Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----Ss. 92(1)(f), (g) & (h)---Public charitable trust---Sale of trust property---Scope of Court’s jurisdiction---Trust deed neither expressly authorized nor prohibited sale of trust property---Trustees sought permission to sell leasehold plot and apply proceeds towards objects of trust---Section 92(1), C.P.C. was couched in broad terms and empowered Court to authorize whole or any part of trust property to be let, sold, mortgaged or exchanged---Where power of sale was not conferred by trust deed, Court could authorize sale under S.92(1)(f), C.P.C.---Sale proceeds were required to be applied exclusively towards objects stated in trust deed and could not be diverted to any other purpose---Law would not allow charitable intention of settlor to fail merely because trust lacked resources to construct institution upon originally allotted plot---Permission to sell could consequently be granted subject to a scheme ensuring realization of original charitable objects. Cited Cases: • Messrs Muhammad Ismail v. Messrs Sir Jahangir Kothari Trust 2011 CLC 1847 • Oldham Borough Council v. Attorney-General [1993] Ch 210 (b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----S.92(1)(f), (g) & (h)---Cy-pres doctrine---Application---Power to authorize sale and settle scheme---Cy-pres enabled Court, where precise fulfilment of charitable purpose had become impossible, inexpedient or impracticable, to substitute a mode of application as near as possible to donor’s original intention---Doctrine was based upon judicial determination of settlor’s charitable intention in changed circumstances and not upon arbitrary disregard of donor’s wishes---Section 92, C.P.C. gave Court wider latitude than common law and permitted Court simultaneously to authorize sale under clause (f), settle a scheme under clause (g) and grant further or other relief under clause (h)---Permission to sell trust property and application of cy-pres doctrine were not mutually exclusive under S.92, C.P.C.---Where statute conferred broader jurisdiction, Court was not required to reintroduce restrictions derived from common law. Cited Cases: • Kandawalla Trust through Trustees and another v. The State 2013 MLD 640 • Oldham Borough Council v. Attorney-General [1993] Ch 210 (c) Charitable trust---Sale of immovable trust property---Whether particular property was indispensable to charitable purpose---Test---Relevant consideration was whether qualities or characteristics of property itself made its retention essential to objects of charitable gift---Property would ordinarily be indispensable where its historical, architectural, environmental or other unique qualities constituted the very basis of charitable purpose---Where charitable purposes could equally be carried out upon another property, sale of original property did not amount to alteration or destruction of trust objects---Trust deed contemplated establishment of madrassa, Islamic school and college for Islamic, general and medical education, but allotted plot possessed no unique quality or characteristic making its retention indispensable---Objects of trust could be realized upon other suitable land---Sale of plot would not defeat or alter original charitable intention of author of trust. Cited Case: • Oldham Borough Council v. Attorney-General [1993] Ch 210 (d) Islamabad Capital Territory Trust Act, 2020----S.21---Trust property---Power of sale or disposal---Trust could hold movable and immovable property in its own name and could sell or otherwise dispose of property held by it---Responsibility for such sale or purchase rested upon trustees---Statutory power of trustees to sell property was recognized, subject to terms of trust and directions of Court under S.92, C.P.C. (e) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----Ss.92 & 107, O.XLI, R.33---Non-contentious suit concerning administration of public trust---Dismissal on technical grounds---Powers of second appellate Court---Trial Court dismissed suit on ground that trustees had not produced NOC from Building Control Directorate of Capital Development Authority, while First Appellate Court upheld dismissal because original allotment letter had not been produced---Such grounds were untenable where authenticity of available documents was not disputed and trustees had consistently maintained that CDA consent and NOCs would be obtained after permission of Court to sell property---Question before Courts was whether sale should be authorized under S.92, C.P.C., and not whether trustees had conclusively proved title through every original document---Title and leasehold interest stood demonstrated on balance of probabilities through CDA renewal letter of May, 2023---In a non-contentious suit, Courts could have directed production of required documents instead of dismissing suit and appeal---Second Appellate Court, exercising powers under S.107 read with O.XLI, R.33, C.P.C., possessed powers of Court of first instance and First Appellate Court and could consider attested allotment and renewal documents placed upon record. (f) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----S.92(1)(f), (g) & (h)---Administration of charitable trust---Sale of trust property---Protective and supervisory scheme---Court authorized trustees to sell plot subject to obtaining CDA consent, permission for change of land use, determination of conversion charges and transfer dues, and issuance of necessary NOCs---CDA was directed not to withhold or deny such permissions unreasonably---Plot was to be independently valued by a valuer approved by Pakistan Banks’ Association, publicly marketed for at least sixty days and sold through auction---Reserve price was not to be less than eighty percent of valuation without prior approval of Court and highest compliant offer was to be accepted unless otherwise approved---Sale proceeds were to be deposited in trust account jointly operated by at least two trustees---Within six months of sale, trustees were required to utilize at least twenty-five percent of proceeds for purchase of suitable land and at least another twenty-five percent for commencement and completion of facilities advancing one or more objects of trust---Proceeds could be applied only towards objects enumerated in trust deed. (g) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----S.92(1)(g) & (h)---Charitable trust---Preservation of permanent capital---Continuing supervisory jurisdiction---Approximately fifty percent, with variation of ten percent, of net sale proceeds was to remain preserved as permanent capital and could be invested only in Government securities, National Savings instruments, Islamic Sukuk, scheduled bank deposits and low to medium-risk mutual funds rated “A” by an SECP-approved credit-rating agency---High-risk equity investments were excluded and not more than fifteen percent of permanent capital could be invested in any single permitted category---Islamabad High Court retained supervisory jurisdiction over implementation of scheme---Trust was required to submit annual progress reports and audited accounts to Advocate General, who was to bring any matter of concern before Court---Trustees were granted liberty to approach Court in case of difficulty or for further directions. Disposition---Regular Second Appeal allowed---Judgments and decrees of Courts below set aside---Trustees authorized under S.92(1)(f), C.P.C. to sell trust property subject to directions and supervisory scheme framed under S.92(1)(g) and (h), C.P.C. Aslam Khan and another v. Taleem ul Quran ul Kareem and others, Regular Second Appeal No.7 of 2026, Islamabad High Court, decided on 03.06.2026 and announced in open Court on 09.07.2026, approved for reporting.

Summary: (a) Supreme Court Rules, 1980----O. XXXIII, R. 6 & O. XV, R. 7---Petition for leave to appeal---Maintainability---Petition instituted against respondent who had died prior to its institution---Proceedings against dead person a nullity---Substitution of legal heirs not sought by petitioners---Dissenting note---Respondent died on 22.09.2021 during pendency of constitutional petition before the High Court, and impugned judgment dated 26.10.2022 recorded the factum of his death---Legal heirs brought the death to notice of the High Court through contempt proceedings on 04.05.2023, yet petitioners filed no application for substitution, and even after legal heirs filed C.M.A. No.2812 of 2025 under O. XXXIII, R. 6 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1980, petitioners neither applied to bring legal heirs on record nor filed an amended memo of parties---Held, that judicial proceedings could not validly be initiated against a deceased person, who is not a juristic entity capable of being impleaded; proceedings so instituted are void ab initio unless the defect is cured by substitution of legal representatives in the manner prescribed by law---Where lis is against a sole dead respondent, it is still-born, a nullity and not a curable defect, whereas where it is against several respondents, it is valid qua those alive and defective only qua the deceased---Petition, having been instituted and prosecuted against a person who had already expired without impleading or substituting his legal heirs, suffered from an incurable defect going to its root and was not maintainable---All proceedings undertaken pursuant thereto, including orders passed during pendency, were without lawful authority, coram non judice and a nullity---Consequently, C.M.A. No.2812 of 2025 could not be allowed or dilated upon, and the order passed thereon (as well as the short order in that regard) was coram non judice. Cited Cases: • Muhammad Yar deceased through legal heirs v. Muhammad Amin deceased through legal heirs 2013 SCMR 464 • Malik Bashir Ahmad Khan v. Qasim Ali PLD 2003 Lahore 615 • Hafiz Brothers (Pvt) Ltd. v. Pakistan Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation Ltd. 2001 SCMR 1 • Mehar Muhammad v. Deputy Settlement Commissioner 1979 SCMR 182 • Nasim Akhtar v. Abdul Rashid Khan 2009 SCMR 12 • Pakistan through Secretary Establishment Division v. Ziaul Haq Malik 1997 SCMR 576 • Mst. Dani v. Deputy Settlement Commissioner Vehari 1990 SCMR 553 • Mohammad Sulaiman v. Muhammad Ismail AIR 1966 SC 792 (b) Compulsory Service in the Armed Forces Ordinance, 1971----S. 9A---Armed Forces service---Counting of previous service for seniority and allied benefits---Non obstante clause---Waiver, estoppel and laches---Observations on merits by dissenting Judge---Respondent had approached the competent authority on 07.08.1994 for benefit under S. 9A, and last rejection of his representation was on 29.04.2011, whereafter constitutional petition was filed---Held, that S. 9A opens with a non obstante clause and uses the mandatory expression "shall be entitled", leaving no discretion with employer; failure of employer to discharge statutory obligation cannot extinguish or diminish the vested statutory right---No estoppel lies against a statute; statutory right created in public interest cannot be defeated by acquiescence, omission, delay, consent or alleged waiver---Plea of laches misconceived, as each rejection of representation furnished fresh cause of action and continuing denial of statutory benefit was a continuing wrong attracting S. 23 of the Limitation Act, 1908. Cited Cases: • 2021 SCMR 678 (c) Oil and Gas Development Company Limited (Conversion) Ordinance, 2001----Ss. 4(1)(c) & 5---Successor company---Liabilities of predecessor Corporation---Held, that OGDCL was deemed to have taken over all contractual rights, licences, concessions, liabilities and obligations of the erstwhile Corporation by operation of law, and, being statutory successor, could not evade liabilities lawfully accrued against OGDC and remained bound to satisfy respondent's entitlement under S. 9A of the Ordinance of 1971 in accordance with law. Disposition: Dissenting note by Syed Arshad Hussain Shah, J.---Petition dismissed as not maintainable, having been instituted against a person who had died before institution; all proceedings and orders thereon, including those relating to C.M.A. No.2812 of 2025, held coram non judice and a nullity; even on merits, respondent held entitled to benefit under S. 9A and OGDCL bound as statutory successor; judgment of the High Court upheld. Approved for Reporting.

Summary: (a) Balochistan Government Initial Appointment to Civil Service Posts (Age and Relaxation of Upper Age Limit) Rules, 2012----R. 4(1)(ii)---Serving civil servant---Automatic relaxation of upper age limit---Petitioner, a Medical Officer (BPS-17) appointed on 10.6.2011, applied for posts of Senior Lecturer, Assistant Professor (Pulmonology), Senior Registrar (Pulmonology) and Chest Specialist (all BPS-18) under Advertisement No.1 of 2026, and her applications were rejected by the online portal as overage under the upper age limit of 43 years notified on 5.8.2025; High Court dismissed her writ petition in limine---Held, that R. 4(1)(ii) prescribes automatic relaxation of five years, up to the age of 50 years, for civil servants who have completed two years continuous regular Government service on the closing date for receipt of applications; the relaxation is by its own terms automatic, is a statutory entitlement of every candidate in the category and is not dependent on any discretionary order or executive approval---Petitioner, in continuous Government service since 2011, fell within the category; her eligibility had to be examined not against the Notification in isolation but against the entire statutory scheme governing age relaxation for serving civil servants---With date of birth 2.11.1982, availing the five-year relaxation brought her within the permissible age limit, she could not be treated as overage, and rejection of her applications by the portal, which applied only the Notification of 5.8.2025 without reference to the statutory relaxation independently available to her, could not be sustained. (b) Balochistan Government Initial Appointment to Civil Service Posts (Age and Relaxation of Upper Age Limit) Rules, 2012----R. 4(6)---Entitlement to relaxation under more than one category---Option of most beneficial category---Notification of 5.8.2025 fixing upper age limit of 43 years---Harmonious construction---Held, that R. 4(6) entitles a candidate qualifying for relaxation under more than one head to elect the category most beneficial to her, and is a beneficial, candidate-protective provision whose operation nothing in the Notification or any other rule or law purports to exclude---Two sources of relaxation were simultaneously available, namely the general upper age limit of 43 years fixed by the Notification of 5.8.2025 (issued under sub-rule (5) read with sub-rule (6) of R. 4 and in relaxation of sub-rule (3) of R. 4) and the five-year relaxation of R. 4(1)(ii); since the Notification does not expressly or impliedly repeal, override or occupy the field covered by R. 4(1)(ii) read with R. 4(6), both must be construed harmoniously and not as conflicting, and the petitioner was entitled under R. 4(6) to elect whichever operates more beneficially---To allow the Notification silently to override a specific subsisting statutory relaxation without express words of exclusion would render R. 4(1)(ii) and R. 4(6) wholly redundant and deprive serving civil servants of a benefit the Rules were designed to confer. (c) Service matter---Government bound to implement statutory rules until repealed---Arbitrary deprivation of right to be considered for appointment---Reiterating the position restated in F.C.P.L.A. No.300 of 2025, it is within the exclusive domain of the Government/Executive to frame, amend or repeal statutory rules and policies governing public service, but once such rules are promulgated the Government/authorities are under a corresponding legal obligation to adhere to and implement them in their true letter and spirit unless repealed---Rule 4(1)(ii) of the Rules of 2012 remained in force, neither repealed nor superseded by the Notification of 5.8.2025 or any other statutory instrument; respondents, having promulgated the Rules and left them un-repealed, were bound to implement them and were not at liberty to apply the Notification in isolation---Rejection of petitioner's applications on the sole ground of overage, without regard to relaxation available under R. 4(1)(ii), amounted to arbitrary and unlawful deprivation of her right to be considered for appointment in accordance with law. Cited Cases: • F.C.P.L.A. No.300 of 2025 Disposition: Petition converted into appeal and allowed; petitioner held entitled to opt for five years' relaxation in upper age limit under R. 4(1)(ii) of the Rules of 2012 and to be within the prescribed age limit; respondents directed to entertain her applications and allow her to participate in the examinations/tests for the posts applied for; appeal arises from order dated 23.2.2026 of the High Court of Balochistan, Quetta in Constitution Petition No.197 of 2026 dismissing the writ petition in limine. Approved for Reporting.

Summary: (a) Pakistan Prison Rules, 1978----Rr. 199, 140, 217(i) & (ii)---Prisons Act, 1894, S. 2(5)---Pakistan Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 57 & 302---Life imprisonment---Remission---Statutory limits---Sentence of life imprisonment reduced by remissions below fifteen years of actual imprisonment---Petitioner convicted under S. 302, P.P.C. and sentenced to life imprisonment; his nominal roll filed on 17th August 2023 showed 9 years, 4 months and 19 days actually undergone, remission (ordinary and special) of 15 years, 7 months and 18 days, and unexpired portion of only 5 months and 23 days---High Court allowed constitutional petitions and declared such remissions illegally granted---Held, that remission neither nullifies the conviction nor sets aside the sentence but lawfully shortens the duration of incarceration in accordance with law; remission system under R. 199 is a reformative mechanism rewarding good conduct, discipline and industry, not intended to alter the sentence imposed by a court---Under S. 57, P.P.C., life imprisonment is reckoned as twenty-five years for calculating fractions of terms of punishment; R. 217(i) bars total remission, ordinary and special, exceeding one-third of sentence save where Government, on recommendation of the Inspector-General, grants more in very exceptional and deserving cases; R. 217(ii) mandates that remission earned by a lifer shall not shorten the sentence to less than fifteen years; R. 140 requires every lifer to undergo a minimum of fifteen years substantive imprisonment---Restriction in R. 217(ii) is mandatory and admits of no exception save where the sentence is lawfully commuted, remitted or modified by the competent authority in exercise of constitutional or statutory powers---Remission is neither unfettered executive discretion nor absolute or unregulated; it must be exercised strictly within limits prescribed by law---Computation in the nominal roll was prima facie inconsistent with R. 217(ii) and R. 140, and remissions granted in excess did not meet the minimum threshold of fifteen years---Remission granted or computed in derogation of express provisions of the Prison Rules cannot confer an enforceable legal right, nor can the Court lend its imprimatur to administrative action travelling beyond authority conferred by law---Judicial sympathy cannot override statutory commands. (b) Constitution of Pakistan----Art. 45---Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, Ss. 401 & 402---Pakistan Prison Rules, 1978, R. 216---Categories of remission---Presidential clemency---Policy Guidelines, 2009---Held, that remission law has three sources, namely constitutional remission under Art. 45, statutory remission under Acts of Parliament or Provincial Legislatures, and administrative remission under the Prison Rules---General (ordinary) remission is an earned administrative reduction regulated by Chapter XVIII of the Prison Rules, 1978 (Rr. 215 to 218), granted by prison authorities under supervision of the Inspector General (Prisons)---Special remission is an extraordinary reduction granted on specified occasions or pursuant to executive or constitutional policy, traceable to Art. 45, Ss. 401 and 402, Cr.P.C. and R. 216, is not earned as of right, and accrues only to prisoners satisfying conditions and thresholds prescribed by the law or order granting it---Presidential power under Art. 45 enjoys supremacy over ordinary statutory provisions but its exercise is not self-executory; it is operationalized through the Prison Rules, 1978 and the Policy Guidelines, 2009 framed by the Federal Government pursuant to directions of the Supreme Court, which identify eligible categories, exclude convicts of specified heinous offences and provide objective standards against arbitrary exercise. Cited Cases: • Nazar Hussain v. The State PLD 2010 SC 1021 • Bhai Khan v. The State PLD 1992 SC 14 • Shah Hussain v. The State PLD 2009 SC 460 (c) Punishment---Objectives---Reformation and rehabilitation versus deterrence and retribution---Comparative jurisprudence---Held, that law of punishment serves retribution, deterrence, denunciation, rehabilitation and protection of society; remission scheme reflects a legislative balance between incentivising good conduct and preserving the integrity of judicially imposed punishment---Where remissions exceed prescribed limits or nullify the minimum period mandated for life convicts, penal consequences determined by the sentencing court are substantially diluted, deterrent and retributive purposes are undermined and legislative intent behind R. 217 is frustrated---Executive clemency and remission are meant to temper justice with mercy, not to supplant judicial sentences or render them illusory---Remission Rules are primarily based on the reformative principle, as held by the seven-member Bench in Nazar Hussain; reference made to Rule 4 of the Nelson Mandela Rules, to Joseph v. State of Kerala (Supreme Court of India), JR123 (Northern Ireland) (UK Supreme Court) and Vinter and Others v. United Kingdom (European Court of Human Rights), with R v. Bieber---Comparative authorities affirm that reformation should be encouraged but not at the expense of statutory limits enacted by the Legislature, and that executive clemency and remission must operate within the framework prescribed by law. Cited Cases: • Nazar Hussain v. The State PLD 2010 SC 1021 • Joseph v. State of Kerala 2023 INSC 843 • An application for Judicial Review by JR123 (Northern Ireland) [2025 UKSC 8] • Vinter and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], nos. 66069/09, 130/10 and 3896/10, ECHR 2013 • R v. Bieber [2009] 1 WLR 223 Disposition: Petition for leave to appeal found to be without merit and dismissed; consolidated judgment dated 31.05.2025 of the High Court of Balochistan, Quetta not interfered with. Approved for Reporting.

Summary: (a) Right of Access to Information Act, 2017----S. 18(3)---Right of Access to Information Rules, 2020, Rr. 9(3) & 26---Pakistan Information Commission---Composition---Quorum---Decision by Chief Information Commissioner and two Members---Validity---Petitioner contended that Commission, comprising three Commissioners under S. 18(3), was not validly constituted as its order was passed by two Members and Act provides no quorum of less than three---Held, no quorum is provided in the Act itself, but R. 9(3) of the Rules provides that two Commissioners shall constitute quorum for a meeting of the Commission, and in case of disagreement the decision of Chief Information Commissioner prevails---Rules were framed under R. 26 to give effect to provisions of the Act and were not in any manner in excess of the Act, as nowhere in the Act is it stipulated that all three Commissioners/Members must attend to carry out functions of Commission---At the time decision was handed down, Commission was validly functioning, with Chief Information Commissioner and two Members holding positions and no vacancy (as categorically submitted by counsel for respondent No. 2)---No legal or jurisdictional infirmity existed in composition of Commission when passing the impugned order. (b) Right of Access to Information Act, 2017----Ss. 2(ix) & 6---Companies Act, 2017---"Public Body"---Company registered under Companies Act and regulated by Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan---Appeal for access to record regarding payment and repayment of Chief Executive Officer---Maintainability---Former employee of Pakistan Microfinance Investment Company Limited sought record of payment and repayment of its Chief Executive Officer; Pakistan Information Commission allowed his appeal on 10.09.2024 directing information to be provided within ten days, and Islamabad High Court dismissed writ petition (W.P. No. 3638/2024) by judgment dated 28.01.2026---Held, Court was not in agreement with the reasons which prevailed with High Court---Commission dealt with the issue whether petitioner was "Public Body" in a cursory manner without giving reasons---High Court, on the basis of respondent's assumption, concluded that since 49% of shareholding/contribution was by Poverty Elevation Board, petitioner was "Public Body"---Plea of respondent No. 2 that petitioner was engaged in public functions and hence a "Public Body" was without substance---Petitioner, registered under Companies Act, 2017 and regulated by Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan, did not fall squarely within the domain of S. 2(ix) of the Act---Record sought, relating to payment and repayment of Chief Executive Officer, did not fall within ambit of S. 6 of the Act and could not form basis for approaching the Commission---High Court did not take this aspect into account at all, dealt with objections in a cursory manner and reached an erroneous conclusion---Decisions of the Commission and of High Court were not tenable. Disposition: Petition for leave to appeal converted into appeal and allowed; impugned judgment dated 28.01.2026 of Islamabad High Court in W.P. No. 3638/2024 and order dated 10.09.2024 of Pakistan Information Commission set aside. Approved for Reporting.

Summary: (a) Islamic law---Inheritance---Fraudulent mutation---Women's shares---West Pakistan Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1962----S.2A---Respondents Nos.1 and 2 instituted a civil suit for declaration, cancellation of mutation entries, possession, mesne profits and perpetual injunctions, claiming that they were daughters and legal heirs of Mst. Ayesha Bibi, who was daughter of Mst. Lal Khatoon, the sole daughter and legal heir of Mitha Khan, owner of agricultural lands in Deh Chattan Pati, Tehsil Jhatpat, and Deh Shahwah, who expired in 1938---It was alleged that Abdul Razzaq Khan, father of the plaintiffs from one marriage, fraudulently transferred the land into his own name and thereafter to his son from his second wife, which ultimately devolved upon legal heirs of Hafiz Aitbar Khan---Trial Court, vide judgment dated 11.11.2017 in Civil Suit No.133 of 2007, decreed the suit---High Court of Balochistan, Quetta, vide judgment dated 07.05.2024 in R.F.A. No.(S)09 of 2017, dismissed the appeal and upheld the judgment and decree---Held, that both Courts below, after examining the matter in great detail, categorically observed that Abdul Razzaq Khan and Wahid Bakhsh (sons of Haji Farid Khan) were not legal heirs of late Mitha Khan, whose rightful legal heir was his daughter Mst. Lal Khatoon, succeeded by Mst. Ayesha Bibi and subsequently by the respondents, who were the true and lawful owners of the property left by late Mitha Khan---Said two individuals, by playing fraud, got the land of late Mitha Khan mutated into their names---Fraud vitiates even the most solemn proceedings---If the foundational transfer is tainted with fraud, the ultimate devolution of the property upon the legal heirs of the fraudsters is itself illegal and unsustainable, and if the superstructure is illegal, the entire edifice built upon it must crumble---Fraudulent mutation was not within the knowledge of Mst. Ayesha Bibi, and when it came to her knowledge the respondents rightly approached the Court for cancellation of those mutation entries---Question of limitation raised by the petitioners was entirely misplaced---Lengthy cross-examination of plaintiffs' witnesses did not shatter their testimony---No Court order, on the basis of which petitioners pleaded transfer of the property, was ever placed on record---Abdul Razzaq Khan and Wahid Bakhsh failed to establish any blood relationship with late Mitha Khan---Their claim rested primarily on either an unproduced Court decision or a purported contract dated 31.10.1968 on oath, which they failed to prove through any cogent material---One of the grounds asserted for claiming the property exclusively was a purported custom that suppresses the inheritance rights of womenfolk---Petitioners failed to prove existence of any such customary law---Any such custom is directly antithetical to Islamic Sharia and the Islamic law of inheritance, which explicitly mandates and guarantees the inheritance rights of women---Even any Jirga decision on this aspect is patently illegal, as a Jirga cannot divest a legal heir of the rights enshrined under the Quran and Sunnah---Any Jirga proceeding held in derogation of the Holy Quran and the Sunnah is void ab initio---S.2A of the West Pakistan Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1962, explicitly condemns and invalidates any such customary action or tribal mechanism that contradicts Islamic injunctions. Fazal Ellahi v. Mst. Zainab Bi 2019 SCMR 1930 and Muhammad Yaqoob v. Mst. Sardaran Bibi PLD 2020 SC 338 ref. (b) Mutation entries---Not documents of title---Revenue and fiscal purpose---Even if mutation entries stood in the names of Abdul Razzaq Khan and Wahid Bakhsh or their legal heirs, the same cannot be construed as documents of title that would entitle them to hold the property to the absolute exclusion of the legally mandated heirs. Hakim Khan v. Nazeer Ahmad Lughmani 1992 SCMR 1832 ref. (c) Islamic law---Inheritance---Hanafi law---Sole surviving daughter---Quranic share (faraidh)---Residuaries (asaba)---Doctrine of Radd---Surah An-Nisa (verse 11)---Trial Court, while decreeing the suit, declared Mst. Ayesha Bibi to be the "exclusive owner" of the properties described in paragraphs 3 and 4 of the plaint, but simultaneously directed, in the operative part of the decree, that Tehsildar Dera Allah Yar should enter the names of the respondents and hand over possession of the suit lands according to their respective shares under the Hanafi law of inheritance---Those parts of the decree must necessarily be read harmoniously---It stood undisputed that late Mitha Khan was owner of the properties described in paragraphs 3 and 4 of the plaint---Upon his demise in 1938 he was survived only by his daughter, Mst. Lal Khatoon---Under the express injunction of Islam contained in Surah An-Nisa (verse 11) of the Holy Quran, as recognised under the settled Hanafi law governing succession of Sunni Muslims in Pakistan, a sole surviving daughter is entitled to one-half of her deceased father's leftover estate as her Quranic share (faraidh)---Any residue remaining thereafter devolves upon the residuaries (asaba) according to their respective entitlements under the Sharia and returns to the Quranic heir by operation of the doctrine of Radd only where no such residuaries exist---Upon the death of late Mitha Khan in 1938, Mst. Lal Khatoon would have inherited only one-half of his estate as her Quranic share---Upon the death of Mst. Lal Khatoon, her sole surviving daughter, Mst. Ayesha Bibi, would in her turn have inherited only one-half of the property held by her mother, the residue devolving upon the residuaries of Mst. Lal Khatoon, making her entitled to one-fourth of the estate originally owned by late Mitha Khan---Ayesha Bibi was survived by her son, Bostan Khan, and two daughters, the respondents/plaintiffs---After demise of Ayesha Bibi, one-half of her property devolved upon her son, Bostan Khan, while the remaining one-half devolved equally upon her two daughters---Present respondents, being daughters and legal heirs of Mst. Ayesha Bibi, shall succeed only to half of the property as was lawfully held by their mother under the Sharia at the time of her demise---Respondents are not the legal heirs of late Mitha Khan but derive their entitlement solely through Mst. Ayesha Bibi, and their entitlement is confined to their respective shares in the one-fourth interest held by Mst. Ayesha Bibi and does not extend to the entirety of the estate originally owned by late Mitha Khan---Concurrent findings and the decree of Trial Court, as upheld by High Court, affirmed subject to the clarification that entry of the suit lands in the names of the respondents in the revenue record, and handing over of possession thereof, shall be effected strictly in accordance with the Islamic law of inheritance mentioned above---Trial Court directed to reframe the decree sheet accordingly. (d) Constitution of Pakistan----Art.185(3)---Concurrent findings of fact---Scope of interference---Concurrent findings of fact are not to be interfered with by Supreme Court unless they are demonstrably shown to be suffering from misreading or non-reading of evidence, perversity, arbitrariness, or a jurisdictional defect---Impugned judgments did not suffer from any legal infirmity or error, except the actual determination of the rights of inheritance of respondents Nos.1 and 2 as explained, warranting interference under Art.185(3) of the Constitution. Muhammad Akhtar v. Mst. Manna 2001 SCMR 1700; Sardar Ali Khan v. State Bank of Pakistan 2022 SCMR 1454 and Faqir Syed Anwar ud Din v. Syed Raza Haider PLD 2025 SC 31 ref. Cited Cases: • Fazal Ellahi (deceased) through his legal heirs v. Mst. Zainab Bi 2019 SCMR 1930 • Muhammad Yaqoob v. Mst. Sardaran Bibi and others PLD 2020 SC 338 • Hakim Khan v. Nazeer Ahmad Lughmani and 10 others 1992 SCMR 1832 • Muhammad Akhtar v. Mst. Manna and 3 others 2001 SCMR 1700 • Sardar Ali Khan v. State Bank of Pakistan and others 2022 SCMR 1454 • Faqir Syed Anwar ud Din deceased through LRs v. Syed Raza Haider and others PLD 2025 SC 31 Disposition: Petition dismissed and leave to appeal refused, with modification in the impugned judgments and decrees that entry of suit lands in names of respondents and handing over of possession shall be effected strictly in accordance with Islamic law of inheritance as clarified, and Trial Court shall reframe the decree sheet accordingly; no order as to costs. (C.P. No.97-Q of 2024, announced at Islamabad on 13.05.2026, by Irfan Saadat Khan, J. (Jamal Khan Mandokhail, J. on the Bench); Approved for reporting)

Summary: (a) West Pakistan Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1962----S.2-A---Muslim inheritance---Rights of female heirs---Custom or tribal practice excluding women from inheritance---Validity---Property of deceased Muslim was required to devolve strictly in accordance with injunctions of Islam and applicable Hanafi law---Any custom purporting to suppress, defeat or exclude inheritance rights of women was directly opposed to Islamic Sharia and could not be recognized by law---Petitioners failed to prove existence of alleged customary law under which male members could exclusively retain property to exclusion of female heirs---Section 2-A of the West Pakistan Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1962, invalidated customary action or tribal mechanism inconsistent with Islamic injunctions---Female heirs could not be deprived of their Quranic shares through custom, family arrangement, tribal practice or any other device. (b) Jirga---Decision affecting inheritance rights---Legal effect---A Jirga had no lawful authority to divest a legal heir of inheritance rights conferred by Holy Quran and Sunnah---Any Jirga proceeding or decision made in derogation of Islamic law of inheritance was patently illegal and void ab initio---Purported arrangement allegedly made on oath upon Holy Quran could not defeat lawful inheritance rights, particularly where such arrangement had not been proved through cogent evidence. (c) Fraud---Fraudulent mutation of inherited property---Effect upon subsequent devolution---Abdul Razzaq Khan and Wahid Bakhsh were not legal heirs of deceased Mitha Khan but had fraudulently represented themselves as such and procured mutation of his land in their names---Fraud vitiated even the most solemn proceedings---Where foundational transfer was tainted by fraud, subsequent devolution of property upon legal heirs of persons responsible for fraud was also illegal and unsustainable---When foundation of title was unlawful, entire superstructure erected upon it was bound to fall. Cited Cases: • Fazal Ellahi (deceased) through his legal heirs v. Mst. Zainab Bi 2019 SCMR 1930 • Muhammad Yaqoob v. Mst. Sardaran Bibi and others PLD 2020 SC 338 (d) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)----Fraudulent mutation---Limitation---Knowledge of fraud---Fraudulent mutation had not been within knowledge of Mst. Ayesha Bibi---Respondents approached Court for cancellation after mutation came to their knowledge---Objection regarding limitation was misplaced where right to sue arose upon discovery of fraudulent entries and no knowledge of fraud at an earlier stage was established. (e) Mutation---Revenue entries---Evidentiary value---Mutation entries were maintained for fiscal and revenue purposes and did not constitute documents of title---Mere existence of mutations in names of Abdul Razzaq Khan, Wahid Bakhsh or their successors could not confer ownership upon them or exclude legally entitled heirs---Revenue entries founded upon fraud carried no legal sanctity and were liable to cancellation. Cited Case: • Hakim Khan v. Nazeer Ahmad Lughmani and 10 others 1992 SCMR 1832 (f) Evidence---Claim of ownership through Court decision or private agreement---Proof---Petitioners asserted that property had been transferred to Abdul Razzaq Khan and Wahid Bakhsh through a Court decision, but no such order was produced---They also relied upon an alleged agreement dated 31.10.1968 but failed to establish it through cogent material---Neither alleged judicial transfer nor purported family arrangement could be acted upon in absence of legal proof---Petitioners also failed to establish any blood relationship between Abdul Razzaq Khan or Wahid Bakhsh and deceased Mitha Khan---Lengthy cross-examination of plaintiffs’ witnesses did not discredit their testimony regarding lawful line of succession. (g) Islamic law of inheritance---Hanafi law---Sole surviving daughter---Quranic share and residuary estate---Mitha Khan died leaving only his daughter, Mst. Lal Khatoon---Under Surah An-Nisa, verse 11, and settled Hanafi law, a sole surviving daughter inherited one-half of her deceased father’s estate as her Quranic share---Remaining residue devolved upon residuaries and would return to Quranic heir through doctrine of Radd only where no residuary existed---Upon death of Mst. Lal Khatoon, her sole daughter, Mst. Ayesha Bibi, similarly inherited one-half of property held by her mother, resulting in her entitlement to one-fourth of estate originally owned by Mitha Khan---Upon death of Mst. Ayesha Bibi, one-half of her property devolved upon her son, Bostan Khan, while remaining one-half devolved equally upon her two daughters---Respondent daughters were not direct legal heirs of Mitha Khan but derived entitlement through their mother, Mst. Ayesha Bibi---Their entitlement was confined to their respective shares in one-fourth interest lawfully held by their mother and did not extend to entire estate originally owned by Mitha Khan. (h) Civil decree---Declaration of exclusive ownership and distribution according to inheritance shares---Harmonious construction---Trial Court had declared Mst. Ayesha Bibi to be exclusive owner of properties described in plaint but had simultaneously directed Tehsildar to enter names of respondents and deliver possession according to their respective shares under Hanafi law---Both parts of decree were required to be read harmoniously---Expression “exclusive owner” could not enlarge inheritance beyond shares permitted by Sharia---Revenue entries and possession were to be effected strictly according to actual Islamic shares determined by Court---Trial Court was directed to reframe decree sheet accordingly. (i) Constitution of Pakistan----Art.185(3)---Concurrent findings of fact---Scope of interference by Supreme Court---Concurrent findings recorded by Trial Court and High Court were not to be disturbed unless shown to suffer from misreading or non-reading of evidence, perversity, arbitrariness or jurisdictional defect---Record established that findings regarding fraudulent mutations, absence of relationship with deceased and lawful succession of female heirs were based upon evidence and did not suffer from any such defect---No ground existed for interference under Art.185(3), except correction of actual quantum of inheritance shares. Cited Cases: • Muhammad Akhtar v. Mst. Manna and 3 others 2001 SCMR 1700 • Sardar Ali Khan v. State Bank of Pakistan and others 2022 SCMR 1454 • Faqir Syed Anwar ud Din deceased through LRs v. Syed Raza Haider and others PLD 2025 SC 31 Disposition---Petition for leave to appeal dismissed and leave refused---Concurrent judgments and decrees maintained subject to modification regarding actual inheritance shares---Respondents held entitled only to their respective shares in one-fourth interest inherited by their mother, Mst. Ayesha Bibi, and not to entirety of estate originally owned by Mitha Khan---Trial Court directed to reframe decree sheet and ensure revenue entries and delivery of possession strictly in accordance with Islamic law of inheritance---No order as to costs. Mst. Ameer Begum and others v. Rahima Khatoon and others, Civil Petition No.97-Q of 2024, Supreme Court of Pakistan, decided on 13.05.2026, approved for reporting.

Summary: The combined reading of the aforementioned provisions of Court Fees Act and sub-rule (3) of Rule 1 of Order XLVII CPC by placing the same in juxtaposition makes it clear that object and purpose of requiring affixation of court fee and deposit of security amount are based on entirely different concepts and requiring the simultaneous deposit of the same side by side for different purposes and intents does not tantamount to constitute double jeopardy by requisition of deposit of the same fee twice and cannot be set aside on the said ground. ---- (a) Court Fees Act (VII of 1870)----First Sched., Arts.3 & 4---Application for review of judgment---Court fee payable---Quantum---Review application presented on or after ninetieth day from date of decree was chargeable with fee equal to that leviable on plaint or memorandum of appeal---Review application presented before ninetieth day was chargeable with one-half of such fee---Distinction between Arts.3 and 4 depended solely upon time within which review application was instituted. (b) Court Fees Act (VII of 1870)----Ss.14 & 15---Court fee on review application---Nature and object---Refund---Court Fees Act was enacted to secure revenue for State and not to penalize litigants or provide technical weapon to one party against another---Where delayed review was not occasioned by applicant’s laches, Court could authorize refund of excess fee under S.14---Where review was admitted and former decision was reversed or modified because of mistake of law or fact, applicant was entitled to refund under S.15, subject to statutory exception concerning fresh evidence which could have been produced at original hearing. Cited Cases: • Siddique Khan and 2 others v. Abdul Shakoor Khan and another PLD 1984 SC 289 • Naik Muhammad and another v. Additional District Judge, Vehari and 5 others 1985 CLC 1969 Lahore • Muhammad Shafi v. Rehmat Ali 1985 CLC 432 Lahore • Rashid Ahmad and another v. Khurshid Ahmad Khawar and another 1985 CLC 274 Lahore • Sikandar Din v. Additional Commissioner (Revenue), Rawalpindi Division, Rawalpindi and 2 others 1987 CLC 2428 Lahore • Hafiz Muhammad Mubeen through legal heirs v. Government of Sindh through Deputy Commissioner, Sukkur and 5 others 2014 MLD 419 Sindh (c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)----S.122, O.XLVII, R.1(3)---Review petition---Cash security of Rs.5,000---Purpose and consequence---No review application could be entertained unless applicant furnished cash security of Rs.5,000, except where applicant had been declared an undischarged insolvent or pauper---Security was liable to forfeiture where review petition was dismissed at initial stage without notice to opposite party---Where review petition was dismissed after contest, security amount was payable to opposite party---Object of security requirement was to discourage frivolous, unnecessary and unwarranted review petitions and to compensate successful opposite party for being compelled to contest renewed litigation---Where review petition succeeded, security amount was returnable to petitioner as rule did not prescribe any penal consequence upon acceptance of review. Cited Case: • Tauqir Ahmed v. Peshawar High Court, Peshawar through Registrar and 3 others PLD 2026 Peshawar 13 (d) Court Fees Act (VII of 1870)----First Sched., Arts.3 & 4---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XLVII, R.1(3)---Review petition---Simultaneous payment of court fee and deposit of cash security---Double jeopardy---Applicability---Court fee and security deposit were founded upon entirely different statutory concepts, objects and consequences---Court fee constituted revenue payable to State and was subject to refund in circumstances provided by Ss.14 and 15 of Court Fees Act---Cash security was a refundable deposit intended to deter frivolous review proceedings and compensate opposite party where review failed---Requirement to pay prescribed court fee and simultaneously furnish cash security did not amount to requisition of same fee twice and did not constitute double jeopardy---Office objection demanding half of applicable court fee together with Rs.5,000 security was legally sustainable. Disposition---Office objection sustained---Petitioner granted fifteen days to remove deficiency by paying requisite court fee and depositing security amount---Office directed to number review petition and place it for hearing on judicial side upon removal of objection within stipulated period; otherwise matter was to be consigned to record. Shabbira Bebe v. Shabbir Ahmad and others, Diary No.64893 of 2026, Lahore High Court, decided on 06.07.2026, approved for reporting.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan----Arts.199, 9, 10-A, 14, 18, 25 & 27---Punjab Public Service Commission Regulations, 2022, Regln.28(b)---Recruitment to Provincial Management Service from Ministerial Quota---Shortlisting of candidates for interview in ratio of 1:5---Constitutional challenge---Advertisement expressly provided that candidates securing prescribed qualifying marks in written examination would be called for interview in ratio of 1:5---Petitioners applied, appeared in examination and subjected themselves to entire selection process with knowledge of said condition---Shortlisting criterion had been uniformly applied to all candidates---Policy, rules, regulations and criterion contained in advertisement did not warrant interference at advanced stage of recruitment process. (b) Service law---Recruitment---Qualifying marks---Right to interview---Candidate obtaining minimum qualifying marks merely became eligible for further consideration and did not acquire vested or indefeasible right to be called for interview---Recruiting authority could, for selection from amongst eligible candidates, prescribe a shortlisting standard higher than minimum eligibility requirement---Candidates who failed to fall within prescribed ratio of 1:5 could not demand interview merely because they had obtained minimum qualifying marks. Cited Case: • State of Haryana v. Subash Chander Marwaha and others (1974) 3 SCC 220 (c) Constitution of Pakistan----Art.199---Recruitment process---Challenge to advertised condition after participation---Estoppel, waiver and acquiescence---Candidate who consciously participated in recruitment process under expressly notified terms and conditions could not, after an unfavourable result, challenge criterion governing same process---Petitioners participated with open eyes and raised no objection before examination or during selection process---Acceptance of advertisement and participation thereunder amounted to acquiescence and attracted principles of estoppel and waiver---Candidate could not simultaneously accept benefit of selection process and subsequently assail its governing condition. Cited Case: • Waheed Khan and others v. Chief Secretary, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and others 2021 PLC (C.S.) 1114 (d) Estoppel---Doctrine of approbation and reprobation---Applicability to recruitment---Person having choice between two courses of conduct and electing one could not subsequently resile from such election---Petitioners certified in their application forms that they had read, understood and accepted all requirements, conditions and general instructions governing advertised posts---Having expressly undertaken to abide by applicable rules, regulations, directions and procedures, petitioners could not approbate by participating in examination and reprobate by challenging shortlisting criterion after failing to secure position within prescribed ratio. Cited Case: • Sardar Ali Khan v. State Bank of Pakistan and others 2022 SCMR 1454 (e) Delegated legislation---Publication in official Gazette---Challenge to amendment in Punjab Public Service Commission Regulations, 2022---Shortlisting criterion independently and expressly incorporated in recruitment advertisement before submission of applications---Petitioners possessed prior notice of criterion and voluntarily participated subject thereto---Authorities cited regarding enforceability of statutory instruments upon publication in official Gazette were distinguishable in peculiar circumstances, as impugned action was founded upon an express condition of advertisement accepted by all candidates---Petitioners could not invoke alleged non-publication of amendment to challenge criterion only after participating unsuccessfully in recruitment process. Distinguished Cases: • Dr. Shahbaz Mujtaba Ghauri v. Punjab Public Service Commission through Chairman, Lahore and 2 others 2020 PLC (C.S.) 127 • Messrs Bio Leads (Pvt.) Limited and others v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Law and Justice and others 2025 CLC 1715 • Tariq Aziz-ud-Din and others, Human Rights Cases Nos.8340, 9504-G and 13936-G 2010 SCMR 1301 • Messrs Mustafa Impex, Karachi and others v. Government of Pakistan through Secretary Finance, Islamabad and others PLD 2016 SC 808 (f) Constitution of Pakistan----Art.199---Public recruitment---Policy, shortlisting and selection---Scope of judicial review---Formulation of recruitment policy, framing of rules and shortlisting of candidates fell primarily within domain of competent authority and Punjab Public Service Commission---Constitutional Court could examine such action only on grounds of illegality, mala fide, arbitrariness or violation of law---No discrimination or arbitrary application was established where same 1:5 ratio had been disclosed beforehand and uniformly applied to all candidates---Court would not substitute its own assessment for recruitment policy merely because some candidates obtaining qualifying marks had not been shortlisted. Disposition---Writ petition and connected writ petitions dismissed for being devoid of merit---Criterion requiring candidates qualifying written examination to be called for interview in ratio of 1:5 maintained---No direction issued to call petitioners for interview. Muhammad Naeem and 21 others v. Punjab Public Service Commission through its Secretary and 3 others, Writ Petition No.9086 of 2026 along with connected petitions, Lahore High Court, decided on 06.07.2026, approved for reporting.

Summary: (a) Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)----S. 7E (inserted through Finance Act, 2022)---Constitutionality---Challenge before provincial High Courts---Peshawar High Court and High Court of Balochistan declared S. 7E ultra vires the Constitution and struck it down; Islamabad High Court, without invalidating the provision in its entirety, read it down and declared S. 7E(2) ultra vires; a learned Single Judge of the Lahore High Court allowed the writ petitions but a Division Bench reversed in intra-court appeals and dismissed the petitions; the High Court of Sindh dismissed the constitutional petitions---Taxpayers assailed the judgments of the Lahore High Court and High Court of Sindh, while the Federal Government/Federal Board of Revenue/Commissioner Inland Revenue challenged the judgments of the Peshawar, Balochistan and Islamabad High Courts---Held, by short order after hearing counsel at considerable length and upon due deliberation, that S. 7E of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 is ultra vires the Constitution and is struck down as void ab initio---Reasons to be recorded separately; the short order itself does not set out the constitutional provisions or reasoning on which the finding rests. (b) Constitution of Pakistan----Art. 175E(5)---Requisition of cases pending before High Court---Pending Intra-Court Appeals before division bench of Islamabad High Court (against judgment of Single Judge) and two writ petitions were requisitioned by order dated 06.04.2026 in the light of Art. 175E(5) of the Constitution and transferred to the Federal Constitutional Court, to be disposed of in accordance with the decision on S. 7E. (c) Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)----S. 7E---Consequential relief---Actions, proceedings and notices initiated under the struck-down provision---Held, that all actions, proceedings and notices initiated or taken by the FBR/Commissioner Inland Revenue under S. 7E are declared to be without lawful authority and are set aside. Disposition: S. 7E of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 held ultra vires the Constitution and struck down as void ab initio; all civil petitions filed by taxpayers against the judgments of the High Court of Sindh and the Lahore High Court converted into appeals and allowed; civil petitions filed by FBR/Commissioner Inland Revenue against the judgments of the Peshawar High Court and the High Court of Balochistan dismissed; transferred cases disposed of accordingly; all actions, proceedings and notices under S. 7E set aside; detailed reasons to be recorded separately. Short Order in C.P.L.A. No.1442-K of 2022 and connected petitions (hearing 13, 14, 15, 27, 28, 29 and 30 April 2026), announced at Islamabad on 07.05.2026. Approved for Reporting.