Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (Cr.P.C.), 1898 (AJ&K) ----S. 249-A---Acquittal before conclusion of trial---Scope---Benefit of doubt---Principles---Misapplication of law---Trial court allowed application under S. 249-A Cr.P.C. and acquitted accused-appellants on the ground of benefit of doubt without recording full prosecution evidence---Held, S. 249-A Cr.P.C. empowers the trial court to acquit an accused at any stage only when the charge is groundless or there is no probability of conviction, based strictly on existing record and evidence---Trial court extended the benefit of doubt, which is a post-trial concept, applicable only upon full evaluation of prosecution evidence---Such premature application of doubt is contrary to the spirit and letter of S. 249-A Cr.P.C.---High Court rightly set aside the acquittal and remanded the case for trial afresh---Supreme Court (AJ&K) held that the trial court had misapplied the law, and that the High Court had appropriately exercised its jurisdiction in restoring the prosecution’s opportunity to prove its case. **(b) Criminal trial---Premature acquittal---Benefit of doubt v. groundless charge---Distinction---Acquittal under S. 249-A Cr.P.C. must be based on manifest absence of prosecutable material, not on inferences that require full trial---Trial court erroneously substituted its assessment of doubt for legal threshold of "no probability of conviction" under S. 249-A Cr.P.C. **(c) Judicial discretion---Exercise of discretion must conform to statutory limits---Misuse of acquittal power by trial courts without recording full evidence undermines prosecution’s right to fair adjudication and disrupts judicial efficiency. Disposition: Appeal dismissed. Judgment of High Court upheld. Trial court directed to conclude trial within one month.

Summary: (a) Cantonments Rent Restriction Act, 1963 ----S. 17---Ejectment petition---Personal bona fide need---Existence of tenancy relationship---Scope---Respondent-landlord filed ejectment application against appellant under S.17 of the Cantonments Rent Restriction Act, 1963, asserting personal bona fide requirement of the demised premises---Appellant denied relationship of landlord and tenant, claiming instead to be purchaser of the property from previous owner and had instituted a civil suit for specific performance---Held, that personal bona fide need was sufficiently established through pleadings and affidavit-in-evidence of respondent, which remained uncontroverted during cross-examination---Appellant produced no evidence to rebut this claim and instead focused on litigation with the previous owner---Court held that pending civil suit for specific performance does not prevent eviction under valid personal need proven under tenancy law---Ejectment rightly allowed. (b) Cantonments Rent Restriction Act, 1963 ----S. 6---Jurisdiction---Appointment of Additional Controller of Rents---Validity---Challenge to jurisdiction of Additional Controller of Rents on ground that appointment required consultation with Chief Justice---Held, S.6 of the Act empowers Federal Government to appoint Controller or Additional Controller by notification in the official Gazette without requiring judicial consultation---Appointment upheld as valid and within statutory framework---Courts are not permitted to read into the statute what is not expressly provided---Literal interpretation must prevail where language is plain and unambiguous. **(c) Relationship of landlord and tenant---Tenant's admission in cross-examination---Effect---Appellant’s attorney admitted receipt of legal notice regarding change of ownership and deposit of rent in court---Such admission sufficient to establish tenancy and renders contrary claim of ownership ineffective for purposes of rent proceedings---Possession coupled with rent deposit confirms landlord-tenant relationship. **(d) Rent default---Deposit of rent after delay---Consequences---Admission by appellant’s attorney that rent from January to March 2016 was deposited belatedly in April 2016---Even though subsequent rent was paid, the fact of interim default remained unaffected---Such default alone, though not the primary ground, corroborated the bonafide claim of respondent. **(e) Civil Procedure---Specific performance suit pending---Effect on rent proceedings---Filing of a civil suit for specific performance by the tenant does not bar rent controller from entertaining and adjudicating an ejectment petition under the Rent Restriction Act, particularly when tenancy is admitted and personal bona fide need is established. Cited Cases: • Khan Gul Khan v. Daraz Khan 2010 SCMR 539 • Lanvin Traders, Karachi v. Presiding Officer, Banking 2013 SCMR 1419 • Mumtaz Hussain v. Nasir Khan 2010 SCMR 1254 • Saeed Mazhar Ali v. Aroosa Mubashir FRA No. 02/2018 • Feroz Khan v. Mir Azam C.R. No. 1196-P/2010 (distinguished) • PLD 1989 Karachi 404, PLD 2015 SC 401, 2020 YLR 61 Disposition: Appeal dismissed. Order of Additional Controller of Rents directing eviction on grounds of personal bona fide need upheld.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Accused petitioner being below the age of 18 years comes under the definition of “Child” as per section 2 (b) of the Juvenile Justice System Act 2018. Section 6 of the ibid Act deals with the release of a juvenile accused on bail. Though sub section 4 of section 6 puts a restriction on the grant of bail to a juvenile accused charged for commission of a heinous offence however that restriction would come into the way of accused petitioner being below the age of 16 years. Similarly first proviso to section 497 Cr.P.C clearly provides that any person under the age of 16 years has a right to be released on bail irrespective of the category of offence. Reliance is placed on the judgement of the august Supreme Court of Pakistan rendered in case titled “Mst. Ghazala vs the State” (2023 SCMR 887) wherein it has been held as under: “No doubt the offence of Qatl-i-amd (intentional murder) punishable under section 302 P.P.C. alleged against the petitioner falls within the prohibitory clause of section 497(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 ("Cr.P.C."") but being a women the petitioner's case is covered by the first proviso to section 497(1) Cr.P.C. The said proviso as held in Tahira Batool case makes the power of the court to grant bail in the offences of prohibitory clause of section 497(1) alleged against an accused under the age of sixteen years a woman accused and a sick or infirm accused equal to its power under the first part of section 497(1) Cr.P.C. It means that in cases of women accused etc. as mentioned in the first proviso to section 497(1) irrespective of the category of the offence the bail is to be granted as a rule and refused only as an exception in the same manner as it is granted or refused in offences that do not fall within the prohibitory clause of section 497(1) Cr.P.C. The exceptions that justify the refusal of bail are also well settled by several judgments of this Court.2 They are the likelihood of the accused if released on bail: (i) to abscond to escape trial; (ii) to tamper with the prosecution evidence or influence the prosecution witnesses to obstruct the course of justice; and (iii) to repeat the offence. 5…………………. 6. In view of the facts and circumstances of the case we do not find that there is a likelihood that the petitioner if released on bail after securing sufficient sureties would abscond to escape trial or tamper with the prosecution evidence or influence the prosecution witnesses to obstruct the course of justice or repeat the offence. Her case thus does not fall within any of the three well-established exceptions that may have justified refusing bail to her. 7. ……………………………… The present petition is therefore converted into appeal and the same is allowed. “"

Summary: Petitioners secured merit position for appointment as community welfare attache, at Baghdad. He is aggrieved that due to misleading summary he has been rejected, and candidate at Sr No. 21 has been selected.

Summary: Background: The State of Libya, through its Head of Mission in Pakistan, entered into a five-year lease agreement with the respondent for a property in Islamabad used as the Libyan Diplomatic Mission. The agreement permitted early termination by mutual consent. Libya sought early termination in 2018, leading to disputes over repair responsibilities for paint and polish work. The respondent sued for repair costs, which Libya contested, citing immunity under diplomatic privileges. -----Issues: 1- Whether the State of Libya waived its diplomatic immunity under the Diplomatic and Consular Privileges Act for claims unrelated to rent or possession. -----2- Whether the lease agreement was a commercial transaction under the State Immunity Ordinance, thus removing immunity from Libya. -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: --Diplomatic Immunity: The court found Libya maintained immunity, as the lease agreement did not constitute a waiver of immunity for claims beyond rent or possession disputes. The claim for repair costs fell outside this scope. --Commercial Transaction Argument: The court held that the lease agreement, serving diplomatic purposes, was not a commercial transaction. Section 5 of the State Immunity Ordinance excludes immunity for commercial transactions, but Section 17 exempts property used for diplomatic missions, reaffirming Libya’s immunity. --Federal Government’s Position: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirmed Libya’s immunity, emphasizing its role in maintaining diplomatic relations and the reciprocal nature of immunity. The court allowed the petition, set aside the Civil Court’s order, and dismissed the respondent’s suit, imposing a cost of Rs. 100,000 on the respondent. -----Citations/Precedents: A.M. Qureshi v. USSR (PLD 1981 SC 377) - Interpretation of immunity scope under diplomatic and consular privileges. Diplomatic and Consular Privileges Act, 1972 - Affirmed immunity for diplomatic missions in Pakistan. State Immunity Ordinance, 1981 - Sections 5 and 17 on exclusions from immunity for commercial transactions and diplomatic mission properties.

Summary: Background: This case involved a longstanding dispute over a financial agreement, mortgage, and subsequent sale of a property. In 1996, Blossom Towels Industries obtained a loan from Small Business Finance Corporation (SBFC), later renamed SME Bank, which was secured by a mortgage on a property. In 1999, the CEO of Blossom entered an agreement to sell the mortgaged property to a buyer, who was unaware of the mortgage. The buyer later sought specific performance of the sale agreement after discovering the mortgage, leading to protracted litigation between the buyer, seller, and SME Bank. -----Issues: 1- Whether the decree for loan recovery, issued in favor of SME Bank against Blossom and the CEO, could be enforced on the property sold to the buyer. -----2- Whether the buyer, having deposited the decretal amount, should bear further liability for accrued interest on the mortgage. -----3- Whether the agreements between the CEO and the buyer should be set aside due to the CEO’s non-disclosure of the mortgage. -----4- Whether the decree for specific performance obtained by the buyer should be treated as final and binding. -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: --Mortgage Liability: The court upheld the decree against Blossom and the CEO, confirming SME Bank’s right to recover the decretal amount from the mortgaged property. Since the buyer had stepped into the shoes of the judgment debtor, they assumed responsibility for any outstanding liabilities. --Interest Accrual: The court found that SME Bank was justified in applying payments first to interest, as per established principles. It ruled that interest continued to accrue on the unpaid principal despite partial payments by the buyer. --Non-Disclosure and Fraud: The court deemed the CEO’s failure to disclose the mortgage as fraudulent, as it misled the buyer into the transaction. --Finality of Decree: The court applied the doctrine of res judicata, treating the earlier decree of specific performance as final. It rejected the CEO’s attempts to challenge the decree through subsequent litigation, asserting that the decree acted as a binding compromise between the parties. -----Citations/Precedents: Meghraj v. Bayabai (AIR 1970 SC 161) - Principle of applying debtor payments first to interest. Meka Venkatadri v. Raja Parthasarathy (AIR 1922 PC 233) - Principle of payment allocation in debt cases. Najam Koreshi v. Chase Manhattan Bank (2015 SCMR 1461) - Application of payment principles under the decree. Government of Balochistan v. Abdul Rashid Langove (2007 SCMR 518) - Limitation Act applicability in revision petitions. Allah Dino v. Muhammad Shah (2001 SCMR 286) - Exclusion of Section 5 Limitation Act in revision cases. Mahmud Alam v. Mehdi Hussain (PLD 1970 Lahore 6) - Specific limitation provisions for special laws.

Summary: -----Quote: The petitioner claimed that she had a joint account with her deceased father, however, after death of her father, the legal heirs (her siblings and mother) were not entitled to claim share in 50% of the deposit lying in the account on the ground that the account was being operated in terms of "either or survival" clause. Held: While such clause has already been declared as unislamic in multiple cases by the Superior Courts, including this Court qua rights of legal heirs of deceased depositor, it has been further observed that the guidelines or stipulations contained in a Bank Account Opening Form are mere operating instructions and are meant to safeguard the banks in situations where one of the joint account holders dies and it does not come to the knowledge of the bank and/or any claim by the legal heirs of the deceased joint account holder is not intimated to the bank and the bank in good faith pays the amount, lying with it, to the surviving account holder(s). In such situation, the bank may be absolved from any liability keeping in view the facts of a particular case and the legal heirs of the deceased account holder can claim the recovery from the surviving joint account holders; however, it does not give unfettered power to the bank to unilaterally facilitate the surviving joint account holder(s) to withdraw all the money. -----Background: This case involved a dispute over the funds in a joint bank account following the death of one of the account holders. The petitioner claimed sole ownership of the funds, arguing that the account, originally opened with her father, was intended only for her use, and her father was added merely as a joint account holder for convenience. The lower court issued a succession certificate in favor of the petitioner’s co-heir (respondent), entitling them to a share in the account based on inheritance laws. Both the trial court and appellate court dismissed the petitioner’s appeals, leading to the present civil revision. -----Issues: 1- Does the surviving joint account holder have an exclusive right to the account funds, or are those funds subject to inheritance laws? -----2- What legal impact does an "either or survivor" clause have in a joint account upon the death of one account holder? -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The court held that joint account instructions like "either or survivor" are intended for operational convenience in managing the account and do not override inheritance rights under Islamic law. These instructions allow for either account holder to operate the account but do not confer exclusive rights to the surviving holder after the other’s death. The petitioner’s argument that the entire amount in the account was hers was unsubstantiated, as she did not provide clear evidence of her income source or contributions to the account. The lower courts, therefore, ruled correctly based on the available evidence. Without an Account Opening Form explicitly stating "either or survivor" privileges, the bank could not unilaterally transfer the funds to the petitioner without proper succession documentation. The court affirmed the lower courts' concurrent findings, emphasizing that without significant procedural errors or misinterpretation of law, there was no basis for interference in a revision petition. -----Citations/Precedents: Syed Shah Pr Mian Kazmi v. Mst. Nelofer (PLD 2012 Peshawar 101): Established that inheritance laws prevail over any "either or survivor" clauses or nominations in bank accounts. Dubai Islamic Bank Pakistan, etc. v. Mst. Saima Yasin etc. (Civil Revision No. 55-D of 2020): Clarified that joint account survivorship instructions do not supersede inheritance rights, and the surviving account holder cannot unilaterally withdraw funds after the other holder’s death. The State through Advocate General, N.W.F.P., Peshawar vs. Naeemullah Khan (2001 SCMR 1461): Interpreted “proceedings” to mean every legal step taken from commencement to disposal, applicable here in considering legal requirements for succession and inheritance.

Summary: The Supreme Court of Pakistan has ruled that FIRs cannot be quashed once a challan has been filed, affirming the limited scope for judicial intervention during the investigative process. Justice Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi emphasized that "quashment of FIR during investigation tantamounts to throttling the investigation, which is not permissible in law," underlining that such judicial powers are reserved for truly exceptional cases. ------ - Key Points of the Judgment include: ------ 1) Judicial and Investigative Roles Are Distinct: Justice Rizvi highlighted the complementary, non-overlapping roles of the judiciary and law enforcement, stating that law enforcement is obligated under Section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to investigate cognizable offences. Courts should not interfere with this duty unless the case is extraordinary. ------ 2) Concurrent Civil and Criminal Proceedings: The judgment clarified that a concurrent civil dispute does not preclude criminal proceedings. Justice Rizvi referenced precedent, stating that "a criminal case must be allowed to proceed on its own merits, regardless of any parallel civil matters." Criminal and civil cases can coexist and be adjudicated independently. ------ 3) Grounds for Quashment Must Be Exceptional: FIR quashment is only permissible if there is clear evidence of misuse of legal authority or if the allegations lack legal basis. Justice Rizvi noted that concerns over conviction probability should be handled within trial proceedings and not preempt the investigation. ----- 4) No Premature Judicial Intervention: The Court emphasized that quashing an FIR should not impede the police's statutory role in evidence gathering. Interference should be limited to cases where allegations unequivocally indicate no offence or a clear abuse of process. ------ This case involves Civil Petitions No. 671-L and 672-L of 2017, where the State challenged the Lahore High Court, Multan Bench’s decision to quash FIR No. 58/2012. This FIR, registered on August 2, 2012, alleged that the respondents fraudulently transferred significant state land in Tehsil Jalalpur to private persons using forged orders from the Deputy Settlement Commissioner. An inquiry by the Anti-Corruption Establishment (ACE) revealed irregularities, leading to FIR registration. However, the respondents contended that the FIR was baseless and filed with malafide intent, ultimately convincing the High Court to quash it. ------Issues ------1) Whether the High Court erred in quashing an FIR involving alleged fraudulent land transfers under Article 199 of the Constitution. ------2) Whether the existence of a civil dispute negates the necessity for criminal proceedings. ------3) Whether the High Court’s quashing of the FIR was justified based on the improbability of conviction. ------Holding/Reasoning/Outcome The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s order, finding that quashing the FIR was improper. Key points of reasoning include: The High Court’s jurisdiction under Article 199 to quash FIRs is limited to cases where the FIR is evidently without legal basis or constitutes an abuse of legal authority. Criminal proceedings should not be prematurely quashed, especially when material evidence supports a cognizable offense. The existence of a civil dispute does not preclude criminal liability; both civil and criminal proceedings can proceed concurrently if the facts disclose a criminal offense. Probable conviction or acquittal is a matter for trial courts to decide, and without strong evidence of malafide intent by investigative authorities, the FIR should not have been quashed at this stage. ------Citations/Precedents Ajmeel Khan v. Abdul Rahim and others (PLD 2009 SC 102) – On the complementary roles of judiciary and police and the conditions under which an FIR may be quashed. FIA, Director General FIA and others v. Syed Hamid Ali Shah and others (PLD 2023 SC 265) – Reaffirming the High Court’s power to quash FIRs when the allegations do not constitute a cognizable offense. Seema Fareed and Others v. The State and another (2008 SCMR 839) – Civil disputes do not bar criminal proceedings if criminal liability is indicated. Neeharika Infrastructure v. State of Maharashtra (AIR 2021 SC 5041) – Guidelines on judicial restraint in staying investigations and quashing FIRs in India. Mst. Tayyeba Ambareen v. Shafqat Ali Kiyani (2023 SCMR 246), Amir Jamal v. Malik Zahoor-ul-Haq (2011 SCMR 1023), Fida Hussain v. Mst Saiqa (2011 SCMR 1990) – High Court’s limited scope under Article 199 in cases requiring factual determinations. The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, thereby reinstating the FIR for investigation and trial.