Summary: Whether Civil Court was vested with the jurisdiction in terms of Section 9 of the C.P.C. to entertain and try the suit challenging the consolidation scheme and the orders passed by the consolidation officers ---- (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----S.9---Jurisdiction of Civil Court---General principle---Civil Courts were Courts of ultimate jurisdiction and ordinarily competent to try all suits of civil nature unless cognizance was expressly or impliedly barred or matter was governed by a general or special law---Where a statute entrusted determination of a particular matter to a designated authority and expressly excluded jurisdiction of Civil Court, parties were required to pursue remedies provided under such statute---Civil Court could not entertain an ordinary suit in disregard of statutory forum merely because civil rights were asserted. (b) Punjab/Sindh/NWFP/Balochistan Consolidation of Holdings Ordinance, 1960----S.26---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S.9---Consolidation proceedings---Challenge to consolidation scheme and orders of consolidation authorities---Jurisdiction of Civil Court---Section 26 expressly barred Civil Court from entertaining any suit or application seeking decision or order regarding a matter which Government, Board of Revenue or any officer was empowered under Ordinance to determine, decide or dispose of---Suit challenging consolidation scheme and orders passed by consolidation officers was therefore not maintainable before Civil Court. Cited Cases: • Muhammad Ajmal and others v. Province of Punjab and others 2008 SCMR 1431 • Gul Meer and others v. Hassan Basri and others 2007 SCMR 1266 • Muhammad Ali v. Nawab Din and others PLJ 2020 Lahore Note 85 (c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----S.9, as amended by Act XIV of 2018---Jurisdiction of Civil Court---General or special law in force---Effect of amendment---Amendment introduced a radical and material change by extending exclusion of Civil Court’s jurisdiction to suits for which a general or special law was in force---Earlier limited space for invoking civil jurisdiction on allegations of fraud or mala fides stood substantially narrowed where special statute provided complete mechanism and forum for adjudication---Plaintiffs could not circumvent statutory scheme by merely describing consolidation proceedings as fraudulent. (d) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----S.9---Bar of jurisdiction---Fraud, mala fides, coram non judice or void action---Scope---Even where statutory bar existed, Civil Court could in an appropriate case examine an act alleged to be mala fide, coram non judice or void---Such jurisdiction, however, was exceptional and could not be invoked as a routine substitute for remedies available under special law---Party was ordinarily required first to exhaust statutory remedies before approaching Civil Court. (e) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----O.XIV, R.2---Question of jurisdiction---Duty of Court---Issue relating to jurisdiction was foundational and obligatory and was required to be determined at earliest stage---Trial Court framed issue regarding maintainability but failed to decide it properly---Appellate Court was justified in examining jurisdiction and setting aside decree passed by Court lacking lawful authority---Judgment rendered without jurisdiction was coram non judice. Cited Cases: • Zahid Zaman Khan and others v. Khan Afsar and others PLD 2016 SC 409 • Messrs Muslim Commercial Bank Limited v. Tahir Edible Oil (Pvt.) Ltd. and others 2003 CLC 416 (f) Jurisdiction---Ground not specifically urged before Trial Court---Appellate Court’s power---Jurisdiction could be examined by Court at any stage because lawful assumption of jurisdiction was condition precedent to valid adjudication---Appellate Court did not act illegally by deciding jurisdictional question even if applicants asserted that particular ground had not been raised in that form before it. (g) Punjab/Sindh/NWFP/Balochistan Consolidation of Holdings Ordinance, 1960----Statutory appellate authority---Refusal to exercise jurisdiction---Effect upon Civil Court’s jurisdiction---Additional Deputy Commissioner (Revenue)/Collector Consolidation dismissed statutory appeal while observing that applicants should approach Civil Court---Such observation amounted to abdication of jurisdiction vested in statutory authority---Erroneous direction of revenue officer could not confer jurisdiction upon Civil Court where statute otherwise excluded it---Party ought to have challenged refusal of statutory authority before competent forum instead of relying upon such observation. Cited Case: • Evacuee Trust Property Board and others v. Mst. Sakina Bibi and others 2007 SCMR 262 (h) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----S.115---Revisional jurisdiction---Divergent findings of Trial Court and First Appellate Court---Comparative appraisal---Where findings of First Appellate Court differed from Trial Court, appellate findings ordinarily prevailed unless shown to suffer from illegality, perversity or material irregularity---Revisional Court was required to compare both judgments but could not disturb well-reasoned appellate findings merely because Trial Court had reached a contrary conclusion. Cited Cases: • Muhammad Nawaz through L.Rs. v. Haji Muhammad Baran Khan through L.Rs. and others 2013 SCMR 1300 • Madan Gopal and others v. Maran Bepari and others PLD 1969 SC 617 • Muhammad Shafi and others v. Sultan Mahmood and others 2010 SCMR 827 • Amjad Ikram v. Mst. Asiya Kausar and 2 others 2015 SCMR 1 • Muhammad Hafeez and another v. District Judge, Karachi East and another 2008 SCMR 398 (i) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----S.115---Revisional interference---Applicants failed to demonstrate illegality, jurisdictional defect or material irregularity in appellate judgment holding Civil Court incompetent to entertain suit against consolidation proceedings---Additional District Judge had correctly set aside decree of Trial Court as coram non judice---No ground for revisional interference was made out. Disposition---Civil revision dismissed in limine---Judgment and decree dated 20.04.2026 passed by Additional District Judge, Attock, setting aside decree of Trial Court and holding suit not maintainable for want of Civil Court jurisdiction, maintained. Amanat Khan and others v. Province of Punjab through District Collector, Attock and others, Civil Revision No.515 of 2026, Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, decided on 01.07.2026, approved for reporting.

Summary: (a) Federal Excise Act, 2005----Ss.2(12-A), 2(23) & 3(1)(d), First Schedule, Table II, Serial No.11---Pakistan Telecommunication (Re-organization) Act, 1996, Ss.2(v), 4 & 20---Federal excise duty---Pakistan Telecommunication Authority---Regulatory functions---Taxability---Pakistan Telecommunication Authority was established as a statutory regulator for reorganization, supervision and governance of telecommunication sector---Its functions comprised licensing, spectrum management, enforcement of regulatory standards, consumer protection, promotion of competition, resolution of disputes and monitoring compliance by licensees---Authority did not itself establish or operate commercial telecommunication systems or render telecommunication services to consumers---Purely regulatory and supervisory functions did not constitute taxable provision of telecommunication or franchise services under Federal Excise Act, 2005. (b) Pakistan Telecommunication (Re-organization) Act, 1996----S.4(1)(a)---Interpretation of expression “regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of telecommunication systems and the provision of telecommunication services”---Operative word “regulate” governed both telecommunication systems and provision of services---Provision conferred power of control, supervision and standard-setting over licensed operators and did not assign function of providing telecommunication services to Authority itself---Reading phrase “provision of telecommunication services” in isolation so as to transform regulator into service provider would distort legislative intent and collapse fundamental distinction between regulator and regulated entity. (c) Statutory interpretation---Regulator and service provider---Distinction---Regulator stood outside market as a governmental supervisory authority entrusted with rule-making, licensing, enforcement, oversight and protection of public interest---Service provider participated in commercial market by directly furnishing services to customers for consideration---Pakistan Telecommunication Authority’s statutory, compulsory and governance-oriented functions were fundamentally different from voluntary, transactional and customer-oriented activities of telecom operators---Authority could not be characterized as commercial service provider merely because it regulated entities that supplied telecommunication services. (d) Federal Excise Act, 2005----Ss.2(23) & 3(1)(d)---Taxable service---Provider-recipient relationship---Charging provisions contemplated actual rendering of specified service by a provider to a recipient in commercial sense for consideration---Pakistan Telecommunication Authority neither emitted, conveyed, switched nor received intelligence for customers, nor operated telecommunication systems commercially---Licensing, allocation of spectrum and enforcement of statutory compliance lacked essential attributes of commercial service provision---Federal excise duty could not be imposed without establishing taxable service falling within charging provisions. (e) Pakistan Telecommunication (Re-organization) Act, 1996----S.20---Telecommunication licence---Nature---Statutory licence did not amount to transfer or assignment of any proprietary or commercial right belonging to Pakistan Telecommunication Authority---Authority possessed no commercial right to provide telecommunication services which could be conferred upon another---Section 20 imposed statutory prohibition upon operation of telecommunication systems or provision of services without regulatory permission---Licence merely authorized qualified entity to undertake otherwise restricted activity within controlled legal framework and source of operator’s right flowed from statute rather than commercial grant by Authority. (f) Federal Excise Act, 2005----S.2(12-A)---“Franchise”---Essential ingredients---Franchise required authority from franchiser, corresponding right in franchisee, identifiable franchised product or service, fee or consideration and, critically, identification of product, service or business activity with franchiser---Element of commercial identity with franchiser was overriding requirement---Telecom operators provided services under their own names, infrastructure, brands and commercial arrangements and were not represented to public as extensions of Pakistan Telecommunication Authority---Absence of branding, representation, business-system replication and market identification negatived franchiser-franchisee relationship. Cited Case: • Pakistan Television Corporation v. Commissioner Inland Revenue 2023 PTD 102 (g) Federal Excise Act, 2005----S.2(12-A)---Statutory licensing fee---Franchise consideration---Distinction---Payment of prescribed licence fee under regulatory statute was a statutory charge for permission to operate in controlled sector and lacked commercial mutuality, brand use, goodwill and business-system replication characteristic of franchise fee or royalty---Mere grant of licence for consideration did not create franchise---Contrary interpretation would absurdly convert driving licences, power-generation licences, import licences and other regulatory permissions into franchise arrangements. Cited Case: • Pakistan Telecommunication Authority v. Additional Collector Sales Tax and others, F.E.R.A. No.1 of 2014, Islamabad High Court, decided on 30.05.2024 (h) Federal Excise Act, 2005----S.2(12-A)---Telecom operators’ audited accounts---Description of payments as licence fee, royalty or technical service fee---Effect---Accounting treatment adopted by regulated operators could not determine legal character of relationship between statutory regulator and licensees---Interpretation and application of taxing statute depended upon true legal nature of transaction and statutory framework, not nomenclature used in private accounts---No technical service was rendered by Pakistan Telecommunication Authority to its licensees. Distinguished Case: • M/s CM Pak Limited v. Additional Commissioner Inland Revenue, Islamabad 2013 SCMR 749 (i) Taxation---Charging provision---Strict construction---Regulatory authorization alleged to be taxable franchise---Department was required to establish every essential ingredient of taxable service within language of statute---Concept of franchise could not be expanded by analogy to encompass every statutory licence carrying a fee---Mischaracterization of sovereign licensing function as commercial franchise amounted to assumption of jurisdiction not supported by Federal Excise Act, 2005. (j) Constitution of Pakistan----Art.165---Pakistan Telecommunication Authority---Limb of Federal Government---Exemption from taxation---Authority’s annual budget was submitted to Federal Government; surplus receipts were remitted to Federal Consolidated Fund; deficits were made good by Federal Government; accounts were audited by Auditor-General; and fines and penalties were credited to Federal Consolidated Fund---Upon lifting statutory veil, ultimate destination and source of Authority’s receipts and expenditure was Federal Government---Authority performed functions on behalf of Federation and qualified as limb of State entitled to protection under Art.165. (k) Rules of Business, 1973----R.14---Opinion of Ministry of Law and Justice---Inter-departmental tax dispute---Legal opinion obtained through Cabinet Division concluded that Pakistan Telecommunication Authority was limb of State and entitled to constitutional tax exemption---Such opinion reinforced statutory and constitutional character of Authority and negated Department’s attempt to treat regulatory receipts as consideration for taxable franchise services. (l) Constitution of Pakistan----Art.199---Tax show-cause notice---Alternative statutory remedy---Maintainability of constitutional petition---Ordinarily tax disputes were to proceed through statutory adjudicatory hierarchy, but constitutional jurisdiction was available where show-cause notice was ex facie without lawful authority, ultra vires, jurisdictionally defective or tainted by mala fides---A party was not required to submit to proceedings founded upon patent absence of jurisdiction merely because appellate remedies existed---Threshold interference was justified to prevent continuation of an unlawful tax proceeding. Cited Cases: • Messrs Pakistan Oilfields Limited through General Manager v. Federation of Pakistan through Ministry of Finance and others 2020 PTD 110 • PKP Exploration Limited and others v. Federal Board of Revenue through Chairman and others 2021 PTD 1644 • Mughal-e-Azam Banquet Complex 2011 PTD 2260 • Northern Power Generation Company Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan and others 2015 PTD 2052 (m) Federal Excise Act, 2005---Show-cause notices demanding federal excise duty and penalties from Pakistan Telecommunication Authority---Jurisdiction---Notices proceeded upon erroneous assumption that Authority exclusively provided telecommunication services and had transferred such rights to operators as franchisees---Authority was neither commercial telecommunication service provider nor franchiser and its licence fees were regulatory receipts---Essential taxable nexus was absent---Show-cause notices suffered from patent lack of jurisdiction and were issued without lawful authority. Disposition---All six writ petitions allowed---Impugned show-cause notices demanding federal excise duty and penalties on licence fees and regulatory receipts of Pakistan Telecommunication Authority set aside as being without lawful authority and jurisdiction---No order as to costs. Pakistan Telecommunication Authority through its Director Budget & Accounts/Director General Law & Regulation v. Federal Board of Revenue through its Chairman and others, Writ Petitions Nos.2398, 2433 and 3877 of 2021, 1570 and 1572 of 2020 and 652 of 2024, Islamabad High Court, heard on 07.04.2026, approved for reporting.

Summary: (a) Muhammadan Law----Hiba---Oral gift---Essential ingredients---Burden of proof---Exclusion of female heirs from inheritance---Where beneficiaries relied upon an alleged oral gift to exclude widow and daughters of deceased from inherited property, burden rested squarely upon beneficiaries to prove transaction through cogent and reliable evidence---Valid gift required proof of declaration by donor, acceptance by donee and delivery of possession---Beneficiary was required to prove gift itself and not merely mutation recording it---Courts were bound to scrutinize alleged gift with particular care where its effect was to bypass or artificially block inheritance rights of female heirs. Cited Cases: • Faqir Ali and others v. Sakina Bibi and others PLD 2022 SC 85 • Barkat Ali v. Muhammad Ismail 2002 SCMR 1938 • Muhammad Sarwar v. Mumtaz Bibi and others 2020 SCMR 276 (b) Muhammadan Law----Hiba by female heirs of inherited property---Knowledge and voluntary relinquishment---Proof---Inheritance rights of widow and daughters had already vested by operation of law upon death of predecessor---Beneficiaries of alleged gift were required to prove not only declaration, acceptance and delivery of possession but also that female heirs fully understood nature, extent and consequences of transaction and consciously and voluntarily elected to abandon their vested proprietary rights---No evidence established that female heirs had been apprised that alleged gift would permanently divest them of inherited estate---Transaction was in favour of male heirs who directly benefited from exclusion of women and therefore demanded closest judicial scrutiny---Mere mutation entry or long possession could not substitute proof of knowing and voluntary relinquishment. (c) Revenue record----Mutation---Evidentiary value---Oral gift---Mutation was maintained primarily for fiscal purposes and neither created nor extinguished title---Where ownership was claimed through oral gift, title flowed from gift itself and not from revenue entry recording it---Mutation could at most corroborate a transaction independently proved but could not establish declaration, acceptance or delivery of possession---Courts below committed error of law by treating Gift Mutation No.75 as substantive proof of title. Cited Cases: • Ghulam Sarwar deceased through LRs and others v. Ghulam Sakina 2019 SCMR 567 • Mst. Ramzanu Bibi v. Ibrahim deceased through LRs and others 2025 SCMR 955 • Noor Ud Din deceased through LRs v. Pervaiz Akhtar and others 2023 SCMR 1928 • Mst. Barikhna and others v. Faiz Ullah Khan and others 2020 SCMR 1618 • Zohra Bibi and another v. Haji Sultan Mahmood and others 2018 SCMR 762 • Khan Muhammad through L.Rs. and others v. Mst. Khatoon Bibi and others 2017 SCMR 1476 • Muhammad Munir v. Muhammad Saleem and others 2004 SCMR 1530 • Muhammad Younus Khan and 12 others v. Government of N.-W.F.P. through Secretary, Forest and Agriculture, Peshawar and others 1993 SCMR 618 • Noor Ahmad and 20 others v. Mst. Zeba and 12 others 1991 SCMR 1990 (d) Muhammadan Law----Oral gift---Subsequent consolidation proceedings, private partition and later revenue transactions---Evidentiary effect---Real controversy was whether valid oral gift had taken place in year 1955---Consolidation proceedings of 1968, preparation of Wanda Jaat, private arrangements amongst alleged donees and subsequent dealings could not relieve beneficiaries of burden to prove original transaction---Events occurring years later were incapable of retrospectively proving declaration, acceptance or delivery of possession at time of alleged gift. (e) Evidence---Oral gift---Witness not present at mutation proceedings---Hearsay testimony---Witness relied upon by beneficiaries was neither present before Revenue Officer at attestation of gift mutation nor participant in proceedings and could not identify persons who appeared or circumstances in which mutation was sanctioned---His testimony represented only what he subsequently learnt and was not evidence of transaction itself---Such testimony could not establish essential ingredients of valid gift. (f) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)----Knowledge of mutation---Proof of underlying transaction---Distinct questions---Knowledge of revenue mutation might be relevant to limitation but did not prove transaction entered therein---Even if female heirs knew of mutation years earlier, such knowledge did not dispense with beneficiaries’ obligation to independently prove valid gift---Courts below erred by conflating knowledge of mutation with proof of oral gift. (g) Muhammadan Law----Oral gift---Continued payment of share in produce to female heirs---Effect---Evidence indicated that female heirs continued to receive hissa batai from land after alleged gift---Such conduct cast doubt upon claim that they had completely and irrevocably divested themselves of all proprietary rights---Continued recognition of their entitlement in produce was inconsistent with assertion of absolute gift in favour of male heirs and was material evidence ignored by Courts below. (h) Muhammadan Law----Hiba---Delivery of possession---Co-heir already in possession---Proof---Delivery of possession was indispensable ingredient of valid gift---No witness identified act, date or manner by which donors allegedly relinquished dominion and delivered possession to donees---Male heirs were already cultivating property as co-heirs and their continued possession was not necessarily referable to alleged gift---Possession already held in capacity of heir could not, without independent evidence, establish delivery of possession pursuant to gift. (i) Muslim inheritance----Co-heirs---Possession of one heir---Constructive possession of all heirs---Possession of one co-heir was ordinarily deemed possession on behalf of all heirs unless rights of others were clearly and unequivocally repudiated---Exclusive physical possession by brothers did not by itself extinguish inheritance rights of sisters---Doctrines of waiver, estoppel, relinquishment and adverse possession generally did not operate amongst co-heirs in absence of express repudiation brought to their knowledge. Cited Cases: • Ghulam Ali and others v. Mst. Ghulam Sarwar Naqvi PLD 1990 SC 1 • Abrar Hussain v. Mst. Bibi Shahida and others PLD 2026 SC 42 (j) Muslim inheritance----Female heirs---Protection of vested inheritance rights---Public policy---Inheritance rights vested immediately upon death of predecessor and were neither bounty of male relatives nor concession dependent upon family custom, convenience or goodwill---Purported relinquishment by women required extreme caution because female heirs were frequently deprived through fabricated gifts, manipulated revenue entries, coercive arrangements and fraudulent documentation---Courts were duty-bound to protect inheritance rights of women and prevent procedural technicalities from perpetuating deprivation. Cited Cases: • Mirza Abid Baig v. Zahid Sabir deceased through legal representatives and others 2020 SCMR 601 • Mst. Aksar Jan and others v. Mst. Shamim Akhtar and others 2025 SCMR 88 • Tanvir Sarfraz Khan v. Federation of Pakistan 2025 SCMR 98 • Ghulam Ali and others v. Mst. Ghulam Sarwar Naqvi PLD 1990 SC 1 (k) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)----Inheritance rights---Old mutation---Subsequent exchange and gift transactions---Fresh assertions of exclusive title---Limitation could not be examined in isolation from nature of right and validity of transaction forming foundation of title---Before relying upon delay, Court was required first to determine whether alleged gift had been proved---Subsequent exchange and gift transactions founded upon disputed mutation constituted independent assertions of exclusive ownership and furnished fresh causes for judicial scrutiny---Claim could not be dismissed merely by counting years from original mutation while ignoring failure to establish foundational gift. Cited Case: • Haji Muhammad Yunis deceased through legal heirs v. Mst. Farukh Sultan and others 2022 SCMR 1282 (l) Constitution of Pakistan----Arts.2-A, 23, 24, 25, 35 & 227---Inheritance rights of women---Equality, property and Islamic injunctions---Constitution did not permit deprivation of women from lawful inheritance---Equality before law and protection of property would become illusory if rights vested through succession could be defeated by coercion, fraud, social pressure, manipulated revenue entries or dubious family arrangements---State, Courts and revenue authorities bore positive obligation to ensure that female heirs obtained, retained and enjoyed inheritance in practical and effective manner---Any custom, practice, arrangement or device excluding female heir from lawful share offended injunctions of Islam and constitutional commitments to equality, dignity, social justice and property rights. (m) Courts and revenue authorities---Inheritance disputes involving women---Duty of heightened scrutiny---Law leaned in favour of protecting rather than defeating inheritance rights of women and vulnerable members of society---Every transaction having effect of excluding female heir from succession was required to be examined with utmost care, caution and judicial scrutiny---Courts could not permit artificial devices, dubious gifts, manipulated entries or prolonged litigation to defeat Divine and statutory scheme of inheritance. (n) Constitution of Pakistan----Art.185(3)---Concurrent findings---Misreading and non-reading of evidence---Interference by Supreme Court---Concurrent findings ordinarily commanded respect but lost sanctity where founded upon misconception of law, misreading or non-reading of material evidence---Courts below failed to require proof of gift independent of mutation, ignored legal character of possession amongst co-heirs, overlooked continued payment of produce to female heirs and treated delay and revenue entries as substitutes for proof---Such findings were infected by misapplication of settled legal principles and warranted interference. Cited Cases: • Habib Ur Rehman and others v. Abdul Karim deceased through L.Rs. and others 2025 SCMR 1262 • United Bank Limited through its President and others v. Jamil Ahmed and others 2024 SCMR 164 • Muhammad Nawaz alias Nawaza and others v. Member Judicial Board of Revenue and others 2014 SCMR 914 • Abdul Hameed and others v. Khalid and others 2007 SCMR 938 • Mst. Saadat Sultan and others v. Muhammad Zahur Khan and others 2006 SCMR 193 • Muhammad Aslam v. Mst. Ferozi and others PLD 2001 SC 213 • Muhammad Akhtar v. Mst. Manna and 3 others 2001 SCMR 1700 Disposition---Petition for leave to appeal converted into appeal and allowed---Judgments and decrees of Trial Court, Appellate Court and High Court set aside---Gift Mutation No.75 dated 17.04.1955 and all subsequent transactions founded thereon declared illegal, void and ineffective against inheritance rights of petitioners---Petitioners declared entitled to their respective shares in estate of Roshan son of Bora according to applicable law of inheritance---Revenue authorities directed to make consequential corrections and determine and separate shares in accordance with law---No order as to costs. Noor Muhammad and others v. Ghulam Haider and others, C.P.L.A. No.1103-L of 2016, Supreme Court of Pakistan, heard on 04.06.2026 and announced on 30.06.2026, approved for reporting.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan----Art.199---Constitutional petition---Threatened cancellation of No Objection Certificate and allied development approvals---Maintainability---Petitioner had obtained NOC for access to proposed service areas, planning approval, land-use conversion, sanctioned building plans and petrol-pump NOCs, deposited substantial government dues and commenced development work---Subsequent stoppage of access-road construction, interference with project and threats to withdraw approvals created real and immediate prejudice sufficient to invoke constitutional jurisdiction notwithstanding absence of a formally notified cancellation order. (b) Punjab Land Use Plan (Classification, Reclassification and Redevelopment) Rules, 2020---Service areas along Rawalpindi Ring Road---Approval process---Proposal was processed through Rawalpindi Development Authority, NESPAK, Pre-District Planning and Design Committee, District Planning and Design Committee, District Council and other competent authorities---Land-use conversion, commercialization, commercial building plans and petrol-pump sites were approved after scrutiny and payment of prescribed charges---Admissions of statutory authorities established that approvals had been granted through lawful institutional process and remained operative. (c) Constitution of Pakistan----Arts.4 & 10-A---Administrative approvals---Withdrawal or cancellation---Due process---No show-cause notice, speaking order or proceedings under any applicable law had been initiated for cancellation, recall or withdrawal of NOC or allied approvals---Threatening, obstructive or coercive action without notice and opportunity of hearing violated right to lawful treatment and due process---Competent authorities could withdraw or modify approvals only through procedure prescribed by law. (d) Constitution of Pakistan----Arts.18, 23 & 24---Lawful business, investment and property---Petitioner acquired land, obtained statutory permissions, deposited government dues and invested substantial sums in development, infrastructure and joint ventures---Lawful commercial activity and investment made in reliance upon official approvals were entitled to constitutional protection---State authorities could not arbitrarily frustrate an approved project or interfere with property and business interests except in accordance with law. Cited Cases: • M.C.R. (Pvt.) Ltd., franchisee of Pizza Hut v. Multan Development Authority and others 2021 CLD 639 • Muhammad Khalid Javed v. Lahore Development Authority and others PLD 2021 Lahore 211 (e) Ease of doing business---Government representations through eBiz Punjab Portal---Protection of investment---State had invited and facilitated private investment through a one-window digital mechanism and its authorities thereafter granted NOC, planning permissions, commercialization and building approvals---Once investment was induced and undertaken on strength of such official acts, authorities were obligated to preserve investor confidence and could not disregard their own approvals without lawful proceedings. (f) Administrative law---Vested rights and legitimate expectation---NOC and consequential approvals acted upon---Petitioner had deposited prescribed charges, undertaken extensive development, obtained electricity demand notices and created contractual and third-party commitments---Such conduct generated accrued interests and legitimate expectation that project would be allowed to proceed in accordance with approved framework---Approvals could not be rendered ineffective through informal threats or administrative obstruction. (g) Administrative law---Promissory estoppel---Public authority---Where authorities themselves processed applications, issued NOC, sanctioned land use and construction, accepted government dues and commenced access-road works, they could not subsequently resile from their representations to detriment of person who had materially altered his position in reliance thereon---Official commitments were required to be honoured unless lawfully withdrawn after due process. Cited Cases: • Messrs Army Welfare Sugar Mills Ltd. and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others 1992 SCMR 1652 • Pakistan Railways through Chief Executive Officer/Senior General Manager, Lahore and another v. Muhammad Aslam 2024 SCMR 97 • Mst. Fatima Faryad and others v. Government of Punjab and others 2020 CLC 836 • Dewan Salman Fibre Ltd. and others v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Finance and others 2015 PTD 2304 (h) Administrative law---Judicial estoppel---Approbation and reprobation---Public authorities could not take a position inconsistent with their earlier official acts after petitioner and other authorities had acted upon same factual and legal foundation---Integrity of governmental and judicial processes required that authority which granted and implemented approvals should not frustrate them through contradictory conduct without lawful basis. Cited Cases: • JDW Sugar Mills Ltd. and others v. Province of Punjab and others PLD 2017 Lahore 68 • Mubashar Javed and others v. Province of Punjab and others PLD 2022 Lahore 817 (i) Administrative law---Government commitments---Doctrine of sovereignty---Official representations and approvals made by duly constituted governmental authorities were not to be lightly disregarded or deliberately ignored---Orderly development and investor confidence required State functionaries to honour commitments in letter and spirit unless altered through lawful statutory process. (j) Constitutional law---Public authority---Duty to assist Court---Rawalpindi Development Authority failed to file report and parawise comments despite specific judicial direction and instead sought further time without justification---Such casual conduct was deprecated, particularly where allegations involved threatened cancellation of approvals and interference with substantial private investment---Statutory authority was required to place complete factual and legal position before Court. (k) Rawalpindi Ring Road---Access to approved service areas---Right of Way---NOC contemplated access through approach road within ROW and construction had already commenced---Authorities were bound to honour and implement approvals and facilitate completion of approved access road, subject to payment by petitioner of any lawful charges assessed under applicable rules and regulations. Cited Case: • Mirza Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Government of Sindh and another 1992 MLD 1119 (l) Constitution of Pakistan----Arts.15 & 18---Service areas along public road---Public interest---Privately developed service areas could facilitate commuters without burdening public exchequer by providing fuel, rest, worship, parking, drinking water, sanitation, emergency and other facilities---Protection of approved project served both lawful commercial activity and convenience and safety of travelling public. Cited Case: • Muhammad Tahir Jamal, Advocate v. Government of Punjab and others PLD 2020 Lahore 407 (m) Development approval---Commercial risk---Petitioner’s investment did not guarantee commercial success and profitability remained dependent upon market conditions and travellers’ choice---Such business risk, however, did not authorize public authorities to obstruct or invalidate approvals already lawfully issued---Regulatory authorities remained bound by their official acts unless approvals were withdrawn in accordance with law. (n) Constitutional jurisdiction---Relief against threatened administrative action---Court was not required to declare approvals absolutely incapable of lawful review or cancellation---Proper relief was to restrain authorities from threatening, cancelling, withdrawing, reviewing or frustrating approvals without due process and to require them to implement subsisting approvals in accordance with law. (o) Service-area development---Obligations of project proponent---Judicial protection of approvals remained subject to petitioner developing project strictly according to sanctioned plans and applicable laws---Petitioner was required to provide adequate plantation, landscaping, parking, public conveniences, drinking water, mosque, electric-vehicle charging facilities, environmental safeguards and other amenities for safety and convenience of travellers. Disposition---Constitutional petition disposed of---Respondents restrained from threatening, cancelling, withdrawing, reviewing or frustrating NOC dated 28.01.2026 and allied approvals without following due process of law---Respondents further restrained from causing obstruction, demolition or interference in petitioner’s lawful development activities except in accordance with law---Rawalpindi Development Authority and concerned authorities directed to honour and implement approvals, facilitate completion of approved project and proceed with construction and completion of access road/right of way subject to payment of lawful charges---Petitioner directed to develop service areas strictly according to approved plans and provide prescribed public amenities. Mazhar Rahim Awan v. Rawalpindi Development Authority and 6 others, Writ Petition No.2335 of 2026, Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, heard on 30.06.2026.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan----Art.199---Constitutional jurisdiction---Demarcation of land---Suppression of material facts---Petitioner failed to disclose that demarcation dated 08.12.2010 had previously been challenged through a civil suit, appeal and civil revision, with suit and appeal dismissed and revision later withdrawn---Such proceedings directly concerned validity of disputed demarcation and constituted material facts---Litigant seeking equitable and discretionary relief was under bounden duty to make full, fair and candid disclosure---Concealment designed to mislead judicial and revenue forums disentitled petitioner to constitutional relief. (b) Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1967----Ss.116, 117, 161 & 164---Demarcation of boundaries---Statutory remedies---Revenue Officer was empowered to define and determine boundaries of estates, holdings and divisions of land---Person affected by demarcation could participate, raise objections, seek correction of measurements or boundary marks and thereafter avail appeal under S.161 and revision under S.164---Demarcation made by competent revenue authority possessed legal sanctity unless successfully challenged through prescribed statutory hierarchy. (c) Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1967----Ss.161 & 164---Demarcation dated 08.12.2010---Finality---Demarcation had been jointly conducted by Survey of Pakistan, Revenue Department, Forest Department and WWF in compliance with an earlier order of High Court and report had been submitted before Court---Petitioner did not challenge it through statutory appeal or revision under Land Revenue Act---Earlier demarcation consequently attained finality and remained binding upon parties. (d) Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1967----S.172---Civil Court’s jurisdiction---Boundary demarcation---Bar---Matters concerning demarcation and determination of boundaries fell within exclusive domain of Revenue Authorities---Civil suit for declaration and injunction challenging demarcation was legally misconceived due to express statutory bar---Resort to a forum lacking jurisdiction could not confer legitimacy upon challenge or substitute remedies provided under revenue law. (e) Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1967----Ss.117, 161, 164 & 172---Choice of remedy---Petitioner, instead of pursuing statutory remedies against demarcation of 2010, instituted civil proceedings which were dismissed and subsequently withdrew civil revision---Failure to invoke competent revenue hierarchy within lawful framework could not be overcome through subsequent constitutional proceedings seeking reopening of settled demarcation. (f) Constitutional jurisdiction---Interpretation of earlier judicial order---Petitioner asserted that fresh demarcation of 2023 had been conducted pursuant to direction in W.P. No.1965 of 2022---Earlier order merely directed competent authority to decide petitioner’s pending application through a speaking order after hearing concerned parties and expressly made no observation on merits---No direction for fresh demarcation was issued---Petitioner’s attempt to attribute such mandate to order was based on clear misreading and could not validate subsequent demarcation. (g) Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1967----Demarcation reports dated 08.12.2010 and 17.02.2023---Successive demarcation---Where earlier demarcation had attained finality, subsequent demarcation prepared without lawful basis possessed no independent legal sanctity---Assistant Commissioner rightly set aside later report on appeal and revisional authorities lawfully maintained such determination. (h) Punjab Land Revenue Rules, 1968----R.67-A(7)---Encroachment map---Challenge to earlier demarcation---Petitioner alleged that demarcation of 2010 was invalid for absence of prescribed encroachment map and non-compliance with statutory procedure---Such challenge could not be entertained after earlier demarcation had attained finality, petitioner had failed to invoke statutory revenue remedies and material prior litigation had been concealed---Revenue authorities committed no illegality in declining to reopen settled proceedings. (i) Constitution of Pakistan----Art.199---Alternative statutory remedy---Connected petition sought preventive directions against removal of existing permanent demarcation points and installation of fresh points---Petitioners had neither approached competent Revenue Authorities nor availed appeal or revision under Land Revenue Act---Constitutional jurisdiction could not ordinarily be invoked at threshold to obtain preventive relief before statutory forum had examined grievance. (j) Constitution of Pakistan----Art.199---Revisional orders of revenue authorities---Scope of judicial review---High Court would exercise restraint in interfering with concurrent orders passed by revenue forums, particularly an order rendered in revisional jurisdiction---Interference was justified only where perversity, patent illegality, jurisdictional defect or material irregularity was apparent on face of record and had resulted in miscarriage of justice---Mere disagreement with factual or procedural conclusions was insufficient. (k) Constitution of Pakistan----Art.199---Discretionary relief---Demarcation dispute---Revenue authorities had considered earlier final demarcation, subsequent proceedings and statutory record and passed concurrent reasoned orders---Petitioners failed to demonstrate any illegality, material irregularity or perversity warranting constitutional interference---Findings of forums below were in consonance with law. Disposition---Writ Petition No.161 of 2026 and connected Writ Petition No.4185 of 2025 dismissed---Order dated 09.10.2025 passed by Member (Judicial-VI), Board of Revenue, Punjab, maintaining orders of Assistant Commissioner and Additional Commissioner (Revenue), upheld---No constitutional interference warranted. Raja Hafeez-ur-Rehman v. Member (Judicial-VI) and others, Writ Petition No.161 of 2026 along with Writ Petition No.4185 of 2025, Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, heard on 30.06.2026.

Summary: (a) Specific Relief Act, 1877---Specific performance of agreement to sell---Proof of agreement---Plaintiff produced original agreement and examined both attesting witnesses, who consistently proved its execution, identified signatures and thumb impressions and confirmed payment of Rs.700,000 as earnest money out of total consideration of Rs.900,000---Scribe had died before institution of suit and his death was proved through certificate---Agreement stood established through legally admissible evidence and concurrent appreciation thereof disclosed no material infirmity. (b) Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984---Agreement to sell---Attesting witnesses---Where both attesting witnesses appeared and gave consistent evidence regarding execution, consideration and signatures of parties, written transaction stood duly proved---Death of scribe did not defeat proof where statutory evidentiary requirements were otherwise satisfied. (c) Power of attorney---Registered general power of attorney---Authority to sell immovable property---Principal admitted execution of registered instrument appointing his brother as general attorney---Document expressly authorized attorney to alienate property and receive sale consideration and contained no cutting, interpolation or overwriting---Bare allegation that power of sale had been fraudulently inserted, without supporting evidence, was insufficient to displace registered instrument. (d) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---O.VI, R.4---Fraud---Pleading and proof---Fraud was a serious allegation required to be specifically pleaded with full particulars and strictly proved through cogent evidence---General, vague or emphatic allegations did not amount to legal proof---Petitioner neither pleaded particulars of alleged fraudulent insertion nor produced documentary or oral evidence in support thereof---Concurrent rejection of plea was lawful. Cited Case: • Aamir Afzal and another v. S. Akmal (deceased) through legal representatives and others 2024 SCMR 1649 (e) Contract Act, 1872---S.226---Agency---Acts of agent binding on principal---Agreement to sell was executed on 26.08.2011, whereas deed cancelling general power of attorney was executed on 25.06.2012---Authority of attorney therefore subsisted on date of transaction---Acts lawfully performed by agent within scope of authority bound principal as if personally performed by him---Subsequent revocation could not invalidate transaction already concluded during subsistence of agency. Cited Case: • Concentrate Manufacturing Company of Ireland and others v. Seven-Up Bottling Company (Private) Limited and others 2002 CLD 77 (f) Contract Act, 1872---Agency---Subsequent revocation---Effect on prior transaction---Revocation of power of attorney operated prospectively and did not retrospectively annul agreement lawfully executed by attorney while authority remained valid---Principal remained bound by sale transaction entered into before cancellation of agency. (g) Agreement to sell---Allegation of ante-dating and collusion---Burden of proof---Petitioner neither identified any definite date of alleged fabrication nor produced evidence impeaching date appearing on agreement---Mere relationship between plaintiff and attorney or general allegation of collusion could not displace a written transaction proved by both attesting witnesses and attorney who executed it. (h) Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984---Best evidence---Failure of party to enter witness box---Petitioner alleged fraud, absence of consent and want of authority but did not himself appear as witness---Instead, his wife appeared as special attorney and admitted that her knowledge of disputed transaction was derived from what petitioner had told her---Her testimony concerning material facts was hearsay---Adverse inference against petitioner for withholding his own testimony was justified. Cited Case: • Mrs. Zakia Hussain and another v. Syed Farooq Hussain PLD 2020 SC 401 (i) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---O.III, Rr.1 & 2---Attorney as witness---Attorney could act and depose only regarding matters within his first-hand and direct knowledge---Where attorney lacked personal knowledge of material transaction and merely repeated information supplied by principal, such testimony could not substitute direct evidence of principal. (j) Evidence---Admission by attorney executing agreement---General attorney who had executed agreement filed conceding written statement, entered witness box and affirmed execution and receipt of earnest money---His testimony corroborated plaintiff’s case and further strengthened proof of transaction. (k) Specific Relief Act, 1877---Specific performance---Discretionary and equitable relief---Relief could not be claimed as of right and discretion had to be exercised judicially, reasonably and according to settled principles---Plaintiff proved execution, payment of substantial consideration, continuous readiness and willingness and subsisting authority of attorney---No inequitable conduct or circumstance existed to justify refusal of specific performance---Concurrent decree was proper. Cited Case: • Mrs. Zakia Hussain and another v. Syed Farooq Hussain PLD 2020 SC 401 (l) Specific performance---Readiness and willingness---Plaintiff’s conduct and evidence established continued readiness and willingness to perform contractual obligations---Payment of substantial earnest money and pursuit of decree supported equitable claim---Petitioner failed to establish any circumstance disentitling plaintiff to relief. (m) Civil revision---Concurrent findings of fact---Scope---Revisional Court could not undertake fresh appraisal of evidence merely because another view was possible---Interference was warranted only where findings suffered from jurisdictional defect, material illegality, perversity, misreading or non-reading of evidence---General assertions that judgments were contrary to law or based on weak evidence, without identifying ignored or misconstrued material, were insufficient. Cited Case: • Mst. Zarsheda v. Nobat Khan PLD 2022 SC 21 (n) Civil revision---Clerical discrepancy---Appellate judgment contained minor discrepancy regarding recital of area of property---Such error was clerical and did not affect identity of transaction, proof of agreement or merits of decree---No revisional interference was called for on that basis. (o) Specific performance---Registered power of attorney---Alleged misuse by close relative---Relationship between attorney and purchaser, without proof of fraud or collusion, did not invalidate transaction lawfully executed under subsisting registered authority---Principal’s unsubstantiated suspicion could not override documentary and oral evidence accepted by both Courts below. Distinguished Case: • Allah Bakhsh through legal representatives and others v. Muhammad Riaz and others PLD 2025 SC 63 Disposition---Civil revision dismissed---Concurrent judgments and decrees dated 09.12.2019 and 30.09.2021 decreeing suit for specific performance and permanent injunction maintained---No order as to costs. Muhammad Dilshad v. Muhammad Khaleel and another, Civil Revision No.81422 of 2021, Lahore High Court, Lahore, heard on 30.06.2026, approved for reporting.

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----Ss.96 & 115; O.XLI, R.31---First appeal---Duty of first Appellate Court---First appeal constituted a valuable statutory right involving rehearing on questions of law as well as fact---First Appellate Court, being final Court of fact, was required to independently reappraise entire oral and documentary evidence, formulate points for determination, examine material grounds of appeal and record its own reasoned findings---Mechanical concurrence with Trial Court or reproduction of its reasoning did not satisfy statutory mandate. Cited Case: • Bashir Ahmed v. Mst. Taja Begum and others PLD 2010 SC 906 (b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----O.XLI, R.31---Appellate judgment---Essential requirements---Judgment of first Appellate Court had to disclose what material was considered, which arguments were accepted or rejected and what reasons led to ultimate conclusion---Such requirement applied equally to an affirming judgment---Even where Trial Court had written a detailed decision, Appellate Court could not abdicate its independent adjudicatory function by merely adopting conclusions recorded below. Cited Case: • Pakistan Refinery Ltd., Karachi v. Barrett Hodgson Pakistan (Pvt.) Ltd. and others 2019 SCMR 1726 (c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----O.XLI, R.31---Mechanical reproduction of Trial Court findings---Effect---Substantial portions of Trial Court’s findings were reproduced almost verbatim in appellate judgment, followed by cursory observation that evidence had been properly appreciated---No independent appraisal of oral or documentary evidence or meaningful adjudication of material grounds was discernible---Appellate judgment therefore suffered from jurisdictional infirmity and could not be sustained. (d) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----S.115; O.XLI, R.31---Revisional jurisdiction---Failure of first Appellate Court to decide appeal according to law---Such failure went to legality of appellate process itself rather than correctness of an individual factual finding---Revisional interference was warranted where statutory right of first appeal had been rendered illusory through absence of independent judicial scrutiny. (e) First appeal---Specific grounds raised in memorandum---Duty to decide---Appellants had specifically challenged respondent’s pleaded source of consideration by pointing out that mortgage mutations relied upon to finance purchase were dated after sale mutation---Such contention directly related to plea of ownership and consideration and required independent examination and a reasoned finding---Appellate Court’s silence on material plea amounted to failure to exercise jurisdiction. (f) Evidence---Revenue entries---Benami ownership---Appellants had questioned decisive reliance upon revenue entries and contended that such entries did not conclusively establish title in a dispute involving plea of benami ownership---They had also raised issues regarding agreement dated 29.08.1983, alleged admissions, oral evidence and contradictions in pleadings---Whether such grounds were ultimately correct was for Appellate Court to determine, but omission to address them independently rendered appellate decision defective. (g) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----O.XLI, R.31---Affirming judgment---Brevity and legality---A brief appellate judgment was not invalid merely because of its length; however, brevity could not excuse absence of points for determination, independent assessment of evidence and reasons---A detailed Trial Court judgment did not dispense with legal obligation of Appellate Court to undertake second factual scrutiny. (h) Civil revision---Remand---Appropriate course---Where first Appellate Court failed to perform its duty as final Court of fact, High Court was not to itself undertake detailed assessment of ownership, benami plea, source of consideration, agreement or oral evidence---Such examination could prejudice parties and usurp appellate function---Proper course was to set aside appellate judgment and remand appeals for fresh decision. Cited Case: • Muhammad Dawood v. Mst. Sakeena Farooque alias Aziza and others 2025 SCMR 1229 (i) Civil revision---Concurrent findings---Scope---Ordinarily concurrent findings were not open to fresh reappraisal in revision; however, principle did not protect an appellate judgment rendered without compliance with O.XLI, R.31, C.P.C.---Where first Appellate Court had not independently adjudicated appeal, concurrence was only apparent and did not bar revisional correction. (j) Remand proceedings---Observations on merits---High Court deliberately refrained from expressing any opinion on validity of benami plea, ownership, evidentiary value of agreement dated 29.08.1983, source of consideration, effect of revenue entries and oral evidence---All questions of fact and law were left open for determination by first Appellate Court uninfluenced by observations except finding regarding procedural defect. (k) Expeditious disposal---Old litigation---Appeals arising from suits instituted long ago had remained pending for considerable period---Upon remand, lower Appellate Court was directed to provide adequate opportunity of hearing, independently reappraise complete evidence, decide all material grounds through reasoned findings and endeavour to conclude proceedings preferably within three months. Disposition---Both civil revision petitions allowed---Consolidated judgment and decree dated 16.03.2019 passed by Additional District Judge, Faisalabad, set aside---Both appeals restored to their original numbers and remanded for fresh decision in accordance with O.XLI, R.31, C.P.C.---Parties directed to appear before Additional District Judge, Faisalabad, on 18.07.2026---No opinion expressed on merits. Riaz Ahmad Khan (deceased) through legal heirs and others v. Rafique Ahmad Khan and others, Civil Revision No.30580 of 2019 along with Civil Revision No.30568 of 2019, Lahore High Court, Lahore, heard on 30.06.2026, approved for reporting.

Summary: (a) Specific Relief Act, 1877---Specific performance of agreement to sell---Burden of proof---Where defendants categorically denied existence and execution of sale agreement, payment of consideration and delivery of possession, heavy burden rested upon plaintiff to establish complete transaction, including oral bargain, execution of written instrument, payment of earnest money and subsequent consideration, through legally admissible and confidence-inspiring evidence. (b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---O.VI, R.2---Pleadings---Agreement to sell---Material particulars---Plaint in suit for specific performance was required to disclose material facts constituting transaction, including time and place of bargain, persons present, agreed consideration, dates and manner of payments and circumstances of execution---Plaint omitted place and time of oral settlement, names of witnesses and date of alleged subsequent payment of Rs.40,000---Material omissions could not be cured by introducing a new version for first time in evidence. (c) Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984---Arts.17 & 79---Agreement to sell---Financial and future obligations---Attestation and proof---Agreement creating financial and future obligations was required to be attested in accordance with Art.17 and could not be used in evidence unless at least two attesting witnesses were called to prove its execution, where available and capable of giving evidence---Production of only one marginal witness failed to satisfy mandatory evidentiary requirement. Cited Cases: • Mst. Rasheeda Begum and others v. Muhammad Yousaf and others 2002 SCMR 1089 • Abdul Khaliq v. Muhammad Asghar Khan and 2 others PLD 1996 Lahore 367 • Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Defence, Rawalpindi and another v. Messrs Farrukh International (Pvt.) Ltd. through Proprietor 2023 SCMR 1118 • Khudad v. Syed Ghazanfar Ali Shah alias S. Inaam Hussain and others 2022 SCMR 933 (d) Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984---Arts.17 & 79---Non-production of second marginal witness---Explanation---Plaintiff alleged during arguments that second attesting witness had connived with defendants and was unwilling to appear---No evidence of such connivance or inability was produced---Unsubstantiated explanation was illusory and did not dispense with statutory requirement of examining two attesting witnesses. (e) Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984---Art.81---Admission of document---Applicability---Where execution of agreement was specifically denied by contesting defendant, document could not be treated as admitted so as to dispense with formal proof---First Appellate Court erred in invoking Art.81 and overlooking mandatory proof under Arts.17 and 79. (f) Evidence---Admission by co-defendants---Effect upon contesting defendant---Subsequent conceding statements made by some defendants did not bind another defendant who had consistently contested execution and consideration---Plaintiff was required to independently prove agreement against contesting defendant---Suit could not be decreed merely on basis of admission by some co-defendants. Cited Cases: • Shah Muhammad and 2 others v. Dullah and 2 others 2000 SCMR 1588 • Allah Rakha through legal representatives v. Nasir Khan and 4 others 2007 CLC 154 (g) Agreement to sell---Proof of execution---Contradictory testimony---Plaintiff and witnesses materially contradicted one another regarding date and time of bargain, whether transaction was settled one day earlier or on date of execution, identity of person who introduced vendor before stamp vendor and notary public and persons present at execution---Such contradictions went to root of transaction and rendered oral account unreliable. (h) Agreement to sell---Stamp vendor, notary public and deed writer---Evidence---Plaintiff claimed that vendor had been identified before stamp vendor and notary public, whereas marginal witness claimed that he had identified vendor and stamp vendor and notary public stated that no person had made such identification in their presence---Witnesses also differed regarding persons present at time of purchase of stamp and scribing of agreement---Conflicting testimony failed to inspire confidence. (i) Specific performance---Payment of consideration---Proof---Plaintiff alleged payment of Rs.75,000 as earnest money and further payment of Rs.40,000 but produced no receipt for either payment and failed to plead date, time or place of subsequent payment---Self-contradictory oral evidence did not establish payment of consideration---Specific performance could not be granted in absence of reliable proof of consideration. (j) Specific performance---Possession under agreement---Denial---Plaintiff asserted that possession had been delivered under agreement, while defendants categorically denied delivery and disputed plaintiff’s possession---In absence of cogent corroboration and in view of failure to prove foundational transaction, plea of possession could not independently sustain decree. (k) Civil revision---Misreading and non-reading of evidence---First Appellate Court reversed dismissal of suit by relying upon inadmissible and contradictory evidence, treating disputed agreement as admitted and overlooking non-compliance with Arts.17 and 79 of Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984---Such findings suffered from material illegality and jurisdictional error warranting interference in revisional jurisdiction. (l) Civil revision---Appellate reversal of Trial Court---Trial Court had correctly evaluated omissions in pleadings, contradictions in evidence, absence of receipts, non-production of second attesting witness and failure to prove consideration---First Appellate Court’s contrary findings rested upon misreading and non-reading of material evidence and were liable to be set aside. (m) Specific performance---Discretionary relief---Plaintiff seeking equitable enforcement had to establish lawful and proved agreement, performance or readiness to perform obligations and reliable proof of consideration---Where execution itself was not proved in accordance with mandatory law and evidence was contradictory, equitable relief could not be granted. Disposition---Civil revision accepted---Judgment and decree dated 27.04.2015 passed by Additional District Judge, Chichawatni, set aside---Judgment and decree dated 18.12.2012 passed by Civil Judge, Chichawatni, dismissing suit for specific performance restored---No order as to costs. Hanifan Bibi and others v. Muhammad Tayyab, Civil Revision No.562-D of 2015, Lahore High Court, Multan Bench, heard on 23.06.2026 and announced on 30.06.2026, approved for reporting.

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----O.XXIII, R.1---Withdrawal of suit---Withdrawal simpliciter and withdrawal with liberty to institute fresh suit---Distinction---Withdrawal simpliciter reflected plaintiff’s decision not to pursue claim and attracted bar against fresh suit under sub-rule (3)---Withdrawal with permission to sue afresh protected plaintiff from such bar and could be granted only where Court was satisfied that suit must fail because of formal defect or that other sufficient grounds existed---Both situations did not stand on same footing. (b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----O.XXIII, R.1(2)---Permission to withdraw with liberty to file fresh suit---Judicial discretion---Discretion conferred upon Court was judicial, structured and not arbitrary---Court had to independently examine defect or ground asserted by plaintiff and determine whether it fell within clause (a) or clause (b) of sub-rule (2)---Permission could not be granted merely as a matter of course. (c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----O.XXIII, R.1(2)---Speaking order---Requirement of reasons---Statutory satisfaction could not remain confined to mind of Court and had to be reflected from order itself---Mere recital that Court was satisfied or that valid reasons existed did not fulfill legal requirement---Order had to identify alleged defect or sufficient ground and explain why it justified liberty to institute a fresh suit. (d) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----O.XXIII, R.1(2)---Formal defect or other sufficient ground---Plaintiff merely stated that suit suffered from “some legal defects” and that plaint had been drafted on wrong facts contrary to his instructions---Neither nature of defect nor manner in which suit was likely to fail was specified---Trial Court failed to determine whether ground constituted formal defect under clause (a) or other sufficient ground under clause (b)---Permission granted without such determination was legally unsustainable. (e) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----O.XXIII, R.1(2)---Absence of objection by defendant---Effect---No-objection or concession by opposite party could be a relevant circumstance but could not substitute independent judicial satisfaction required by statute---Permission to institute fresh suit was not to be granted merely because defendant did not oppose request---Court remained duty-bound to record reasons showing that statutory conditions were fulfilled. (f) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----O.XXIII, R.1(2)---Expression “in the interest of justice”---Use of broad formula without analysis could not cure absence of reasons---Justice according to law required that basis for exercise of discretion be discernible from order---Trial Court’s reliance upon general phrase, without identifying defect or sufficient ground, rendered order non-speaking. (g) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----O.XXIII, R.1---Composite request to withdraw with permission to file afresh---Indivisibility---Where plaintiff applied to withdraw suit only on condition that liberty to institute fresh suit was granted, request was one composite and indivisible prayer---Court could either accept both limbs or refuse permission and allow suit to continue---It could not treat withdrawal as final while refusing liberty unless plaintiff thereafter independently elected to withdraw simpliciter. Cited Cases: • Karim Gul and another v. Shahzad Gul and another 1970 SCMR 141 • Haji Abdur Rashid Sowdagar v. S.M. Lolita Roy PLD 1959 SC (Pak.) 281 • Muhammad Yar (deceased) through legal representatives and others v. Muhammad Amin (deceased) through legal representatives and others 2013 SCMR 464 (h) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----O.XXIII, R.1(2)---Order granting liberty without reasons---Legal consequence---Invalidity of permission did not automatically convert order into withdrawal simpliciter---Plaintiff had never elected to abandon suit without liberty---Proper course was to set aside impugned order, restore suit to its earlier stage and require Trial Court to reconsider composite request through a reasoned order. (i) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----O.XXIII, R.1(2)---Refusal of permission---Procedure---If Court was not satisfied that formal defect or sufficient ground existed, it had to decline liberty while leaving suit pending---Plaintiff would then remain free to continue suit or thereafter elect to withdraw it simpliciter---Court could not prejudicially split composite request and impose unconditional withdrawal upon plaintiff. (j) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----O.XXIII, R.1---Suit at evidence stage---Heightened scrutiny---Where suit had crossed pleadings and issues and was fixed for plaintiff’s evidence, Court was required to exercise greater care before granting liberty to file fresh suit---Reasons had to demonstrate that permission was based upon genuine statutory defect and not an attempt to escape evidentiary or procedural consequences. (k) Civil revision---Order permitting withdrawal with liberty to file afresh---Revisional scrutiny---Trial Court granted permission without identifying formal defect or sufficient ground and Revisional Court affirmed order without examining absence of reasons---Both Courts acted with material illegality and irregularity in exercise of jurisdiction---Orders were liable to be set aside. (l) Adjournment---Illness of counsel---Sufficient cause---Bare request received one day before hearing, containing vague assertion of illness without identifying ailment or producing medical material, did not constitute sufficient cause---Party had adequate opportunity to engage alternate counsel or appear personally---Adjournment was not claimable as a matter of right and request was rightly declined. (m) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----O.XXIII, R.1---Withdrawal after adjudication on merits---Distinction---Cases where suit had already culminated in a decree after full adjudication stood on different footing---A concluded judgment could not be effaced indirectly through withdrawal proceedings---Such precedents did not govern a suit still pending at plaintiff’s evidence stage when composite request for withdrawal with liberty was made. Distinguished Cases: • Haji Muhammad Boota and others v. Member (Revenue), Board of Revenue, Punjab and others PLD 2003 SC 979 • Khawaja Bashir Ahmed and Sons (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Messrs Martrade Shipping and Transport and others PLD 2021 SC 373 • Muhammad Ashraf and others v. Muhammad Khan and others 2025 SCMR 1066 (n) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----O.XXIII, R.1---Principles governing permission---Plaintiff was required to disclose formal defect or other sufficient ground; Court had to examine whether stated ground fell within statutory parameters; order had to record reasons demonstrating satisfaction; and if permission was refused, suit was to continue unless plaintiff thereafter withdrew it simpliciter---Permission granted without reasons was unsustainable but did not extinguish suit. Disposition---Constitutional petition allowed---Order dated 23.06.2025 passed by Civil Judge, Wazirabad, and order dated 20.02.2026 passed by Additional District Judge, Wazirabad, set aside---Suit deemed pending before Trial Court at stage existing on 23.06.2025---Trial Court directed to reconsider plaintiff’s request for withdrawal with liberty to institute fresh suit, if still pressed, through a speaking order in accordance with law---In case permission was refused, suit to proceed unless plaintiff thereafter elected to withdraw it simpliciter---Parties directed to appear before Trial Court on 22.07.2026. Ghulam Hussain v. Additional District & Sessions Judge, Wazirabad and others, Writ Petition No.19357 of 2026, Lahore High Court, Lahore, heard on 30.06.2026, approved for reporting.

Summary: (a) Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972----S.3(2), proviso---Intra-Court Appeal---Maintainability---Where order challenged before Single Judge had been passed by a statutory forum in exercise of appellate, revisional, review or reconsideration jurisdiction, judgment rendered under Art.199 of Constitution was not amenable to Intra-Court Appeal---Nature and substance of statutory jurisdiction, rather than nomenclature assigned to remedy, determined applicability of bar. (b) Punjab Procurement Rules, 2014----Rr.35, 38, 67 & 67-A---Technical evaluation of bids---Statutory remedial mechanism---Technical proposal rejected by Technical Evaluation Committee could be challenged before Grievance Redressal Committee, which possessed authority to uphold, set aside or modify decision and recommend scrapping of procurement process---Aggrieved bidder could thereafter submit representation before Managing Director, Punjab Public Procurement Regulatory Authority, whose decision was final and binding---Remedies were substantive and effective rather than cosmetic or illusory. (c) Punjab Procurement Rules, 2014----Rr.67 & 67-A---Complaint and representation---Character of jurisdiction---Where statutory forums could re-examine record and affirm, vary, reverse or set aside decision of Technical Evaluation Committee, remedies partook character of appeal, review or reconsideration for purposes of proviso to S.3(2) of Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972---Use of terms “complaint” or “representation” did not alter appellate substance of jurisdiction. Cited Cases: • Messrs Shahzadi Polypropylene Industries v. Federation of Pakistan 2017 PTD 2019 • Muhammad Ashraf Saeed v. Habib Bank Limited 2018 PLC (C.S.) Note 13 • Hassan Mahmood v. Habib Bank Limited 2020 PLC (C.S.) 272 • Federation of Pakistan v. Messrs Sahib Jee 2017 PTD 1481 (d) Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972----S.3(2), proviso---Expression “original order”---Meaning---Original order was order with which proceedings under relevant statutory framework commenced---Procurement proceedings commenced when Technical Evaluation Committee rejected technical bids under R.38---Subsequent orders passed by Grievance Redressal Committee and Managing Director, PPRA, upon statutory challenges were not original administrative determinations. Cited Case: • Muhammad Abdullah v. Deputy Settlement Commissioner, Centre-I, Lahore PLD 1985 SC 107 (e) Punjab Procurement Rules, 2014----R.67-A---Order of Managing Director, PPRA---Original or appellate order---Managing Director set aside decisions of Technical Evaluation Committee and Grievance Redressal Committee and declared previously rejected bidders technically responsive---Such order arose from successive statutory scrutiny and plainly exercised reconsideration jurisdiction---It could not be treated as original order merely because Managing Director was located outside procuring agency. (f) Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972----S.3(2), proviso---Special statute providing complete remedies---Where special statutory framework created successive forums capable of reviewing and reversing original decision, scope of Intra-Court Appeal stood extinguished unless legislature expressly conferred such right---Procurement laws provided no independent right of Intra-Court Appeal. Cited Cases: • Frontier Holdings Limited v. Petroleum Exploration (Pvt.) Ltd. 2025 SCMR 1907 • International Islamic University, Islamabad v. Syed Naveed Altaf 2024 SCMR 472 (g) Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972----S.3(2), proviso---Representation---Omission of particular nomenclature---Absence of word “representation” from statutory text did not preserve right of Intra-Court Appeal where representation involved full statutory reconsideration of decision below---Controlling test was whether authority possessed jurisdiction to reconsider, uphold, reverse or modify prior determination. (h) Constitution of Pakistan----Art.189---Binding precedent---Supreme Court had authoritatively clarified that complete and self-contained mechanism of appeal, review or reconsideration excluded Intra-Court Appeal unless expressly provided---High Court was bound to apply such dictum while determining maintainability. (i) Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972----S.3(2), proviso---Settlement proceedings---Principle from precedent---Where relevant statute provided adjudicatory or remedial mechanism and excluded further challenge, Intra-Court Appeal was barred---Principle equally supported conclusion that statutory procurement remedies having attributes of appeal or review attracted legislative bar. Cited Case: • Karim Bibi v. Hussain Bakhsh PLD 1984 SC 344 (j) Punjab Procurement Rules, 2014----Rr.38, 67 & 67-A---Successive tiers of scrutiny---Technical Evaluation Committee constituted first decision-making tier; Grievance Redressal Committee constituted first statutory corrective tier; and Managing Director, PPRA, constituted final statutory reconsideration tier---Order ultimately challenged under Art.199 had thus emerged from completed statutory remedial hierarchy. (k) Intra-Court Appeal---Preliminary objection---Effect---Question of maintainability went to root of proceedings and was required to be decided before examination of merits relating to technical responsiveness, expert evaluation or jurisdictional correctness of procurement decision---Once statutory bar was attracted, merits did not call for adjudication in appeal. Disposition---Intra-Court Appeal dismissed as not maintainable under proviso to S.3(2) of Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972---No order as to costs. M/s Popular International v. Government of Punjab and others, Intra-Court Appeal No.17271 of 2026, Lahore High Court, Lahore, heard on 30.06.2026, approved for reporting.