper age limit---Relaxation---Backward area---Petitioner / authority was aggrieved of judgment passed by High Court declaring respondent / candidate as entitled to relaxation of upper age limit for her appointment to post in question---Validity---Only hurdle/objection in appointment of respondent / candidate was that she was over age---Respondent / candidate hailed from District Buner, and as per Serial No.xiv of Appendix to Rule 3(ii) of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Initial Appointment to Civil Posts (Relaxation of Upper Age Limit) Rules, 2008, the area was in the category of “backward areas”---Besides three years automatic relaxation under category (ii) specified in Rule 3(i) of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Initial Appointment to Civil Posts (Relaxation of Upper Age Limit) Rules, 2008, respondent / candidate was also entitled to relaxation in upper age limit upto two years by appointing authority under Serial No.iii of Table of Rule 3(i) of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Initial Appointment to Civil Posts (Relaxation of Upper Age Limit) Rules, 2008---Case of respondent / candidate was also covered under the category of “general candidates”, as stipulated in proviso to Rule 4 Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Initial Appointment to Civil Posts (Relaxation of Upper Age Limit) Rules, 2008---Federal Constitutional Court declined to interfere in judgment passed by High Court as there was no illegality, irregularity or infirmity and respondent / candidate was entitled to relaxation in upper age limit---Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused. Muzammil Khan, Additional Advocate General, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa for Petitioners. Mushtaq Ahmad Khan Alizai, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent. Date of hearing: 25th February, 2026.

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---- ----O. XLI, Rr. 11, 12, 16 & 17---Appeal dismissed for non-prosecution---Appeal not fixed for hearing but for procuring attendance/service of respondent---Effect---Regular Second Appeal filed by petitioners was dismissed for non-prosecution on 26.10.2022---Record showed that on previous date, appeal had been adjourned for submission of correct address of respondent and for issuance of notice parvee, as respondent had reportedly shifted residence---Supreme Court held that on 26.10.2022 appeal was not fixed for hearing, rather it was fixed for procuring attendance of respondent by issuance of notice---High Court, in such circumstances, ought not to have dismissed appeal for non-prosecution, but should have passed an order in relation to service/proceedings for procuring attendance---Order XLI, Rule 17(1), C.P.C. applies where appeal is called on for hearing and appellant fails to appear; where appeal is not fixed for hearing, dismissal in default under said provision is not justified. Cited Cases: • Tehsil Municipal Administrator, Faisalabad v. Muhammad Saleem and others 2016 SCMR 2009 • Manager, Jammu & Kashmir State Property in Pakistan v. Khuda Yar and another PLD 1975 SC 678 (b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---- ----O. XLI, Rr. 11 to 17---Expression “called on for hearing”---Meaning---Service of respondent and completion of earlier procedural steps---Supreme Court held that expression “called on for hearing” in Order XLI, Rule 17 presupposes completion of earlier steps envisaged by Rules 11 to 16 of Order XLI, C.P.C.---After appeal crosses preliminary hearing stage under Rule 11, appeal cannot be heard and decided without service of respondent or his counsel---Effective hearing of appeal means a date on which arguments are to be heard, which presupposes service of parties---Court must first ascertain whether respondent has been duly served before treating matter as one fixed for hearing---Where respondent had not yet been served and matter was pending for issuance of notice or correction of address, appeal could not be treated as having been called on for hearing for purposes of dismissal under Order XLI, Rule 17, C.P.C. Cited Case: • Manager, Jammu & Kashmir State Property in Pakistan v. Khuda Yar and another PLD 1975 SC 678 (c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---- ----O. XLI, R. 17---Dismissal of appeal for non-appearance of appellant---Discretionary power---Mechanical dismissal deprecated---Supreme Court reiterated that under Order XLI, Rule 17, C.P.C., Court “may” dismiss appeal for non-appearance of appellant when appeal is fixed for hearing, therefore power is discretionary and not mandatory---Court is not bound in every case to dismiss appeal in default and may adjourn matter to another date where circumstances so require---Dismissal of appeal without appreciating that appeal was not fixed for hearing and without considering discretionary nature of power amounted to mechanical exercise of jurisdiction---Such order could not be sustained. Cited Case: • Manager, Jammu & Kashmir State Property in Pakistan v. Khuda Yar and another PLD 1975 SC 678 (d) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)---- ----Arts. 168 & 181---Application for restoration/re-admission of appeal---Appeal not dismissed under Order XLI, Rule 17(1), C.P.C.---Applicable limitation---Article 168 provides thirty days for application seeking re-admission of appeal dismissed for non-prosecution under Order XLI, Rule 17(1), C.P.C.---Supreme Court held that since dismissal order dated 26.10.2022 could not be termed as an order passed under Order XLI, Rule 17(1), C.P.C., Article 168 was not attracted---In such circumstances, residuary Article 181 applied, providing limitation period of three years---Restoration application filed on 08.10.2024 was therefore within time---High Court erred in dismissing restoration application as barred by limitation. Cited Case: • Tehsil Municipal Administrator, Faisalabad v. Muhammad Saleem and others 2016 SCMR 2009 (e) Administration of justice---- ----Act of Court---Party should not suffer due to act of Court---Technicalities not to defeat merits---Supreme Court held that petitioners should not be made to suffer due to act of Court, particularly when appeal had been dismissed on a date not fixed for hearing---Mere technicalities, unless presenting insurmountable hurdles, should not defeat ends of justice, as legal formalities exist to safeguard paramount interest of justice---In circumstances, restoration of appeal for decision on merits was in interest of justice, subject to costs because petitioners’ conduct was also not aboveboard. Cited Cases: • Abdul Qudoos v. Commandant Frontier Constabulary, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Peshawar and another 2023 SCMR 334 • Sherin and 4 others v. Fazal Muhammad and 4 others 1995 SCMR 584 • The State v. Asif Adil and others 1997 SCMR 209 • Sajawal Khan v. Wali Muhammad and others 2002 SCMR 134 • Jawad Mir Muhammadi and others v. Haroon Mirza PLD 2007 SC 472 • Zulfiqar and others v. Shahadat Khan PLD 2007 SC 582 • Homeo Dr. Asma Noreen Syed v. Government of the Punjab through Secretary Health Department and others 2022 SCMR 1546 • Mian Shehzad-ud-Din and 4 others v. Member, Board of Revenue S&E Chief Settlement Commissioner, Board of Revenue, Punjab, Lahore and another 2002 YLR 3755 (f) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---- ----Restoration of Regular Second Appeal---Costs imposed to balance equities---Supreme Court found impugned order dismissing restoration application unsustainable---Regular Second Appeal was restored to its original number and deemed pending before Lahore High Court, Multan Bench, for decision afresh after hearing parties in accordance with law within one month from receipt of judgment---However, as petitioners’ conduct was not aboveboard, they were burdened with costs of Rs.50,000 to be paid to respondents before High Court on first date of hearing; in case of failure, High Court was empowered to pass appropriate order. Disposition: Civil Petition was converted into appeal and allowed; impugned order dated 03.11.2025 passed by Lahore High Court, Multan Bench, Multan was set aside; RSA No.50 of 2010 titled “Abdul Rehman, etc. v. Syed Jaffer Hussain (deceased) through L.Rs.” was restored/deemed pending before High Court for fresh decision after hearing parties within one month from receipt of judgment; petitioners were directed to pay costs of Rs.50,000 to respondents before High Court on first date of hearing, failing which High Court may pass appropriate order.

Summary: (a) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)--- ----Challenge to mutation---Suit filed after twenty-two years---Unexplained delay---Effect---Mutation No.684 was sanctioned on 15.03.1980, whereas suit challenging the same was instituted on 16.05.2002 after lapse of more than twenty-two years---Plaintiff remained silent during such prolonged period and took no steps to question validity of mutation or underlying transaction---No convincing or legally acceptable explanation was furnished for such inordinate delay---Held, that person who sleeps over his rights for decades cannot subsequently seek to unsettle long-standing entries in revenue record and disturb settled rights of parties---Suit was hopelessly barred by limitation. Cited Cases: • Muhammad Miskeen and others v. Noor Muhammad and others 2011 SCMR 808 • Muhammad Hussain and others v. Muhammad Shafi and others 2008 SCMR 230 • Ghulam Haider and others v. Wali Muhammad and others 2008 SCMR 1425 • Atta Muhammad v. Maula Bakhsh 2007 SCMR 1446 • Dr. Muhammad Javaid Shafi v. Syed Rashid Arshad and others PLD 2015 SC 212 • United Bank Limited and others v. Noor-Un-Nisa and others 2015 SCMR 380 • Lahore Development Authority v. Mst. Sharifan Bibi and another PLD 2010 SC 705 • Sardar Anwar Ali Khan and others v. Sardar Baqir Ali through Legal Heirs and others 1992 SCMR 2435 (b) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)--- ----S. 39---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Art. 91---Fraudulent document or transaction---Suit for declaration/cancellation---Limitation---Plaintiff attempted to avoid bar of limitation by alleging that mutation was procured through fraud and misrepresentation---Held, that although fraud vitiates solemn acts, allegation of fraud must be specifically pleaded and strictly proved through reliable evidence---Where a document or transaction is alleged to have been obtained through fraud or misrepresentation, matter falls within S.39 of Specific Relief Act, 1877 and suit seeking declaration or cancellation must be filed within limitation prescribed under Art.91 of Limitation Act, 1908, i.e. three years from date when alleged fraud comes to knowledge of plaintiff---Plea of fraud could not be invoked merely to circumvent law of limitation. Cited Cases: • Mst. Zulaikhan Bibi through LRs and others v. Mst. Roshan Jan and others 2011 SCMR 986 • Muhammad Younus Khan v. Government of N.-W.F.P. 1993 SCMR 618 • Dr. Muhammad Javaid Shafi v. Syed Rashid Arshad and others PLD 2015 SC 212 (c) Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984--- ----Fraud, forgery and misrepresentation---Burden of proof---Mutation challenged after long delay---Plaintiff alleged that mutation was result of fraud, forgery and misrepresentation and had been sanctioned without his consent or authority---Trial Court and First Appellate Court, after appraisal of oral and documentary evidence, concurrently held that plaintiff failed to prove fraud through independent evidence---Held, that bald allegations of fraud were insufficient---Fraud being a question of fact had to be established by reliable, convincing and cogent evidence---Plaintiff’s long silence for more than two decades further undermined credibility of allegation. (d) Revenue record--- ----Long-standing mutation entries---Laches, limitation and third-party rights---Effect---Mutation in question remained incorporated in revenue record for decades without challenge and third-party rights had also come into existence---Held, that long-standing entries in revenue record ought not to be unsettled lightly, particularly where they remained unquestioned for considerable period and rights accrued on their basis---Challenges to old mutation entries after prolonged inaction must be viewed with great circumspection and ordinarily ought not to be entertained. Cited Cases: • Waris Khan and 18 others v. Col. Humayun Shah and 41 others PLD 1994 SC 336 • Mst. Grana through legal heirs v. Sahib Kamala Bibi PLD 2014 SC 167 (e) Revenue record--- ----Mutation incorporated in Jamabandi---Presumption of correctness---Burden to rebut---Once mutation was sanctioned and incorporated into Jamabandi, it formed part of regular revenue record and carried statutory presumption of truth---Plaintiff failed to produce convincing evidence to rebut such presumption---Held, that presumption of regularity and correctness attached to revenue entries could not be lightly displaced---Courts below rightly gave due weight to revenue record and held that plaintiff failed to discharge heavy burden required to dislodge presumption attached thereto. Cited Cases: • Abdul Ahad and others v. Roshan Din and others PLD 1979 SC 890 • Ghulam Haider and others v. Wali Muhammad and others 2008 SCMR 1425 • Muhammad Hussain and others v. Muhammad Shafi and others 2008 SCMR 230 (f) Land Revenue Act--- ----Mutation proceedings---Procedural irregularity---Effect on otherwise established sale transaction---Plaintiff raised objections regarding procedure adopted in attestation of mutation---Held, that even if certain procedural irregularities existed in attestation of mutation, such irregularities by themselves would not invalidate an otherwise established transaction of sale---Where authenticity and genuineness of underlying sale transaction is established, mere irregularity in mutation procedure does not affect binding effect of mutation---Technical defects in mutation process cannot defeat substantive rights where transaction is proved by credible oral and documentary evidence. Cited Cases: • Muhammad Ishaq and others v. Ghafoor Khan and another 2000 SCMR 519 • Muhammad Afzal and others v. Province of Punjab 2001 SCMR 593 • Nawab Din v. Giani 2008 SCMR 657 (g) Revenue record--- ----Mutation entries---Nature and evidentiary value---Mutation entries by themselves do not create title, but where underlying transaction is proved through credible evidence, such entries may validly reflect transfer of rights---In the present case, subordinate Courts examined oral and documentary evidence and concurrently held that transaction reflected in mutation was genuine and plaintiff had failed to establish fraud or misrepresentation---Held, that procedural objections regarding mutation proceedings could not annul transaction or justify setting aside concurrent findings recorded by subordinate Courts. (h) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----S. 115---Revisional jurisdiction---Concurrent findings of fact---Scope of interference---Trial Court and First Appellate Court concurrently held that mutation reflected genuine sale transaction, fraud was not proved and suit was time-barred---High Court, in revision, reassessed evidence and substituted its own conclusions without identifying misreading, non-reading, perversity or material illegality in findings of Courts below---Held, that revisional jurisdiction is supervisory and does not convert High Court into a third Court of fact---Concurrent findings of fact cannot ordinarily be disturbed unless based on misreading or non-reading of evidence, or suffering from perversity, illegality or material irregularity affecting merits of case---High Court exceeded settled limits of revisional jurisdiction. Cited Cases: • Sultan Muhammad and another v. Muhammad Qasim and others 2010 SCMR 1630 • Mst. Tayyeba Ambareen and another v. Shafqat Ali Kiyani and another 2023 SCMR 246 • Nawab Din v. Giani 2008 SCMR 657 • Muhammad Ishaq and others v. Ghafoor Khan and another 2000 SCMR 519 • Mst. Zaitoon Begum v. Nazar Hussain and another 2014 SCMR 1469 • Cantonment Board through Executive Officer, Cantt. Board Rawalpindi v. Ikhlaq Ahmed and others 2014 SCMR 161 • Muhammad Farid Khan v. Muhammad Ibrahim etc. 2017 SCMR 679 • Muhammad Sarwar and others v. Hashmal Khan and others PLD 2022 SC 13 • Mst. Zarsheda v. Nobat Khan PLD 2022 SC 21 • Salamat Ali and others v. Muhammad Din and others PLJ 2023 SC 8 • Mst. Farzana Zia and others v. Mst. Saadia Andaleeb 2024 SCMR 916 (i) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----S. 115---Misreading, non-reading and misappreciation of evidence---Distinction---Scope of revisional Court---Held, that misreading or non-reading of evidence may justify revisional interference where finding is perverse, absurd, jurisdictionally defective or contrary to law---Mere misappreciation or possibility of another view does not permit revisional Court to substitute its own conclusion for concurrent findings of Courts below---If facts have been justly tried by two Courts and both reached same conclusion, High Court should not revisit evidence merely to draw another conclusion. (j) Civil suit--- ----Challenge to mutation---Solitary statement of plaintiff versus documentary proof---Effect---Plaintiff alleged that he did not visit Patwari’s office on date of mutation but produced no independent witness and remained confined to his solitary statement---Mutation No.684 and Exchange Mutation No.683 were entered and sanctioned on same day with same identifying witnesses, which negated plaintiff’s stance---Held, that solitary statement was insufficient to dislodge documentary proof and revenue record produced by defendants---Subordinate Courts correctly concluded that plaintiff failed to prove fraud, forgery or misrepresentation. (k) Civil suit--- ----Suit for declaration, mandatory injunction and permanent injunction---Challenge to mutation after twenty-two years---Concurrent dismissal by Trial Court and First Appellate Court---High Court decreeing suit in revision---Supreme Court interference---Held, that cumulative effect of record showed that suit was hopelessly barred by limitation; allegations of fraud, forgery and misrepresentation remained unsubstantiated; mutation incorporated in revenue record for decades carried presumption of correctness; third-party rights had intervened; and High Court transgressed limits of revisional jurisdiction by interfering with concurrent findings without showing misreading or non-reading of evidence---Impugned High Court judgment could not be sustained. Disposition: Appeals were allowed. Judgment dated 21.11.2019 passed by Islamabad High Court was set aside. Concurrent judgments and decrees of Trial Court dated 17.03.2017 and First Appellate Court dated 11.11.2017 were restored. Civil suit filed by respondent No.1 stood dismissed. Pending CMAs were disposed of as infructuous. No order as to costs.

Summary: (a) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)---- ----Challenge to mutation after twenty-two years---Unexplained delay---Suit for declaration, mandatory injunction and permanent injunction---Mutation No.684 was sanctioned on 15.03.1980, whereas respondent No.1 instituted suit on 16.05.2002 after lapse of more than twenty-two years alleging fraud, forgery and misrepresentation---Supreme Court held that unexplained delay in challenging a mutation renders the claim legally untenable---Respondent remained completely silent for more than two decades and took no step to question validity of mutation or underlying sale transaction---No convincing or legally acceptable explanation was furnished for such inordinate delay---A person who sleeps over his rights for decades cannot subsequently seek to unsettle long-standing entries in revenue record and disturb settled rights of parties---Law of limitation is designed to bring certainty and finality to legal relations and prevent reopening of stale claims---Suit was clearly and hopelessly barred by limitation. Cited Cases: • Muhammad Miskeen and others v. Noor Muhammad and others 2011 SCMR 808 • Muhammad Hussain and others v. Muhammad Shafi and others 2008 SCMR 230 • Ghulam Haider and others v. Wali Muhammad and others 2008 SCMR 1425 • Atta Muhammad v. Maula Bakhsh 2007 SCMR 1446 • Dr. Muhammad Javaid Shafi v. Syed Rashid Arshad and others PLD 2015 SC 212 • United Bank Limited and others v. Noor-Un-Nisa and others 2015 SCMR 380 • Lahore Development Authority v. Mst. Sharifan Bibi and another PLD 2010 SC 705 • Sardar Anwar Ali Khan and 10 others v. Sardar Baqir Ali through Legal Heirs and 4 others 1992 SCMR 2435 (b) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)---- ----S. 39---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Art. 91---Fraud alleged in respect of mutation/sale transaction---Fraud vitiates all solemn acts, but must be specifically pleaded and strictly proved---Supreme Court reiterated that fraud vitiates solemn acts and any instrument, deed, judgment or decree obtained through fraud is a nullity, but allegation of fraud cannot be accepted on mere assertion---Fraud must be specifically pleaded and strictly proved through reliable evidence---Question of fraud involves finding of fact regarding conduct of party concerned---Even where fraud is alleged in relation to an instrument or transaction, party challenging such instrument is required to seek cancellation within prescribed limitation period---Where document is alleged to have been obtained through fraud or misrepresentation, matter falls within S.39 of Specific Relief Act and suit seeking declaration/cancellation must be filed within three years under Art.91 of Limitation Act from date when alleged fraud comes to knowledge of plaintiff---Respondent failed to produce convincing evidence of fraud and remained silent for more than two decades; plea of fraud could not be used to circumvent law of limitation. Cited Cases: • Mst. Zulaikhan Bibi through LRs and others v. Mst. Roshan Jan and others 2011 SCMR 986 • Muhammad Younus Khan v. Government of N.-W.F.P. 1993 SCMR 618 • Dr. Muhammad Javaid Shafi v. Syed Rashid Arshad and others PLD 2015 SC 212 (c) Qanun-e-Shahadat Order (10 of 1984)---- ----Proof of fraud, forgery and misrepresentation---Independent and reliable evidence required---Respondent alleged that Mutation No.684 dated 15.03.1980 was procured through fraud, forgery and misrepresentation and without his consent or authority---Trial Court and First Appellate Court, after appraisal of oral and documentary evidence, held that respondent failed to prove fraud, forgery or misrepresentation through independent evidence---Supreme Court held that such allegations remained unsubstantiated and were rightly disbelieved by subordinate Courts---Mutation No.684 and Exchange Mutation No.683 were entered and sanctioned on same day and identifying witnesses were the same, which negatived respondent’s stance that he had not visited office of Patwari on relevant date---Respondent remained confined to his solitary statement and did not produce independent witnesses sufficient to dislodge documentary proof brought on record. (d) Revenue record---- ----Long-standing mutation entries---Presumption of correctness---Jamabandi---Revenue entries remaining unquestioned for decades---Supreme Court held that long-standing entries in revenue record ought not to be unsettled lightly, particularly where they have remained unquestioned for considerable period and rights have subsequently accrued on their basis---Once mutation is duly sanctioned and incorporated into Jamabandi, it forms part of regular revenue record and carries statutory presumption of truth unless rebutted by strong and cogent evidence---Mutation in question remained part of revenue record for more than two decades without challenge---Respondent produced no convincing evidence to rebut presumption attached to revenue entries---Courts below were justified in giving due weight to revenue record and holding that respondent failed to discharge heavy burden required to displace statutory presumption. Cited Cases: • Waris Khan and 18 others v. Col. Humayun Shah and 41 others PLD 1994 SC 336 • Mst. Grana through legal heirs v. Sahib Kamala Bibi PLD 2014 SC 167 • Abdul Ahad and others v. Roshan Din and others PLD 1979 SC 890 • Ghulam Haider and others v. Wali Muhammad and others 2008 SCMR 1425 • Muhammad Hussain and others v. Muhammad Shafi and others 2008 SCMR 230 (e) Mutation---- ----Procedural irregularity in attestation---Effect on proved sale transaction---Mutation entries do not themselves create title, but where underlying transaction is proved through credible evidence, technical defects in mutation proceedings cannot invalidate transaction---Supreme Court held that even if certain procedural irregularities in attestation of mutation were assumed, such irregularities by themselves would not invalidate an otherwise established transaction of sale---Subordinate Courts examined oral and documentary evidence and concurrently held that transaction reflected in mutation was genuine and respondent had failed to establish fraud or misrepresentation---Procedural objections regarding mutation proceedings could not annul transaction or justify setting aside concurrent findings. Cited Cases: • Muhammad Ishaq and others v. Ghafoor Khan and another 2000 SCMR 519 • Muhammad Afzal and others v. Province of Punjab 2001 SCMR 593 • Nawab Din v. Giani 2008 SCMR 657 (f) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---- ----S. 115---Revisional jurisdiction---Concurrent findings of fact---Scope of interference---Trial Court and First Appellate Court concurrently dismissed suit after proper appraisal of oral and documentary evidence, holding that sale transaction was genuine, fraud was not proved and suit was barred by limitation---Supreme Court held that concurrent findings of fact cannot ordinarily be disturbed in revisional jurisdiction unless shown to suffer from misreading or non-reading of evidence, perversity, illegality or material irregularity affecting merits---Revisional jurisdiction is supervisory and does not convert High Court into third court of fact---High Court reassessed evidence and substituted its own conclusions without identifying misreading, non-reading, material illegality or perversity in findings of subordinate Courts---Such approach was inconsistent with settled limits of revisional jurisdiction and amounted to impermissible interference with concurrent findings of fact. Cited Cases: • Sultan Muhammad and another v. Muhammad Qasim and others 2010 SCMR 1630 • Mst. Tayyeba Ambareen and another v. Shafqat Ali Kiyani and another 2023 SCMR 246 • Nawab Din v. Giani 2008 SCMR 657 • Muhammad Ishaq and others v. Ghafoor Khan and another 2000 SCMR 519 • Mst. Zaitoon Begum v. Nazar Hussain and another 2014 SCMR 1469 • Cantonment Board through Executive Officer, Cantt. Board Rawalpindi v. Ikhlaq Ahmed and others 2014 SCMR 161 • Muhammad Farid Khan v. Muhammad Ibrahim, etc. 2017 SCMR 679 • Muhammad Sarwar and others v. Hashmal Khan and others PLD 2022 SC 13 • Mst. Zarsheda v. Nobat Khan PLD 2022 SC 21 • Salamat Ali and others v. Muhammad Din and others PLJ 2023 SC 8 • Mst. Farzana Zia and others v. Mst. Saadia Andaleeb 2024 SCMR 916 (g) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---- ----S. 115---Difference between misreading/non-reading and misappreciation of evidence---High Court’s limits in revision---Supreme Court reiterated that scope of appellate and revisional jurisdiction must not be confused---Revisional Court cannot upset finding of fact merely because another view appears more plausible---Interference is permissible only where finding is result of misreading, non-reading, perverse or absurd appraisal of material evidence, jurisdictional error, illegality or serious miscarriage of justice---If facts have been justly tried by two Courts and same conclusion has been reached concurrently, revisiting evidence in second appeal or revision to draw another conclusion would offend doctrine of finality---High Court cannot independently reassess evidence to supplant its own conclusion unless findings below are legally flawed. Cited Cases: • Sultan Muhammad and another v. Muhammad Qasim and others 2010 SCMR 1630 • Salamat Ali and others v. Muhammad Din and others PLJ 2023 SC 8 • Mst. Farzana Zia and others v. Mst. Saadia Andaleeb 2024 SCMR 916 (h) Revenue record / Limitation---- ----Third-party rights and finality of long-standing entries---Mutation remaining incorporated for decades---Effect---Supreme Court held that where revenue entries have remained unchallenged for prolonged period and third-party rights have intervened, challenges to such entries must be viewed with great circumspection and ordinarily ought not to be entertained---In present case, during long interregnum of over twenty-two years, third-party rights had come into existence, further strengthening need to uphold sanctity and finality of long-standing revenue entries---Belated suit challenging mutation could not be permitted to unsettle settled rights. Disposition: Appeals were allowed; judgment dated 21.11.2019 passed by Islamabad High Court in Civil Revision No.410 of 2017 was set aside; concurrent judgments and decrees of Trial Court dated 17.03.2017 and First Appellate Court dated 11.11.2017 were restored; civil suit filed by respondent No.1 was dismissed; no order as to costs; connected CMAs No.12138 and 12580 of 2019 and CMA No.2581 of 2022 were disposed of as infructuous.

Summary: (a) Divorce Act (IV of 1869) - The Queen v. Leresche and another 1891 QB 2418; Azhar Abbas Haideri v. Government of the Punjab and others PLD 2022 Lah. 278 and PLD 2026 SC 53 ref. (b) Administration of justice- -The expectation that the judiciary must act to eliminate any form of injustice serves as a cornerstone of trust in the legal system-It is this ability to priorities substantial justice over mere technical compliance that fortifies the integrity and efficacy of our legal processes. Province of Punjab through the District Collector, Bhakkar v. Muhammad Chiragh and others PLD 2026 SC 53 rel. (c) Divorce Act (IV of 1869)- -Ss.10 & 22-Dissolution of marriage between Christian spouses-Scope-The bond of Christian marriage is treated as a solemn and enduring civil status, and its dissolution is not to be granted lightly-There exists no concept analogous to dissolution at will; relief is conditioned upon strict proof of statutory grounds. Mst. Parveen Amanual v. ADJI and 2 others PLD 2009 Lah. 213 ref. (d) Divorce Act (IV of 1869)- -S.10-Dissolution of marriage-Statutory grounds-Proof-Requirement-Unless and until anyone of the grounds is not proved, marriage cannot be dissolved, meaning thereby, to get the dissolution of marriage, the party is required to allege and prove the allegation of adultery. Saima v. Additional District Judge PLD 2022 Lahore 214 and Mushtaq v. Mst. Fareeda 1979 CLC 457 ref. (e) Divorce Act (IV of 1869)- -Ss.10 & 22-Dissolution of Christian marriage-Desertion-Concept and essential ingredients-Desertion is not a mere physical separation, it consists of certain essential constituent elements, namely: i. the factum desired: the fact of separation; ii. the animus deserendi: the intention to permanently abandon the matrimonial union; iii. absence of consent of the other spouse; iv. absence of reasonable cause for such withdrawal; and v. the completion of the statutory period of desertion as required under the law-The concept may manifest either as actual desertion or constructive desertion, depending upon whether the abandonment arises from physical departure or from conduct rendering cohabitation impossible. (f) Constitution of Pakistan- -Art.199-Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court-Scope-In exercise of its constitutional jurisdiction under Art.199 of the Constitution, High Court can review the judgments to ensure that the lower courts acted in accordance with law and properly considered the evidence before them-However, High Court cannot assume the functions of a civil court to re-examine evidence or to pass a decree in favor of either party-The primary responsibility for determining the facts and granting relief rests with the Civil Court, which is empowered to adjudicate disputes based on the evidence and material placed before it-High Court under its discretionary writ jurisdiction under Art.199 of the Constitution, is neither an appellate forum nor a vehicle for re-appraisal of evidence meticulously recorded by the forums below-The Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court is not designed to undertake a roving exercise of re-evaluating factual findings or to substitute its own opinion for that of the Family Court and the Appellate Authority, who are the primary fact-finding tribunals entrusted with the appreciation of evidence-While the High Court retains the power to interfere where orders are suffering from jurisdictional defects, patent illegality, non-consideration of material evidence, or where the forums below have acted in violation of the law declared by the superior courts, it cannot embark upon a de-novo assessment of the evidence as if sitting in regular appeal-However, where the impugned judgment demonstrably overlooks crucial admissions and fails to apply settled legal principles, the appropriate remedy is not for the High Court to re-adjudicate the factual matrix itself, but to remand the matter for fresh determination in accordance with law. Shahbaz v. Fakhira Bibi 2021 MLD 1506; Tariq Javed v. Mst. Tahira Bibi and 2 others 2006 MLD 1956 and Tahir Umar v. Messrs Bata Shoe (Pakistan) Limited through Managing Director and 3 others 1991 MLD 1236 ref. (g) Constitution of Pakistan- -Art.20-Freedom to profess religion and to manage religious institutions-Constitutional guarantee-Scope-Article 20 of the Constitution has been interpreted as a broad guarantee of equal religious freedom for all citizens; Muslims and non-Muslims alike-Article 20 ensures both individual and collective rights of conscience, protecting citizens not only from interference by other religious groups but also from coercion within their own faith communities. PLD 2014 Supreme Court 699 rel. (h) Constitution of Pakistan- -Arts.4 & 10-A-Fair trial and due process, right of-Procedural compliance-Constitutional obligation of the Courts-Scope-After insertion of Art.10-A of the Constitution in the list of fundamental rights, it has become obligatory upon the Court to adhere to the procedural steps and to avoid from doing anything which caused prejudice to the rights of the parties-Article 10-A of the Constitution provides right of fair trial and due process for determination of rights and obligations-It is also pertinent to mention here that Art.4 of the Constitution clearly states that it is inalienable right of every citizen to be treated in accordance with law and no action detrimental to the reputation, life, and liberty shall be taken except as per law. Taj Wali Shah v. Bakhti Zaman 2019 SCMR 84 and Syed Tahir Hussain Mehmoodi and others v. Agha Syed Liaqat Ali and others 2014 SCMR 637 rel. Dates of hearing: 9th and 23rd February of 2026.

Summary: ----Ss.3(9), 10, 11 & 22---Constitution of Pakistan, Arts.10-A, 14, 20 & 199---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XX, Rr.1 & 6---Constitutional petition---Judicial separation/dissolution of marriage between Christian spouses---Scope and evidentiary discipline---Petitioner contracted Christian marriage and sought dissolution---Concurrent judgments dismissing petitioner’s petition for failing to prove allegation of adultery, challenge to---Legality---Courts below failing to evaluate other statutory grounds such as cruelty and desertion---Effect---Brief facts of the matter were that the petitioner/husband and respondent No.3/wife, both Christians by faith, contracted marriage; the petitioner initially filed a petition for dissolution/judicial separation under the (Christian) Divorce Act, 1869 before the Civil Court, which was dismissed and the appeal thereagainst was later withdrawn with permission to file afresh; he subsequently instituted a fresh petition under Ss. 7 & 10 of the Act, 1869 which was dismissed and the dismissal was maintained by the District Court; aggrieved, the petitioner invoked the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court challenging the concurrent findings of the courts below---Pivotal questions for determination were as to “whether the allegations of adultery and cruelty had been adjudicated after strict compliance with the evidentiary discipline required under the C.P.C. read with Ss. 10 & 12 of the Act, 1869?”; and “whether the plea of desertion was legally available on the facts and properly examined by the Courts below?”---Held: Impugned judgments were passed without fully considering the evidence, which amounted to non-compliance of the requirements of O.XX, Rr. 1 & 6 of the C.P.C.---To discuss or elaborate reliance upon an allegation of adultery in the absence of cogent and legally admissible evidence was not only contrary to the procedural mandate of the C.P.C. and the statutory safeguards of the Act, 1869 but also implicated the constitutional guarantee of dignity under Art.14 of the Constitution---Since it was admitted that the parties had been living apart, it became apparent that the constituent elements of desertion were not examined by the Courts below while framing issues---The matter therefore had to be remanded for proper framing of issues---The right of Christian citizens to seek dissolution or judicial separation through Civil Courts was a manifestation of their freedom to profess, practice and manage matters arising out of their religious law---In the present case, the courts below failed to examine the petitioner’s claim in the light of this constitutional mandate, as neither the ground of cruelty nor the admitted state of separation was analyzed within the statutory framework of Ss. 10 & 22 of the Act, 1869---Such omission constituted non-compliance of the procedural discipline of law and also infringed the petitioner’s right to fair trial and due process secured under Art.10-A, read with Art.4 of the Constitution---Concurrent judgments and decrees of the courts below were set aside---Matter was remanded to Trail Court for fresh adjudication---Constitutional petition was allowed, in circumstances. The Queen v. Leresche and another 1891 QB 2418; Azhar Abbas Haideri v. Government of the Punjab and others PLD 2022 Lah. 278 and PLD 2026 SC 53 ref. (b) Administration of justice--- ----The expectation that the judiciary must act to eliminate any form of injustice serves as a cornerstone of trust in the legal system---It is this ability to priorities substantial justice over mere technical compliance that fortifies the integrity and efficacy of our legal processes. Province of Punjab through the District Collector, Bhakkar v. Muhammad Chiragh and others PLD 2026 SC 53 rel. (c) Divorce Act (IV of 1869)--- ----Ss.10 & 22---Dissolution of marriage between Christian spouses---Scope---The bond of Christian marriage is treated as a solemn and enduring civil status, and its dissolution is not to be granted lightly---There exists no concept analogous to dissolution at will; relief is conditioned upon strict proof of statutory grounds. Mst. Parveen Amanual v. ADJ I and 2 others PLD 2009 Lah. 213 ref. (d) Divorce Act (IV of 1869)--- ----S.10---Dissolution of marriage---Statutory grounds---Proof---Requirement---Unless and until anyone of the grounds is not proved, marriage cannot be dissolved, meaning thereby, to get the dissolution of marriage, the party is required to allege and prove the allegation of adultery. Saima v. Additional District Judge PLD 2022 Lahore 214 and Mushtaq v. Mst. Fareeda 1979 CLC 457 ref. (e) Divorce Act (IV of 1869)--- ----Ss.10 & 22---Dissolution of Christian marriage---Desertion---Concept and essential ingredients---Desertion is not a mere physical separation, it consists of certain essential constituent elements, namely: i. the factum desired: the fact of separation; ii. the animus deserendi: the intention to permanently abandon the matrimonial union; iii. absence of consent of the other spouse; iv. absence of reasonable cause for such withdrawal; and v. the completion of the statutory period of desertion as required under the law---The concept may manifest either as actual desertion or constructive desertion, depending upon whether the abandonment arises from physical departure or from conduct rendering cohabitation impossible. (f) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art.199---Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court---Scope---In exercise of its constitutional jurisdiction under Art.199 of the Constitution, High Court can review the judgments to ensure that the lower courts acted in accordance with law and properly considered the evidence before them---However, High Court cannot assume the functions of a civil court to re-examine evidence or to pass a decree in favor of either party---The primary responsibility for determining the facts and granting relief rests with the Civil Court, which is empowered to adjudicate disputes based on the evidence and material placed before it---High Court under its discretionary writ jurisdiction under Art.199 of the Constitution, is neither an appellate forum nor a vehicle for re-appraisal of evidence meticulously recorded by the forums below---The Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court is not designed to undertake a roving exercise of re-evaluating factual findings or to substitute its own opinion for that of the Family Court and the Appellate Authority, who are the primary fact-finding tribunals entrusted with the appreciation of evidence---While the High Court retains the power to interfere where orders are suffering from jurisdictional defects, patent illegality, non-consideration of material evidence, or where the forums below have acted in violation of the law declared by the superior courts, it cannot embark upon a de-novo assessment of the evidence as if sitting in regular appeal---However, where the impugned judgment demonstrably overlooks crucial admissions and fails to apply settled legal principles, the appropriate remedy is not for the High Court to re-adjudicate the factual matrix itself, but to remand the matter for fresh determination in accordance with law. Shahbaz v. Fakhira Bibi 2021 MLD 1506; Tariq Javed v. Mst. Tahira Bibi and 2 others 2006 MLD 1956 and Tahir Umar v. Messrs Bata Shoe (Pakistan) Limited through Managing Director and 3 others 1991 MLD 1236 ref. (g) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art.20---Freedom to profess religion and to manage religious institutions---Constitutional guarantee---Scope---Article 20 of the Constitution has been interpreted as a broad guarantee of equal religious freedom for all citizens; Muslims and non-Muslims alike---Article 20 ensures both individual and collective rights of conscience, protecting citizens not only from interference by other religious groups but also from coercion within their own faith communities. PLD 2014 Supreme Court 699 rel. (h) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Arts.4 & 10-A---Fair trial and due process, right of---Procedural compliance---Constitutional obligation of the Courts---Scope---After insertion of Art.10-A of the Constitution in the list of fundamental rights, it has become obligatory upon the Court to adhere to the procedural steps and to avoid from doing anything which caused prejudice to the rights of the parties---Article 10-A of the Constitution provides right of fair trial and due process for determination of rights and obligations---It is also pertinent to mention here that Art.4 of the Constitution clearly states that it is inalienable right of every citizen to be treated in accordance with law and no action detrimental to the reputation, life, and liberty shall be taken except as per law. Taj Wali Shah v. Bakhti Zaman 2019 SCMR 84 and Syed Tahir Hussain Mehmoodi and others v. Agha Syed Liaqat Ali and others 2014 SCMR 637 rel. Muhammad Ahsan Khan and Mudassar Hassan for Petitioner. Muhammad Musarrat Nawaz Khan and Syed Haider Ali Shah for Respondents. Barrister Zain Mansoor, Assistant Attorney General, assisted by: Ms. Areej Omar Ramay for Respondents. Dates of hearing: 9th and 23rd February of 2026.