Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: A decree of jactitation does not fetter the criminal court from probing the victim's consent in a rape trial

Summary: Execution of Decree?Judicial Auction?Maintainability of Objections?Finality of Earlier Adjudication?An issue finally determined between the parties cannot be permitted to be reopened in subsequent execution proceedings merely on the basis of a later judicial exposition of law. Order XXI Rule 90, C.P.C.?PLD 2024 SC 873 (Mst. Samrana Nawaz)?Prospective Operation of Judicial Pronouncements?Subsequent declaration of law does not automatically unsettle judicial determinations that have already attained finality inter se the parties. Doctrine of Finality of Litigation?Binding Effect of Earlier Judicial Orders?Where an order regarding maintainability of objections has attained finality after exhaustion of remedies, the same cannot be circumvented through collateral proceedings. Execution Proceedings?Judicial Discipline?Execution cannot be converted into endless litigation by repeatedly raising controversies already concluded by competent Courts. Speaking Order?Validity?A judicial order is to be assessed by the substance and quality of its reasoning, not by its length or elaboration?Mere brevity does not render an order non-speaking. Judicial Sale?Order XXI Rules 84 & 85, C.P.C.?Material Irregularity?Substantial Injury?Every procedural deviation does not ipso facto vitiate a judicial sale?Interference is justified only where material irregularity is coupled with proof of substantial prejudice. Judicial Auction?Deposit of Auction Money?Banking Instruments?Deposit through demand drafts/pay orders accepted by Court Auctioneers under authority of the executing Court constitutes valid compliance in the absence of statutory violation or demonstrable prejudice. Substantial Injury?Essential Ingredient?A challenge to a concluded judicial sale cannot succeed unless the objector establishes both material irregularity and consequential substantial injury. Court Auction?Competing Bidder?Higher Offer?Absence of any rival bidder, superior offer or demonstrable financial loss strongly negatives the plea of prejudice or inadequacy of sale. Judicial Sale?Reserve Price?Undervaluation?Valuation Report?A subsequent valuation report represents only an expert opinion and cannot, by itself, invalidate a concluded auction or establish inadequacy of price. Judicial Sale?Mere Inadequacy of Price?Not a Ground for Setting Aside Sale?Unless directly attributable to fraud, material irregularity or illegality resulting in substantial injury. Valuation Evidence?Contemporaneous Challenge?Failure to challenge valuation before the executing Court precludes reopening the issue on the basis of subsequently procured valuation reports. Fraud and Collusion?Standard of Proof?Fraud must be specifically pleaded and proved through clear, cogent and legally admissible evidence?Suspicion, however grave, cannot substitute proof. Unproved Documents?No Evidentiary Value?Findings of fraud or collusion cannot be founded upon disputed or unproved material. Jurisdiction of Executing Court?Transfer Application?Section 12(2), C.P.C.?Pendency of collateral proceedings, in the absence of an express stay order, does not divest the executing Court of jurisdiction to proceed with execution. Execution Proceedings?Statutory Jurisdiction?Banking Court?Section 19 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001?Executing Court remains competent to supervise execution and determine objections unless specifically restrained. Bona Fide Auction Purchaser?Protection of Vested Rights?Rights acquired through a court-supervised auction deserve protection and cannot be unsettled except upon proof of fraud, fundamental illegality or substantial injury. Judicial Auctions?Public Confidence?Sanctity and Finality?Frequent interference with concluded judicial sales on speculative or technical objections would erode public confidence and discourage genuine participation in court auctions. Appellate Jurisdiction?Section 22 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001?Interference is unwarranted in the absence of illegality, jurisdictional defect, material irregularity, or misreading or non-reading of evidence. Execution First Appeals?Dismissal?Auction Sale Upheld?Where objections stand barred by finality and otherwise fail on merits for want of proof of fraud, illegality, material irregularity or substantial injury, confirmation of sale and issuance of sale certificate call for no interference.

Summary: (a) Supreme Court Rules, 2025 (as adopted by the Federal Constitutional Court)----O. XXVIII, R. 1 & Code of Civil Procedure, 1908----O. XLVII---Review jurisdiction---Scope---Petitioner (PIA) sought review of order dated 17.10.2025 of the Supreme Court dismissing C.P.L.A. No. 5882/2021 as withdrawn, contending that its request for withdrawal was conditional upon an observation that the High Court of Sindh's judgment dated 12.10.2021 would not operate as a precedent in similar cases of its employees---Held, review is not a routine procedure nor an appeal in disguise; its jurisdiction is extremely limited and may be exercised only where there is a patent and manifest error apparent on the face of the record, an omission of material significance, or a circumstance resulting in miscarriage of justice---No error apparent on the face of the record was pointed out and no sufficient ground was made out---Petitioner failed to bring its case within the parameters of O. XXVIII, R. 1 of the Supreme Court Rules, 2025 read with O. XLVII, C.P.C. (b) Review---Conduct and delay of petitioner---Order allegedly not reflecting what was announced in open Court---Held, petitioner was expected to act with due diligence and promptitude by immediately bringing the matter to the notice of the Bench, or the concerned member, through the office of the Court; no such effort was made and petitioner remained silent for more than a month before filing review---Such conduct does not inspire confidence and militates against bona fide exercise of the discretionary review jurisdiction. (c) Precedential value of impugned judgment---Observation sought to be incorporated in order of withdrawal---Held, the observation sought was itself not legally warranted; without hearing the parties on merits and without adjudicating upon the issues, the Court could not render any declaration or observation regarding precedential value or future applicability of the impugned judgment in similar cases, and any such observation, made without proper adjudication, would travel beyond the scope of the proceedings and might prejudice rights of parties not before the Court. (d) Withdrawal of petition---Request for withdrawal not a concession---Reliance on Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos v. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius (AIR 1954 SC 526) on error regarding concession of counsel---Held, reliance wholly misconceived and distinguishable on facts and in law; matter did not pertain to a concession regarding rights or liabilities of parties or misunderstanding as to its scope---Request by counsel for withdrawal of a petition cannot be equated with a concession on a question of law or fact, particularly when respondents were not present before the Court; petitioner's own case was that it sought withdrawal when it sensed the Bench was not inclined to grant leave. Cited Cases: • Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos v. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius AIR 1954 SC 526 (e) Advocates---Affidavit by counsel regarding facts of case in which he is engaged---Propriety---Held, affidavit subsequently filed by learned counsel for the petitioner cannot be permitted to override, vary or supplement a judicial order formally passed by the Court---Superior Courts have consistently deprecated the practice of advocates filing affidavits concerning facts of cases in which they are professionally engaged, as not in consonance with professional ethics and propriety. Cited Cases: • Barkat Ali v. Muhammad Nawaz PLD 2004 SC 489 Disposition: Review petition (F.C.R.P. No. 12/2025 in C.P.L.A. No. 5882/2021) found meritless and dismissed; no order as to costs. Approved for Reporting.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan (as amended by Constitution (Twenty-Seventh Amendment) Act, 2025)----Arts. 175F(1)(c) & 175F(2), 199---Federal Constitutional Court---Jurisdiction---Appeals from judgments of High Courts under Art. 199---Transfer of pending matters---Held, that Federal Constitutional Court was established with exclusive jurisdiction to hear appeals arising from judgments, decrees or final orders of the High Courts passed under Art. 199, subject to grant of leave under Art. 175F(1)(c), and Supreme Court ceased to have jurisdiction over such matters---Present case being of that nature stood automatically transferred to the Federal Constitutional Court by virtue of Art. 175F(2). (b) Compulsory Service in the Armed Forces Ordinance, 1971----S. 9A (as inserted by Ordinance of 1978 and amended by Ordinances of 1984 and 2000)---Medical practitioner released from Armed Forces---Counting of compulsory service towards seniority and pay---Subsequent employment in Oil and Gas Development Company Limited (OGDCL), a public limited company---Respondent, a qualified doctor called up on 04.03.1981 under the Ordinance of 1971 and released on 21.10.1989 after nine years and twenty-nine days, joined the Oil and Gas Development Corporation on 18.08.1992 after a gap of almost three years during which he had joined Cadet College Petaro, and his successive applications for benefit of S. 9A were declined, except for grant of two advance increments---Held, that S. 9A is beneficial and compensatory in nature, intended to mitigate hardship of medical practitioners and other essential persons compulsorily inducted into Armed Forces, and its non obstante clause gives it primacy over other laws---However, the provision affects the rights and expectations of existing civil servants and operates in a delicate balance between relief to persons subjected to compulsory service and stability of service structures; benefit under S. 9A is neither automatic nor absolute, a person seeking it must strictly satisfy the statutory conditions, and claim must fall squarely within the provision and cannot be extended by implication or liberal construction---OGDCL, in its present corporate form as a public limited company, does not prima facie owe any statutory obligation under S. 9A, it not being the case of respondent that OGDCL is the Federal or a Provincial Government, is controlled by either of them through majority shareholding, or is a local body---Statutory body, upon incorporation as public limited company, loses its earlier legal character. Cited Cases: • Maqsood Ahmed Toor v. Federation of Pakistan 2000 SCMR 928 (c) Oil and Gas Development Corporation (Re-organization) Ordinance, 2001----Ss. 5 & 7---Successor-in-interest of statutory Corporation---Transfer of employees---Saving and continuity provision---Whether OGDCL as successor was liable for claim under S. 9A of Ordinance of 1971 allegedly accrued against predecessor Corporation---Corporation was incorporated as public limited company on 23.10.1997, and Ordinance of 2001 given retrospective effect from that date repealed the Ordinance of 1961 by S. 7---Held, that S. 5 is a saving and continuity provision, embodying principle that conversion was merely a change in juristic form and not termination or novation of service relationship; it creates legal fiction only to the extent of treating employees as employees of OGDCL on the same terms and conditions applicable on date of incorporation, neither creates new rights nor enlarges existing rights and does not revive claims which had either not accrued or had been declined and allowed to become stale---Claim of respondent under S. 9A had been expressly rejected by Corporation on 19.10.1994, hence no vested or crystallized right existed on date of incorporation which could be preserved by S. 5---Section 5 protects only rights and privileges actually subsisting and available immediately before conversion, and cannot be construed as making OGDCL inherit liabilities in respect of disputed, unrecognized or stale claims; respondent could derive no assistance from S. 5. (d) Precedent---Ratio decidendi---Distinguishable facts---Capt. (Retd.) Abdul Qayyum's case---High Court had relied on judgment in Capt. (Retd.) Abdul Qayyum v. Government of Punjab (C.A. No. 1895 of 2000 decided on 16.12.2002), where officer was appointed in the same year as his release from Pakistan Army in a department of Provincial Government---Held, that in that case subsequent employment fell squarely within S. 9A and there was hardly any break between military release and civil appointment, whereas in present case OGDCL did not fall within any entity enumerated in S. 9A and there was neither continuity of service nor an immediate transition from military service---Ratio decidendi of a judgment is to be understood in the backdrop of its own facts, and a slight variation in facts may make a world of difference to precedential value---Analogy drawn by High Court was wholly misconceived and judgment was of no assistance to respondent. Cited Cases: • Capt. (Retd.) Abdul Qayyum v. Government of Punjab 2003 PLC (C.S.) 1008 (e) Constitution of Pakistan----Art. 199---Constitutional petition---Delay and laches---Repeated representations---Fresh cause of action---Respondent's claim under S. 9A was rejected on 19.10.1994, whereafter he submitted successive applications dated 05.07.2000, 01.12.2002, 27.01.2009 and 01.02.2011, all rejected, and filed constitutional petition on 21.11.2011 after last rejection dated 29.04.2011---High Court neither adverted to objection of delay and laches nor returned any finding thereon---Held, that laches is a doctrine under which a party possessing an enforceable right may lose the remedy if the claim is hit by delay and acquiescence; laches per se is not an absolute bar to constitutional jurisdiction, and question has to be examined in the light of facts of each case, but unless a satisfactory and plausible explanation for delay is forthcoming it cannot be overlooked---Distinction exists between delay in instituting proceedings within period prescribed by the Limitation Act, 1908, where each day's delay is to be explained under S. 5, and lapse of time in invoking constitutional jurisdiction, for which no period of limitation is prescribed, which is examined on equitable principles since such jurisdiction is discretionary and relief equitable; party guilty of contumacious lethargy, inaction, laxity or gross negligence may be non-suited---Cause of action, if any, accrued in 1994 on rejection of first claim, and subsequent applications, not contemplated by any law or rules, did not give rise to fresh cause of action or extend limitation or revive a stale cause of action; permitting litigant to overcome bar of laches through repeated applications on same subject would render the doctrine nugatory---Constitutional petition invoked after about seventeen years without plausible explanation, High Court having failed to advert to this material aspect, and petition ought not to have been entertained---On ground of delay and laches alone, constitutional petition was liable to be dismissed. Cited Cases: • Jawad Mir Muhammadi v. Haroon Mirza PLD 2007 SC 472 • State Bank of Pakistan v. Imtiaz Ali Khan 2012 PLC (C.S.) 218 • S.A. Jameel v. Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, Cooperative Department 2005 SCMR 126 • John Ojobo Agbeyegbe v. Festus Makene Ikomi PLD 1953 Privy Council 19 • Lindsay Petroleum Company v. Hurd L.R. 5 P.C. 221 • Premier Cloth Mills Ltd., Lyallpur v. Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Finance PLD 1976 Lahore 1553 Disposition: By majority of 2 to 1 (Syed Arshad Hussain Shah, J. dissenting), petition converted into appeal and allowed; impugned order dated 26.10.2022 of the High Court of Sindh, Circuit Court Hyderabad in C.P. No. D-1850/2011 set aside and writ petition filed by respondent dismissed; no order as to costs; reasons for short order dated 10.06.2026. Approved for Reporting.

Summary: Summary pending.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Where material before the Court prima facie discloses obstruction in execution of judicial orders or interference with judicial proceedings by a public functionary, the Court is justified in referring the matter to the competent authority for departmental action or investigation in accordance with law. Such referral does not constitute a finding of guilt or impose any punishment and, being merely recommendatory in nature, ordinarily does not warrant interference in constitutional jurisdiction.