Summary: (Against the judgment and decree dated 21.01.2013 of the Peshawar High Court, D.I.Khan Bench passed in C.R. No. 52 of 2009). Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)--- ----Ss. 42 & 54---Suit for declaration and injunction---Concurrent findings of facts by two Courts below---Revisional jurisdiction of High Court, exercise of---Principle---Suit filed by respondents/plaintiffs was dismissed by Trial Court and Lower Appellate Court on the ground that they could not prove their relationship with deceased allottee of suit property---High Court in exercise of revisional jurisdiction set aside concurrent findings of facts by two Courts below---Validity---Respondents/plaintiffs could not establish and prove their relationship with allottee of suit land by leading confidence inspiring, trustworthy and independent evidence---Suit filed by respondents/plaintiffs was rightly dismissed by Trial Court as well as Lower Appellate Court and High Court had wrongly evaluated evidence on record while setting aside concurrent judgments and decrees passed by the Courts below---High Court had ample powers to undo and disturb concurrent findings of Trial Court and Lower Appellate Court in exercise of revisional jurisdiction under section 115, C.P.C. but if the same were found to be based on any illegality or irregularity and wrong exercise of jurisdiction---No such occasion was available with High Court; therefore, when position was as such, concurrent findings of two Courts on facts should not have been interfered with---Supreme Court set aside judgment and decree passed by High Court and restored those of Trial Court and Lower Appellate Court---Appeal was allowed. Muhammad Nawaz alias Nawaza and others v. Member Judicial Board of Revenue and others 2014 SCMR 914 and Mst. Khair-Ul-Nisa and 6 others v. Malik Muhammad Ishaque and 2 others PLD 1972 SC 25 rel. Abdul Sattar Khan, Advocate Supreme Court (for appellants and applicants in C.M.A. No. 11-P of 2014) (via video-link from Peshawar). Syed Abid Hussain Shah, Advocate Supreme Court for applicant(s) (in C.M.A. No. 213-P of 2017). Ahmed Ali, Advocate Supreme Court for applicant(s) (in C.M. Nos. 530-P of 2018 and 2570 of 2024). Syed Mastan Ali Shah Zaidi, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents Nos. 1 to 6. Rashdeen Nawaz Kasuri, Additional Attorney General for Pakistan on Court's call. Date of hearing: 21st February, 2025.

Summary: (On appeal against the order dated 22.01.2025 passed by the Lahore High Court, Multan Bench, in Crl. Misc. No. 10453-B of 2024). Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----S.497---Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act (XL of 2016), Ss. 20 & 21---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185(3)---Sexual harassment and blackmailing---Bail, grant of---Case not falling in prohibitory clause---Complainant alleged sexual harassment and blackmailing against her husband on the basis of sharing her objectionable images on social media---Trend of such like activities is rising pointing towards deterioration of cultural values---Duty is cast upon Court to see whether from the facts and peculiar circumstances a case of bail is made out---Offences alleged in F.I.R. fell outside prohibitory clause of section 497, Cr.P.C. and maximum punishment of imprisonments for them were five years and three years respectively---Accused was behind the bars for the last 2-3 months---Grant of bail in such-like cases was a rule and refusal was an exception---Supreme Court granted bail to accused as no exceptional circumstances were pointed out to refuse concession of bail---Appeal was allowed. Mian Ahmad Mahmood, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner. Rashdeen Nawaz Kasuri, Addl. AGP and Adnan Ali, S.I. for the State. Date of hearing: 21st February, 2025.

Summary: Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----S. 497---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 406, 409, 420, 468, 471 & 109---Prevention of Corruption Act (II of 1947), S. 5(2)---Criminal breach of trust, cheating, using forged documents and misconduct---Bail, grant of---Case not falling in prohibitory clause---Tentative assessment of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Accused persons sought their bail after arrest on the plea that offences were not covered under prohibitory clause of S. 497, Cr.P.C.---Validity--- Court cannot go beyond the facts of the case and has to restrict itself to the material placed by prosecution---For the purpose of disposal of bail application tentative assessment is to be made and no deeper appreciation is allowed---In cases where reasonable doubt arises with regard to implication of accused in a crime he should not be deprived of such benefit even at bail stage---Case did not fall in prohibitory clause of S.497(1) Cr.P.C. nor the authorities could show any such circumstance or conduct of accused persons that would bring their case under exception to the rule of granting bail in such offences--- Guilt of accused persons was yet to be determined at trial--- Investigation was completed and interim challan was submitted--- There was no indication that accused persons would either interfere in investigation or tamper with evidence--- No useful purpose would be served by keeping accused persons in jail--- Bail was allowed, in circumstances. Riaz Jafar Natiq v. Muhammad Nadeem Dar and others 2011 SCMR 1708; Tariq Bashir v. The State PLD 1995 SC 34; Zafar Iqbal v. Muhammad Anwar 2009 SCMR 1488 and Muhammad Tanveer v. The State PLD 2017 SC 733 rel. Muhammad Munsif Jan and Muhammad Imran for Applicant (in Criminal Bail Applications Nos. 07 and 178 of 2025). Mian Haad A.M. Paggawala for Applicants (in Criminal Bail Application No. 79 of 2025). Raj Ali Wahid Kunwar for Applicants (in Criminal Bail Application No. 89 of 2025). Shaukat Hayyat, Syed Muhammad Abdul Kabir and Ms. Amna Magsi for Applicants (in Criminal Bail Application No. 102 of 2025). Mumtaz-ul-Hassan for Applicants (in Criminal Bail Application No. 136 of 2025). Irshad Ali, DAG along with Muhammad Junaid Hasan, Inspector/I.O. FIA Anti-Corruption Circle, Karachi for the State. Order Shamsuddin Abbasi, J .--- Having been unsuccessful in securing bail from the trial Court in Crime No. in Crime No.40 of 2024 registered at Police Station FIA ACC, Karachi, for the offences punishable under Sections 406, 409 (added through interim charge sheet), 420, 468, 471 and 109, P.P.C read with Section 5(2) of PCA, 1947, the applicants have approached this Court for their release on bail. 2. First Information Report in this case has been lodged on the basis of an enquiry conducted by FIA upon receipt of letter from competent authority containing the names of 17 officers working as Entomologist (BPS-17) in Department of Plant Protection, who alleged to have issued Phytosanitary Certificates against 46 consignments of rice exported to European Union without fulfilling the legal requirements, which were intercepted at the destination and exports of Pakistani rice to EU countries badly suffered causing a colossal loss to the National Exchequer. 3. It is jointly contended on behalf of the applicants that they are officers in Grade-17, working as Entomologist, in Department of Plant Protection, and have nothing to do with the alleged offence and have been made victim of the circumstances. It is next submitted that the entire responsibilities lie on the exporters, who were under obligations to follow the guidelines issued by the Government of Pakistan, Ministry of National Food Security and Research Department of Plant Protection, through certain circulars especially circular dated 11.07.2024, for management of pesticide residues in Pakistan rice export and ensure self-regulation and provide Maximum Residue Limits (MRL) Aflatoxin traceable reports issued by Eurofins/SGS/Internationality Accredited Laboratory along with assurance from SGS/Supply Chain/ International 3rd party agencies confirming the lot's sealing, testing and compliance with EU regulations, which should be communicated via email, following which the authorized officer of DPP will issue the Phytosanitary Certificate, but they have not performed their duties per guidelines. It is also submitted that the applicants have issued Certificates after following the standard procedure as per information and documents provided to them and they were the exporters who were actual beneficiaries, but none of them have been joined as accused in the challan. It is also submitted that the investigating officer has conducted dishonest investigation and extended undue favour to the exporters and no iota of evidence has been collected against the applicants to substantiate their involvement in the commission of alleged offence. It is further argued that the alleged offences fall outside the ambit of prohibitory clause of Section 497, Cr.P.C. The have pointed out that the learned trial Court has rejected the bail pleas of applicant mainly observing that the investigation is in progress and being a premature stage declined bail to the applicants and now the challan has been submitted and the applicants are no more required for the purpose of any investigation. They are in custody since last about four months and their involvement in the commission of offence is yet to be determined, therefore, pending trial the applicants may be ordered to be released on bail. 4. The learned DAG and investigating officer have opposed the grant of bail to the applicants on the ground that they have issued fake Certificates and extended undue favour to the exporters and due to their illegal and unwarranted acts, not only the country earned bad name amongst EU countries but the National Exchequer also suffered colossal loss, hence the applicants do not deserve to be enlarged on bail. 5. I have heard the arguments of both the sides and perused the entire material available before me with their able assistance. 6. There is no denial of the fact that the applicants are Grade-17 Officers in Department of Plant Protection, serving as Entomologist. Per prosecution case, they have issued Phytosanitary Certificates against 46 consignments of rice, exported to EU, without fulfilling the requisite formalities for wrongful gains as a result of which the country has earned bad name and the National Exchequer has also suffered irreparable losses and injuries. On the other hand, the learned counsel appearing for the applicants emphasized that the applicants have issued Certificates after following the standard procedure as per information and documents provided to them and they have not earned any unlawful gain and it was the responsibility of the exporters, who were bound to follow the guidelines issued by the Government of Pakistan from time to time, they were the actual beneficiaries, but none of them have been arraigned as accused in the interim challan, which shows clear mala fide of the investigating officer. Admittedly, the entire case of the prosecution rests on documentary evidence, hence, at this juncture, the genuineness or falsehood of the allegations levelled against the applicants would be determined at trial after recording of the evidence. 7. It is a well settled principle of law that the Court cannot go beyond the facts of the case and has to restrict itself to the material placed by the prosecution and further for the purpose of disposal of bail application tentative assessment is to be made and no deeper appreciation is allowed. It is also a well settled that in cases where reasonable doubt arises with regard to implication of an accused in a crime he should not be deprived of such benefit even at bail stage. Prima facie reasonable grounds exist to believe that the case of the applicants is fully covered by Section 497(2) Cr.P.C. calling for further inquiry into their guilt. They are in custody since last about four months and the prosecution has not demonstrated that the applicants are likely to abscond or tamper with evidence if released on bail. The interim challan has already been submitted and the applicants are no longer required for investigation, therefore, their continued incarceration serves no purpose. Besides, the alleged offence does not fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497, Cr.P.C. and grant of bail in like cases is a rule and refusal thereof is an exception. Bail should be declined only in exceptional cases, which need to be evaluated based on the facts and circumstances of each case. No exceptional circumstances exist in the case in hand to refuse bail to the applicants. Reliance in this behalf may well be made to the case of Riaz Jafar Natiq v Muhammad Nadeem Dar and others (2011 SCMR 1708), wherein it was held as under:- "8. Thus keeping in view the law laid down in the case of Zafar Iqbal v Muhammad Anwar and others" (2009 SCMR 1488) ordaining that grant of bail must be favourably considered and should only be declined in exceptional cases". 8. I may also add here that the main purpose of keeping an under-trial accused in detention is to secure his attendance at the trial so that the trial is conducted and concluded expeditiously or to protect and safeguard the society, if there is an apprehension of repetition of offence or commission of any other untoward act by the accused. Therefore, in order to make the case of an accused person fall under the exception to the rule of grant of bail in offences not covered by the prohibitory clause of Section 497(1) Cr.P.C. the prosecution has to essentially show from the material available on the record, such circumstances that may frustrate any of the said purposes, if the accused person is released on bail. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases of Tariq Bashir v. The State (PLD 1995 SC 34), Zafar Iqbal v Muhammad Anwar (2009 SCMR 1488) and Muhammad Tanveer v The State (PLD 2017 SC 733) has time and again illustrated such circumstances or such conduct of an accused that may bring his case under the exceptions to the rule of granting bail, which include his likelihood of absconsion, tampering with the prosecution evidence or influencing the prosecution witnesses to obstruct the course of justice his repeating the offence keeping in view his previous criminal record or the desperate manner in which he has prima facie acted in the commission of offence alleged. A Court which deals with an application for grant of bail in an offence not falling within the prohibitory clause of Section 497(1) Cr.P.C. must apply its judicious mind to the facts and circumstances of the case and to the conduct of the accused and decline to exercise the discretion of granting bail to him in such offence only when it finds any of the above noted circumstances or some other striking circumstance that impinges on the proceedings of the trial or poses a threat or danger to the society, justifying his case within the exception to the rule, as the circumstances mentioned above are not exhaustive and the facts and circumstances of each case are to be evaluated for application of the said principle and following the said principle in the case of Muhammad Tanveer's case (supra), held as under:- "Once this Court has held in categorical terms that grant of bail in offences not falling within the prohibitory limb of section 497, Cr.P.C. shall be a rule and refusal shall be an exception, then the Courts of the country should follow this principle in its letter and spirit because principles of law enunciated by this Court are constitutionally binding [under Article 189] on all Courts throughout the country including the Special Tribunals and Special Courts. 9. In the case in hand, the learned trial Court has not mentioned any circumstance that may bring the case of the applicants under the exception of declining bail in offences not falling within the prohibitory clause of Section 497(1) Cr.P.C. nor the learned counsel for the State could show any such circumstance or conduct of the applicants that would bring the case of the applicants under exception to the rule of granting bail in such offences. As noted above guilt of the applicants is yet to be determined at trial. The investigation has been completed and the interim Challan is submitted and that there are no indication that the applicants either interfere in the investigation or tamper with the evidence, therefore, no useful purpose would be served by keeping the applicants in jail. 10. For what has been discussed above, I am of the view that the applicants have been able to make out a case for grant of bail. The bail applications are, therefore, allowed. The applicants shall be released on bail subject to their furnishing solvent surety in the sum of Rs.100,000/- each and execution of P.R. Bonds in the like amount to the satisfaction of learned trial Court. It is, however, need not to state that the observations recorded herein above are of tentative assessment and meant for the purpose of the instant bail application, therefore, the learned trial Court shall not be influenced in any manner whatsoever while deciding the case on merits. MH/A-37/Sindh Bail allowed.

Summary: Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----Ss. 561-A, 22-A & 22-B---Inherent powers of High Court under S. 561-A, Cr.P.C.---Scope---Powers of Ex-officio Justice of Peace---Application of the petitioner for the registration of FIR was turned down by Ex-officio Justice of Peace---Validity---Complainant-petitioner alleged that he entered into nikah with a widow lady/proposed accused No. 1 against dower amount of Rs. 50,000/- and he extended loan amount of Rs. 5,00,000/- to her relatives, the proposed accused Nos. 2 to 4, however, rukhsati was refused due to quarrel between the parties, and respondent No. 1 started demanding khula---Allegedly, complainant against harassment by the proposed accused persons lodged two complaints---Applicant further alleged that he was kidnapped by proposed accused who harassed and threatened him to pronounce talaq upon his wife, (proposed accused)---Applicant produced copy of an early hand written application filed by him to the DIG Police---Contents of said application dated 14.10.2024 clearly revealed that no allegation of any cognizable offence was alleged therein but the applicant imputed allegations of bad character against the proposed accused/wife of applicant and demanded to lodge FIR against her solely for recovery of the loan amount of Rs.5,00,000/- and dower amount of Rs. 50,000/----Surprisingly, that first application was not disclosed before the Ex-officio Justice of Peace---Apparently, in the first two applications, applicant demanded lodging of FIR without even alleging any offence, whereas this time he had alleged the purported incident---For seeking discretionary relief, a person who sought equity and justice from the Court had to firstly disclose all the relevant facts and the ground realities before the Court; and secondly the conduct of the person seeking justice from the Court was also to be looked into, as the applicant must come before the Court with clean hands and without suppressing material facts from the Court---Claim of money transaction with his in-laws by the applicant and repeated applications by him appeared to be motivated with malice to subjugate and pressurize the proposed accused persons who, as claimed by the applicant himself, were his wife and her relatives, the same being matrimonial and financial issues of civil nature---Contradictions between such repeated applications were also worth noticing---From the record, it appeared that no cognizable offence had been made out and neither any witnesses nor any proof of such incident was placed, whereas the earlier application was also concealed---Applicant had not approached the Court with clean hands, which was sine qua non for seeking discretionary---Purpose of filing consecutive complaints under S.22-A & B, Cr.P.C., was to impress upon his wife and in-laws---Neither any cognizable offence was made out from the complaint nor any infirmity in the order passed by the Ex-officio Justice of Peace could be found---Application was dismissed, in circumstances. Syed Qamber Ali Shah v. Province of Sindh and others 2024 SCMR 1123; Saeed Ahmad and others v. Naseer Ahmad and others PLD 2000 Lahore 208; Muhammad Aslam v. Additional Sessions Judge and others 2004 PCr.LJ 1214; Khizer Hayat v. Inspector General of Police (Punjab), Lahore PLD 2005 Lah. 470; Munawar Alam Khan v. Qurban Ali Malano 2024 SCMR 985; Jamal Khan v. Secretary Home Department 2021 SCMR 468; Rai Ashraf and others v. Muhammad Saleem Bhatti and others PLD 2010 SC 691 and Haider Ali v. State 2015 SCMR 1724 rel. Applicant in person. Irfan Ali Talpur, Assistant Prosecutor General, Sindh for Respondents. Date of hearing: 30th January, 2025. Order Muhammad Hasan (Akber), J .--- Through the instant Criminal Miscellaneous Application under section 561-A, Cr.P.C., the applicant has impugned the order dated 12-11-2024 passed by learned 7th Additional Sessions Judge, Hyderabad (Ex-officio Justice of Peace), thereby dismissing the application under section 22-A and B(vi)(i) of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cr.P.C) for registration of First Information Report (FIR) under section 154, Cr.P.C.. 2. The Applicant is present and on his request, he was allowed to plead in person. He contended that through the impugned order, gross illegality and failure to exercise the powers vested in Justice of Peace, has occurred. Applicant states that he entered into nikah with a widow lady/the proposed accused No.1 against dower amount of Rs.50,000/- and he also extended loan amount of Rs.500,000/- to her relatives, the proposed accused Nos. 2 to 4. 3. However rukhsati was refused due to quarrel between the parties, and proposed accused No.1 started demanding khula. He further alleges that against harassment by the proposed accused persons, he lodged a complaint dated 23-09-2024 and 28-10-2024. He further alleges that on 27-10-2024 at 11 pm, he was kidnapped by proposed accused No.2 along with other proposed accused who harassed and threatened him to pronounce talaq upon proposed accused No.1, however upon his raising hue and cry, he was released. 4. Learned A.P.G. supported the impugned Order since neither any witnesses were available nor is there any evidence of the alleged incident. He further contended that as admitted by the applicant himself, there is relationship of husband and wife as also a money transaction between the parties, hence it is a civil and matrimonial dispute which the applicant is malafidely attempting to convert into criminal proceedings as a pressure tactic. It was lastly argued that the applicant has attempted to abuse the process of Court and has not approached the Court with clean hands. 5. Heard the Applicant-in-person and learned A.P.G. and perused the record with his assistance. 6. There is no cavil with the proposition that the provisions of section 154, Cr.P.C. are quite explicit and the officer in charge of the relevant Police Station is under a statutory obligation to register FIR whenever information disclosing commission of a cognizable offence is provided to him, as held in the case of 'Syed Qamber Ali Shah v. Province of Sindh and others' (2024 SCMR 1123). It is also settled that the officer in-charge of a police station or for an ex-officio Justice of the Peace are not obliged to afford an opportunity of hearing to the accused party, before registration of a criminal case or before issuing a direction in that regard. Reference in this regard can be made to the cases of 'Saeed Ahmad and others v. Naseer Ahmad and others' (PLD 2000 Lahore 208 (DB)) and 'Muhammad Aslam v. Additional Sessions Judge and others" (2004 PCr.LJ 1214). 7. However the provisions of section 22-A(6), Cr.P.C. do not make it obligatory for an ex-officio Justice of the Peace to necessarily or mechanically issue a direction regarding registration of a criminal case, whenever a complaint is filed before him in that regard. The use of the word "may" in section 22-A(6), Cr.P.C. clearly shows that the jurisdiction of an ex-officio Justice of the Peace in that regard is discretionary in nature, and understandably so, because unfortunately, the machinery of criminal law with its coercive process is increasingly being misused by motivated persons for achieving self-serving objectives. Thus, there is a pressing need on the part of the ex-officio Justices of the Peace to exercise caution and restraint before issuing a direction regarding registration of a criminal case. It is for this reason that in some cases, comments are also called from the officer in charge of the relevant Police Station in order to help pierce the veil, which may have been created due to economizing with the truth by the complainant. In an appropriate case, depending upon the circumstances thereof, an ex-officio Justice of the Peace may therefore, rightly refuse to issue a direction regarding registration of a criminal case and may dismiss the complaint under section 22-A(6), Cr.P.C., reminding the complaining person of his alternate statutory remedies under sections 156(3) and 190, Cr.P.C. Such was the ratio settled by a three member bench of the Lahore High Court in the case of 'Khizer Hayat v. Inspector-General of Police (Punjab), Lahore' (PLD 2005 Lahore 470). 8. While dealing with applications under sections 22-A and 22-B Cr.P.C., it has been held as the duty of the Court to take care of the possible misuse of the process and such applications should not be lightly entertained and decided in a mechanical manner for issuing direction to the police to lodge an FIR, conduct investigation in the matter and prosecute the accused. It has also been held that serious notice should be taken of frivolous, false or vexatious complaints, and where applicable, cases should be registered under sections 182 and 211 of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860. Reliance is placed on the case of 'Munawar Alam Khan v. Qurban Ali Malano' (2024 SCMR 985) where such guidelines are worded in the following terms: "4. Having heard the petitioner and scanned the material available on the record, we observe that there are many precedents regarding misuse of provisions of Sections 22-A and 22-B, Cr.P.C. and it is the prime duty of the Court that such misuse be taken care of and application filed should not be lightly entertained and decided in a mechanical manner for issuing direction to the police to lodge an FIR, conduct investigation in the matter and prosecute the accused?" 9. Likewise in the case of 'Jamal Khan v. Secretary Home Department' (2021 SCMR 468) refusal to direct police to lodge FIR in a dispute of a civil nature between the parties pertaining to alleged forgery of thumb impression on an arbitration agreement was upheld by the Supreme Court. 10. In another case, prayer for registration of FIR was refused on the ground inter alia that other remedy of criminal complaint was available with the complainant (1975 SCMR 149), whereas in the case of 'Rai Ashraf and others v. Muhammad Saleem Bhatti and others' (PLD 2010 SC 691) mala fide motives and ulterior intentions of the complainant were also probed by the Supreme Court in a complaint under sections 22-A and 22-B and based whereon, registration of FIR was refused. 11. While taking notice of the trend of frivolous complaints and misuse of sections 22-A and 22-B Cr.P.C., a three Member Bench of the apex Court in the case of 'Haider Ali v. State' (2015 SCMR 1724) at paragraph 9 (ii) of the Judgment, has also recommended action against lodging of false, frivolous and vexatious complaints in the following terms: "(ii) Serious notice should be taken of frivolous, false or vexatious complaints and where applicable cases should be registered under sections 182 and 211 of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860." 12. The order dated 12.11.2024 is based upon an application dated 28.10.2024 filed by the applicant, however, during course of hearing before this Court, the applicant also produced copy of an earlier hand written application by himself dated 14.10.2024 with the Senior Superintendent of Police/DIGP Hyderabad with receiving stamp dated 23.10.2024. The contents of such application dated 14.10-2024 clearly reveals that no allegation of any cognizable offence was alleged therein but the applicant imputed allegations of bad character against the proposed accused No.1, and demanded to lodge FIR against her solely for recovery of the loan amount of Rs.500,000/- and dower amount of Rs.50,000/-. Surprisingly, this first application was not disclosed before the Ex-officio Justice of Peace. Apparently, in the first two applications, he demanded lodging of FIR without even alleging any offence, whereas this time he has alleged the purported incident. Based upon the above and the reports from SSP and SHO concerned, the impugned Order was passed. 13. The present application in hand is under section 561-A, Cr.P.C., scope whereof is to prevent the abuse of the process and to foster the ends of justice. For seeking discretionary relief, a person who seeks equity and justice from this Court has to firstly disclose all the relevant facts and the ground realities before this Court; and secondly the conduct of the person seeking justice from this Court has also to be looked into, as the applicant must come before this Court with clean hands and without suppressing material facts from the Court. The claim of money transaction with his in-laws by the applicant and repeated applications by him appear to be motivated with malice to subjugate and pressurise the proposed accused persons who, as claimed by the applicant himself, are his wife and her relatives, the same being matrimonial and financial issues of civil nature. The contradictions between such repeated applications are also worth noticing. From the record, it appears that no cognizable offence has been made out and neither any witnesses nor any proof of such incident was placed, whereas the earlier application was also concealed. The applicant has not approached the Court with clean hands, which is sine qua non for seeking discretionary relief, but the purpose of filing consecutive complaints under sections 22-A and 22-B, Cr.P.C. is to impress upon or to influence his wife and in-laws. 14. Applying the above discussed legal principles to the facts of the instant case, it appears that the ex-officio Justice of Peace did not act in a mechanical manner but exercised jurisdiction after taking into consideration all material aspects of the matter, including the relationship between the parties, the conduct of the complainant and also his motives and has rightly dismissed the application under sections 22-A and 22-B Cr.P.C. For the foregoing reasons, neither any cognizable offence is made out from the complaint nor any infirmity in the Order passed by the Ex-officio Justice of Peace could be found. 15. For the foregoing reasons, the Application is dismissed. JK/M-78/Sindh Application dismissed.

Summary: (a) Punjab Consumer Protection Act (II of 2005)--- ----S. 33---Judgment passed by the Consumer Court---Appeal, filing of---Limitation--- Sufficient cause---Scope---Appellant (air-conditioner seller) filed appeal against the order passed by the Consumer Court with a delay of 41 days---Appellant filed application seeking condonation of delay---Contention of the applicant/appellant, while attaching a travel history (proof of tickets), was that he was out of country at the time of passing of adverse orders in the matter and was not even available in Pakistan at the time of announcement of the impugned order---Validity---Contents of the appli cation seeking condonation of delay drew an inference that the reason assigned was inexplicit, general and not true, which was neither permissible nor satisfactory to convince the Court to condone the delay in filing the appeal---Appellant had placed on the record contrary documents, which could not strengthen his cause---Appellant opted the stance that the impugned order was passed in his absence, when he was abroad, however, his travel history revealed that, he came back to Pakistan after four days of passing of the impugned order, meaning thereby, that prima facie he had knowledge of passing of the impugned order---In terms of S. 33 of the Punjab Consumer Protection Act, 2005 ('the Act 2005'), any person aggrieved may file an appeal within 30 days against final order of the Consumer Court passing such an order---The rationale behind said provision is to ensure that judgments become conclusive within a reasonable timeframe to prevent indefinite litigation and fair opportunity for appeal---Aggrieved party is granted adequate time to challenge an order while maintaining procedural discipline that statutory limitation periods are not mere technicalities but substantive provisions that serve to promote finality in litigation and judicial efficiency---Even, from perusal of travel history of the appellant, it was manifestly clear that he was available in Pakistan, during the last /cut-off date(s) of limitation for challenging the impugned order, thus, stance of the appellant appeared to be intangible---The appellant's failure to challenge the impugned order within the prescribed time despite being available in the country during the relevant period reflected a lack of diligence in pursuing his legal remedy---The explanation offered for the delay, in light of the appellant's presence in Pakistan, did not appear to be convincing or sufficient to justify the delay in filing the appeal---Law is well settled that mere filing of an application for condonation of delay is not sufficient to persuade the Court to condone the delay in preferring an appeal---The object of law of limitation is to help the vigilant and not the indolent---Law of limitation is required to be construed strictly and the delay of each day has to be explained---Appellant had to satisfy as to why he took about 41 days to prefer present appeal against the impugned order of the Consumer Court---The reasons provided in the application for condonation of delay did not constitute a sufficient cause within the meaning of law---Thus, in the absence of sufficient cause, a time-barred appeal must be dismissed---Application for condonation of delay being merit-less, was dismissed along with the appeal. Ghulam Sarwar through L.Rs. v. Province of Punjab through District Collector, Lodhran PLD 2025 SC 60 ref. (b) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)--- ----S. 5---Condonation of delay----Circumstances---Scope---Law mandates strict adherence to limitation period---Courts possess discretion to condone delay in exceptional circumstances---Said discretion, however, must be exercised sparingly and cautiously---A party seeking condonation must prove that the delay resulted from circumstances beyond its control, such as, force majeure events (e.g., natural disasters, unforeseen emergencies); court closures due to extraordinary circumstances; legal impediments preventing timely filing---A casual approach or mere administrative lapses do not constitute sufficient cause for condonation of delay---If the delay is found to be intentional, avoidable or due to negligence, the appeal must be dismissed---The doctrine of limitation is based on the principle that "condonation of delay is an exception, not the rule"---Impediments of limitation cannot be traversed under pretense of hardships or imaginary inherent discretionary jurisdiction of the Court---Negligence, mistake or hardship do not save from limitation nor does poverty of the parties. Khushi Muhammad through L.Rs. and others v. Mst. Fazal Bibi and others PLD 2016 SC 872 ref. (c) Punjab Consumer Protection Act (II of 2005)--- ----Ss. 33 & 34---Judgment passed by the Consumer Court---Filing of appeal beyond period of limitation---Finality of order---Effect---Appellant (air-conditioner seller ) filed appeal against the order passed by the Consumer Court with a delay of 41 days---Validity---Section 34 of the Punjab Consumer Protection Act, 2005 ('the Act 2005'), deals with the finality of order---Said provision in consumer law is acknowledged as finality clause which stipulates that once the statutory appeal period, typically 30 days, expires, the judicial order issued by the Consumer Court attains finality and becomes legally enforceable---Said provision is crucial for upholding judicial discipline, preventing the misuse of appellate mechanisms and ensuring that justice is not indefinitely delayed---Without such a clause, Courts would be susceptible to an influx of untimely or repetitive appeals, which could obstruct the prompt enforcement of consumer remedies and exacerbate judicial backlog---Through imposition of a fixed limitation period for appeals, the legal framework provides certainty and closure to both parties, ensuring that judicial orders rest on a firm legal foundation---Said requirement compels aggrieved parties to act within the prescribed timeframe, discouraging dilatory tactics designed to evade legal obligations---The strict enforcement of appeal deadlines except in exceptional circumstances is vital for preserving the efficiency of judicial proceedings and safeguarding consumer rights---Ultimately, the finality clause functions as a legal safeguard that solidifies the binding nature of judicial orders once the appeal period lapses, thereby promoting the expeditious resolution of consumer disputes and reinforcing stability as well as predictability of legal proceedings---Appellant had badly failed to substantiate his claim for condonation of delay in filing the appeal---Application for condonation of delay being merit-less was dismissed along with the appeal. Abid Ali Bodla for Appellant.

Summary: (a) Election Law – Authority of Returning Officer – Corrigendum After Declaration – Scope and Limitations A Civil Judge, acting as Returning Officer, was dismissed from service for issuing a corrigendum altering the election result nearly a month after the original declaration, thereby reversing the success of the declared candidate. The Tribunal held that once the result is consolidated and notified, the Returning Officer becomes functus officio and has no authority to alter the result. Disputes must be resolved only through Election Tribunals, as held in PLD 2008 SC 663 and 2024 SCMR 1902. (b) Principles of Natural Justice – Violation – Change in Election Result Without Notice Issuance of a revised election result by the appellant without notifying the adversely affected party violated fundamental principles of natural justice. The Tribunal emphasized that altering an election outcome without hearing both sides and without jurisdiction amounts to serious misconduct. (c) Misconduct – Definition – Public Servant’s Duty – Conduct Unbecoming of Judicial Officer The appellant’s act of issuing a backdated corrigendum, bypassing the DRO and ECP hierarchy, and tampering with polling station results constituted “misconduct” within the meaning of Rule 2(i)(e) of the Punjab Civil Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1999. The Tribunal affirmed that such deliberate misuse of authority, dereliction of duty, and manipulation of public office falls under the scope of misconduct. Cited jurisprudence includes AIR 1992 SC 2188, AIR 2006 SC 80, and 2016(4) SCT 102. (d) Disciplinary Proceedings – Standard of Proof – No Requirement for Criminal Standard The Tribunal reiterated that disciplinary proceedings are distinct from criminal trials. Strict rules of evidence do not apply, and proof beyond reasonable doubt is not required. Findings may be based on preponderance of probabilities, supported by AIR 1997 SC 2286. (e) Double Jeopardy – Re-inquiry After Reinstatement – Validity Dismissal of the appellant after a fresh inquiry was upheld. The earlier termination had been set aside on procedural grounds for not conducting regular inquiry. The subsequent proceedings were not barred by double jeopardy, being procedurally and legally distinct. The Tribunal relied on PLD 1987 SC 195, 1992 SCMR 774, and 2004 PLC (C.S.) 55 to clarify that separate inquiries under departmental rules and prior complaints before ECP are independent. Disposition: Appeal dismissed. The Tribunal upheld the major penalty of dismissal from service on account of proven misconduct following a lawful and procedurally fair inquiry.

Summary: videography on the spot not recorded by the police pregnant woman.

Summary: (a) Service Law – Proforma Promotion – Principles and Entitlement---Punjab Civil Servants (Appointment & Conditions of Service) Rules, 1974, R. 13(i)---Punjab Subordinate Judiciary---Proforma promotion---Right of consideration---Appellant was terminated in 2004 but later reinstated in service in 2014 with back benefits and continuity of service---His junior was promoted as Senior Civil Judge in 2013, whereas he was promoted in 2019 after clearance of adverse reports---Held, once all impediments to promotion had been removed and appellant was deemed continuously in service, he was entitled to consideration for promotion from the date his junior was promoted---Failure to grant such relief would amount to unfair treatment and denial of legitimate career progression---Reliance placed on Abdul Jabbar Khan v. Government of Sindh (1996 SCMR 850), Chief Secretary, Sindh v. Riaz Ahmed Massan (2016 SCMR 1784), and Nazir Ahmed Langah v. Lahore High Court, Lahore (2024 PLC (C.S.) 1566).(b) Administrative Law – Officiating Promotion – Effect on Proforma Promotion---Officiating promotion v. regular promotion---Whether officiating promotion precludes a civil servant from claiming proforma promotion---Held, an officiating promotion, if made in accordance with eligibility criteria and not rescinded later, does not permanently preclude a civil servant from receiving proforma promotion if his junior was promoted to a substantive post---Respondents failed to show that the junior’s promotion was not made against a regular vacancy, thus the appellant’s claim was valid---Reliance placed on Secretary to Government of Punjab, Communication and Works Department v. Muhammad Khalid Usmani [2017 PLC (C.S.) 373].(c) Service Law – Limitation – Joinder of Necessary Parties---Limitation Act, 1908, S. 22---Whether an appeal is barred due to impleading necessary parties at a later stage---Held, if an appeal is filed in time against the primary department, subsequent joinder of necessary parties does not render the entire appeal time-barred---Where administrative inefficiency or procedural delays cause a civil servant to be deprived of his rightful claim, he cannot be non-suited merely due to a technical procedural lapse---Reliance placed on Messrs Khurshid Soap and Chemical Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2020 SC 641) and Chami Narayanan v. V.R. Krishna Iyer (AIR 1998 Kerala 365).(d) Administrative Justice – Doctrine of Bona Fide Mistake – Effect on Procedural Compliance---Principle Actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea (an act alone does not make one liable unless there is wrongful intent)---Bona fide mistakes in procedural matters such as misjoinder or non-joinder of parties should not hinder substantive justice---Held, where an appellant makes a genuine procedural mistake without mala fide intent, courts should prioritize substantive justice over technicalities---Reliance placed on Pitt v. Holt [(2013) UKSC 26], Barclays Bank Ltd v. W J Simms, Son and Cooke (Southern) Ltd [(1980) QB 677], and Guruvayya v. Dattatraya [(1903) ILR 28 Bom. 11].(e) Fundamental Rights – Fair Treatment in Service Matters---Right to equal opportunity in service progression---Failure to consider a civil servant for proforma promotion despite removal of adverse remarks constitutes denial of fair treatment and violates principles of equality and justice---Reliance placed on Federation of Pakistan v. Jahanzeb [2023 PLC (C.S.) 336] and Wadhu Mal v. Province of Sindh [2023 PLC (C.S.) 1310].--- Disposition:Appeal allowed – Impugned orders dated 15.11.2021 and 18.12.2021 set aside.Respondent authority directed to reconsider the appellant’s proforma promotion from the date his junior was promoted, in accordance with law.

Summary: (a) Civil Law – Burden of Proof in Inheritance Claims: --- Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, Arts. 117 & 118 – Civil Procedure Code, 1908, S. 115 Plaintiffs (respondents No.1-6) failed to establish their legal heirship with the original allottee, Hassan Muhammad (deceased), through independent and corroborative evidence—Neither produced a properly authenticated pedigree table nor any independent witness from the revenue records—Held, mere pleading a fact in a suit does not suffice; it must be proved through reliable evidence—Reliance placed on Muhammad Nawaz alias Nawaza v. Member Judicial Board of Revenue (2014 SCMR 914) and Mst. Khair-ul-Nisa v. Malik Muhammad Ishaque (PLD 1972 SC 25). (b) Fraudulent Power of Attorney – Burden to Prove Genuineness: --- Contract Act, 1872 – Registration Act, 1908 Appellants (defendants) failed to establish the validity of the alleged general power of attorney purportedly executed by the original allottee, Hassan Muhammad—Neither produced the principal himself (Hassan Muhammad) post-remand, nor provided any legitimate explanation for his absence or demise—Held, burden to prove a legal document's validity, particularly in cases of fraud, lies on the party relying on it—Reliance placed on Mst. Zaitoon Begum v. Nazar Hussain (2014 SCMR 1469). (c) Revisional Jurisdiction – Limits on High Court's Power to Reverse Concurrent Findings: --- Civil Procedure Code, 1908, S. 115 High Court erroneously reversed the concurrent findings of the trial and appellate courts, despite no misreading of evidence or jurisdictional error—Held, revisional courts cannot substitute their own findings unless lower court rulings are based on an illegality, misreading, or non-reading of evidence—Reliance placed on Salamat Ali v. Muhammad Din (PLJ 2023 SC 8) and Mst. Farzana Zia v. Mst. Saadia Andaleeb (2024 SCMR 916). (d) Nazul Land – Disputed Land Reverts to Federal Government: --- Government Lands Act, 1912 – Land Disposal Regulations As neither party could prove a valid claim over the disputed land, the Supreme Court held that the land would revert to the Federal Government as ‘Nazul Land’—Revenue authorities directed to proceed as per applicable rules. ----Disposition: Civil Appeal Allowed. Peshawar High Court’s judgment set aside. Appellate Court’s decision restored. Disputed land remitted to the Federal Government as Nazul Land. ----Cited Cases: Muhammad Nawaz alias Nawaza v. Member Judicial Board of Revenue (2014 SCMR 914) Mst. Khair-ul-Nisa v. Malik Muhammad Ishaque (PLD 1972 SC 25) Mst. Zaitoon Begum v. Nazar Hussain (2014 SCMR 1469) Salamat Ali v. Muhammad Din (PLJ 2023 SC 8) Mst. Farzana Zia v. Mst. Saadia Andaleeb (2024 SCMR 916)

Summary: Bail granted ---- a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) ---- ----S. 497---Bail in cases not falling within prohibitory clause---Marital disputes and allegations of cyber harassment---Judicial discretion in granting bail. The petitioner, a medical professional, was accused of accessing and disseminating private images of his spouse on social media, allegedly for blackmail. The prosecution asserted that the act amounted to sexual harassment and tarnished the complainant's reputation. The petitioner contended that the case arose from a marital dispute and that the allegations were exaggerated. The Supreme Court noted that the offences in question carried a maximum punishment of five and three years, respectively, and did not fall within the prohibitory clause of S. 497, Cr.P.C. The Court emphasized that bail is a rule and refusal an exception, particularly where the accused has been in custody for months without trial. Finding no exceptional circumstances warranting denial of bail, the Court granted bail to the petitioner, directing the Trial Court to expedite proceedings. Cited Cases: Abdul Samad v. The State 2025 SCP 31 Abdul Hayee and Abdullah alias Ghazali & another v. The State 2025 SCMR 281 Syed Fida Hussain Shah v. The State 2024 SCMR 1622