Summary: The case involves a double murder where Muhammad Iqbal, the appellant, was accused of killing Muhammad Shafaat and Muhammad Ijaz, father and son, due to a land dispute. The incident took place on June 23, 2014, near Udhowal. Muhammad Iqbal, along with his co-accused, was tried and convicted by the Additional Sessions Judge, Gujrat. The trial court sentenced Muhammad Iqbal to death under Section 302(b) PPC. The co-accused were acquitted. The appellant filed an appeal against his conviction, and the State submitted a murder reference for the confirmation of the death penalty. ---- Issues: ---- 1) Whether the prosecution provided sufficient and credible evidence to establish Muhammad Iqbal’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt. ---- 2) Whether the delay in filing the FIR and conducting the postmortem affected the credibility of the prosecution's case. ---- 3) Whether the appellant was entitled to the benefit of doubt based on discrepancies in eyewitness accounts, medical reports, and other evidentiary weaknesses. ---- 4) Whether the acquittal of co-accused persons was justified. ---- Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: Delay in FIR and Postmortem: The court observed that there was an unexplained delay in lodging the FIR and conducting the postmortem. The FIR was registered 45 minutes after the alleged incident, even though the police station was only 1.5 kilometers away. This delay raised suspicions about the authenticity of the prosecution's case and suggested possible embellishments and afterthoughts. The delay in conducting the postmortem also raised doubts, further weakening the prosecution's case. ---- Inconsistencies in Witness Testimony: The court found numerous contradictions in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses (PW-1, PW-2, and PW-4). The witnesses were related to the deceased and considered interested parties. Their accounts of the incident were inconsistent with earlier statements given to the police and contradicted by the physical evidence, such as the layout of the crime scene and the presence of a "Jawar" crop obstructing their view. ---- Weakness in Forensic Evidence: The court noted that the forensic evidence, including the recovery of firearms, was unreliable. The crime scene and the weapons used did not match the accounts provided by the witnesses. The rifle recovered from the appellant was sent to the forensic lab much later than claimed, raising further doubts about the investigation. ---- Benefit of Doubt: Based on the cumulative effect of these discrepancies and weaknesses, the court concluded that the prosecution failed to prove the case beyond a reasonable doubt. The inconsistencies in the witness statements, the delayed FIR, and the questionable forensic evidence entitled the appellant to the benefit of doubt. The court relied on the principle that any reasonable doubt should be resolved in favor of the accused. ---- Acquittal of Co-Accused: The court upheld the acquittal of the co-accused, stating that the prosecution had not produced sufficient evidence to link them to the crime. The court reiterated the principle of double presumption of innocence, particularly for those acquitted by the trial court, and found no compelling reason to interfere with their acquittal. ---- Conclusion: The appeal filed by Muhammad Iqbal (Crl. Appeal No. 48876 of 2019) was accepted, and his conviction and death sentence were set aside. He was ordered to be released if not required in any other case. The murder reference (Murder Reference No. 185 of 2019) for confirmation of the death sentence was answered in the negative. The appeal seeking conviction of the co-accused (Crl. Appeal No. 44259 of 2019) was dismissed, and their acquittal was upheld. ---- Citations/Precedents: Muhammad Akram v. The State (2009 SCMR 230): Established that even a single reasonable doubt entitles the accused to acquittal as a matter of right, not as a concession. Tariq Pervez v. The State (1995 SCMR 1345): Held that for giving the benefit of doubt, it is not necessary that there should be many circumstances creating doubts.

Summary: Background: The petitioner was initially employed as an Assistant Manager Technical (BPS-17) in a federal autonomous body and was transferred on deputation to the Provincial Government. Over the years, the petitioner served in various higher posts within the Provincial Government and subsequently sought absorption into the Provincial Management Service (PMS). The petitioner filed a writ petition, which directed the Chief Minister of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa to decide on the absorption request according to the law. The Chief Minister, however, denied the request through the impugned order dated 13.08.2024. The petitioner contested this decision and sought absorption into the PMS. -----Issues: ---1- Whether the petitioner, an employee of a federal autonomous body, could be absorbed into the Provincial Management Service under the Provincial Management Service Rules, 2007. ---2- Whether the petitioner's prolonged deputation violated the Provincial Government's deputation policy. ---3- Whether there was any legal precedent or provision that entitled the petitioner to absorption in the PMS. -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The court dismissed the petition, holding that: The petitioner, as an employee of a federal autonomous body, was not eligible for absorption into the PMS under Rule 4(2) of the PMS Rules, 2007. The deputation policy allowed a maximum of five years on deputation, and the petitioner had exceeded this period. The petitioner's prolonged deputation was unprecedented and unauthorized by law. The court relied on various precedents from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, which established that deputationists have no vested right to remain on deputation or to seek absorption. The borrowing department has the discretion to repatriate the deputationist at any time, and there is no legal basis for absorbing a federal employee into provincial services. The court found no merit in the petitioner's claim, and the writ petition was dismissed. -----Citations/Precedents: "Contempt Proceedings against Chief Secretary, Sindh and others" (2013 SCMR 1752) "Ali Azhar Khan Baloch and others vs. Province of Sindh and others" (2015 SCMR 456) "Ghansham Das vs. Govt of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa" (2024 SCMR 188) "Sudhir Ahmed and others vs. The Speaker and Assembly and others" (2017 SCMR 2051) "Masood Abbas Rizvi vs. Federation of Pakistan and others" (2014 SCMR 799) "Dr. Shafi ur Rehman Afridi vs. C.D.A Islamabad through Chairman and others" (2010 SCMR 378) "Ghulam Nabi Sheikh and another vs. Secretary Establishment Division Government of Pakistan and another" (2023 PLC (C.S) 32) "Hamid Nasrullah Rana vs. Chief Commissioner, Islamabad ICT and others" (2022 PLC (C.S) 73)

Summary: Background: The petitioner charged respondents with committing the intentional murder (qatl-i-amd) of her son and attempting to murder her by firing upon them with Kalashnikovs. The incident led to the registration of a criminal case under Sections 302, 324, and 34 of the Pakistan Penal Code (PPC) at the local police station. The respondents applied for pre-arrest bail and submitted an application to the Deputy Inspector General of Police (DIG), claiming innocence based on an alibi. The petitioner alleged that the investigation was biased in favor of the respondents, leading to their names being placed in column No.2 of the challan, declaring them innocent. The petitioner sought judicial intervention under Article 199 of the Constitution to declare the actions of the police as unlawful. -----Issues: 1- Jurisdiction of the Police: Whether the placement of the respondents’ names in column No.2 of the challan by the investigating officer (I.O.) declaring them innocent was lawful. 2- Judicial Oversight: Whether the Court could intervene in the investigation phase and overrule the findings of the investigating officer. 3- Magistrate’s Authority: What role does the Magistrate play after receiving a police report that declares the accused innocent? -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: Jurisdiction of the Police: The court held that placing the respondents’ names in column No.2 of the challan falls within the powers granted to the officer-in-charge under Section 169 of the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC). The police officer has the authority to release an accused if insufficient evidence or reasonable suspicion exists, and the investigation is subject to the discretion of the officer to ensure fairness. Judicial Oversight: The court emphasized that it could not assume the role of an investigative body. It is the trial court's responsibility to evaluate both the prosecution and defense evidence presented in the challan. The findings of the I.O. are not binding on the trial court, and the court retains the discretion to summon and try the accused if evidence on record supports it. Magistrate’s Authority: The court ruled that the ultimate decision regarding the discharge of the accused lies with the Magistrate, who must independently review the evidence provided by the police report under Section 173 of the CrPC. The release under Section 169 does not amount to acquittal, and the Magistrate can decide whether to proceed with the trial or discharge the accused. The petition was dismissed, and the court refrained from intervening further, leaving the matter for the trial court and the Magistrate to decide based on the evidence. -----Citations/Precedents: Sheikh Zahoor Ahmed v. The State (2023 PCrLJ 1567 Peshawar) Yasir Khan v. Imtiaz and two others (PLD 2013 Peshawar 46) Pordil Khan v. State through Advocate-General Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and 11 others (2016 MLD 314 Peshawar) Shehnaz Begum v. The Hon'ble Judges of the High Court of Sindh and Balochistan (PLD 1971 SC 677) Brig: Imtiaz Ahmad v. Government of Pakistan through Secretary Interior Division and 2 others (1994 SCMR 2142) Muhammad Latif ASI Police Station Sadar Sheikhupura v. Sharifan Bibi and another (1998 SCMR 666) Anwar Ahmad Khan v. The State (1996 SCMR 24) Raja Khushbakhtur Rehman and another v. The State (1985 SCMR 1314) Waqarul Haq alias Nithoo and another v. The State (1988 SCMR 1428)

Summary: Background: Muhammad Anwar, the respondent, was an employee of the Central Directorate of National Savings, where he was initially appointed as Assistant Director (BPS-17) and later promoted to Director (BPS-19). Disciplinary proceedings were initiated against him, resulting in the imposition of a major penalty. However, his appeal against this penalty was allowed by the Federal Service Tribunal, and the Supreme Court upheld the Tribunal's decision. After his retirement on May 15, 2016, the respondent sought proforma promotion to benefit from upgraded posts in the Directorate. The Federal Service Tribunal declared him "qualified for promotion" and directed the competent authority to consider him for proforma promotion. The Ministry of Finance challenged the Tribunal's decision in the Supreme Court. --- Issues: 1) Whether the Federal Service Tribunal had the jurisdiction to declare the respondent "qualified for promotion" and direct the competent authority to consider him for proforma promotion. ---2) Whether a civil servant who has retired after attaining the age of superannuation is eligible for promotion. ---3) Whether the Tribunal can substitute its opinion on the respondent’s fitness for promotion in place of the competent authority’s evaluation. ---- Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: Jurisdiction of the Tribunal: The Supreme Court ruled that the Federal Service Tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction by declaring the respondent "qualified for promotion." Under the Civil Servants Act, 1973, and the Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion, and Transfer) Rules, 1973, the authority to evaluate the fitness and qualification of a civil servant for promotion rests exclusively with the designated forums, such as the Departmental Promotion Committee or the Central Selection Board. The Tribunal does not have the power to determine the fitness of a civil servant for promotion, as this is a subjective evaluation conducted by the competent authority. ---- Eligibility for Promotion Post-Retirement: The Court emphasized that a civil servant who has retired after reaching the age of superannuation cannot claim the right to be considered for promotion to a higher post. However, such a civil servant may be considered for proforma promotion under the Fundamental Rules (FR) 17(1) if it can be shown that the civil servant was wrongfully prevented from being promoted during their service due to no fault of their own. In this case, the respondent’s claim for proforma promotion was distinct from a regular promotion and required separate consideration. ---- Proforma Promotion: The Tribunal’s direction to consider the respondent for proforma promotion was upheld. The Court found that the Tribunal was justified in directing the competent authority to consider the respondent’s case for proforma promotion, as the respondent had been exonerated from the disciplinary charges. However, the Tribunal overstepped by declaring the respondent "qualified for promotion," as that decision must be made by the competent authority based on a proper evaluation process. ---- Outcome: The Supreme Court allowed the appeal to the extent of setting aside the Tribunal’s declaration that the respondent was "qualified for promotion." However, the Court upheld the Tribunal’s direction to consider the respondent for proforma promotion and expected the competent authority to take action on this matter at the earliest. --- Citations/Precedents: Mian Abdul Malik v. Dr. Sabir Zameer Siddiqui and others (1991 SCMR 1129) Abid Hussain Shirazai v. Secretary Ministry of Industries and Production (2005 SCMR 1742) Muhammad Yousaf v. Chairman Railway Board (1999 SCMR 1559) Muhammad Anis and others v. Abdul Haseeb and others (PLD 1994 SC 539) Dr. Alyas Qadeer Tahir v. Secretary Ministry of Education (2014 SCMR 997)

Summary: Background: This case involves two civil petitions (Civil Petition No. 5795 of 2021 and Civil Petition No. 2-Q of 2022) filed by Mr. Muhammad Hassanullah and the Government of Balochistan, challenging a judgment dated October 30, 2021, passed by the High Court of Balochistan. The High Court's judgment addressed the legality of Mr. Muhammad Hassanullah's appointment as Acting Additional Secretary of the Health Department, Balochistan, which was challenged by other civil servants from the Balochistan Secretariat Service. The petitioners sought to set aside the High Court's decision and argued that the matter should have been addressed by the Balochistan Service Tribunal as it involved terms and conditions of service. ---- Issues: ---- 1) Whether the High Court of Balochistan had jurisdiction to entertain the petition under Article 199 of the Constitution, given the bar on jurisdiction under Article 212. ---- 2) Whether the posting and transfer of civil servants fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Balochistan Service Tribunal under the Balochistan Civil Servants Act, 1974. ---3) Whether the respondents, as civil servants, followed the proper procedure for challenging their terms and conditions of service. ---- Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: Jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 199: The Supreme Court held that the High Court should not have exercised its jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution in this matter, as the case related to the terms and conditions of service of civil servants. Article 212 of the Constitution bars the High Court from intervening in cases concerning service matters, which are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal. ---- Exclusive jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal: The court emphasized that grievances related to the posting and transfer of civil servants must be raised before the Balochistan Service Tribunal, in accordance with the Balochistan Civil Servants Act, 1974, and the Balochistan Service Tribunals Act, 1974. The respondents had admitted that the same matter was already pending before the Service Tribunal, further justifying the ouster of the High Court's jurisdiction. Failure to exhaust departmental remedies: The respondents had not exhausted the departmental remedies available to them under the applicable service laws before approaching the High Court. The court reiterated that civil servants must pursue their remedies through the proper legal channels, and bypassing the Service Tribunal was not permissible. The Supreme Court allowed the petitions, set aside the High Court's judgment, and confirmed that the Service Tribunal has exclusive jurisdiction over service-related matters. The court also clarified that the petitioners' appeal does not automatically restore Mr. Hassanullah to his previous position, and the Government of Balochistan is free to make postings and transfers in accordance with the law. ---- Outcome: The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, setting aside the High Court's judgment. The case was remanded to the Balochistan Service Tribunal, which has exclusive jurisdiction over the matter. The judgment also reinforced the legal framework governing service-related disputes and the procedural requirements for civil servants seeking to challenge postings and transfers. ----- Citations/Precedents: Syed Arshad Ali and others v. Pakistan Telecommunication Company Ltd. and others (2008 SCMR 314) Peer Muhammad v. Government of Balochistan through Chief Secretary and others (2007 SCMR 54) Khalid Mahmood Wattoo v. Government of Punjab and others (1998 SCMR 2280) I.A Sherwani and others v. Government of Pakistan through Secretary Finance and others (1991 SCMR 1041) Ayyaz Anjum v. Government of Punjab, Housing and Physical Planning Department and others (1997 SCMR 169)

Summary: Issues: 1) Whether the review petitions filed against the Supreme Court’s short order and detailed judgment should be granted on the basis of claims of valid licenses. ---- 2) Whether the petitioner’s business and other applicants were legally operating within the Margalla Hills National Park, given that licenses had expired or were absent. --- 3) Whether the petitioner’s partner’s commitment to vacate the premises binds the entire partnership firm. --- 4) Whether the non-registration of the petitioner’s firm affected its ability to initiate legal proceedings. --- 5) Whether the petitioners could retract their undertakings to vacate the premises. ---Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: Licensing and Occupation of Land: The Court held that the petitioner had been issued a one-year license in 1999, which was not renewed after it expired in 2001. The petitioner’s claim that the Metropolitan Corporation Islamabad (MCI) had extended the license was rejected, as it was the Capital Development Authority (CDA) that issued licenses. The petitioner was found to be in illegal occupation of the land. ---- Commitment to Vacate: The Court ruled that the partner's commitment to vacate the land bound the entire firm, as partners act as agents of the firm under the Partnership Act, 1932. Therefore, the firm's argument that the minority partner’s consent to vacate was invalid was rejected. --- Non-Registration of Firm: The Court found that the petitioner’s firm was unregistered, which barred it from initiating legal proceedings under Section 69 of the Partnership Act, 1932. Consequently, the firm could not lawfully file the review petitions or challenge the decision. ---- Environmental Violations: The Court emphasized the severe environmental degradation caused by illegal operations within the protected National Park. It condemned the actions of government officials who had facilitated the illegal businesses and highlighted the need to uphold environmental protections and regulations. Retraction of Undertakings: The Court did not permit the petitioners to retract their previous commitments to vacate the land within three months. The Court noted that reneging on such solemn undertakings would undermine judicial processes, and those attempting to do so would face consequences. ----Outcome: The review petitions were dismissed, and the Supreme Court affirmed that the petitioner and other applicants were illegally occupying land in the National Park. The Court withdrew its previous offer of preferential treatment for future leases and confirmed that no legal right existed for the petitioners to continue operating in the National Park. The Court reiterated the importance of environmental protection and condemned the complicity of officials involved in the illegal occupation of protected land. ----Citations/Precedents: --- Partnership Act, 1932: Section 18: Partner as an agent of the firm. Section 19: Partner binds the firm. Section 69: Requirement for firm registration to initiate legal action. Islamabad Wildlife (Protection, Preservation and Management) Ordinance, 1979: Law protecting the Margalla Hills National Park. --- Case law cited by the Court: Lahore Stock Exchange Limited v. Fredrick J. Whyte Group, Pakistan Ltd. and others (PLD 1990 SC 48): Established that issues of fraud, coercion, or undue influence in an agreement are to be decided by an arbitrator appointed by the parties and not by the court. M.A. Ghani Sufi & Sons vs. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 1957 (W.P) Lahore 363): Known interest of an arbitrator does not invalidate the appointment unless the interest is concealed or arises after the appointment.

Summary: Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)--- ----Ss.19 & 22---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XXI, R.66---Execution proceedings---Public auction---Reserve price---Determining factors---Appellant / judgment debtor was aggrieved of auction proceedings and dismissal of his objections---Contention of appellant / judgment debtor was that reserve price was not properly fixed---Validity---In public auctions it is imperative that reserve price is determined in the most transparent manner because it is in the interest of all the parties that mortgaged asset must fetch best and highest price---Before finalization of reserve price, there are two conditions precedent; first, to ensure that independent evaluators from the list of Pakistan Banks Association have been appointed who may evaluate the property according to its location, commercial value as well as assess rate compatible to DC rates’ value---Executing Court instead of determining reserve price through independent source proceeded on the wishful thinking of decree holder bank---Record was bereft of sufficient material justifying that on what clue or commercial assessment bank presented reserve price---Secondly while attempting sale of property of judgment debtor for execution and satisfaction of decree, wide publicity should be given through proclamation of sale in order to fetch the highest and most handsome price for the property---Such an exercise assisted in attracting the attention of participation of public at large and compliance thereof would maintain balance and protect rights and liabilities of parties according to established norms and standards---High Court set aside order passed by Executing Court, dismissing objections filed by judgment debtor, as the same was passed in violation of law---High Court remanded the matter to Executing Court to hold auction proceedings afresh from the stage of issuance of notices under O. XXI, R. 66, C.P.C.---High Court directed Executing Court that before holding auction reserve price should be determined after receiving evaluation report for the subject matter property through an independent evaluator---Appeal was allowed accordingly. Brig. (Retd.) Mazhar-ul-Haq and another v. Messrs Muslim Commercial Bank Limited, Islamabad and another PLD 1993 Lah. 706; Zakria Ghani and 4 others v. Muhammad Ikhlaq Memon and 8 others PLD 2016 SC 229; Summit Bank Limited, Lahore v. Messrs M.M. Brothers, Proprietorship Concern through Proprietor and others 2023 SCMR 374 and Abdul Jabbar Shahid and others v. National Bank of Pakistan and others PLD 2019 Lah. 76 ref. Muhammad Suleman Bhatti for Appellants. Sardar Riaz Karim for Respondent No.1. Respondent No.3. in person.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: The pivotal question of law emanating from the facts spelled out hereinabove is the interplay between the appointment rules of a post and the advertisement for the said post as well as the impact of an apparent inconsistency between the two. In the present case, admittedly the post of Patwari is Tehsil specific in terms of the Punjab Revenue Department (Revenue Administration Posts), Rules, 2009 ("the Rules") and the merit list was accordingly compiled albeit pursuant to an advertisement, which does not depict the fact that the post is Tehsil specific. Held: This Court is of the view that the Rules stipulating the candidate to be resident of the Tehsil to which the post belongs is to be accorded the precedence over the requirement stipulated in the advertisement as the Rules are conferred with the statutory force, which cannot be trumped and nullified by intentional and/or unintentional mistake on part of the department while advertising the posts of Patwari. The Rules provide for the criterion and the mechanism for the appointment and filling up the post whereas the advertisement is one of the steps and/or subsets of the overall scheme of appointment envisaged under the law. Therefore, it belies logic if a subset of the process is permitted to attain primacy over the entire scheme envisaged under the Rules itself.