Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Deceased Quota ------ ''A married daughter remains equally a child of her deceased parent, and to deny her this entitlement on the basis of marriage is to deny her constitutional identity as an equal citizen. (2). Financial independence is not a privilege but a necessary precondition for the full realization of citizenship, autonomy, and personhood. (3) Executive clarification cannot override statutory rules.'' ---- (a) Constitution of Pakistan----Arts. 14, 25, 27 & 184(3)---Married daughter---Compassionate appointment---Equality---Non-discrimination---Right to dignity---Marital status---Legal personhood---Constitutional guarantees---Petitioner, appointed as Primary School Teacher under deceased son/daughter quota per Rule 10(4) of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion & Transfer) Rules, 1989, was removed from service through an executive clarification that excluded married daughters from entitlement---Held, such exclusion amounts to gender-based discrimination, violating Arts. 14, 25, and 27 of the Constitution---Married daughters remain children of their deceased parent and cannot be denied compassionate employment merely due to marital status---Executive clarification issued by the Establishment Department amounted to impermissible curtailment of a statutory rule through administrative fiat---Doctrine of separation of powers violated by executive interference in legislative domain---Clarification struck down for being ultra vires, unconstitutional, discriminatory, and without lawful authority---Held further, Constitution guarantees rights to individuals regardless of gender or marital status; treating married daughters as dependent liabilities contravenes both constitutional principles and Islamic jurisprudence, which upholds a woman’s financial autonomy irrespective of marital status.(b) Service Law----Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Civil Servants Act, 1973, S. 26---Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion & Transfer) Rules, 1989, R.10(4)---Interpretation of rules---Scope---Compassionate appointment---Married daughter---Executive clarification---Legal competence---Held, Rule 10(4) of the 1989 Rules does not exclude married daughters from compassionate appointment---Executive clarification purporting to limit rule’s applicability to unmarried daughters or separated women lacked legal authority under S.26 of the Act---Only the Governor is competent to frame or amend rules---Executive instruction cannot override or amend a statutory rule---Clarification introducing gender-based classification between married sons and daughters declared unconstitutional and violative of equal protection under the law.(c) Islamic Law----Financial autonomy of women---Marital status---Islamic jurisprudence---Scope---Held, Islamic law recognizes the right of a woman to retain full ownership and control over her earnings and property irrespective of marriage---Presumption of economic dependency of married women is neither legally tenable nor religiously grounded.(d) Feminist Legal Theory----Gender equality---Legal identity---Patriarchal assumptions---Held, exclusion of married daughters reflects regressive, patriarchal notions that equate womanhood with dependency on male relatives---Legal personhood and entitlement to economic rights are individual and not contingent on marriage---State policies denying women equal access to employment on the basis of marital status reinforce structural inequality---References made to feminist theorists such as Martha Fineman, bell hooks, Simone de Beauvoir, and jurisprudence rejecting doctrine of coverture and affirming women’s rights as autonomous individuals.(e) International Law----CEDAW---Articles 1, 2 & 11---Gender discrimination---Marital status---Pakistan’s international obligations---Held, exclusion of married daughters from compassionate employment violates Pakistan’s obligations under CEDAW, ICCPR, and ICESCR---Administrative practices rooted in customary gender roles and stereotypes are incompatible with international standards requiring substantive equality.(f) Judicial Language----Gender-neutral judicial reasoning---Structural bias---Held, phrase “a married daughter becomes a liability of her husband” used in the impugned Service Tribunal judgment was patriarchal, factually and legally erroneous, and constitutionally incompatible---Judicial and administrative authorities must adopt gender-sensitive and gender-neutral language as part of their constitutional duty to uphold dignity and equality---Judgments must not encode bias through language.(g) Practice & Procedure----Prospective application of precedent---Retrospective effect---Held, SC judgment in GPO Islamabad v. Muhammad Jalal (PLD 2024 SC 1276), which struck down Rule 10(4), applies prospectively and does not affect appointments already made under the Rule.Disposition: Petition converted into appeal and allowed. Impugned judgment and executive clarification set aside. Petitioner’s appointment restored with all back-benefits.Cited Cases:• Muhammad Nadeem Arif v. IG Police, Punjab 2011 SCMR 408• Federal Public Service Commission v. Altaf Hussain 2015 SCMR 581• Province of Punjab v. Kanwal Rashid 2021 SCMR 730• Khawaja Ahmad Hassan v. Government of Punjab 2005 SCMR 186• Federation of Pakistan v. Shuja Sharif 2023 SCMR 129• Pakistan Peoples Party Parliamentarians v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2022 SC 574• General Post Office, Islamabad v. Muhammad Jalal PLD 2024 SC 1276• Zarai Taraqiati Bank v. Sarfraz Khan Jadoon 2021 SCMR 1305• Pakistan Medical & Dental Council v. Muhammad Fahad Malik 2018 SCMR 1956Cited International Instruments:• Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW)• International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)• International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)

Summary: (a) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877) --- Ss. 12 & 42 --- Compromise decree --- Relief confined to prayer clause --- Decree in respect of unidentified or contingent property --- Scope and limitations. Plaintiff sought specific performance, declaration, and permanent injunction regarding identified land mentioned in prayer clause (a). The suit was disposed of on the basis of a compromise application. The learned Single Judge decreed the suit only in terms of paragraph 1 of the compromise application, holding that the remaining paragraphs referred to events and properties outside the scope of the pleadings. Held, relief in a civil suit must strictly conform to the claims specifically pleaded and prayed for; any compromise terms relating to alternate land or contingent future events—such as possible allotment of land by the Government—could not be enforced through a decree when such relief was not sought in the original prayer clause. A decree cannot cover property that is not yet identified or in existence. Specific performance must be confined to a definite and existing subject matter. The learned Single Judge’s exercise of discretion was proper and consistent with the scope of the suit. (b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) --- O. XXIII, R.3 --- Compromise decree --- Discretion of Court to limit decree to permissible scope --- Validity. Where parties file a compromise application, the Court is not bound to incorporate all its terms into the decree if some terms extend beyond the pleadings and relief claimed. Held, the Court rightly confined the decree to paragraph 1 of the compromise application as it alone pertained to the identified suit land mentioned in the prayer clause. Paragraphs concerning future or alternative land were outside the scope of the suit and the pleadings, and therefore could not be made part of the judgment. Discretion exercised by the learned Single Judge in this regard was lawful and did not warrant interference by the appellate Court. (c) Contract --- Contingent agreements --- Specific performance --- Non-identifiable subject matter --- Effect. A valid agreement may contain contingent terms relating to future events, but specific performance can only be granted with respect to definite and existing property. Held, even if compromise terms anticipate possible allotment of alternative land in future, such stipulations cannot be enforced by decree unless the property exists and is properly identified in the suit. Relief cannot be granted in anticipation of hypothetical future events not pleaded. Disposition: Appeal dismissed along with pending applications.

Summary: Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)--- ----S. 131---Appeal before Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, filing of---Limitation---Technical consideration---Condonation of delay---Scope---Appellant (Registered person / Company) filed appeal before the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue (‘Tribunal’), which was late by 99 days---Plea of the appellant was that, against the order passed by the concerned Commissioner (‘impugned order’), it had filed complaint before the Federal Tax Ombudsman (‘Ombudsman’) under the wrong impression that the there was no right of appeal and after disposal of said complaint , the Tribunal was approached---Validity---Record showed that against the impugned order, the appellant had approached the Ombudsman--- Since the appellant had already filed complaint before the Ombudsman which was later rejected for lack of jurisdiction, the delay in filing the (present) appeal late was not without reason---Delay in filing of appeal was a technical error---Prayer for condonation of delay should be considered sympathetically---Technical ground of delay in filing appeal should not be made to hinder the cause of justice---When technical and procedural considerations were pitted against rights on substantial considerations, the substantial considerations had to be preferred over technical considerations in order to effectuate the cause of justice---Case of the appellant deserved to be decided on merits of facts and legal provisions rather than mere technicalities---Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue condoned the delay in filing the appeal and admitted the main appeal for hearing and adjudication on merits--- Application for condonation of delay was accepted accordingly. 2012 PTD 637 (Trib.); Messrs Ashraf Dawakhana v. Additional Collector Sales Tax GST 2003 CL 601 and 2002 PTD 1035 ref. Muhammad Azam for Appellant. Ms. Saima Ijaz, DR for Respondent. Date of hearing: 14th March, 2025.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)--- ----Ss. 42 & 54---Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Arts. 117 & 120---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S. 115, O. XXIX, R. 1 & O. XLI, R. 1---Suit for declaration and injunction---Maintainability---Locus standi to file revision application---Illegal use of electricity---Proof---Onus to prove---Respondent / plaintiff assailed excessive bill of electricity issued by petitioner / Peshawar Electric Supply Company---Suit and appeal were concurrently decided against petitioner / Company---Validity---Signatory of Vakalatnama was not competent to file civil revision on behalf of petitioner / Company---Memorandum of appeal was not signed by Chief Executive or legally authorized person and this was against the mandate of O. XXIX, R. 1, C.P.C.---In a suit by or against corporation any pleading could be signed and verified on behalf of corporation by Secretary or Director or other principal officer of the corporation, who was liable to depose to the facts of the case---Memorandum of appeal could be signed as per O. XLI, R. 1, C.P.C. by appellant or his pleader, and a Revision Petition could also be signed by petitioner or its pleader as revisional jurisdiction was a part of general appellate jurisdiction of superior Courts---As a beneficiary, the petitioner / Company was required to prove allegation of illegal use of electricity and genuineness of assessments so imposed on respondent / plaintiff but no evidence was brought on record---Electricity meter of respondent / plaintiff was defective and she had applied for its replacement which was not replaced---High Court declined to interfere in judgments and decrees passed by both the Courts below, as there was no illegality, irregularity or jurisdictional error---Revision was dismissed, in circumstances. Khan Iftikhar Hussain Khan of Mamdot v. Messrs Ghulam Nabi Corporation Ltd Lahore PLD 1971 SC 550; Messrs Razo (Pvt) Ltd v. Director Karachi City Region Employees Old Age Benefit Institution and others 2005 CLD 1208; Hasnain Cotex Ltd and 2 others v. Jasim Khan 2012 YLR 2743; Shankar Ramchandra v. Krishnaji Dattatreya AIR 1970 SC 1 and Atta Muhammad v. Muhammad Bakhsh PLD 2004 Lahore 300 rel. Muhammad Anwar Awan for Petitioners. Malik Muhammad Asad for Respondent. Date of hearing: 14th March, 2025.

Summary: (Against the order/judgment dated 20.09.2021 passed by the High Court of Balochistan, Quetta, in Crl. A. No. (T)67 of 2021). (a) Maxim--- ----Communi observantia non set recedendum---Connotation---When law requires a thing to be done in a particular manner, the same must be done accordingly and if prescribed procedure is not followed, it would be presumed that the same had not been done in accordance with law. Noman Mansoor v. State PLD 2024 SC 805; Ahmed Ali v. State 2023 SCMR 781; Ameer Zeb v. State PLD 2012 SC 380 and Muhammad Hashim v. State PLD 2004 SC 856 rel. (b) Control of Narcotic Substances Act (XXV of 1997)--- ----S. 9(c)---Police Rules, 1934, R. 22.70, Register No. XIX---Recovery of narcotic substance---Re-appraisal of evidence---Safe custody and transmission of case property---Collective forensic report of all samples---Accused was arrested for recovery of 100 packets of charas, weighing 100 grams each---Trial Court convicted and sentenced the accused to imprisonment for life---Validity---Safe custody and safe transmission of alleged drug from the spot of recovery till its receipt by Narcotic Testing Laboratory were not satisfactorily established---It was mandated in Police Rules, 1934 that case property must be kept in Malkhana and entry of the same must be recorded in Register No. XIX of that police station---It was duty of police and prosecution to establish that case property was kept in safe custody, and if required to be sent to any laboratory for analysis, to further establish its safe transmission and also record it in the relevant register, including road certificate etc.---Procedure in Police Rules, 1934 ensured that case property, when it was produced before Court, had remained in safe custody and was not tampered with until that time---Complete mechanism was provided in Police Rules, 1934 regarding safe custody and safe transmission of case property to concerned laboratory and then to Trial Court---Each sample was to be tested separately and individual reports must be prepared for each sample---Collective forensic report not only diminished credibility of chemical examination but also raised serious questions regarding representative nature of samples sent for analysis---In the present case. there were serious procedural violations, absence of credible forensic evidence and failure to establish safe custody and transmission---Supreme Court set aside conviction and sentence awarded to accused as prosecution could not prove its case beyond reasonable doubt and accused was acquitted of the charge---Appeal was allowed. Ameer Zeb v. State PLD 2012 SC 380; Asif Ali v. State 2024 SCMR 1408 and Zain Shahid v. State 2024 SCMR 843 rel. Muhammad Shabbir Rajput, Advocate Supreme Court and Asif Ali Talpur, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner. Ms. Rubina Butt, State Counsel for the State. Date of hearing: 10th March, 2025.