Summary: Background: A murder case led to the registration of an FIR against an individual who was subsequently arrested. To resolve the matter, a village Panchayat mediated a compromise. The Panchayat decided that the accused's family would offer his daughter in marriage to the victim's family and, failing that, a penalty of Rs. 1,000,000 would be imposed on the petitioner. The petitioner issued a cheque as a security for the penalty, but it bounced. The victim’s family sought legal action under Section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code (dishonest issuance of a cheque). The Ex-Officio Justice of Peace directed the police to register an FIR under Section 489-F. The petitioner challenged this directive under Article 199 of the Constitution. -----Issues: 1- Can a Panchayat legally enforce a compromise requiring marriage or financial penalties? -----2- Is a cheque issued as part of such an agreement valid and enforceable under the law? -----3- Did the Ex-Officio Justice of Peace act lawfully in ordering the registration of an FIR? -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: --Custom of Vani/Swara is illegal and un-Islamic: The compromise enforced by the Panchayat was deemed void ab initio as it violated constitutional and Islamic principles. The practice of giving women in marriage as a form of dispute resolution (vani/swara) is un-Islamic, unconstitutional, and criminalized under Section 310-A of the Pakistan Penal Code. --Invalidity of the cheque: The cheque issued under the unlawful compromise was void under Section 24 of the Contract Act, 1872, as its consideration was illegal and against public policy. As a result, the cheque could not form the basis of a civil or criminal case. --Registration of FIR under Section 489-F was not justified: Since the cheque and its underlying agreement were void, initiating criminal proceedings under Section 489-F was legally untenable. --Improper conduct by the Ex-Officio Justice of Peace: The Ex-Officio Justice of Peace failed to consider the facts and the illegality of the compromise before directing the registration of an FIR. The petition was accepted, and the directive of the Ex-Officio Justice of Peace to register an FIR was set aside. -----Citations/Precedents: International Instruments: Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), Articles 1 & 2. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), 1979. Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women (DEVAW), 1993. Constitution of Pakistan (1973): Article 8(1): Declares customs and laws inconsistent with Fundamental Rights void. Article 25: Guarantees equality before the law and prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex. Article 14: Protects the dignity of individuals. Article 34: Promotes full participation of women in all spheres of life. Article 36: Protects women, children, and families. Judicial Precedents: Atif Zareef v. The State (PLD 2021 SC 550): The right to dignity is inviolable and non-negotiable. Mst. Sakeena Bibi (PLD 2022 FSC 57): Declared vani/swara practices un-Islamic. National Commission on Status of Women v. Government of Pakistan (PLD 2019 SC 218): Jirgas/Panchayats cannot make arbitrary decisions violating fundamental rights. Muhammad Siddique v. The State (PLD 2002 Lah. 444): Customs inconsistent with law and civil society values are invalid. Hasnain Akhtar v. Justice of Peace (2015 YLR 2294): Panchayats cannot resolve criminal cases or bypass the legal process. Cooper et al. v. Aaron (358 U.S. 1, 1958): Local customs must yield to constitutional principles. Legislation: Section 310-A, Pakistan Penal Code: Criminalizes vani/swara with penalties of imprisonment and fine. Section 24, Contract Act, 1872: Invalidates agreements based on unlawful consideration.

Summary: Background: A writ petition was filed seeking the recovery of a minor girl who was allegedly abducted and later claimed to have entered into a marriage contract with an adult man. The petitioner alleged that the minor was unlawfully taken and sought her custody. The court placed the minor in Dar-ul-Aman for protection while determining the validity of the marriage and the minor’s legal capacity to consent. The court also examined statutory and constitutional provisions addressing child welfare, marriage, and sexual abuse. -----Issues: 1- Can a minor under 18 years of age legally consent to a marriage? -----2- Does puberty alone establish the legal competence of a minor to enter into a marriage contract under Pakistani law? -----3- Is a marriage contract involving a minor valid when it entails conduct defined as rape or sexual abuse under the Pakistan Penal Code (PPC)? -----4- Who should have custody of the minor pending the resolution of the matter? -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The court declared that a minor under the age of 18 years cannot validly consent to marriage. A purported marriage involving a minor is void ab initio as it violates statutory laws prohibiting child marriages and sexual exploitation. --Statutory Provisions: The court emphasized that under the Majority Act, 1875, a person below 18 years is a minor. Sections 375 and 377A PPC criminalize any sexual activity involving a minor, even with purported consent. A marriage contract involving a minor thus has an unlawful object and is void. --Islamic Personal Law: The court clarified that Muslim Personal Law is subject to statutory enactments, which take precedence when regulating marriage and child protection. --UNCRC Compliance: The court referenced Pakistan’s obligations under the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC), which protects children under 18 years from exploitation and mandates their welfare as a primary consideration. --Public Policy: Allowing such marriages would undermine laws ensuring the welfare, safety, and education of minors, particularly females, and is against constitutional protections for children. The minor was ordered to be released into the custody of her mother. The respondent claiming to be her husband was directed to pay litigation costs. The court also recommended legislative clarity to address inconsistencies in child marriage laws. -----Citations/Precedents: PLD 2018 Islamabad 385 (Determination of age through NADRA records without requiring medical examination) PLD 2020 Islamabad 28 (Directions to curb child marriages) PLD 1970 SC 323 (Mst. Bakhshi v. Bashir Ahmed) (Marriage of a girl under 16 attracts criminal liability but does not automatically invalidate the marriage contract; distinguished due to subsequent legal developments) 2000 PCr.LJ 226 (Tariq Mahmood v. The State) (Minors are not competent to contract marriage) 2012 PCr.LJ 11 (Muhammad Aslam v. The State) (Marriage requires "consenting adults") 2016 PCr.LJ Note 61 (A minor cannot give consent) 2002 SCMR 1694 (Societe Generale De Surveillance S.A. v. Pakistan) (International obligations in statutory interpretation) 2021 SCMR 1401 (Yar Muhammad Khan v. Sajjad Abbas) (Minors lack capacity to contract) PLD 1994 SC 693 (Shehla Zia v. WAPDA) (Right to life includes a meaningful existence) PLD 2016 SC 17 (Malik Mumtaz Qadri v. State) (Judicial limits in interpreting Shari’ah law)

Summary: Background: The complainant, a 20-year-old woman, was abducted and gang-raped by the accused while traveling from Kotli Sattian to Rawalpindi. She immediately reported the incident to the police, naming the perpetrators. Two more accused were added to the FIR through a supplementary statement. Three of the accused were tried and convicted under Section 376(2) of the Pakistan Penal Code (PPC), receiving the death penalty and compensation orders from the trial court. The High Court upheld the conviction but reduced the sentence to life imprisonment. One accused appealed his conviction and another challenged the reduction of sentence in the Supreme Court. -----Issues: 1- Was the complainant's testimony reliable and sufficient for conviction? -----2- Is the defense of questioning the complainant's character admissible in court? -----3- Can DNA evidence and medical reports independently corroborate the complainant's testimony? -----4- Was the reduction of the death sentence to life imprisonment appropriate? -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: --Testimony of the Complainant: The complainant's testimony was detailed, consistent, and trustworthy. It was corroborated by her immediate reporting of the incident and supported by medical evidence and DNA analysis. The Court emphasized that the complainant, a well-educated woman, had no motive to falsely accuse the perpetrators of such a heinous act. --Defense of Character Questioning: The Court deemed any attempt to question the complainant’s character irrelevant and unconstitutional, emphasizing that a victim's sexual history has no bearing on consent or credibility in a rape case. References to the "two-finger test" or similar methods were criticized as unscientific and violative of the victim’s dignity under Articles 4 and 14 of the Constitution. --Corroboration by DNA Evidence: DNA evidence was considered the gold standard for identification, confirming the involvement of two accused in the crime. Medical reports corroborated recent sexual activity and injuries, supporting the complainant's account. --Acquittal of One Accused: One appellant, was acquitted due to insufficient evidence, including his exclusion from the DNA report and lack of identification by the complainant at the time of the FIR. --Reduction of Sentence: The life imprisonment sentence for the remaining convicted appellants was upheld as proportionate, given the severity of the crime and the evidence presented. --Directive on Proclaimed Offenders: The Court directed the Inspector General of Punjab Police to ensure the arrest of the remaining two proclaimed offenders, emphasizing that the delay in justice undermines the rule of law. Two appellants’ convictions were upheld, and their life sentences were maintained. One appellant was acquitted on benefit of the doubt. A directive was issued to pursue the arrest of proclaimed offenders. -----Citations/Precedents: Legal and Constitutional Protections: Article 4 and Article 14 of the Constitution: Protection of human dignity and reputation. Omission of Article 151(4) of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order: Prohibits questioning the victim's general immoral character. Scientific and Legal Standards: DNA evidence and modern forensic science are the gold standard for corroborating rape allegations. WHO’s "Eliminating Virginity Testing" Statement: Declares "two-finger tests" unscientific and irrelevant. Relevant Cases: Mukhtar Ahmad v. Government of Pakistan: Declared Article 151(4) of QSO repugnant to Islamic injunctions. National Commission on the Status of Women Reports: Highlighted the patriarchal biases in sexual assault cases.

Summary: The appellant (Petitioner) was convicted for the triple murder of his daughter (Victim 1), her husband (Victim 2), and their infant child (Victim 3). The victims were allegedly called to the appellant's residence under the pretext of a reconciliation meeting following a strained relationship between the appellant and his daughter due to her marriage against his wishes. The appellant was charged under sections 302(b) and 302(c) of the Pakistan Penal Code (P.P.C.), with death and imprisonment sentences. The murders were reportedly motivated by "honor" concerns. The prosecution relied on eyewitness testimonies, medical evidence, and circumstantial evidence. ------- Issues: ------- 1) Was the appellant's conviction for triple murder justified based on the evidence provided by the prosecution? ------- 2) Could the compromise offered by the legal heirs of the victims lead to the appellant’s acquittal under Section 338-E of the P.P.C.? ------- Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: Conviction: The court upheld the appellant's conviction, affirming that the evidence, including eyewitness accounts, medical reports, and circumstantial evidence, conclusively proved the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. The recovery of bodies from the appellant's house and the recovery of the weapon added to the corroborative evidence. ------- Rejection of Compromise: The court rejected the compromise petition despite legal heirs agreeing to forgive the appellant. The court exercised its discretion under Section 338-E, P.P.C., highlighting that the murders were premeditated and carried out in a brutal and calculated manner, motivated by misplaced notions of "honor." ------- Social Considerations: The court emphasized the societal impact of "honor killings" and the need for judicial responses to deter such crimes. It noted that accepting the compromise would signal societal endorsement of such acts, undermining the fundamental rights enshrined in the Constitution and the rule of law. Sentence: The court confirmed the death sentence and rejected the appeal against the appellant’s conviction and sentence. ------- Citations/Precedents: Faqirullah v. Khalil-uz-Zaman (1999 SCMR 2203): Discussed the discretionary powers of courts in awarding Tazir punishments even when Qisas is not applicable. Mst. Humaira Mehmood v. The State (PLD 1999 Lahore 494): Addressed the societal and judicial responses to women exercising their right to marry against familial wishes. Holy Qur'an, Sura Al-Takwir (Verse 8): Highlighted religious condemnation of violence against women and honor-based crimes. Statistical Reports: The court took judicial notice of data on "honor killings" reported by the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan and the Sindh Crimes Branch, showcasing the widespread nature of such crimes. ------- Outcome: The criminal appeal was dismissed, and the compromise petition was denied. The appellant's death sentence was confirmed, reinforcing the court's stance against honor-based violence.

Summary: Background: The appellant was convicted for the murder of the deceased, allegedly committed under the impulse of "ghairat" (honor) after suspecting the deceased of improper conduct with his sister. The murder occurred on a metalled road, with eyewitnesses present, and the prosecution cited prior animosity between the appellant and the deceased as the motive. The appellant claimed that the deceased was found talking to his sister in a field, which provoked him to act in a fit of honor-based anger. The trial court sentenced the appellant to death, which was upheld by the High Court. The appellant appealed to the Supreme Court. -----Issues: 1- Does the defense of "ghairat" (honor killing) mitigate the severity of the crime? -----2- Were the prosecution witnesses reliable, given their relationship with the deceased? -----3- Was the appellant's plea of grave and sudden provocation supported by evidence? -----4- Was the death sentence lawfully and appropriately awarded? -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: --Defense of "ghairat" rejected: The defense of honor killing was deemed legally and morally unacceptable. The Court held that no individual has the right to take the law into their hands to commit murder under the pretext of "ghairat." Honor killings are a violation of Article 9 of the Constitution, which guarantees the right to life and liberty. --Prosecution witnesses deemed credible: Although the witnesses were related to the deceased, the Court found their testimony reliable as they had no ulterior motive to falsely implicate the appellant. Independent corroborative evidence, such as the recovery of the murder weapon and its forensic match with the crime scene empties, further validated their statements. --Defense of provocation unsupported: The appellant's claim of grave and sudden provocation was not corroborated by any evidence. The incident occurred on a public road, not in the field as claimed. The appellant’s claim of provocation was viewed as an afterthought to mitigate the severity of the charges. --Death sentence upheld: The Court found the prosecution had proven its case beyond a reasonable doubt. The appellant's actions were premeditated and deliberate, and the defense of honor did not constitute a mitigating factor. The death sentence, affirmed by the High Court, was upheld as appropriate and lawful. The appeal was dismissed, and the death sentence was confirmed. -----Citations/Precedents: Constitution of Pakistan: Article 9: Guarantees the right to life and liberty. Article 8(1): Declares customs or practices in derogation of fundamental rights void.

Summary: Background: Two writ petitions were filed concerning the alleged abduction and forced marriage of a woman. The first petition sought the production of the woman, claiming her life was in danger after being taken into custody under suspicious circumstances despite having pre-arrest bail. The second petition requested the quashing of an FIR accusing her of abduction and theft. The petitioner asserted that she had married a man of her choice against her family’s wishes and had fled to seek protection. The case involved competing claims of two marriages, alleged police misconduct, and questions of legal consent. -----Issues: 1- Can the High Court quash an FIR alleging abduction and theft based on evidence of mala fides and lack of legal grounds? -----2- Was the petitioner’s first marriage valid, and if so, is the subsequent marriage void under Islamic law? -----3- Did the police officials act beyond their lawful authority and violate the petitioner’s rights? -----4- Can a forced marriage without consent be considered valid under Islamic law and Pakistani legal principles? -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The FIR alleging abduction and theft (FIR No. 601/1998) was quashed as it was found to be false, mala fide, and lacking evidence. The petitioner’s first marriage was declared valid, and the second marriage void due to lack of consent and its occurrence during the subsistence of the earlier marriage. Police officials involved in the misconduct, including illegal detention and forced actions against the petitioner, were convicted of contempt of court. --Consent and Validity of Marriage: The court reiterated that under Islamic law, a sui juris woman can contract a marriage only with her free consent. The evidence, including video footage of the alleged second marriage, showed clear signs of coercion, such as the petitioner crying and resisting during the ceremony. --Evidence of First Marriage: Testimonies, registration records, and witnesses confirmed the validity of the first marriage, which predated the second. The later marriage was found to lack authenticity and consent. Police Misconduct: The police actions, including forcibly taking the petitioner from a shelter and ignoring her pre-arrest bail, were deemed to reflect gross abuse of authority and mala fide intent. Role of Constitutional Jurisdiction: The court emphasized its role in protecting fundamental rights and quashed the FIR based on evident malice and lack of jurisdiction. The FIR was quashed. Police officials involved in the misconduct were penalized. The petitioner’s first marriage was upheld, and the second marriage declared void. -----Citations/Precedents: PLD 1971 SC 677 – High Court’s jurisdiction to intervene in mala fide investigations. PLD 1997 Lahore 301 (Hafiz Abdul Waheed v. Asma Jahangir) – Validity of a woman’s choice in marriage. PLD 1984 Supreme Court 95 – Coercion invalidates a marriage under Islamic law. PLD 1998 Lahore 287 (Asif Saigol v. Federation of Pakistan) – Protection of constitutional rights during investigations. 1997 PCr.LJ 928 (Muhammad Arshad v. SHO) – Presumption of marriage when acknowledged by both spouses. 1994 PCr.LJ 1111 – Quashing FIRs in Hudood cases when prima facie evidence supports the marriage. 1988 PCr.LJ 1576 (Mst. Sabai and Muhammad Sher v. The State) – Evidence of valid marriage justifying FIR quashment. 1996 SCMR 24 (Anwar Ahmad Khan v. The State) – High Court’s authority to correct mala fide investigations.

Summary: Background: The case revolves around a 4th-year student who entered into a secret marriage with her brother’s tutor. The marriage was discovered by her father, leading to disputes over its validity. The situation escalated when the woman was allegedly abducted, and legal petitions ensued. The primary issues presented before the court involved whether a virgin adult woman can contract marriage without her guardian’s (wali) consent and whether such marriages are valid under Islamic law. -----Issues: 1- Are parents judicially enforceable in their right to obedience from children? -----2- Is marriage in Islam a civil contract? -----3- Is the consent of a wali necessary for the validity of a nikah? -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The court held that a sui juris (adult and sane) Muslim woman has the right to marry without the consent of her wali. It was argued that the Hanafi school of thought does not require a wali's consent for a valid nikah, provided the marriage meets conditions of compatibility (kufu) and proper dower (mehr). The court referred to the Quranic verses and Hadith that emphasize mutual consent of spouses as essential for marriage. The court ruled the marriage valid but expressed concern over societal and moral implications of secret marriages. It emphasized that parents and families play a significant role in marital decisions and advised legislative reform to address secret marriages. -----Citations/Precedents: PLD 1981 FSC 308: Federal Shariat Court ruling allowing sui juris women to marry without wali consent. Mst. Khurshid Bibi v. Baboo Muhammad Amin (PLD 1967 SC 97): Discussing marriage as a social contract. Abdul Qadir v. Salima (ILR 1886 Allahabad 149): Noting dower is not strictly contractual consideration. Sura-e-Al Baqra (2:232): Permission for marriage of divorced women without familial obstruction. Sura-e-Luqman (31:14): Children’s obligations towards parents. Imam Abu Hanifa’s opinions: Cited as a basis for Hanafi rulings on marriage without wali consent. Tafseer Ibne Kaseer and Tafseer Qurtubi: Commentaries on the role of wali in nikah. Sunnah and Hadith collections: Including Sahi Bokhari and Sunnan Abu Dawood addressing the role of wali.