Summary: This Civil Review Petition was filed by the Supreme Court Bar Association of Pakistan (SCBA) to review the majority decision in Constitution Petition No. 2 of 2022. The original decision had been rendered by a five-member bench of the Supreme Court in a 3-2 split, with Justice Munib Akhtar authoring the majority opinion and Justices Umar Ata Bandial, CJ, and Ijaz ul Ahsan concurring. The minority opinion was given by Justices Mazhar Alam Khan Miankhel and Jamal Khan Mandokhail. The SCBA sought review of this judgment. The case arose from a Presidential Reference and two Constitution Petitions, involving a complex interplay between political and legal issues. ------- Issues: ------- 1) Whether the Supreme Court's original majority decision in Constitution Petition No. 2 of 2022 warrants reconsideration. ------- 2) Whether the judgment involved any legal or procedural errors justifying review. ------- 3) Whether Justice Munib Akhtar’s inability to join the review bench should lead to the appointment of another judge. ------- Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The hearing of the review petition was scheduled for 1st October 2024, as the Supreme Court awaited the resolution of certain procedural issues. ------- Justice Munib Akhtar’s Participation: Justice Munib Akhtar, who had authored the majority opinion in the original judgment, expressed his inability to participate in the review petition proceedings via a letter to the Registrar, though he clarified it was not a formal recusal. The Court directed the Registrar to inform Justice Akhtar of the order and requested him to join the bench. If Justice Akhtar remained unavailable, the Committee under the Supreme Court (Practice and Procedure) Act, 2023 would appoint another judge in his place. ------- Representation and Counsel Changes: The SCBA's original counsel, Mr. Mansoor Usman Awan, had since become the Attorney-General for Pakistan and would now represent the Federation, while new representation was arranged for other parties, including Mr. Imran Khan’s counsel from Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf (PTI). ------- Next Steps: The Court scheduled the next hearing for October 1, 2024, to address the review petition and resolve the bench composition issues. ------- Citations/Precedents: Constitution Petition No. 2 of 2022 (Original Case) ------- The 3-2 majority judgment under review, authored by Justice Munib Akhtar and concurred by Umar Ata Bandial, CJ, and Ijaz ul Ahsan, J. Supreme Court (Practice and Procedure) Act, 2023 ------- Section 2 of the Act governs the process of constituting a bench when a judge is unable to participate, potentially affecting Justice Akhtar’s replacement on the review bench. ------- The petition is pending further proceedings, with the next hearing scheduled for 1st October 2024.

Summary: The Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) appealed against the Lahore High Court's judgment, which ruled in favor of petitioners challenging the ECP's authority to unilaterally appoint Election Tribunals without proper consultation with the Chief Justice of the Lahore High Court. The High Court judgment required the appointment of Tribunals to be made on the recommendation of the Chief Justice of the Lahore High Court. The ECP sought to overturn this decision, arguing it held the constitutional power to appoint Election Tribunals independently. ------Issues: ------1) Does the ECP have the exclusive authority to appoint Election Tribunals under the Constitution and the Elections Act, 2017? ------2) Is consultation with the Chief Justice of the High Court a mandatory prerequisite for the appointment of Election Tribunals? ------3) Were the petitioners before the High Court aggrieved parties entitled to challenge the ECP’s actions? ------Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the Lahore High Court’s judgment. However, since the matter was resolved amicably between the ECP and the Chief Justice of the Lahore High Court, the Court refrained from making any substantive legal rulings. ------ Resolution Through Consultation: The Court noted that the conflict between the ECP and the Chief Justice of the Lahore High Court arose from a lack of meaningful consultation. Following a face-to-face meeting, a consensus was reached on the appointment of Election Tribunals, rendering further adjudication unnecessary. ------ Role of Consultation: The Court emphasized that the power to appoint Election Tribunals lies with the ECP, but meaningful consultation with the Chief Justice of the High Court is required, as he is best positioned to nominate suitable judges. ------ Constitutional Balance: The Court underlined the importance of cooperation between constitutional bodies, such as the ECP and the judiciary, and cautioned against judicial intervention unless absolutely necessary. The Supreme Court appreciated the amicable resolution of the matter and set aside the High Court’s decision and its subsequent notifications regarding Tribunal appointments. ---- Citations/Precedents: Al-Jehad Trust v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 1996 SC 324) Establishes principles of judicial independence and consultation in appointments. Riaz-ul-Haq v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2013 SC 501) Reiterates the requirement of meaningful consultation for administrative and judicial appointments. Constitution of Pakistan, Articles 219(c), 222(d), 225 Constitutional provisions governing the powers and functions of the ECP. Elections Act, 2017, Sections 140(3), 151 Details the process of appointing Election Tribunals and transferring election petitions. The appeals were allowed based on the settlement between the ECP and the Chief Justice of the Lahore High Court, and the issue was resolved without the need for further judicial intervention.

Summary: The petitioner claimed that she had a joint account with her deceased father, however, after death of her father, the legal heirs (her siblings and mother) were not entitled to claim share in 50% of the deposit lying in the account on the ground that the account was being operated in terms of "either or survival" clause. Held: While such clause has already been declared as unislamic in multiple cases by the Superior Courts, including this Court qua rights of legal heirs of deceased depositor, it has been further observed that the guidelines or stipulations contained in a Bank Account Opening Form are mere operating instructions and are meant to safeguard the banks in situations where one of the joint account holders dies and it does not come to the knowledge of the bank and/or any claim by the legal heirs of the deceased joint account holder is not intimated to the bank and the bank in good faith pays the amount, lying with it, to the surviving account holder(s). In such situation, the bank may be absolved from any liability keeping in view the facts of a particular case and the legal heirs of the deceased account holder can claim the recovery from the surviving joint account holders; however, it does not give unfettered power to the bank to unilaterally facilitate the surviving joint account holder(s) to withdraw all the money.

Summary: The petitioner claimed that she had a joint account with her deceased father, however, after death of her father, the legal heirs (her siblings and mother) were not entitled to claim share in 50% of the deposit lying in the account on the ground that the account was being operated in terms of "either or survival" clause. Held: While such clause has already been declared as unislamic in multiple cases by the Superior Courts, including this Court qua rights of legal heirs of deceased depositor, it has been further observed that the guidelines or stipulations contained in a Bank Account Opening Form are mere operating instructions and are meant to safeguard the banks in situations where one of the joint account holders dies and it does not come to the knowledge of the bank and/or any claim by the legal heirs of the deceased joint account holder is not intimated to the bank and the bank in good faith pays the amount, lying with it, to the surviving account holder(s). In such situation, the bank may be absolved from any liability keeping in view the facts of a particular case and the legal heirs of the deceased account holder can claim the recovery from the surviving joint account holders; however, it does not give unfettered power to the bank to unilaterally facilitate the surviving joint account holder(s) to withdraw all the money. 955Writ Petition- Family- Maintenance 1234-23 MISBAH IFTIKHAR VS ALEESA ETC Mr. Justice Mirza Viqas Rauf 26- 09- 2024 2024 LHC 5139 PLD 2025 Lahore 249

Summary: Cantonments Rent Restriction Act (XI of 1963)--- ----Ss. 6, 17 & 24---Ejectment application---Change of ownership---Bona fide personal need---Denial of relationship of landlord and tenant---Tenant alleged that he entered into a sale agreement with previous owner of disputed premises and asserted payment of consideration and possession---There was pending suit for specific performance between the tenant and previous owner---Subsequent owner after issuance of notice qua change of ownership filed an application under S.17 of the Cantonments Rent Restriction Act, 1963 (Act), which was allowed by the Additional Controller of Rents---Contention of the tenant was that the Additional Controller of Rents had no jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the rent matter---Validity---Section 6 of the Act had laid down a scheme, whereby, the Controller of Rents is appointed by a notification in Official Gazette for one or more cantonments---Appellant had not disputed that the Additional Controller of Rents had been appointed through notification as stipulated in law, thus, the plea of appellant was a repelled---Ground on which the application under S.17 of the Act was filed by the respondent was related to his personal bona fide need and not default in payment of rent---Subsequent landlord/respondent in the application as well as affidavit in evidence had categorically stated that he had purchased the demised premises for his personal bona fide use, which assertion had not been controverted by the tenant in cross-examination of respondent---Instead, respondent had been asked questions regarding the suit filed by the tenant against the previous owner---Nothing rebutting the ground of personal bona fide use of respondent, had been propounded by the tenant through any oral or documentary evidence, thus, the case of respondent on the ground of personal bona fide stoodproved---As regards the case of appellant that he had purchased the property from previous owner, if the tenant succeeded in his suit for specific performance, he would succeed in acquiring possession of the property---Attorney of the tenant had admitted possession of the demised premises in the capacity of tenant and depositing the rent in the court,thus, no further proof in presence of such admission was needed to show the nature of relation of the landlord and tenant--- First Rent Appeal was dismissed, in circumstances. PLD 1989 Kar. 404; PLD 2015 SC 401; 2001 SCMR 1888; 2019 YLR 2500; 2019 YLR 2846 and 2018 CLC Note 97 ref. 2020 YLR 61; Civil Petition No. 1152 of 2018 rel. Khawaja Shams-ul-Islam along with Javeria Saleem and Asfandyar Khan for Appellant. Saleem Thepdawala for Respondent No. 1. Ghulam Muhammad Dars for Respondent No. 2. Date of hearing: 19th September, 2024. Judgment Muhammad Iqbal Kalhoro, J .--- Respondent No.1 filed an application under section 17 of Cantonments Rent Restriction Act, 1963 (Act, 1963) against appellant in respect of a Bungalow No.15-B/II, 22nd Street, Khayban-e-Tanzeem, Phase-V, DHA, Karachi. He has stated in the application that he has purchased the property from Syed Shahzad Ali, who had rented the said bungalow to appellant w.e.f 01.07.2010 against monthly rent of Rs.25,000/-. He has further disclosed that he has purchased the said Bungalow for personal bona fide use, hence he sent a legal notice to appellant dated 23.12.2015 to vacate the Bungalow but he failed to even respond to the same. Hence, he has filed application. 2. This application was contested by the appellant on the ground that he was not the tenant but had purchased the property and paid US$ 62091.00 to previous owner but since he did not perform his part of agreement, he has filed a Civil Suit No.161/2016 against him for specific performance of contract. He has further taken a plea in the written reply that there is no relationship of tenant and landlord between him and respondent No.1; that the application is an outcome of mala fide. 3. Learned Additional Controller of Rents by way of impugned order has allowed the application and ordered the appellant to vacate the demised premises within 30 days, hence this appeal. 4. Learned counsel for appellant has contended that Additional Controller of Rents has no jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the matter; that Additional Controller of Rents is no one but Additional Cantonment Executive Officer, he is not appointed under section 6(2) of the Act, 1963, and powers conferred upon him to adjudicate rent matters are illegal, void abinitio. He in this regard has relied upon PLD 1989 Karachi 404 and PLD 2015 SC 401. Learned counsel has further submitted that appellant is in possession of demised premises in capacity of purchaser and not as a tenant which he had purchased against payment of US$ 62091; that he was put in possession of the property by previous owner against occupancy charges of Rs.25000/- per month till the appellant was able to arrange amount of sale consideration; that subsequently appellant paid the sale consideration to the previous owner in shape of US dollars but he failed to perform his part of contract, hence the appellant filed a civil suit which is pending adjudication before this court on original side; that sale between respondent No.1 and previous owner is manipulated one in order to defeat the civil case put up by the appellant before this court for seeking enforcement of his rights; that sale deed dated 14.12.2015 shows that respondent No.1 was delivered vacant peaceful physical possession of the property which is false because appellant was in occupation of the property at the time of alleged sale deed between the parties and respondent No.1 was never delivered possession of the property, hence the sale of the demised premises between the parties was incomplete and not enforceable. He has relied upon 2001 SCMR 1888, 2019 YLR 2500, 2019 YLR 2846 and 2018 CLC Note 97. 5. On the other hand, learned counsel for respondent No.1 has supported the impugned judgment and has relied upon 2020 YLR 61 to establish jurisdiction of the Additional Controller of Rents to adjudicate upon the matter. He has further submitted that very issue was taken up by this court in F.R.A. No.-02/2018 in the case of Saeed Mazhar Ali v. Mrs. Aroosa Mubashir and another, which was challenged before the Supreme Court in Civil Petition No.1152/2018 and upheld by an order dated 16.04.2018. 6. I have heard the parties and perused material available on record including case law relied upon by learned counsel. Insofar as issue of jurisdiction of Additional Controller of Rents is concerned, section 6 of the Act, 1963 has laid down a scheme whereby the Controller of Rents is appointed by a notification in official gazette for one or more cantonments. Learned counsel for appellant has not disputed that the Additional Controller of Rents in this case has been appointed through a notification as stipulated in law. Further in the case of Saeed Mazhar supra, this court has discussed this issue in detail as follows:- Thus, in consequence to above legal position, I would prefer to attend the challenge made by the learned counsel for the appellant with reference to Section 6(2) of the Act. This challenge is entirely based on section 6 of the Act therefore, it would be appropriate to have a direct reference to the same which reads as:- 'Section 6. Appointment of Controller.-(1) The (Federal Government) may, for purposes of this Act, by notification in the official Gazette, appoint a person to be the Controller of Rents for one or more cantonments. (2) The (Federal Government) may also, by notification in the official Gazette, appoint a person to be the Additional Controller of Rents for one or more cantonments. The plain reading of the above makes it clear that 'appointment of controller' requires only issuance of notification which however has not been made subject to 'consultation of Chief Justice' rather the absolute competence has been vested with the Federal Government to appoint 'a person' as 'Controller or Additional Controller' by issuing notification in official gazette. Legally, in name of interpretation the Court cannot add or delete anything in or out of above provision. The reference may well be made to the case of Khan Gul Khan v. Daraz Khan 2010 SCMR 539 wherein it is held as:- 26. It is a settled proposition of law that Courts have only power to interpret the law as laid down by this Court in various pronouncements. See Zia-ur-Rehman's case PLD 1973 SC 49. In the grab of interpretation, the Courts have no power to add or omit even a single word from the provision of law. In Muhammad Tariq's case supra by holding that pre-emptor and vendee are two distinct classes the distinction between the pre-emptor and vendee is not based on any legal, valid reason or logic or mandate of section itself. In another case of Lanvin Traders, Karachi v. Presiding Officer, Banking 2013 SCMR 1419 it was held as: "46. The above discussion as regards the scope and interpretation of Order XXI, Rule 66 of the Code, leaves me in no doubt to hold that firstly nothing could be added or read in a provision of law which is not provided therein by the legislature. I would further add that the scope of interpretation is to make a bona fide attempt to unfold ambiguous words or phrases without disturbing the object and intention of the legislature rather legally every attempt even while interpreting such ambiguous thing, the intention and object of the legislation has to be protected. Reference may well be made to the case of Mumtaz Hussain v. Nasir Khan 2010 SCMR 1254 wherein it is held as:- *10. It is cardinal rule of interpretation that objects made reasons of a Statute is to be looked into as an extrinsic aid to find out legislative intent only when the meaning of the Statute by its ordinary language is obscure or ambiguous. But if the words used in a statue are clear and unambiguous then the Statute itself declares the intention of the Legislature and in such a case it would not be permissible for a Court to interpret the statute by examining the object and reasons for the Statute question. Further, that status of the 'Act' aimed to control of rent matters of certain classes of buildings within the limits of cantonment area only hence the Act shall enjoy the status of special law. The special law shall prevail over the general law and the Courts are not supposed to widen the scope thereof by adding or deleting anything else object and intention of the legislature shall fail. Since, the literal and plain language of the Section 6 of the Act does not leave any room for presuming even that the appointment of the Controller or Additional Controller would require consultation of the Chief Justice hence legally the plea of learned counsel for the appellant to such an extent cannot be accepted. 7. Now, insofar as merits of the case are concerned, the attorney of the appellant in his cross-examination has admitted that he had received a legal notice from respondent's counsel informing change of ownership of Bungalow in the year 2015. He has further admitted that rent of January, 2016 to March, 2016, he started depositing in the court of Additional Controller of Rents through an application. He has also admitted in cross-examination that after lapse of four months of receipt of the notice regarding change of ownership dated 23.12.2015, he filed an application and deposited the rent in the court. 8. Learned counsel for appellant while referring to cross-examination of the respondent has argued that he has admitted that he had received the rent upto date and there was no issue of outstanding rent in support of his case. He has further contended that learned Additional Controller of Rents has erred in allowing the application on the ground of default. However, I am not convinced with this proposition because attorney of the appellant has admitted in cross-examination that he deposited the rent of three months from January, 2016 to March, 2016 only in April, 2016. The relevant question which was put to the respondent in his cross-examination was on 03.04.2017, after the incidence of depositing the rent had already happened. Therefore, admission of the respondent that he had received the rent up to the date was not incorrect, but could not absolve the appellant of the liability of default in respect of three months i.e. January, 2016 to March, 2016. This can be explained by the following example. If a tenant does not pay the rent from January to April, in any given year, and then pays the rent of all the months in May of that year. And then the landlord is asked as to whether he has received the rent upto date, his answer would be in positive. But it could not change the fact that for four months, the tenant had not paid the rent, had committed default and then paid the rent after four months in May of that year. In the present case also this is what happened; as per admission of attorney of the appellant after getting the notice of change of ownership, the appellant did not pay rent for three months and then without any refusal by respondent No.1 to receive the rent in the fourth month of April, 2016, he deposited the same in the court through an application. 9. Be that as it may, the ground on which the application under section 17 of the Act, 1963 was filed by the respondent was related to his personal bona fide need and not default in payment of rent. The respondent No.1 in the application as well as affidavit in evidence has categorically stated that he had purchased the demised premises for his personal bona fide use. This assertion has not been controverted by the appellant in cross-examination of respondent. Instead, respondent No.1 has been asked questions regarding the suit filed by the appellant against the previous owner. Nothing rebutting the ground of personal bona fide use of respondent has been propounded by the appellant through any oral or documentary evidence. Hence the case of respondent No.1 on the ground of personal bona fide stands proved. 10. Insofar as case of appellant that he has purchased the property from previous owner is concerned, it goes without saying that if the appellant succeeds in the suit for specific performance, undoubtedly he would succeed in acquiring possession of the property, if this is what he has sought in the suit is granted by the court. As far as, merit of the present appeal is concerned, attorney of the appellant has admitted possession of the demised premises in the capacity of tenant and depositing the rent in the court. No further proof in presence of such admission is needed to show the nature of relation of the appellant with the respondent. I, therefore, find no merit in this appeal and dismiss it accordingly. The appeal stands disposed of in the above terms along with pending application. SA/S-62/Sindh Appeal dismissed.

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----S. 154---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199---Quashing of FIR---Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court---Scope---Jurisdiction in terms of Article 199 of the Constitution for quashing an FIR can only be exercised in exceptional cases---Exercise of extra-ordinary jurisdiction for quashing an FIR under Article 199 is permissible only in cases when the facts on record unequivocally indicate that no offence can be established against the accused; or if registration of FIR reflects a misuse of legal authority or lacks any sound legal justification because allowing the prosecution to continue under such conditions would constitute an abuse of the process of law, justifying the quashing of the FIR; cases registered without proper authority or in clear violation of established laws must also be quashed to maintain the integrity of the judicial system---However, the court should not invoke this provision if the allegations made by the prosecution establish a prima facie case against the accused---Even if a civil dispute is pending between the parties, FIR cannot be straightaway quashed based on the civil dispute---Criminal proceedings are not barred in presence of civil proceedings and civil and criminal proceedings can proceed simultaneously. Ajmeel Khan v. Abdul Rahim and others PLD 2009 SC 102; FIA, Director General FIA and others v. Syed Hamid Ali Shah and others PLD 2023 SC 265; Seema Fareed and others v. The State and another 2008 SCMR 839 and Central Bureau of Investigation and others v. Thommandru Hannah Vijayalakshmi and others AIR 2021 SC 5041 ref. (b) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art. 199---Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court---Scope---Factual controversies---High Court, in exercise of its constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199, cannot resolve factual controversies---High Court cannot assume the role of an investigation agency or of a trial Court without recording evidence to deliberate upon the factual controversies involved in the cases in exercise of its constitutional jurisdiction. Mst. Tayyeba Ambareen and another v. Shafqat Ali Kiyani and another 2023 SCMR 246; Amir Jamal and others v. Malik Zahoor-ul-Haq and others 2011 SCMR 1023 and Fida Hussain v. Mst. Saiqa and others 2011 SCMR 1990 ref. Irfan Zia, Additional Prosecutor General, Punjab for Petitioner (in both cases). Shakeel Javed, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent No.1 (in both cases). Date of hearing: 27th September, 2024.

Summary: ----Ss. 42, 104, 151 & 152---Powers of courts under S.152, C.P.C. to correct clerical or arithmetical errors---Scope---Petitioner against auction of the property in execution proceedings preferred an appeal, which was allowed in the year 2021---Application filed by the petitioner under S. 152, C.P.C. in the year 2023 for correction of name of the appellant in the title of appeal was dismissed by the Appellate Court on the ground of delay of two years---Validity---There is no restriction on the power of the Court under Ss.151 & 152 of C.P.C. to correct the mistake in the plaint, judgment or decree, if the same occurs due to a bona fide mistake or oversight and the party is not found to be guilty of gross negligence---Mere fact that the petitioner sought correction after a lapse of a period of two years was not a valid ground to refuse the relief---Correction was not sought in the judgment and decree of Trial Court, rather the same was sought qua correction of the name in the title of appeal filed under S. 104, C.P.C., without prejudicing the other side---Constitutional petition was allowed, in circumstances. (b) Administration of justice--- ----Procedural law---Purpose and scope---All the rules of procedural law have been enacted for the purpose of administration of justice---Basic purpose of all the rules is to serve the administration of justice and they should be subordinate to it---Procedural law should not be construed strictly so as to put the parties to undue inconvenience because the principle object behind all legal formalities is to safeguard the paramount interest of justice---No one should be defeated merely on the basis of technicalities unless offering insurmountable hurdles---Legal technicalities should not be allowed to stand in the way of justice, which may lead to unsettlement and uncertainty of law. Saifullah Baloch for Petitioner. Date of hearing: 25th September, 2024.

Summary: ----Ss. 42, 104, 151 & 152---Powers of courts under S.152, C.P.C. to correct clerical or arithmetical errors---Scope---Petitioner against auction of the property in execution proceedings preferred an appeal, which was allowed in the year 2021---Application filed by the petitioner under S. 152, C.P.C. in the year 2023 for correction of name of the appellant in the title of appeal was dismissed by the Appellate Court on the ground of delay of two years---Validity---There is no restriction on the power of the Court under Ss.151 & 152 of C.P.C. to correct the mistake in the plaint, judgment or decree, if the same occurs due to a bona fide mistake or oversight and the party is not found to be guilty of gross negligence---Mere fact that the petitioner sought correction after a lapse of a period of two years was not a valid ground to refuse the relief---Correction was not sought in the judgment and decree of Trial Court, rather the same was sought qua correction of the name in the title of appeal filed under S. 104, C.P.C., without prejudicing the other side---Constitutional petition was allowed, in circumstances. (b) Administration of justice--- ----Procedural law---Purpose and scope---All the rules of procedural law have been enacted for the purpose of administration of justice---Basic purpose of all the rules is to serve the administration of justice and they should be subordinate to it---Procedural law should not be construed strictly so as to put the parties to undue inconvenience because the principle object behind all legal formalities is to safeguard the paramount interest of justice---No one should be defeated merely on the basis of technicalities unless offering insurmountable hurdles---Legal technicalities should not be allowed to stand in the way of justice, which may lead to unsettlement and uncertainty of law. Saifullah Baloch for Petitioner. Date of hearing: 25th September, 2024.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan ----Art. 199---Constitutional petition---Encroachment on public land---Allotment of commercial property---Abuse of public purpose---Maintainability---Petitioners, representing the Mashakhor community, challenged alleged illegal occupation of land by Commission Agents in the Hazar Ganji Fruit and Vegetable Market, Quetta, and claimed deprivation of their rightful space originally allotted to them---Official record confirmed that twenty-three (23) acres had been allotted to Mashakhors by Quetta Development Authority in 1998 for business operations---However, petitioners were found to have sold or rented their allotted land and instead encroached on auction platforms and public utility areas such as roads and spaces allocated for Mazda stands and drainage---Civil suit earlier filed by petitioners regarding the same land dispute had already been dismissed---Court held that encroachments under the guise of business activity could not be tolerated, particularly when causing obstruction to others’ legitimate business and undermining public security---No person has a vested right to encroach upon land beyond their lawful allotment---Court declined to interfere under Art.199 in the absence of bona fide entitlement. **(b) Administrative Law---Encroachment---Public markets and commercial complexes---Scope of judicial review---Court emphasized that allottees of public land must restrict use strictly to the purpose for which allotment was made---Where land is misused, alienated, or encroached upon by the allottee, no equitable relief is warranted---Security and functional administration of public commercial markets must take precedence over individual claims of possession not supported by law. **(c) Civil Procedure---Bar of jurisdiction---Earlier civil suit by petitioners seeking similar relief against official respondents was dismissed by competent Civil Court---Constitutional petitions on same subject held not maintainable. Disposition: Petitions dismissed.

Summary: (a) Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1935 & 1962 ----Inheritance---Limited ownership of widow under custom---Devolution of property on death of widow---Scope and effect---Widow shown as full owner in revenue record---Reversion of property to legal heirs of deceased husband---Petitioners, being legal heirs of deceased Muhammad Ayub, filed a suit claiming that his widow, Mst. Bibi Hawa (later shown as Mst. Hashmat Bibi), was entered as a limited owner under prevailing custom and that upon her death, property should have devolved upon Ayub’s legal heirs under Islamic law---Mutation No. 2844 (dated 05.06.1983) had transferred full ownership to legal heirs of the widow, to the exclusion of other legal heirs of Muhammad Ayub---Held, under prevailing Riwaj before the promulgation of the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1935, a widow inherited as limited owner, and on her death, the property reverted to the husband’s legal heirs---After promulgation of the Shariat Act, the widow became full owner only to the extent of her Islamic share---Property in dispute was wrongly mutated to her legal heirs as though she owned the entire share of her deceased husband, which was contrary to law. (b) Civil Procedure Code, 1908 ----S. 115---Revisional jurisdiction---Concurrent findings of courts below---Misreading and non-reading of evidence---Interference justified---Trial court and appellate court concurrently dismissed petitioners’ suit without appreciating material on record, including entries in Jamabandis and the implications of customary and Islamic inheritance laws---High Court held that both lower courts misread the evidence and wrongly applied estoppel and limitation, necessitating revisional interference. (c) Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 ----Art. 112(2)---Judicial notice of custom---Court may take judicial notice of well-established custom having the force of law---No need to prove customary limitation of widow’s rights in each case where settled precedent exists. **(d) Estoppel---Scope---Petitioners not estopped from asserting legal entitlement merely due to non-objection to compensation received by legal heirs of widow---Such acquiescence did not negate their claim under Islamic law, particularly when only 16 marlas of property were acquired, and petitioners admitted entitlement of respondents to widow’s Shari share. (e) Limitation Act, 1908 ----Art. 120---Continuous possession---Refreshing cause of action---Wrong entries in revenue record---Effect---Where plaintiffs remain in continuous possession and only a portion of the land is acquired or claimed adversely, recurring entries constitute continuing wrongs and refresh the cause of action---Petition held not barred by limitation. **(f) Relief---Correction of mutation---Declaratory relief---Civil court and revisional court have jurisdiction to mould relief even if mutation is not specifically challenged, where necessary to give effect to declaratory findings---Earlier inheritance mutation (No. 2844) in favour of legal heirs of widow set aside and direction issued for fresh mutation as per Shariah shares. Cited Cases: • Maqbool Ahmad v. Fazal-i-Haq 2012 SCMR 917 • Additional Settlement Commissioner (Land), Sargodha v. Muhammad Shafi PLD 1971 SC 791 • Fayyaz Hussain v. Haji Jan Muhammad 2018 SCMR 698 • Salamat Ali v. Muhammad Din PLD 2022 SC 353 • Saadat Khan v. Shahid ur Rehman PLD 2023 SC 362 • Muhammad Akhtar v. Mst. Manna 2001 SCMR 1700 • Samar Gul v. Mohabat Khan 2000 SCMR 974 Disposition: Revision allowed. Judgments of trial and appellate courts set aside. Mutation No. 2844 declared void to the extent of excess inheritance. Petitioners declared entitled to Shari shares. Revenue record to be corrected accordingly. Preliminary decree passed with liberty to seek final decree.