Summary: Background: A murder case led to the registration of an FIR against an individual who was subsequently arrested. To resolve the matter, a village Panchayat mediated a compromise. The Panchayat decided that the accused's family would offer his daughter in marriage to the victim's family and, failing that, a penalty of Rs. 1,000,000 would be imposed on the petitioner. The petitioner issued a cheque as a security for the penalty, but it bounced. The victim’s family sought legal action under Section 489-F of the Pakistan Penal Code (dishonest issuance of a cheque). The Ex-Officio Justice of Peace directed the police to register an FIR under Section 489-F. The petitioner challenged this directive under Article 199 of the Constitution. -----Issues: 1- Can a Panchayat legally enforce a compromise requiring marriage or financial penalties? -----2- Is a cheque issued as part of such an agreement valid and enforceable under the law? -----3- Did the Ex-Officio Justice of Peace act lawfully in ordering the registration of an FIR? -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: --Custom of Vani/Swara is illegal and un-Islamic: The compromise enforced by the Panchayat was deemed void ab initio as it violated constitutional and Islamic principles. The practice of giving women in marriage as a form of dispute resolution (vani/swara) is un-Islamic, unconstitutional, and criminalized under Section 310-A of the Pakistan Penal Code. --Invalidity of the cheque: The cheque issued under the unlawful compromise was void under Section 24 of the Contract Act, 1872, as its consideration was illegal and against public policy. As a result, the cheque could not form the basis of a civil or criminal case. --Registration of FIR under Section 489-F was not justified: Since the cheque and its underlying agreement were void, initiating criminal proceedings under Section 489-F was legally untenable. --Improper conduct by the Ex-Officio Justice of Peace: The Ex-Officio Justice of Peace failed to consider the facts and the illegality of the compromise before directing the registration of an FIR. The petition was accepted, and the directive of the Ex-Officio Justice of Peace to register an FIR was set aside. -----Citations/Precedents: International Instruments: Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), Articles 1 & 2. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), 1979. Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women (DEVAW), 1993. Constitution of Pakistan (1973): Article 8(1): Declares customs and laws inconsistent with Fundamental Rights void. Article 25: Guarantees equality before the law and prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex. Article 14: Protects the dignity of individuals. Article 34: Promotes full participation of women in all spheres of life. Article 36: Protects women, children, and families. Judicial Precedents: Atif Zareef v. The State (PLD 2021 SC 550): The right to dignity is inviolable and non-negotiable. Mst. Sakeena Bibi (PLD 2022 FSC 57): Declared vani/swara practices un-Islamic. National Commission on Status of Women v. Government of Pakistan (PLD 2019 SC 218): Jirgas/Panchayats cannot make arbitrary decisions violating fundamental rights. Muhammad Siddique v. The State (PLD 2002 Lah. 444): Customs inconsistent with law and civil society values are invalid. Hasnain Akhtar v. Justice of Peace (2015 YLR 2294): Panchayats cannot resolve criminal cases or bypass the legal process. Cooper et al. v. Aaron (358 U.S. 1, 1958): Local customs must yield to constitutional principles. Legislation: Section 310-A, Pakistan Penal Code: Criminalizes vani/swara with penalties of imprisonment and fine. Section 24, Contract Act, 1872: Invalidates agreements based on unlawful consideration.

Summary: Background: The petitioner challenged the constitutionality of specific sections of the Pakistan Penal Code (PPC), namely Sections 306(b)(c), 307(1)(b)(c), 309(1), and 310(1), on the grounds that these provisions, related to Qisas (retaliation) and Diyat (compensation), were against the Injunctions of Islam. Additionally, the petitioner contested Sections 313 and 338 of the PPC and Sections 345(1) & (2A) of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cr.P.C.) on similar grounds. ----Issues: 1- Whether the impugned sections of the PPC and Cr.P.C. are against the Injunctions of Islam. 2- Whether the existing legal provisions adequately address the gravity of offenses like honor killing. 3- Whether the state has the authority to legislate and enact laws for maintaining law and order while adhering to Islamic principles. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome The court dismissed the petition, holding that the provisions in question were not against the Injunctions of Islam. The court emphasized that the state has the authority to legislate within the limits prescribed by Islamic law. The court further noted that the existing legal framework, particularly the amended Section 311 PPC, already addresses the concerns raised by the petitioner, especially regarding offenses categorized as "fasad-fil-arz" (mischief on earth). The court found that the petitioner's arguments did not sufficiently demonstrate that the impugned sections violated Islamic principles. ----Citations/Precedents 1997 SCMR 1307 - Sheikh Muhammad Aslam & another Vs. Shauakat Ali alias Shauka 2004 SCMR 236 - Bashir Ahmed Vs. The State 2005 SCMR 599 - Khan Muhammad Vs. The State PLD 1996 SC 1 - Abdul Haque vs. The State and another 2000 SCMR 338 - Abdus Salam vs. The State PLD 2005 SC 252 - Muhammad Abdullah Yousaf and others vs. Miss Nadia Ayub and others PLD 2015 SC 77 - Zahid Rehman vs. The State PLD 1980 FSC 1 - Muhammad Riaz Versus Federal Government PLD 1989 SC 633 - Shariat Appellate Bench of the Supreme Court Judgment on compoundability of Qatl-e-Amd under Section 302 PPC

Summary: Penal Code (XLV of 1860)-------Ss. 302(b), 309, 310, 311 & 323---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S.345---Qatl-eamd---Compromise---Waiver---Afw of Qisas---Payment of Badal-e-Sulh---Compromise wasarrived at between accused and legal heirs of the deceased, whereby legal heirs of the deceasedhad waived their right of Qisas without accepting any Diyat or compensation, and prayed thataccused be acquitted of the charge---Genuineness of compromise arrived at between the partieswas duly verified by the Sessions Judge---Out of nine legal heirs of the deceased two wereminors---Mother of said minors appeared before the court and recorded her statement on theirbehalf, with the assertion that she had waived the right of Qisas on behalf of the minors beingtheir mother and natural guardian, and that she had forgone the Diyat---Validity---In view ofS.309, P.P.C., there could be no waiver of right of Qisas to the extent of minors, only rightavailable would be compounding of right of Qisas, which could be exercised by 'Wali' of minoron their behalf---Such right was further protected by the Proviso contained in subsection (2) ofS.309, P.P.C.; there must be an acceptance of "Badal-e-Sulh" and value of the same would not beless than the value of Diyat---Waiver of right of Qisas by mother of the minors on their behalfwithout accepting any compensation, was neither legal nor just---Condition provided in S.310,P.P.C. of "Badal-e-Sulh", was to be observed being a legal requirement and withoutdetermination of value of "Badal-e-Sulh", the right of Qisas could not be allowed to becompounded---Settlement arrived at between the parties only would amount to waiver or compounding of right of Qisas, and order of acquittal was not its ultimate result---Discretion laywith the court to make an order of acquittal or conviction of the offender, keeping in view thefacts and circumstances of the case and nature of the offence---Accused was acquitted of thecharge under S.302(b), P.P.C.; he would remain in custody until he paid the amount of 'Badal-eSulh' determined as Rs.32,00,000 as per requirement of S.311, P.P.C.---Said amount would bedeposited in the National Savings in the names of minors in equal shares until they attainedmajority.

Summary: Sections 310, 323, 331 PPC. Determination of Diyat, Mode of its payment, specifying shares of minors on acceptance of compromise.The learned counsel for the petitioners argued that the trial court should have allowed the payment of Diyat amount in the form of landed property, considering the financial position of the petitioners. It was further asserted that the matter had already been compromised between the parties, and the major Walis (legal heirs) of the deceased had waived their right of Qisas (retaliation). However, the only unresolved issue pertained to the determination of Diyat for the minor legal heirs of the victim.The court observed that the trial court had failed to make a specific order either accepting or rejecting the compromise submitted by the parties. Instead, it had directed the payment of Diyat without specifying the amount and the mode of payment. The trial court's order seemed to be based on a misconception that the accused persons were acquitted merely upon the submission of the compromise.The court highlighted the legal requirement for the trial court to make a decision on the compromise, determine the Diyat amount, and specify the shares of the minor legal heirs. The trial court's failure to follow this procedure was noted, and it was directed to proceed with the case in accordance with the law.The judgment referred to relevant provisions of the Pakistan Penal Code, including Sections 310, 323, and 331, as well as the Diyat, Arsh, and Daman Fund Rules, 2007. The court accepted the quashment petition, set aside the impugned orders, and instructed the trial court to proceed in accordance with the law. The legal principle that the ultimate result of a compromise is not an automatic acquittal of the accused was emphasized, and the court underscored the need for the trial court to assess the merits of the case before accepting or rejecting a compromise.