Summary: In terms of Section 33 of the Act any person aggrieved may file an appeal within 30 days against final order of the consumer court passing such an order. Granting an aggrieved party adequate time to challenge an order while maintaining procedural discipline that statutory limitation periods are not mere technicalities but substantive provisions that serve to promote finality in litigation and judicial efficiency. The law mandates strict adherence to limitation period, courts possess discretion to condone delay in exceptional circumstances. This discretion, however, must be exercised sparingly and cautiously. Section 34 of the Act deals with the finality of order. This provision in consumer law is acknowledged as finality clause which stipulates that once the statutory appeal period, typically 30 days expires, the judicial order issued by the consumer court attains finality and becomes legally enforceable. (a) Consumer Protection—Appeal Against Consumer Court Order & Limitation: ----Delay of 41 Days in Filing Appeal Before High Court—Appellant challenged order of District Consumer Court, Multan dated 08.11.2024 but filed the appeal 41 days beyond the statutory limitation under Section 33 of the Punjab Consumer Protection Act, 2005—Appellant sought condonation of delay on the ground that he was out of the country at the time of order—Held, statutory limitation periods are substantive provisions that promote finality in litigation and judicial efficiency—Mere filing of an application for condonation of delay does not automatically warrant relief—Reliance placed on Khushi Muhammad v. Mst. Fazal Bibi (PLD 2016 SC 872). (b) Absence of Justifiable Cause for Delay: ----Appellant’s Travel History Contradicts His Claim of Unawareness—Appellant contended he was abroad when the order was passed, but his travel record (Annexure-C) showed he returned on 12.11.2024—Held, appellant had knowledge of the order but failed to challenge it within the prescribed period—Failure to act despite being present in Pakistan reflects lack of due diligence—Held, law favors the vigilant, not the indolent. (c) Strict Application of Limitation Law: ----Limitation Cannot Be Relaxed Without Exceptional Circumstances—Held, courts have discretion to condone delay only in exceptional cases, such as force majeure, court closures, or legal impediments beyond the party’s control—However, negligence, administrative lapses, or a casual approach do not justify condonation of delay—Reliance placed on Ghulam Sarwar v. Province of Punjab (PLD 2025 SC 60). (d) Finality of Consumer Court Orders: ----Section 34 of Punjab Consumer Protection Act, 2005 Mandates Finality—Once statutory appeal period expires, the judicial order attains finality and becomes legally enforceable—This provision ensures judicial discipline, prevents misuse of appellate remedies, and avoids indefinite delays—Held, strict enforcement of appeal deadlines is crucial for upholding judicial efficiency and safeguarding consumer rights. (e) Disposition: ----Appeal Dismissed as Time-Barred—Held, since the appellant failed to establish sufficient cause for condonation of delay, there was no need to examine the merits of the case—Appeal dismissed in limine.

Summary: Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----Ss. 249-A, 265-K and 561-A---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 448, 427 & 34---Quashing of proceedings---Scope---Allegation that complainant got the FIR against the accused/applicant with sole aim to deprive the applicant from inheritance and that the accused/applicant was colouring the civil dispute into criminal solely to pressurize the applicant and illegal investigation was carried out against the applicant, which required quashing of the same---Validity---Remedy provided under S.561-A, Cr.P.C., could not be construed as an alternate remedy or substitute for an express remedy provided under Ss. 249-A or 265-K, Cr.P.C., as the case maybe---Therefore, the ordinary remedy provided under the law could not be bypassed or circumvented---Section 249-A,Cr.P.C.,provided the powers of the Magistrate to acquit an accused at any stage of the case if, after hearing the prosecutor and the accused and for reasons to be recorded, it is considered that the charge was groundless or that there was no probability of the accused being convicted of any offence---Likewise, S.265-K, Cr.P.C., also vested in the Court (Sessions Court or High Court) the powers to acquit the accused at any stage of the case, if, after hearing the prosecutor and the accused and for reasons to be recorded, itis considered that there is no probability of the accused being convicted of any offence---However, according to the judicial consensus and unanimity matured on the characteristics of inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under S.561-A, Cr.P.C., it is well-established that the inherent jurisdiction so conferred is curative in nature---In fact, the expression "abuse of process" used under S.561-A, Cr.P.C., connotes an unwarranted or irrational use of legal proceedings or process which also includes the presence of ulterior motives for activating the process for unjustified arrest or groundless criminal prosecution---Essential purposefulness of this doctrine is to foster and safeguard the judicial system, ensuring that it is not misused or blemished---This terminology can be comprehended as an acuity that if a Court has jurisdiction to hear a case, it may terminate the prosecution if an abuse of process is floating on the surface on record, with logical reason and probability of exasperation, persecution and unfairness to the opposite side----Applicant had already availed his remedy under the prescriptions of S.249-A,Cr.P.C., before the Judicial Magistrate and that too had already been dismissed, which fact was also admitted by the counsel for the applicant during the course of arguments, thus, the Criminal Miscellaneous Application was dismissed, in circumstances. Shahnaz Begum v. The Ho’ble Judges of the High Court of Sindh and Balochistan and another PLD 1971 SC 677; Canadian Union of Public Employees v. City of Toronto 2003 SCC 63; R. v. Power [1994] 1 S.C.R. 601, at p. 616; R. v. Conway, [1989] 1 S.C.R 1659, at p. 1667 and R. v. Scott [1990] 3 S.C.R 979, at p. 1007 rel. Tariq Hussain for Applicant. Javed Raza for Respondents Nos. 3 and 4. Ms. Rahat Ehsan, APG.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art. 199---Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance (XVII of 1979), S.15---Ejectment proceedings---Concurrent findings---Invoking constitutional jurisdiction of High Court---Scope---Jurisdiction under Art. 199 of the Constitution cannot be invoked as substitute of another appeal against the order of the Appellate Court---Therefore, mere fact that upon perusal of evidence there exists possibility of a different view would never be sufficient to seek concurrent findings disturbed by invoking constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court---Constitutional Petition was dismissed. Shakeel Ahmed and another v. Muhammad Tariq Farogh and others 2010 SCMR 1925 ref. (b) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art. 199---Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance (XVII of 1979), S.15---Ejectment of tenant---Concurrent findings---Invoking constitutional jurisdiction of High Court---Scope---While pressing constitutional jurisdiction in such like matter, the petitioner must establish that the findings of two Courts below, particularly of Appellate Court, are prima facie not in accordance with law and available material---There is no denial to existence of relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties and in such like matter the claim is to be accepted once landlord states on oath and same goes un-shattered in cross-examinantion---Constitutional petition was dismissed. Pakistan Institute of International Affairs v. Naveed Merchant and others 2012 SCMR 1498 ref. (c) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art. 199---Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance (XVII of 1979), S.15---Ejectment of tenant---Concurrent findings---Invoking constitutional jurisdiction of High Court---Scope---The ambit of a constitutional petition is not that of a forum of appeal, nor does it automatically become such a forum in instances where no further appeal is provided, and is restricted inter alia to appreciate whether any manifest illegality is apparent from the order impugned---Where the fora of subordinate jurisdiction has exercised its discretion in one way and that discretion has been judicially exercised on sound principles the supervisory forum would not interfere with that discretion, unless same is contrary to law or usage having the force of law---The impugned judgments appeared to be well-reasoned and no manifest infirmity was discernable therein or that they could not have been rested upon the rationale relied upon---Constitutional petition was dismissed. Gul Taiz Khan Marwat v. Registrar Peshawar High Court PLD 2021 SC 391; Naheed Nusrat Hashmi v. Secretary Education (Elementary) Punjab PLD 2006 SC 1124 and Naseer Ahmed Siddiqui v. Aftab Alam PLD 2013 SC 323 ref. (d) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art. 199---Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance (XVII of 1979), S.15---Ejectment of tenant---Concurrent findings---Invoking constitutional jurisdiction of High Court---De novo appreciation of evidence, seeking of---Scope---For de novo appreciation of evidence, the constitutional jurisdiction of High Court is not an amenable forum in such regard---Constitutional petition was dismissed. Zayad Khan Abbasi for Petitioner. Faqir Ghazi for Respondent No. 1. Date of hearing: 20th February, 2025.

Summary: Pakistan Rangers can exercise powers under sections 21, 22, 23, 37(2) & 38 of CNSA, 1997 within the areas of their jurisdiction.

Summary: "Cruelty to child" does include forcing for begging or vagrancy.

Summary: The pivotal issues for determination before this Court are as under: i. Whether the respondents who are employees of the petitioner-Parks & Horticulture Authority ("PHA"), on daily wages mostly for more than 10 years, fall under the definition of ?workman'? ii. If the answer to the above question is in affirmative, what is the distinction between the regularization of service and the declaration as a permanent workman and whether the Labour Appellate Tribunal was justified in directing the regularization of services of the respondents? Held that based on the legislative definitions under the Punjab Industrial Relations Act, 2010 ("PIRA"), the Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 ("Ordinance") and the judicial pronouncement of Supreme Court of Pakistan in case of Province of Punjab through Secretary Communication and Works Department and others v. Ahmad Hussain (2013 SCMR 1547), I am of the opinion that for the purposes of the Ordinance, the petitioner-PHA is a commercial establishment and the respondents are workmen. Further held that as permanent workmen, the employees of Petitioner-PHA are entitled to certain statutory rights, as held in case of Ahmad Hussain, supra. These rights include job security, fair wages, gratuity and the ability to form or join trade unions whereas Labour Courts do not have the authority to introduce the regularization, which applies to the contractual, ad-hoc, or daily wage employees in public authorities under the civil service rules and/or a specific government policy. Courts cannot lose sight of the fact that the workmen engaged in non-administrative roles, are covered by the Ordinance and the PIRA.

Summary: If it is claim of the prosecution that first information report (FIR) was recorded earlier and thereafter inquest report was prepared, then number of the first information report (FIR) must have been mentioned at the first page of inquest report and absence of the same reflects that FIR was not recorded earlier, rather with the delay, however, ante-time was mentioned in the record which minimizes evidentiary value of first information report and said fact is ultimately fatal for the prosecution.

Summary: The prosecution case is hinges upon the circumstantial evidence and DNA report. It is well settled by now that in such like cases, prosecution is required to link each circumstance to the other in a manner that it must form a complete, continuous and unbroken chain of circumstances, firmly connecting the accused with the alleged offence and if any link is missing then obviously benefit is to be given to the accused. DNA report is not reliable if safe transmission of sealed parcels in the office of the Punjab Forensic Science Agency has not been proved. Accused acquitted of the charge.

Summary: Scope of Section 34 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908.

Summary: The fundamental issue for consideration before this Court is to determine whether some of the legal heirs of a deceased donor are clothed with locus standi for filing of an application under Section 12(2), CPC against the judgment, determining the validity of gift, passed in a suit instituted by another legal heir?donee (respondent No.5) against the donor, during the lifetime (of the donor), on the ground that the applicants were deprived of inheritance by not being made party to the suit. Held that mere non-mentioning of certain family members (the applicants and proforma respondent No.6), does not amount to fraud unless it demonstrably alters the fundamental basis of a judicial decision, which is not the position in the present case inasmuch as the dispute was between the respondent/petitioner and respondents No.2 to 4, to whom the property was given away as gift although part thereof (64-Kanal) was earlier given to the respondent/petitioner and the deceased Muhammad Aameen?the donor, actively participated in the legal proceedings. Moreover, once the order dated 19.05.2014, in C.R. No.1593 of 2005 was passed in favour of the respondent/petitioner, the same was never challenged by him before the Supreme Court of Pakistan as admittedly, it was only respondents No. 2 to 4 who filed CPLA No. 1733-L of 2014. Meaning thereby that predecessor of the applicants conceded to the impugned decree dated 19.05.2014 and the applicants can only step into his (their predecessor/donor) shoes. In short, the donor having actively participated in the prior legal proceedings and conceded the validity of the gift transaction, estops his legal heirs from raising belated claims under the pretext of fraud.