Summary: (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860): ----S. 302(b)----Murder----Conviction and sentence----Petitioner convicted under S. 302(b), P.P.C. and awarded death sentence, later modified to life imprisonment by High Court----Factual and evidentiary assessment----Ocular account furnished by eyewitnesses was consistent, corroborated by medical evidence, and substantiated by prompt registration of F.I.R.----Minor contradictions in witness statements not material, given passage of time----Occurrence took place in broad daylight, ruling out mistaken identity----Petitioner failed to prove false implication----Trial Court and High Court, upon proper appreciation of evidence, upheld conviction, modifying only the sentence due to unproven motive. (b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898): ----S. 544-A----Compensation to legal heirs----Petitioner ordered to pay Rs. 300,000/- as compensation to the legal heirs of deceased with six-months’ imprisonment in case of default----Compensation upheld by High Court and Supreme Court, reinforcing the principle that monetary reparation is necessary despite modification of sentence. (c) Qisas and Diyat Ordinance, 1990: ----Ss. 338-F, 331----Diyat----Inability to pay due to financial constraints----Compromise between petitioner and legal heirs of deceased deemed incomplete as minor legal heir’s share of Diyat remained unpaid----Precedents indicate that compromise is ineffective unless fully executed and all legal heirs are compensated----Petitioner directed to seek relief under “Diyat, Arsh and Daman Fund Rules, 2007” for financial assistance or payment in installments as per S. 331, P.P.C. (d) Administration of justice: ----Judicial review of compromise in murder cases----Incomplete compromise cannot absolve liability of a convict unless executed in its entirety----Financial incapacity to pay Diyat does not bar alternative legal remedies, including installment-based payment or assistance from government-administered funds. ----Disposition: Petition dismissed. Conviction maintained. Life imprisonment upheld in lieu of death sentence. Compensation and Diyat obligations sustained. ----Cited Cases: Government of Punjab v. Abid Hussain (PLD 2007 SC 315) Muhammad Aslam v. The State (2003 SCMR 658) Muhammad Akram v. The State (2011 SCMR 1964) PLD 2012 SC 769

Summary: Bail granted---The petitioner, a doctor by profession, seeks post-arrest bail in a case where he has been accused of qatl-bissabab (unintentional homicide) under Section 322 of the Pakistan Penal Code (PPC). The case was registered at Police Station Model Town, Gujranwala, based on allegations of negligence during surgery resulting in the death of Muhammad Asim, the son of the complainant. Upon review, the court observed that the punishment for qatl-bissabab, as provided under Section 322 PPC, is limited to Diyat (monetary compensation to the victim's heirs). The court referenced legal provisions specifying the value of Diyat and noted that imprisonment is not a prescribed punishment under Section 322 PPC. Therefore, the court highlighted that the accused can only be detained if they default on payment of Diyat, as outlined in Section 331 PPC. Furthermore, the court emphasized that the provisions of Section 382-B of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cr.P.C), which mandate consideration of pre-sentence custody periods, do not apply in cases where the accused is charged under Section 322 PPC. The court cited legal precedents supporting the interpretation that imprisonment is not a punishment for such offenses, and refusal of bail would amount to double jeopardy. In light of these considerations, the court concluded that the petitioner's pre-trial detention is not justified, as it does not serve any purpose and cannot be compensated even in the event of conviction. Therefore, the court granted post-arrest bail to the petitioner upon the condition of furnishing a bail bond in the sum of Rs. 27,00,000/- with one surety of the same amount to the satisfaction of the trial court or area magistrate.

Summary: Sections 310, 323, 331 PPC. Determination of Diyat, Mode of its payment, specifying shares of minors on acceptance of compromise.The learned counsel for the petitioners argued that the trial court should have allowed the payment of Diyat amount in the form of landed property, considering the financial position of the petitioners. It was further asserted that the matter had already been compromised between the parties, and the major Walis (legal heirs) of the deceased had waived their right of Qisas (retaliation). However, the only unresolved issue pertained to the determination of Diyat for the minor legal heirs of the victim.The court observed that the trial court had failed to make a specific order either accepting or rejecting the compromise submitted by the parties. Instead, it had directed the payment of Diyat without specifying the amount and the mode of payment. The trial court's order seemed to be based on a misconception that the accused persons were acquitted merely upon the submission of the compromise.The court highlighted the legal requirement for the trial court to make a decision on the compromise, determine the Diyat amount, and specify the shares of the minor legal heirs. The trial court's failure to follow this procedure was noted, and it was directed to proceed with the case in accordance with the law.The judgment referred to relevant provisions of the Pakistan Penal Code, including Sections 310, 323, and 331, as well as the Diyat, Arsh, and Daman Fund Rules, 2007. The court accepted the quashment petition, set aside the impugned orders, and instructed the trial court to proceed in accordance with the law. The legal principle that the ultimate result of a compromise is not an automatic acquittal of the accused was emphasized, and the court underscored the need for the trial court to assess the merits of the case before accepting or rejecting a compromise.

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)- - S. 288-Statement of witness before committing Magistrate not to be treated as evidence at sessions trial unless witness confronted with that statement in terms of S. 145 Evidence Act (I of 1872). The evidence recorded by the committing Court cannot be used as evidence under section 288 Criminal Procedure Code, at a sessions trial, unless the witness is confronted with his previous statement as required by section 145 of the Evidence Act. The words in section 288 Criminal Procedure Code "for all purposes subject to the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act. 1872" were added to that section by an amendment in 1920'. Surely, one object of treating the previous statement as evidence would be to contradict the statement of a witness made at the sessions trial and section 145 which is a part of the Evidence Act, should come into play, on the language of section 288, Criminal Procedure Code. After the proper procedure has been followed and the Sessions judge has in his discretion admitted the previous statement under section 288, Criminal Procedure Code as evidence at the trial, it may of course be treated as evidence in the case for all purposes. As the proper procedure was not followed in the present case by the Sessions judge, the previous depositions of the witnesses were not treated 'as evidence in the case. Tara Singh v. The State, A I R 1951 Supreme Court 441 Nanhu Mahton v. Emperor; A I R 1930 Pat. 338, approved. Muhammad Sarwar v. Emperor, 43 Cr. L J, 828 (D B) dissented. Queen Empress v. Dan Sahai, I L R 7 All. 862; Emperor v. Dwarka Kurmi I L R 28 All. 683; Fakira v. Emperor, A I R 1937 P C 119, mentioned. Sadar v. Emperor, A I R 1929 Lah. 111, not applicable. (b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)- - Ss. 302, 331-Accused charged and convicted by Sessions Court under S. 302-Grievous injuries caused by hands and striking with shoes to make deceased to confess and restore stolen property-Conviction changed on appeal to S. 331 P. P. C. and sentence reduced.