Summary: ''Section 3 Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972--- Article 31 & 35 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973. A widow who was inducted on contract employment due to death of her husband during service, was terminated from service due to contracting second marriage---- held that marriage or re-marriage is a religious and fundamental right of a woman and any step /action taken in contravention of such right would be illegal, unlawful and ultra vires. A civil servant passed away during his service upon which his widow was appointed as Naib Qasid. But on her re-marriage, her services were terminated under Memorandum dated 15.12.2015 issued by the Establishment Division whereby on remarriage of a widow the contract of employment provided to her would be terminated from the date of her remarriage. The said Memorandum dated 15.12.2015 had already been set aside by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan. Thus no immunity/ protection is attached to such illegal order of an authority. Intra Court Appeal allowed.'' ---- Background: The appellant, Zoya Islam, a widow of a Pakistan Mint employee, was appointed as a Naib Qasid (BS-01) on a five-year contract under the "Revision of Assistance Package for Families of Government Employees who Die in Service" dated 04.12.2015. Following her second marriage, her employment was terminated on 30.09.2021, based on a notification issued by the Establishment Division dated 15.12.2015, which disqualified widows who remarry from continuing their employment under the assistance package. Zoya Islam challenged this termination through a writ petition (W.P. No.73497/2022), which was dismissed by the learned Single Judge on the grounds that contract employees cannot maintain writ petitions. This dismissal led to the present intra-court appeal (ICA). ---- Issues: 1) Whether the appellant’s termination from service due to her remarriage was lawful. ---2) Whether the 15.12.2015 notification that disqualifies widows from employment upon remarriage is constitutional and consistent with Islamic principles and prior court rulings. ---3) Whether the appellant, as a contract employee, has the legal standing to file a writ petition. ---- Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The court ruled in favor of the appellant, holding that: The termination of Zoya Islam on the grounds of remarriage was unconstitutional and against Islamic principles. Islam encourages widows to remarry, and their rights, including employment, should not be infringed based on such a decision. The notification dated 15.12.2015 issued by the Establishment Division was previously declared unconstitutional by the Islamabad High Court and the Supreme Court of Pakistan in the Mst. Samia Tabassum case. This precedent established that a widow’s employment under the assistance package should not be affected by her remarriage. The termination order violated the principles of Shariah, Articles 31 and 35 of the Constitution, and precedents established by the superior courts, thus rendering it void. The appellant was entitled to reinstatement. The appeal was allowed, and the writ petition was accepted. The termination order dated 30.09.2021 and the decision to decline reinstatement were both set aside. ---- Citations/Precedents: Mst. Samia Tabassum v. Federation of Pakistan, Writ Petition No.389 of 2016 (Islamabad High Court judgment dated 27.05.2016) – Declared the 15.12.2015 memorandum unconstitutional and affirmed the right of widows to continue employment despite remarriage. Mst. Basharat Jehan v. Director General, Federal Government Education, FGEI (C/O) Rawalpindi, 2015 SCMR 1418 – Affirmed that once a legal right is vested through an appointment, it cannot be taken away without legal justification. Muhammad Sharif v. Settlement Commissioner and others, 2007 SCMR 707 – Affirmed the mandatory compliance of superior court judgments under Article 189 of the Constitution. Iffat Jabeen v. District Education Officer (M.E.E.), Lahore and another, 2011 SCMR 437 – Reinforced the principle of adhering to superior court decisions. Dr. Iqrar Ahmad Khan v. Dr. Muhammad Ashraf and others, 2021 SCMR 1509 – Reiterated the binding nature of Supreme Court rulings.

Summary: Background: The petition arises from a civil suit for declaration and injunction where the plaintiffs (petitioners) requested that the trial court issue a summons for the first defendant, Mst. Saima Saeed, to testify as a witness. The trial judge denied the application, and both the Appellate Court and the Revision Court upheld the decision. The petitioners challenged these orders under Article 185(3) of the Constitution before the Supreme Court of Pakistan. ---- Issues: 1) Whether the plaintiffs can compel the first defendant to appear as a witness on their behalf. --2) Whether the lower courts correctly refused the plaintiffs' application for a witness summons for the first defendant. ---3) Whether the refusal to issue a witness summons affects the fairness of the trial and justice. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The Supreme Court upheld the decisions of the lower courts, emphasizing that it is generally improper to call an opposing party as a witness on behalf of the other party. The Court cited precedents from the Privy Council, specifically Kishori Lal v. Chunni Lal (31 All. 116 at page 122) and Mahunt Shatrugan Das v. Bawa Sham Das (AIR 1938 PC 59), which disapprove of the practice of calling the defendant to testify for the plaintiff. The Court reiterated that parties who are in a position to provide personal evidence should not refrain from doing so, and if a party fails to appear without sufficient cause, the court may draw an adverse inference against them. However, the plaintiffs should not compel the defendant’s presence through a summons. The Court ruled that the lower courts had appropriately followed the established legal principles, and there was no legal infirmity in their orders. The petition was dismissed, and leave to appeal was refused. ---- Citations/Precedents: Kishori Lal v. Chunni Lal (31 All. 116) Mahunt Shatrugan Das v. Bawa Sham Das (AIR 1938 PC 59)

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: ----Ss.169, 173 & 190(2)---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 302, 324 & 34---Investigation report---Name in Column No. 2---Constitutional petition---Complainant was aggrieved of placing name of accused person in Column No. 2 of investigation report submitted by investigating officer in case of qatl-i-amd and attempt to commit qatl-i-amd---Validity---Under the scheme of investigation, the Police Officer was empowered to release an accused upon the execution of a bond if it appeared to him that there was insufficient evidence or reasonable ground of suspicion to justify forwarding the accused to a Magistrate as per S. 169, Cr.P.C.---However, of great importance was the fact that these powers were not analogous to those of the Trial Court, which evaluated the credibility of evidence---In cases where the prosecution and the defence evidence were in conflict, the Trial Court served as the ultimate forum to weigh palpably both sets of evidence on a judicial scale, determining which to rely on and which to discard---Subsection (3) of S. 173, Cr.P.C., empowered the Magistrate to make such orders for the discharge of the bond or 'otherwise' as deemed fit after receiving the police report showing that the accused had been released on bond---Ipse dixit of the police was not binding on the Court and the Court retained the ultimate authority to determine the fate of the accused, regardless of their names being placed in Column No.2 of the challan-- -Placing the name of the respondent/accused in Column No.2 of the challan was within the statutory powers of the officer-in-charge of the police station and, thus, no jurisdictional error had been established---Authority now rested with the Magistrate to make such orders, after going through the record, as deemed appropriate, either discharging the bond or otherwise---Release of the accused under S. 169, Cr.P.C. did not equate to acquittal, and neither the Magistrate nor the Trial Court was bound by the ipse dixit of the police without conducting an independent assessment of the record---As challan had already been submitted in the case, therefore, Court left it to the forum seized of the matter to pass such orders under the law as deemed appropriate in the circumstances of the case---Constitutional petition was accordingly dismissed in limine. Sheikh Zahoor Ahmed v. The State and others 2023 PCr.LJ 1567; Yasir Khan v. Imtiaz and 2 others PLD 2013 Pesh. 46 and Pordil Khan v. State through Advocate-General, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and 11 others 2016 MLD 314 rel. Masood Adnan for Petitioner. Date of hearing: 10th September, 2024.

Summary: (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b) & 34---Qatl-i-amd, common intention---Appreciation of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Contradictions and dishonest improvements in the statements of witnesses---Accused were charged that they in furtherance of their common intention committed murder of the son of complainant and caused injuries to his other son---Record showed that the evidence of star-witness of the prosecution i.e. injured witness, who undoubtedly was having the stamp of injury on his person, had already been disbelieved by the trial Court to the extent of culpability of co-accused "TH" with respect to his role of causing injury to deceased---Case of the prosecution, since inception had been that the accused caused Chhura (dagger) blow at the neck of deceased and co-accused "TH" caused dagger below on his left flank, whereas no injury on the person of the deceased had been attributed to other co-accused---On going through the seat of both the injuries, the conclusion was inescapable that the medical evidence was not in-line with the prosecution case rather it contradicted the same, as the injury attributed to both the accused and co-accused at the neck and flank, were not found mentioned in the post-mortem report---Similarly, according to the prosecution case, accused inflicted dagger blow at the flank of injured witness and co-accused's blow of hatchet, stated to have landed on his left thigh, also contradicted with the medical evidence, as observed by Medical Officer, while deposing in the dock---Notably the eye-witnesses had improved their version, while deposing before the Trial Court, in order to bring their testimony in-line with the prosecution case, which could be termed as dishonest improvement---Appeal against conviction was accordingly allowed. Muhammad .Mansha v. The State 2018 SCMR 772; Abdul Jabbar and another v. The State 2019 SCMR 129; Muhammad Arif v. The State 2019 SCMR 631; Ibrar Hussain and others v. The State and another 2007 SCMR 605 and Nazeer Ahmed v. The State 2016 SCMR 1628 rel. (b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b) & 34---Qatl-i-amd, common intention---Appreciation of evidence---Motive not proved---Accused were charged that they in furtherance of their common intention committed murder of the son of complainant and caused injuries to his other son---Motive behind the occurrence was that deceased daughter of brother of complainant, was married to accused, who had come to her parents, place and was not willing to restore matrimonial relations---Neither the father of deceased, who was statedly real brother of complainant nor daughter of the brother of complainant, who were important witnesses of the prosecution to prove the motive, had ever been associated in the investigation or appeared before the Trial Court, to depose such aspect of the case---Trial Court had disbelieved the motive set-up by the prosecution by observing that the occurrence took place in the spur of moment, without any premeditation---Appeal against conviction was accordingly allowed. (c) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b) & 34---Qatl-i-amd, common intention---Appreciation of evidence---Recovery of weapon of offence---Inconsequential---Accused were charged that they in furtherance of their common intention committed murder of the son of complainant and caused injuries to his other son---Allegedly, Chhura (dagger) was recovered from the possession of the accused, and the same was found to be stained with human blood vide report of Chemical Examiner---Recovery of weapon of offence was always considered to be corroboratory evidence---No conviction could be sustained on the evidence of recovery alone---Since, the ocular account furnished by the prosecution had been doubted and disbelieved, so, the evidence of recovery of weapon of offense, hardly advanced the case of the prosecution in any manner---Appeal against conviction was accordingly allowed. (d) Criminal trial--- ----Benefit of doubt---Principle---Any reasonable doubt, arising out of the prosecution case, would be resolved in favour of the accused. Tariq Pervez v. The State 1995 SCMR 1345; Ayub Masih v. The State PLD 2002 SC 1048 and Munir Ahmad and another v. The State and others 2019 SCMR 79 rel. Prince Rehan Iftikhar and Hafiz Muhammad Haseeb for Appellant. Rana Muhammad Nadeem Kanjo and Mehar Noor Hussain Malooka for the Complainant. Muhammad Umar Farooq Khan, Addl. Prosecutor General for the State. Date of hearing: 10th September, 2024. Judgment Muhammad Waheed Khan, J .--- Appellant Rajab Ali has challenged his conviction and sentence awarded to him by the learned Judge Juvenile Court, Vehari vide judgment dated 11.03.2013 in case FIR No.447/2011 registered under sections 302, 34, P.P.C. at Police Station Saddar, Vehari, whereby he was convicted and sentenced as under;- Under section 302(b) P.P.C. awarded life imprisonment. He was also directed to pay compensation of Rs.50,000/- to the legal heirs of the deceased under section 544-A Cr.P.C. and in default whereof to further undergo imprisonment for six months. Benefit under section 382-B Cr.P.C. was also extended to him. Whereas his co-accused Talib Hussain was separately tried being major and also convicted. 2. Brief facts of the case as narrated by the complainant Allah Rakha in complaint Exh.PF are that on 04.08.2011 at about 4.30 p.m., his son Nazir Ahmad was standing outside his house, all of a sudden Rajab Ali armed with Chhura , Talib Hussain armed with dagger and Shuban armed with hatchet assaulted on him, Rajab Ali made a Chhura blow at the neck of Nazir Ahmad, followed by a dagger blow of Talib Hussain at his left flank, on this his another son Bashir Ahmad intervened, whereby Talib Hussain also gave him a dagger blow on his flank, who fell down and Muhammad Shuban caused hatched blow to Bashir Ahmad on his left thigh. On hue and cry, Ghulam Rasool son of Muhammad Yousaf, Ghulam Yasin and other persons of the village attracted to the spot, who witnessed the occurrence, whereas the aforesaid accused succeeded in fleeing away. The motive behind the occurrence was that Mst. Nasreen Bibi daughter of brother of complainant Ahmad Bakhsh was married to Talib Hussain accused, who had come to her parents and mother of Talib Hussain came to take her back, whereupon they said that she would be sent after few days, hence, due to this grudge Talib Hussain, etc. in furtherance of their common intention, committed Qatl-i-amd of Nazir Ahmad and injured Bashir Ahmad. 3. After registration of case, matter was investigated and two different reports under section 173 Cr.P.C. were submitted before the learned trial Court while declaring the appellant and his co-accused Muhammad Shuban and Talib Hussain as guilty. Thereafter, formal charge was framed against the appellant, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. The prosecution in order to prove its case produced as many as eleven witnesses and after producing certain documents closed its evidence. After completion of prosecution evidence, statement of the appellant was recorded under section 342 Cr.P.C., in which he denied all the allegations levelled against him by the prosecution. He neither opted to appear as his own witness under section 340 (2) Cr.P.C., nor produced any defence evidence. After evaluating prosecution evidence available on record, learned trial Court found the prosecution version correct beyond any shadow of doubt to the extent of the appellant, which resulted into conviction and sentence of appellant Rajab Ali in the afore stated terms. 4. In support of the instant appeal, learned counsel for the appellant submits that the prosecution story is inherently flawed and failed to inspire confidence; that the impugned judgment is based on surmises and conjectures and the material evidence in favour of the appellant has been misread; that the ocular account has been disbelieved to the extent of Talib Hussain, whereby he was acquitted from the charge of murder of Nazir Ahmad; that there is glaring contradiction between the ocular account and the medical evidence; that the motive part of the incident has been disbelieved by the learned Trial Court, by observing that the alleged incident took place at the spur of moment and the stated recovery of weapon of offence is of no consequence, as having certain defects in it and lastly submits that since the prosecution has miserably failed to prove its case, as per dictates of law, so, by accepting the instant appeal, the appellant be acquitted from the charge. 5. Conversely, learned Addl. Prosecutor General assisted by the learned counsel for the complainant refuted the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant and faithfully defended the impugned judgment, by stating that the prosecution has successfully brought home the guilt of the appellant by producing cogent, trust-worthy and confidence inspiring natural evidence; that one of the eye-witness Bashir Ahmad, was having the stamp of injuries, so, his testimony cannot be disbelieved on any hypothesis; that the ocular account, adduced by the prosecution has been sufficiently corroborated by the other pieces of evidence, like recovery of weapon of offence and the motive part of incident and lastly submit that since the prosecution has proved its case to the hilt against the appellant, hence, the appeal filed by him is liable to be dismissed. 6. I have heard arguments of learned counsel for the parties and have perused the record with their assistance and noted that machinery of law was set into motion by Allah Rakha (PW.8), father of the deceased Nazir Ahmad, while lodging the complaint Exh.PF and FIR Exh.PB, contending that on the day of incident i.e. on 04.08.2011 at about 4.30 p.m., his son Nazir Ahmad was standing outside his house, all of a sudden Rajab Ali armed with Chhura Talib Hussain appellant armed with dagger and Muhammad Shuban armed with hatchet assaulted on him, Rajab Ali made a Chhura blow at the neck of Nazir Ahmad, followed by a dagger blow of Talib Hussain at his left flank, on this his another son Bashir Ahmad intervened, whereby Talib Hussain also gave him a dagger blow on his flank, who fell down. Similarly, Muhammad Shuban caused hatched blow to Bashir Ahmad on his left thigh. On hue and cry, the other witnesses attracted to the spot. The incident allegedly took place in the backdrop of a motive that Mst. Nasreen Bibi daughter of brother of complainant Ahmad Bakhsh was married to Talib Hussain accused, who on account of strained relations, had come back to her parents home and was not willing to restore the matrimonial life with Talib Hussain. Owing this grudge, the occurrence took place, whereby one Nazir Ahmad lost his life, whereas Bashir Ahmad (PW.9) sustained severe injuries on his person. I have straightway observed that Rajab Ali and Talib Hussain were attributed the active role of causing injuries with Chhura and dagger in the FIR and also during the statement in terms of section 161 Cr.P.C. of the witnesses, they along with their co-accused Muhammad Shuban were challaned but on culmination of the trial, Talib Hussain was acquitted from the charge of murder of Nazir Ahmad, whereas he was convicted and sentenced of causing injury on the person of Bashir Ahmad (PW.9). I have gone through the reasons cited by the learned Trial Court in para Nos.26 and 28 of the judgment, for acquitting Talib Hussain from the charge of homicide. I have noted that the learned Trial Court had observed that the incident took place all of a sudden at the spur of moment, without any meditation and also that injury attributed to him (Talib Hussain) at the person of Nazir Ahmad deceased, was also not proved, as the ocular account in this regard was contradicted by the medical evidence and his vicarious liability and element of sharing common intention, has also not been proved. I have repeatedly asked the learned law officer and the learned counsel for the complainant about this aspect that whether there is any mis-reading of evidence by the learned Trial Court in this regard, they remained unable to respond the query satisfactorily and could not point out any mis-reading or non-reading of evidence on part of the learned Trial Court, meaning thereby that the evidence of the star-witness of the prosecution i.e. Bashir Ahmad, who undoubtedly was having the stamp of injury on his person, had already been disbelieved by the learned Trial Court to the extent of culpability of Talib Hussain with respect to his role of causing injury to Nazir Ahmad deceased. Adverting to the arguments of learned counsel for the appellant with regard to the conflict between the ocular account and the medical evidence, I have gone through the testimony of the eye-witnesses and noted that case of the prosecution, since inception has been that Rajab Ali appellant, caused Chhura blow at the neck of Nazir Ahmad deceased and Talib Hussain caused dagger on his left flank, whereas no injury at the person of the deceased has been attributed to Muhammad Shuban. To appreciate this argument of learned counsel for the appellant, I have also gone through the medico legal certificate, post-mortem report and also the testimony of Dr. Mojeeb ur Rehman (PW.6) and observed that the said doctor conducted the autopsy on the dead-body of the deceased at 11:00 p.m. on 04.08.2011 and noted two injuries:- Injury No.1 . An incised wound 6cm x 2cm going deep on front of upper part of chest just about right clavicle. Injury No.2. An incised wound 10cm x 4cm x muscle deep on the posterior part of left upper arm 12cm below the top of shoulder joint. So, on going through the seat of both the injuries, the conclusion is inescapable that there is force in the arguments of learned counsel for the appellant that the medical evidence is not in-line with the prosecution case rather it contradicts the same, as the injury attributed to both the appellants i.e. Rajab Ali and Talib Hussain at the neck and flank, were not found mentioned in the postmortem. Similarly, according to the prosecution case, Talib Hussain inflicted dagger blow at the flank of Bashir Ahmad injured PW and Muhammad Shuban's blow of hatchet, stated to be landed at his left thigh, were also contradicted with the medical evidence, as observed by Dr. Muhammad Aslam, while deposing in the dock as PW.1. According to his testimony, he observed an incised wound 3 cm x 1 cm x bone deep on back of left hand of Bashir Ahmad, whereas a penetrating wound 3 cm x 1 cm x going deep on outer side lower part left side of abdomen 5 cm above left iliac spine. I have also noted that the eye-witnesses have improved their version, while getting recorded their depositions before the learned Trial Court in this regard, in order to bring their testimony in-line with the prosecution case, which can be termed as dishonest improvement. Reliance in this regard may be placed on the cases of "Muhammad Mansha v. The State" (2018 SCMR 772), "Abdul Jabbar and another v. The State" (2019 SCMR 129) and "Muhammad Arif v. The State" (2019 SCMR 631). There is another aspect of the case that according to the prosecution case, Bashir Ahmad (PW.9) was operated in the Nishtar Hospital, Multan by Dr. Amjad Aleem, who was also cited as a witness in the calendar of witness but the said witness did not appear in the dock to favour the prosecution and it is also note-worthy that the operation notes, prepared by the said witness had also not been got exhibited by the prosecution. So, this failure on part of the prosecution also goes against it. The august Supreme Court of Pakistan in case of "Ibrar Hussain and others v. The State and another" (2007 SCMR 605) held that contradictory statement cannot be held worthy of credence. Similarly, in other judgments rendered in various cases, the apex Court, while finding conflict between the ocular and medical evidence, proceeded to acquit the accused. Reliance in this regard is placed on the case of "Nazeer Ahmed v. The State" (2016 SCMR 1628). 7. I have also observed that the complainant had challenged the decision of the learned Trial Court by filing an appeal against acquittal from the charge of Qatl-e-Amd and also filed a criminal revision for enhancement of sentence but both i.e. the appeal and the revision petition have already been dismissed by this Court. It is also pertinent to mention there that co-accused/convict Muhammad Shuban, who has also been tried separately, was convicted and sentenced by the learned Trial Court as two years R.I. under section 337-F(ii) P.P.C., has already been released from jail, after serving out his sentence and learned counsel for the appellant admitted that he had never challenged his conviction before this Court. 8. Now, coming to the motive part of the incident, although it is alleged in the FIR that Mst. Nasreen Bibi daughter of brother of complainant, namely, Ahmad Bakhsh was married to Talib Hussain accused, who had come to her parents and was not willing to restore the matrimonial relations but neither said Ahmad Bakhsh, who is statedly, real brother of complainant Allah Rakha nor Mst. Nasreen Bibi, who were the important witnesses of the prosecution to prove the motive, have been ever associated in the investigation or appeared before the learned Trial Court, to depose this aspect of the case and as discussed above the learned Trial Court has disbelieved the motive set-up by the prosecution, by observing that the occurrence took place in the spur of moment, without any premeditation. 9. So far as the Chhura allegedly recovered from the possession of the appellant is concerned, the same was found to be stained with human blood vide report of Chemical Examiner Punjab, Lahore (Exh.PQ) but without going into the veracity of the same, I observe that recovery of weapon of offence is always considered to be the corroboratory evidence and no conviction could be sustained on the evidence of recovery alone, and while observing earlier, the ocular account, furnished by the prosecution has been doubted and disbelieved, so, the evidence of recovery of weapon of offence, hardly advances the case of the prosecution in any manner. 10. So, viewing the facts of the case in its totality, I found that there are many lapses/lacunas in the prosecution case and law is well settled that any 'reasonable doubt' arising out of the prosecution case, shall be resolved in favour of the accused. Reliance is placed on the judgments passed by the august Supreme Court of Pakistan in cases of "Tariq Pervez v. The State" (1995 SCMR 1345), "Ayub Masih v. The State" (PLD 2002 SC 1048) and "Munir Ahmad and another v. The State and others" (2019 SCMR 79). 11. So, for the foregoing reasons, I believe that the evidence adduced by the prosecution is not worth reliance and no implicit reliance can be placed on it to maintain the conviction of the appellant. Resultantly, this appeal is allowed and the conviction and sentence awarded to the appellant, Rajab Ali, vide judgment dated 11.03.2013 by the learned Judge Juvenile Court, Vehari, is set-aside. He is acquitted of the charge(s). He be released forthwith, if not required to be detained in any other case. JK/R-14/L Appeal allowed.

Summary: (a) Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964) — Ss. 5, 9, 10, 12 & Schedule — West Pakistan Family Courts Rules, 1965 — Suit for recovery of dowry (haq mehr) by parents of deceased wife — Maintainability — Petitioners, being parents of deceased Mst. Mehreen, filed suit before Family Court seeking recovery of dowry articles (100 misqal gold) from her husband — Held, Family Court has limited jurisdiction to matters expressly listed in the Schedule to the Family Courts Act, 1964, which primarily covers disputes arising between spouses or arising directly from the marriage relationship — Claim for share in dowry as tarka by heirs of deceased wife amounts to a succession matter and not a matrimonial dispute — Such claim lies outside the scope of Family Court’s jurisdiction — Family Court rightly dismissed suit for lack of locus standi — Orders upheld. PLD 1991 SC 750; PLD 1991 SC 731; PLD 2019 Sindh 1 ref. (b) Constitution of Pakistan — Art. 199 — Constitutional petition against concurrent findings — Scope — Both Family Court and Appellate Court had concurrently dismissed petitioners’ suit for want of jurisdiction and locus standi — Constitutional jurisdiction cannot be invoked to disturb concurrent factual and legal findings unless findings are perverse, illegal, or without jurisdiction — No illegality, irregularity, or miscarriage of justice shown — Petition dismissed in limine. 2008 YLR 2309; PLD 2008 Karachi 2005 ref. (c) Inheritance and succession — Jurisdiction — Claim to dowry after death of wife — Legal character of dowry — Dowry may form part of deceased’s estate (tarka), but determination of heirs’ shares in tarka is not a matter falling within jurisdiction of Family Court — Remedy lies in civil court having jurisdiction over succession matters — Filing suit before Family Court by legal heirs of deceased wife is misconceived and not maintainable. Disposition: Petition dismissed in limine. Concurrent findings of Family Court and Appellate Court upheld. Family Court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate inheritance-based claims by legal heirs.

Summary: (a) Guardians and Wards Act (1890): ----Section 25 The Petitioner challenged the decision regarding the custody of the minor, claiming that the Respondent No.1, being an 80-year-old woman with health issues, was incapable of providing proper care for the minor. The court emphasized that the welfare of the minor is the paramount consideration in custody cases. While the Respondent No.1, as the maternal grandmother, had a preferential right to custody, this was subject to the welfare of the child. Held, the Court observed that the Petitioner, as the natural guardian, was in a better position to care for the minor, given the Respondent No.1's health issues and dependency on her daughter for assistance. The court restored the custody of the minor to the Petitioner. ----Cited Cases: • Shabana Naz v. Muhammad Saleem (2014 SCMR 343) • Raja Muhammad Owais v. Mst. Nazia Jabeen (2022 SCMR 2123) • Mehmood Akhtar v. District Judge Attock (2004 SCMR 1839) (b) Welfare of the Minor: ----Custody Decisions Based on Welfare The Court reiterated that custody decisions must always prioritize the welfare of the minor, considering factors such as emotional, physical, and educational well-being. While the maternal grandmother had a preferential right to custody under Muslim Personal Law, this was not an absolute criterion. The Court considered the father’s ability to provide a stable and secure home, his financial capacity, and his willingness to care for the child. Held, the Petitioner’s capacity to provide for the minor’s well-being outweighed the Respondent No.1’s preferential right under Muslim law, as the welfare of the child was better served by the father. ----Cited Cases: • Mst. Seema Choudhary v. Ahsan Ashraf Sheikh (PLD 2003 SC 877) • Shaista Habib v. Muhammad Arif Habib (PLD 2024 SC 629) (c) Appeal and Judicial Review: ----Erroneous Judgments and Misreading of Evidence The Court found that the Additional District Judge had grossly misread the evidence and wrongly interfered with the well-reasoned findings of the Senior Civil Judge. The Court invoked its constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution, observing that the Appellate Court had exercised jurisdiction in an arbitrary manner without proper consideration of the facts. Held, the impugned judgment of the Additional District Judge was set aside, and the decision of the Senior Civil Judge (Family Division) was restored. ----Cited Cases: • Hammad Ali Khan v. Mst. Sadia Akbar (2024 MLD 1445) -----Disposition: Both writ petitions were allowed. The consolidated judgment and decree passed by the Additional District Judge, Rawalpindi, and the order dated 02.07.2024 passed by the Family Executing Court were set aside. The judgment of the Senior Civil Judge (Family Division), Rawalpindi, was restored. The District Judge, Rawalpindi, was directed to investigate the actions of the Family Executing Court regarding its misconduct.