Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---- ----O. XXIII, R.1---Withdrawal of suit---Withdrawal with permission to file fresh suit---Effect on earlier judgment and decree---Plaintiff’s right to abandon suit---Court’s discretion to grant permission for fresh suit---Held, that under O.XXIII, R.1, CPC, a plaintiff may withdraw his suit or abandon part of his claim, but if such withdrawal is without permission under sub-rule (2), he is precluded from instituting a fresh suit on the same subject-matter---Where permission is granted under sub-rule (2), the withdrawal protects the plaintiff from the restrictive consequences of O.II, R.2 and S.11, CPC---Grant of such permission is not a matter of right but a judicial discretion to be exercised only where the suit must fail by reason of a formal defect or where other sufficient grounds exist for allowing a fresh suit---When a suit is withdrawn with permission to institute a fresh suit, parties are placed in the same legal position as if the original suit had never been filed. Cited Cases: • Balida Kamayya and others v. Paragada Papayya and another AIR 1918 Mad. 1287 • Behari Lal Pal v. Srimati Baran Mai Dasi 1894 ILR 17 All 53 • Becharam Chowdhuri and others v. Purna Chandra Chatterji and others AIR 1925 Cal. 845 • Baisnab Das Mohanta v. Nani Gopal Das and others PLD 1963 Dacca 504 (b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---- ----O. XXIII, R.1---Withdrawal of suit at appellate stage---Permission to file fresh suit---Effect on decrees already passed---Judicial caution---Held, that an application under O.XXIII, R.1(2), CPC, especially when made at appellate or second appellate stage, requires strict judicial scrutiny---If permission is granted at such stage, it may enable an unsuccessful plaintiff to avoid adverse decrees already rendered against him and may deprive the contesting defendant of rights accrued through adjudication by courts below---Court must consider all relevant factors, including the effect of allowing a party to re-agitate the same dispute and the wastage of public judicial time---Backlog of cases and delay in disposal of litigation further require appellate courts to exercise such discretion with care and restraint. Cited Case: • Mrs. Afroz Shah and others v. Sabir Qureshi and others PLD 2010 SC 913 (c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---- ----O. XXIII, R.1---Withdrawal order with permission to file fresh suit---Finality of unchallenged order---Collateral attack---Subsequent proceedings---Held, that once a competent Court grants permission to withdraw a civil suit with liberty to institute a fresh suit, such order remains binding unless set aside in appeal, revision or other lawful direct proceedings---Court seized of a subsequent suit cannot examine whether the earlier permission was rightly or wrongly granted---Such order cannot be challenged collaterally in proceedings not intended to reverse, modify or annul it---Where the appellants did not challenge the withdrawal order through proper procedure, they could not later question its validity in subsequent proceedings. Cited Cases: • Garland v. Consumers’ Gas Co. 2004 1 SCR 629 • Raj Kumar Mahto v. Ram Khelawan Singh AIR 1922 Pat. 44 • Haridey Nath Roy v. Ramchandra AIR 1921 Cal. 34 • R v. Wilson 1983 2 SCR 594 • Danyluk v. Ainsworth Technologies Inc. 2001 2 SCR 460 (d) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---- ----O. XXIII, R.1---Declaratory suit based on earlier decree---Earlier suit withdrawn with permission to file fresh suit---Effect of withdrawal on earlier decree---Held, that where the first suit had been withdrawn with permission to institute a fresh suit, the judgment and decree previously passed in that first suit ceased to have operative legal value for founding a subsequent claim---Such judgment and decree became ineffective and could not be used as the basis for declaration of title---Appellants’ claim in the second suit was based solely on the earlier judgment and decree dated 26.02.1998, but after withdrawal of the first suit, that decree no longer furnished any foundation for claiming ownership---Courts below were justified in dismissing the declaratory suit. (e) Precedent---- ----Leave-refusing order---Applicability of precedent---Decision to be read in context of its own facts---Held, that every judicial opinion must be understood in relation to the facts established or assumed in that case---Broad observations in a judgment are not to be treated as complete expositions of law divorced from their context---A case is authority only for what it actually decides---Precedent of Haji Muhammad Boota was distinguishable because in that case the Supreme Court had itself permitted withdrawal and later revisited the withdrawal order due to indications of misrepresentation and possible fraudulent acquisition of escheated land---In the present case, withdrawal was allowed by the First Appellate Court and the appellants never challenged such order before any forum at the proper time---Reliance on Haji Muhammad Boota was therefore misplaced. Cited Cases: • Haji Muhammad Boota and others v. Member (Revenue), Board of Revenue, Punjab and others PLD 2003 SC 979 • Quinn v. Leathern 1901 AC 495 • Trustees of the Port of Karachi v. Muhammad Saleem 1994 SCMR 2213 • Muhammad Shakeel and others v. Additional District Judge and others PLD 2025 SC 572 (f) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---- ----O. VI, R.17---Amendment of plaint---Declaratory suit---Change in character of claim---Request for remand to amend plaint and prove independent title---Held, that although the proposed amended suit would still remain one for declaration, the character of the appellants’ claim would materially change because the original plaint was founded solely on the earlier judgment and decree---Amendment which changes the character of the original claim is not permissible under O.VI, R.17, CPC---Appellants had not produced any foundational material or supplementary documents showing that they could establish title independently of the earlier decree---Remanding the matter merely on counsel’s assertion would serve no practical purpose and would create unnecessary litigation. Cited Cases: • Alokeshi Banik v. Aftabuddin PLD 1963 Dacca 87 • Syed Muhammad Ali and others v. Syed Dabir Ali and others 2016 SCMR 2164 (g) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)---- ----Declaratory suit---Declaration of title---Burden to establish independent legal foundation---Earlier ineffective decree relied upon as sole basis of title---Held, that a plaintiff seeking declaration of ownership must establish a valid legal foundation for such title---Where the only foundation pleaded was an earlier judgment and decree which had become ineffective due to withdrawal of the suit with permission to file fresh proceedings, no declaration of title could be granted---In absence of any other evidence or documentation proving ownership of the disputed land, appellants were rightly non-suited. Disposition: Appeal was dismissed with costs throughout; judgment of the Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, maintaining dismissal of appellants’ declaratory suit, was upheld.

Summary: (a) Punjab Rented Premises Act (VII of 2009)---- ----S.15---Ejectment petition---Commercial premises---Unregistered lease deed for thirty-three years---Long-term tenancy---Effect---Held, that an unregistered lease deed purporting to create rights in immovable property for a term exceeding one year could not be relied upon for establishing a long-term tenancy---Where the alleged lease deed was unregistered, the tenancy was rightly treated as month-to-month tenancy under the law---Upon valid termination of such tenancy, ejectment petitions were maintainable and could lawfully be accepted. (b) Constitution of Pakistan---- ----Art.185(3)---Leave to appeal---New factual plea before Supreme Court---Alleged partition of property and identity of landlord---Held, that a party cannot be permitted to raise, for the first time at the stage of leave to appeal, a factual controversy requiring determination through evidence---Jurisdiction of Supreme Court under Art.185(3) is not intended to reopen factual disputes which were neither pleaded nor adjudicated upon by the courts below---Where no foundational plea challenging the locus standi of the ejectment petitioner on the basis of alleged partition or different landlord was raised before the Rent Controller, no issue was framed and no evidence was led, such plea could not be entertained for the first time before the Supreme Court. Cited Cases: • Pirzada Noor-Ul-Basar v. Mst. Pakistan Bibi and others 2023 SCMR 1072 • WAPDA through Chairman and others v. Alam Sher and others 2023 SCMR 981 • Najaf Iqbal v. Shahzad Rafique 2020 SCMR 1621 • Muhammad Rashid Bhatti v. Director General FIA Headquarters, Islamabad and others 2018 SCMR 1995 • Muhammad Saleem v. Muhammad Azan and another 2011 SCMR 474 • Rauf Ahmad v. Mst. Walayat Begum PLD 1995 SC 639 (c) Civil Procedure---- ----Remand---Scope and object---Not to be ordered routinely---Held, that remand is a corrective jurisdiction to be exercised carefully where a material issue has remained undecided or where a party has been denied fair opportunity to present its case---Remand cannot be used as a device to prolong litigation or to provide a litigant a second opportunity to fill lacunae in his case---Where Rent Controller framed relevant issues, recorded oral and documentary evidence and returned findings after appraisal of record, and Appellate Court and High Court also examined the matter, remand was not warranted in absence of jurisdictional defect, misreading or non-reading of material evidence. Cited Cases: • Rozi Khan and others v. Nasir and others 1997 SCMR 1849 • Chairman, WAPDA, Lahore and another v. Gulbat Khan 1996 SCMR 230 (d) Civil Procedure---- ----Pleadings---Parties bound by pleadings---Evidence beyond pleadings---Held, that parties are bound by their pleadings and no amount of evidence can be looked into in support of a plea not specifically raised---A litigant cannot improve or reconstruct his case at a later stage by introducing facts that were neither pleaded, nor made subject of issue, nor tested through evidence before the competent forum---Pleas regarding acquisition of ownership through sale deeds during pendency of proceedings and extension of demised premises through adjoining portions could not be entertained where such pleas were not part of the original defence before the Rent Controller. Cited Cases: • Hafiz Qari Fateh through L.Rs. v. Ms. Urooj Fatima and others 2024 SCMR 1709 • Muhammad Ghaffar through LRs and others v. Arif Muhammad 2023 SCMR 344 • Zulfiqar and others v. Shahdat Khan PLD 2007 SC 582 • Government of West Pakistan through Collector, Bahawalpur v. Hail Muhammad PLD 1976 SC 469 • Messrs Choudhary Brothers Ltd., Sialkot v. The Jaranwala Central Co-operative Bank Ltd., Jaranwala 1968 SCMR 804 • Binyameen and others v. Chaudhry Hakim and another 1996 SCMR 336 • Major (Retd.) Barkat Ali and others v. Qaim Din and others 2006 SCMR 562 (e) Qanun-e-Shahadat Order (10 of 1984)---- ----Art.115---Estoppel of tenant---Tenant disputing landlord’s title---Subsequent claim of ownership---Held, that a tenant who entered into possession under a tenancy cannot, during subsistence of tenancy, dispute the landlord’s title as it existed at the inception of tenancy---Doctrine of estoppel under Art.115 bars such denial---If, after expiry of tenancy, tenant sets up an independent title in himself, lawful course is to vacate the premises and pursue appropriate remedies before a competent civil forum---Rent proceedings cannot be converted into proceedings for adjudication of complex title disputes. Cited Cases: • Nazir Ahmad v. Mst. Sardar Bibi and others 1989 SCMR 913 • Mst. Seema Begum v. Muhammad Ishaq and others PLD 2009 SC 45 • Barkat Masih v. Manzoor Ahmad through L.Rs. 2006 SCMR 1068 • Ghulam Mustafa and others v. Mst. Muhammadi Begum and others 1991 SCMR 432 • Muhammad Nazir v. Saeed Subhani 2002 SCMR 1540 • Waheed Ullah v. Mst. Rehana Nasim and others 2004 SCMR 1568 (f) Transfer of Property / Rent Law---- ----Doctrine of pendente lite---Sale deeds executed during pendency of ejectment proceedings---Effect on rent proceedings---Held, that reliance upon sale deeds executed in 2022 and 2023 could not be used to resist ejectment proceedings instituted in 2018---Rights, if any, acquired pendente lite cannot be employed as a ploy to defeat proceedings lawfully initiated years earlier, particularly where such rights were neither pleaded at inception nor integrated into the original defence before the Rent Controller. (g) Punjab Rented Premises Act (VII of 2009)---- ----S.15---Rent Controller---Jurisdiction---Title dispute---Summary nature of rent proceedings---Held, that rent jurisdiction under the Punjab Rented Premises Act, 2009 is summary and specialized in character and is confined to determining the landlord-tenant relationship and statutory grounds of ejectment---Rent Controller cannot adjudicate complex questions of proprietary title---Questions of ownership fall within the exclusive domain of the civil court---Where tenants had already disputed respondents’ title through separate civil proceedings pending before a competent civil court, remand to the Rent Controller for inquiry into title would be misconceived and would merely delay finality of rent proceedings. (h) Punjab Rented Premises Act (VII of 2009)---- ----S.15---Co-ownership dispute---Change in ownership of demised premises---Distinguishable precedents---Held, that precedents relating to change in ownership of the very demised premises through alienation by co-owners were distinguishable where no such alteration in ownership of the demised premises had been established---Alleged purchases relied upon by tenants related to adjoining portions and were never made part of the original defence before the Rent Controller---Precedents apply only where factual foundation is analogous; where facts materially differ, reliance upon such authorities is of no assistance. Cited Cases: • Mst. Sanobar Sultan and others v. Obaidullah Khan and others PLD 2009 SC 71 • Abdul Zahir v. Jaffar Khan 2010 SCMR 189 (i) Constitution of Pakistan---- ----Art.185(3)---Concurrent findings of Rent Controller, Appellate Court and High Court---Interference by Supreme Court---Held, that concurrent findings that tenancy stood established, unregistered lease deed could not create long-term tenancy, plea of extended ownership/acquisition of title was neither pleaded nor proved, and ejectment petitions were maintainable, were based on proper appreciation of record and settled principles of law---No perversity, misreading, non-reading of material evidence or jurisdictional defect was shown---Supreme Court refused interference. Disposition: All connected C.P.L.As. Nos.209, 210, 211, 212, 324 and 325 of 2026 were dismissed; leave to appeal was refused; no order as to costs.

Summary: Customs Act (IV of 1969)--- ----S. 194-C---Adjudication of matters---Customs Appellate Tribunal, powers / responsibilities of---Scope---Perusal of the impugned judgment reflected that the Customs Appellate Tribunal (Tribunal) had failed to give any reasoned finding on its own and had dismissed the appeal by merely observing that the order of the Collector of Customs (Appeals), was well reasoned---It appeared that the Tribunal had not dilated upon the facts nor on law and had passed the judgment in a slipshod and perfunctory manner---Such an approach was not only incorrect and not appreciable but was, at the same time, a burden on this /High Court--- Time and again such matters are to be remanded due to such approach of the Tribunal, which amounts to sheer wastage of the High Court’s time and also burdens the importer as well as the department with additional costs for no fault of theirs---Moreover, the highest authority for factual determination in tax matters is the Tribunal, therefore, the Tribunal is required in law to determine the facts finally so that none of the parties are prejudiced in further proceedings including Reference Applications before the High Court which are to be decided only on questions of law arising out of the order of the Tribunal---In the present case, the Tribunal's observation that the order of the Collector of Customs (Appeals)was well-reasoned did not suffice; nor fulfilled the minimum requirements of passing of orders in accordance with law---High Court set-aside the impugned judgment and remanded the matter to the Tribunal to decide the same afresh and pass a reasoned order after affording opportunity of being heard to the parties---Special Customs Reference, filed by importer, was disposed of accordingly. Commissioner Inland Revenue v RYK Mills Lahore 2023 SCMR 1856; Commissioner Inland Revenue v. Sargodha Spinning Mills 2022 SCMR 1082; Commissioner Inland Revenue v. MCB Bank Limited, 2021 PTD 1367 and Wateen Telecom Limited v Commissioner Inland Revenue 2015 PTD 936 ref. Imran Iqbal Khan for Applicants. Sardar Zafar Hussain for Respondents. Date of hearing: 5th March, 2025.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: (a) A plain reading of the statutory language shows that the scope of Section 172 is to exclude the jurisdiction of Civil Law Courts only where the subject matter falls within the administrative functions of the revenue hierarchy. The legislative intent appears to be to entrust Revenue Officers and Revenue Courts with the preparation, maintenance, attestation, and administrative correction of revenue records, which are essential for effective land-revenue administration. While Section 172(1) generally bars the jurisdiction of Civil Law Courts in matters assigned to revenue authorities, and sub-section (2) enumerates specific subjects within that exclusion, the bar remains qualified by the nature of the rights and remedies involved. The mere inclusion of the expression “correction of entries” does not, by itself, confer upon the revenue hierarchy the competence to adjudicate disputed Civil Law rights or contested questions of law and fact, which extend beyond administrative record-keeping. The power to correct entries in the revenue record is essentially administrative in nature and is intended to ensure that revenue registers accurately reflect the factual position regarding land holdings, ownership, and related particulars. Such correction ordinarily extends to clerical mistakes, inadvertent errors, or omissions that do not affect substantive proprietary rights. However, where the correctness of an entry is challenged on the ground that it was procured through fraud, misrepresentation, or collusion, and where such entry directly affects the title or proprietary rights of a party, the matter ceases to remain one of mere administrative adjustment and assumes the character of a Civil Law controversy. Disputes of this nature involve determination of substantive rights, resolution of contested facts, and adjudication through framing of issues, recording of evidence, and evaluation of legal arguments—functions which fall within the exclusive domain of Civil Law Courts. Significantly, the language of Section 172 does not expressly oust the jurisdiction of Civil Law Courts in matters affecting title or proprietary interests arising from disputed mutations. Any interpretation enlarging the authority of Revenue Officers to finally determine allegations of fraud would extend their statutory mandate beyond its legislative design. Thus, the bar contained in clauses (v) and (vi) of Section 172(2) applies only to matters relating to the administrative preparation, attestation, and correction of revenue records, and not to disputes involving determination of Civil Law rights or title. (b)It is by now well settled that proceedings before Revenue Officers or Revenue Courts are summary in nature; therefore, disputes involving complicated questions of fact or law cannot be finally adjudicated by them and must be resolved by a competent Civil Law Court. Section 53 of the West Pakistan Land Revenue Act, 1967 expressly provides that any person aggrieved by an entry in the record-of-rights may institute a suit for declaration under Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877 before a Civil Law Court of competent jurisdiction. The determination of disputed title and proprietary rights squarely falls within the plenary jurisdiction of Civil Law Courts under Section 9 of the Code of Civil Law Procedure. A mutation entry cannot be cancelled without recourse to a competent Civil Law Court where such entry affects substantive rights. Likewise, a Revenue Officer or Revenue Court is not competent to examine the authenticity or validity of a registered instrument while exercising powers under the West Pakistan Land Revenue Act, particularly in view of the provisions of Section 39 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877. The object of Section 172 of the West Pakistan Land Revenue Act, 1967 is limited to excluding the jurisdiction of Civil Law Courts only in respect of matters which the statute specifically entrusts to the revenue hierarchy, such as the preparation, maintenance, and correction of entries in the record-of-rights, periodical records, and mutation registers under Section 172(2)(vi), as well as questions relating to the procedure adopted by revenue authorities in performing such functions. The purpose of this provision is to prevent parallel proceedings before Civil Law Courts in matters assigned to revenue authorities for administrative or summary determination. However, the statutory bar created by Section 172 does not extend to cases involving allegations of fraud. By excluding such matters from the scope of the jurisdictional bar, the legislature has clearly recognized that disputes involving fraud require a full judicial inquiry, including recording of evidence and detailed adjudication, which fall within the exclusive competence of Civil Law Courts.

Summary: Held: S.25, Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 — Custody of minor — Paramount consideration — Welfare of minor — Scope — Held, the welfare of the minor is the paramount and overriding consideration in proceedings under S.25 of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890. The term “welfare” is to be construed in its broadest sense, encompassing the minor’s moral, spiritual, physical, psychological, educational, emotional and material well-being. Factors such as the minor’s health, academic progress, religious upbringing and emotional development are integral to the welfare test. The minor’s happiness and emotional bonding with the proposed guardian must also receive due consideration. It is the duty of the Court to ensure that the welfare of the minor is of paramount concern, and that the actions of the litigating parties are not motivated by personal vendettas, vanity, or emotional desires for affection, but solely in the best interest of the minors. In matters concerning the custody of a child, the Family Court is not obliged to delve into the intricacies or technicalities of the case but must focus on determining what is in the best interest of the minor. — Minor’s preference— Relevance The minor daughters were called before this Court, where they candidly expressed their willingness to reside with their mother/petitioner. Their preference appears to be voluntary and reflective of their comfort and attachment with the petitioner. Therefore, keeping in view the paramount consideration of the welfare, betterment, and best interests of the minors, it is imperative that their custody remains with their mother. — Mother’s remarriage — Whether disqualification — A female, on account of re-marriage may be disqualified to exercise this right, but a mother on account of remarriage is not absolutely disqualified to be entrusted the custody of a minor child rather she may lose her preferential right of custody. — Constitutional Law jurisdiction—Interference No misreading or non-reading of evidence, nor any jurisdictional error established to warrant interference by the Court. Result: Petition Allowed.

Summary: Section 286 and 287 of the Companies Act, 2017 | Section 480 | Section 256 | Section 256 of the Act of 2017 ---- (a) Law Reforms Ordinance (XII of 1972)---- ----S.3(2), proviso---Intra Court Appeal---Constitutional petition arising from proceedings under Companies Act, 2017---Statutory appeal provided---Maintainability---Held, that where proceedings out of which a constitutional petition arose were governed by a statute providing at least one appeal, revision or review to a court, tribunal or authority against the original/culminating order, an Intra Court Appeal against the judgment of a Single Judge was barred under the proviso to S.3(2) of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972. Cited Cases: • Mst. Karim Bibi and others v. Hussain Bakhsh and another PLD 1984 SC 344 • National Bank of Pakistan through President and another v. Muhammad Adeel and others 2024 SCMR 982 • International Islamic University, Islamabad through Rector and another v. Syed Naveed Altaf and others 2024 SCMR 472 (b) Law Reforms Ordinance (XII of 1972)---- ----S.3(2), proviso---Expression “proceedings”---Meaning and scope---Held, that the term “proceedings” is comprehensive and includes the entire prescribed course of action for enforcing a legal right, beginning from the first step that sets the machinery of law in motion and continuing through all intermediate stages up to final adjudication and execution---It is not confined to one particular order, stage or forum. (c) Law Reforms Ordinance (XII of 1972)---- ----S.3(2), proviso---“Proceedings specific” and not “party specific” bar---Held, that availability of Intra Court Appeal is tested by examining whether the proceedings in which the original order was passed provide an appeal, revision or review; it is immaterial whether a particular party personally had a right of appeal---The proviso is proceedings-specific, not party-specific. Cited Case: • National Bank of Pakistan through President and another v. Muhammad Adeel and others 2024 SCMR 982 (d) Law Reforms Ordinance (XII of 1972)---- ----S.3(2), proviso---Original order---Appeal against culminating order---Effect---Held, that the statutory appeal contemplated by the proviso need not be against the precise interlocutory order challenged in the constitutional petition; if the applicable law provides at least one appeal against the original or culminating order in the statutory proceedings, the bar to Intra Court Appeal is attracted. (e) Companies Act (XIX of 2017)---- ----Ss.256, 257 & 480---Application for investigation into affairs of company---Show cause notice by SECP---Nature---Held, that issuance of show cause notice under S.256 is merely the commencement of a quasi-judicial statutory process; it is not the final determination of rights---The concerned party is afforded opportunity to reply, produce material and be heard before the Commission forms an opinion under S.257. (f) Companies Act (XIX of 2017)---- ----Ss.256 & 257---SECP investigation into affairs of company---Prima facie opinion and substantive order---Held, that upon considering reply and record, SECP forms an opinion under S.257 whether circumstances warrant investigation into affairs of a company; an order under S.257 constitutes the first substantive determination of rights and obligations of parties. (g) Companies Act (XIX of 2017)---- ----Ss.258 to 264---Investigation by inspectors---Statutory process---Held, that once SECP orders investigation, inspectors exercise statutory powers to examine books, records and persons and submit interim/final report to the Commission; such report may lead to prosecution, court proceedings, regulatory directions or other enforcement steps---Thus proceedings initiated under S.256 form part of a continuous statutory mechanism. (h) Companies Act (XIX of 2017)---- ----S.480---Right of appeal---Orders of SECP---Held, that S.480 expressly confers a right of appeal upon any person aggrieved by an order of the Commission made under the Act---Legislative intent is that grievances arising out of proceedings under Ss.256 and 257 and consequential actions thereunder are to be addressed within the statutory framework of the Companies Act, 2017. (i) Law Reforms Ordinance (XII of 1972)---- ----S.3(2), proviso---Show cause notice set aside by Single Judge---Proceedings terminated before SECP order---ICA still barred---Held, that the fact that proceedings pursuant to show cause notice were terminated by the Single Judge’s judgment did not make an Intra Court Appeal competent, because the relevant test is whether the statutory proceedings were of a nature that would culminate in an appealable order under the applicable law. (j) Constitutional jurisdiction---- ----Art.199---Company investigation proceedings---ICA against Single Judge judgment---Alternate statutory appellate framework---Held, that where the constitutional petition arose from proceedings initiated under Companies Act, 2017, which provided a structured process and appeal under S.480, the parties were bound by the statutory mechanism and ICA under the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972 was not maintainable. Disposition: Intra Court Appeal was dismissed as not maintainable; Court held that proceedings commenced through application/show cause notice under S.256 of the Companies Act, 2017 were part of a continuous statutory mechanism culminating in an appealable order under S.480, thereby attracting the bar contained in proviso to S.3(2) of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972; parties were left to bear their own costs.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan---- ----Art.199---Cooperative housing society---Removal/suspension of Chairman---Statutory appeal exhausted---Maintainability of constitutional petition---Held, that mere absence of a further statutory appeal, or finality attached to an appellate order under the statutory framework, does not by itself oust constitutional judicial review---High Court may examine jurisdictional defect, violation of mandatory procedure, breach of natural justice, mala fide apparent on record, or patent misreading/non-reading of material evidence. (b) Constitution of Pakistan---- ----Art.199---Concurrent findings of Registrar and appellate authority---Scope of interference---Held, that constitutional jurisdiction is supervisory and corrective, not appellate---High Court does not reappraise evidence or disturb concurrent findings of fact unless impugned orders suffer from lack/excess of jurisdiction, coram non judice proceedings, violation of mandatory provisions, prejudice-causing breach of natural justice, mala fide, or patent misreading/non-reading of evidence. (c) Islamabad Cooperative Societies Rules, 2018---- ----R.57---Inquiry against office bearer of cooperative society---Procedure---Held, that R.57 does not prescribe a rigid trial-like inquiry requiring examination and cross-examination of witnesses in every case---Where allegations are based mainly on official documentary record, fair inquiry may be conducted by confronting the charged person with relevant documents and affording opportunity to explain. (d) Islamabad Cooperative Societies Rules, 2018---- ----R.57---Inquiry report---Natural justice---Non-examination of witnesses/cross-examination---Held, that mere assertion that no witnesses were examined or no cross-examination was afforded is insufficient to vitiate inquiry unless petitioner demonstrates what material evidence would have been rebutted through cross-examination and how absence of such opportunity caused prejudice. (e) Islamabad Cooperative Societies Rules, 2018---- ----R.57---Non-cooperation by delinquent office bearer---Belated participation---Waiver---Held, that where petitioner was aware of inquiry, failed to appear despite repeated notices, joined proceedings belatedly, and was later afforded full hearing pursuant to High Court’s earlier directions, he could not successfully challenge the inquiry on procedural deficiencies allegedly caused by his own non-participation. (f) Cooperative Societies Act, 1925 / Islamabad Cooperative Societies Rules, 2018---- ----Managing Committee of cooperative society---Chairman acting beyond authority---Effect---Held, that Managing Committee, being executive body of society, is empowered to regulate society affairs and its decisions recorded in minutes bind office bearers including Chairman---Chairman cannot disregard collective decisions of Managing Committee by making unauthorized representations, appointments, terminations or issuing notices without approval. (g) Cooperative housing society---- ----Chairman---Unauthorized representations in judicial forums---Power of attorney contrary to Managing Committee decision---Held, that Chairman acted beyond authority where he made representations in judicial forums despite Managing Committee’s decision designating other office bearers for that purpose, and executed power of attorney contrary to said decision. (h) Cooperative housing society---- ----Chairman---Unauthorized appointments and terminations---Violation of bye-laws and Managing Committee decisions---Held, that termination and appointment of employees without approval of Managing Committee, and in violation of Bye-law No.36(1) and decisions taken in meetings, justified adverse findings against Chairman. (i) Cooperative housing society---- ----Forged document---Fake stamp of R&I Branch---Inquiry finding---Held, that finding regarding production of forged document bearing fake R&I Branch stamp was not based on mere allegation where Incharge of R&I Branch verified that stamp was counterfeit---Such verification showed inquiry officer had conducted independent verification and did not merely reproduce complaint. (j) Constitution of Pakistan---- ----Art.199---Inquiry report based on documents---Application of mind---Held, that inquiry report is not invalid merely because it narrates allegations before evaluating them---True test is whether authority applied its mind to evidence and recorded independent findings; where report discussed complaint, documentary record, petitioner’s response/lack thereof and reasons for conclusions, it could not be termed sham or colorable exercise. (k) Cooperative Societies Act, 1925---- ----S.43---Separate application by Chairman---Proceedings under R.57---Effect---Held, that petitioner’s contention that his separate application under S.43 was not decided did not affect validity of proceedings under R.57 where final order was passed on complaint before Registrar and ancillary application stood merged in final determination. (l) Constitution of Pakistan---- ----Art.199---Cooperative society dispute---Suspension/removal order---Due process---Held, that where Registrar and appellate authority afforded opportunities of hearing, examined documentary material including minutes, dispatch register and verified forged stamp, and recorded concurrent findings, High Court declined interference in constitutional jurisdiction. Disposition: Writ petition was dismissed; preliminary objection to maintainability was overruled only to the limited extent of examining jurisdictional/procedural illegality and natural justice; however, impugned orders dated 04.03.2025 and 31.10.2025 passed by Registrar Cooperative Societies and Secretary Cooperative Society Department were upheld; Court held that inquiry was lawfully conducted, based on material evidence, in substantial compliance with natural justice, and suffered from no illegality, jurisdictional defect, perversity, misreading or non-reading of evidence.

Summary: Acquittal ---- (a) Pakistan Penal Code (XLV of 1860)----Ss. 302, 324, 353, 396, 435, 427, 148 & 149---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997)----S. 7---Appreciation of evidence---Unnamed accused---Conviction on capital charge---Sustainability---FIR was lodged against unknown assailants and appellants were not nominated by name---Informant attempted to give physical descriptions of only some assailants, but gave no identifying particulars of the remaining alleged offenders including the driver and the LMG operator---Prosecution case rested mainly on ocular account of two witnesses who, despite alleged indiscriminate firing, remained completely unhurt and whose conduct in immediately chasing heavily armed assailants, though they were in plain clothes, unarmed, and had already witnessed one death and multiple serious injuries, was held to be unnatural and contrary to normal human behaviour---Their claimed ability, during a sudden life-threatening attack, to observe and retain minute features such as age, height, complexion and clothing of the assailants was also found inherently improbable---Presence of said witnesses at the place of occurrence was not established through any independent and unimpeachable evidence---Held, that prosecution version suffered from material improbabilities and could not safely sustain conviction on capital charge. (b) Criminal trial---Identification parade---Evidentiary value---Joint identification parade of multiple accused---Effect---Identification parade in the present case was not conducted through injured witnesses, but through two alleged eyewitnesses, and that too jointly in respect of multiple accused---It is a settled rule that each accused is to be put to identification separately and a joint identification parade is unsafe, unreliable and has consistently been disapproved by the Supreme Court---Such defective identification proceedings lost their corroborative value and could not be safely relied upon for maintaining conviction. Cited cases: Gulfam and another v. The State (2017 SCMR 1189); Lal Pasand v. The State (PLD 1981 SC 142); Ziaullah alias Jaji v. The State (2008 SCMR 1210); Bacha Zeb v. The State (2010 SCMR 1189); Shafqat Mehmood and others v. The State (2011 SCMR 537). (c) Criminal trial---Identification parade---Prior disclosure of identity of accused to police---Effect---Appellants had already been arrested in another criminal case and were in judicial custody when, according to the prosecution itself, they allegedly disclosed involvement in the present occurrence and were thereafter formally arrested in this case---Where identity of accused already stands disclosed to police before holding of identification parade, sanctity and evidentiary worth of such parade becomes highly doubtful---Held, that identification evidence so procured had lost legal significance as corroborative evidence. (d) Qanun-e-Shahadat / criminal jurisprudence principles---Disclosure by accused in another case---Acquittal in that case---Effect---Appellants had allegedly been linked with the present occurrence through disclosures made by them in FIR No.73 dated 24.04.2010, but in that very case they had already been acquitted by the Supreme Court vide judgment dated 17.02.2025 in Criminal Appeal No.627 of 2022---In such circumstances, the alleged disclosure lost legal weight and could not validly connect the appellants with the present crime---Prosecution further failed to produce any independent direct or circumstantial evidence reasonably connecting the appellants with commission of the offence. (e) Criminal trial---Benefit of doubt---Scope---Where prosecution evidence is afflicted with material inconsistencies, inherent improbabilities and defects going to the root of the case, benefit of doubt must be extended to accused---Such benefit is not a matter of grace or concession but a matter of right---Even a single circumstance creating reasonable doubt in the mind of a prudent person is sufficient to dislodge prosecution case---Held, that Courts below failed to properly notice serious infirmities in prosecution evidence and thereby fell into error in maintaining conviction and death sentence. Appeal was allowed, convictions and sentences recorded by the Trial Court and maintained by the High Court were set aside, appellants were acquitted of the charge on benefit of doubt, and were directed to be released forthwith if not required in any other case.

Summary: The execution of agreement to sell and receiving payment thereunder has been denied by the respondents altogether by claiming the said agreement as fabricated, based on fraud and thus void, hence there was no legal requirement for the respondents to challenge the agreement to sell allegedly executed by their predecessor in interest through a separate suit as the same had not created any legal right in favour of the petitioner or any other person and the respondents were not precluded from denying the genuineness of the said agreement through written statement by treating the same as a void document.