Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan—Art. 184(3); West Pakistan Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964), S. 17-A; Alternative Dispute Resolution Act, 2017— Family dispute—Maintenance of children—Enhancement of maintenance—Mediation as an alternative to prolonged litigation—Scope and importance—Judicial endorsement of ADR—Effect. Petitioner/father challenged enhancement of monthly maintenance for his daughters from Rs. 30,000/- to Rs. 150,000/- each, along with educational expenses, as decreed by the appellate court—Family Court had earlier passed decree under S. 17-A of the Family Courts Act, 1964 due to petitioner’s failure to comply with interim maintenance order—Supreme Court, after prolonged litigation spanning over seven years, referred the matter to mediation under the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act, 2017—Mediation was successfully concluded within five weeks, and parties submitted a settlement agreement—Court highlighted the effectiveness of mediation in resolving disputes swiftly and amicably, as opposed to traditional adversarial proceedings—Judgment underscored that mediation promotes party autonomy, reduces costs, safeguards privacy, and fosters creative and interest-based resolutions not possible under rigid judicial remedies—Held, courts should proactively refer cases suitable for mediation at early stages to reduce backlog and improve dispute resolution efficiency—Court acknowledged the legal framework supporting mediation, including ADR Act, 2017, ADR Mediation Accreditation (Eligibility) Rules, 2023, and Mediation Practice Direction (Civil) Rules, 2023—Court appreciated the mediator for her diligence and effectiveness in resolving the familial dispute—Petition was disposed of in terms of the mediated settlement agreement. Disposition: Petition disposed of in terms of settlement agreement dated 05.05.2025.

Summary: (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 302 & 34—Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), Ss. 342, 544-A & 265-H(i)—Qatl-i-Amd—Murder of wife and minor children—Benefit of doubt—Retraction of confessional statement—Conflict between ocular and medical evidence—Failure to establish motive—Acquittal. Petitioner was convicted and sentenced to death thrice under S. 302 PPC for murdering his wife and two children, based on a confessional statement recorded before a Magistrate and circumstantial evidence—Trial court’s judgment was affirmed by the High Court—Supreme Court noted that the confession was retracted, and the accused alleged it was obtained under duress to protect his detained family members—Magistrate who recorded the confession failed to complete procedural formalities, including time record and thumb impression—Medical evidence conflicted with prosecution's version; no poison was detected in chemical examination, and no physical evidence (bottle, teacup, etc.) corroborated poisoning—Contradictions between testimonies of complainant and witnesses regarding cause of death (strangulation vs. poisoning), and no eyewitness account existed—No motive was proven, and prior enmity was absent—Three alleged co-accused were acquitted for lack of evidence—Held, prosecution failed to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt; settled law mandates benefit of doubt be extended in such circumstances—Conviction set aside and petitioner acquitted. Cited Case: • Abdul Jabbar and another v. The State (2019 SCMR 129) Disposition: Jail Petition converted into appeal and allowed—Conviction and death sentence set aside—Petitioner acquitted and ordered to be released if not required in any other case.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan ----Art. 199—Writ jurisdiction—Maintainability—Show cause notice—Initiation of investigation—No adverse order—Premature petition—Principles Petitioners challenged notice dated 04.05.2024 issued by National Tariff Commission (NTC) initiating anti-circumvention investigation under S.63(4) of Anti-Dumping Duties Act, 2015—Held, notice merely invited interested parties to submit comments/evidence within 45 days and did not constitute an adverse action—Court ruled petition was premature as no determination or penalty had been passed—Established principle that a writ petition is not maintainable against a mere initiation of investigation or show-cause notice unless issued without jurisdiction or due to mala fides—Petitioners directed to raise objections and submit evidence before NTC during pending inquiry. Cited Cases: • Sadiq Poultry Pvt. Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2025 Lahore 57 • Strategic Plans Division v. Punjab Revenue Authority PLD 2024 Lahore 545 • Shaheen Merchant v. Federation of Pakistan 2021 PTD 2126 (Lahore) • Tasneem Enterprises v. National Tariff Commission CP D-4261/2024, Sindh High Court (28.01.2025) • Niaz Ahmad v. Federation of Pakistan WP No. 3396-P/2024, Peshawar High Court (12.03.2025) • Mian Azam Waheed Case (Supreme Court dictum on exhaustion of remedies) (b) Anti-Dumping Duties Act, 2015 ----Ss. 63, 70—Initiation of anti-circumvention investigation—Scope—Remedies under special statute—Jurisdiction of High Court—Exhaustion of remedies Notice of initiation under S.63(4) of Anti-Dumping Duties Act is not a final determination but a procedural step allowing stakeholders to participate—Petitioners had adequate statutory remedy to submit comments or file appeal under S.70 of the Act after final determination—Held, bypassing special statutory mechanisms undermines regulatory process—Judicial review barred where effective remedy is provided under special law—High Court directed parties to exhaust NTC process before invoking constitutional jurisdiction. (c) Trade Remedies—Anti-Dumping vs. Anti-Circumvention ----Comparative scope—Nature of investigations—Purpose Anti-dumping investigations address underpricing of foreign goods harming domestic industry—Anti-circumvention proceedings seek to ensure anti-dumping measures are not bypassed through technical or strategic modifications (e.g., relabeling, re-routing)—In present case, NTC initiated anti-circumvention investigation after determining prima facie evidence of evasion through minor modification of paperboard—Held, such investigations are within NTC’s regulatory mandate as per S.63—No case made out for judicial interference at initiation stage. (d) Procedural Law—Disputed questions of fact—Scope of judicial review ----Determination of factual controversies—Limited scope under Art.199—Forum of competent authority Petition raised disputed questions regarding classification of goods and alleged misapplication of customs declarations—Held, such factual inquiries fall within exclusive jurisdiction of NTC and cannot be adjudicated in writ proceedings—Court reiterated settled law that it cannot assume fact-finding role in constitutional jurisdiction—Disputes regarding product classification, circumvention techniques, or material evidence must be presented before the investigative forum. Disposition: Petition dismissed—Held to be premature and not maintainable—Petitioners advised to submit reply and objections before NTC during ongoing anti-circumvention investigation—No adverse order had yet been passed.

Summary: Conviction maintained ---- (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860) ----S. 302(b)—Qatl-i-Amd—Conviction—Sentence reduced from death to imprisonment for life—Mitigating circumstances Appellant was convicted under S. 302(b), PPC for committing Qatl-i-Amd by firing at the deceased Khalid Mehmood with a pistol at THQ Hospital, Depalpur—Trial court awarded death sentence—High Court found ocular account of complainant and PW-2 supported by court witnesses CW-6 and CW-7, medical evidence, and forensic report—However, mitigating circumstances existed: appellant was not present during initial motive quarrel; he fired at the deceased in a state of reaction upon seeing his father and brother in injured condition—Held, although conviction was maintained, circumstances warranted commutation of death sentence to life imprisonment—Compensation under S. 544-A Cr.P.C. and sentence in default thereof upheld—Benefit of S. 382-B Cr.P.C. also extended. Cited Cases: • Syed Ali Bepari v. Nibaran Mollah PLD 1962 SC 502 • Abdul Rauf v. The State 2004 CrLJ 12 • Sajid Mehmood v. The State 2022 SCMR 1882 (b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) ----Ss. 342, 340(2), 382-B—Statement of accused—Evidentiary value—Failure to appear under oath or produce defence—Benefit of sentencing provisions Appellant in his statement under S. 342 Cr.P.C. offered a defence of false implication due to personal vendetta, alleging the deceased initiated the assault—He did not appear as witness under S. 340(2) Cr.P.C. nor adduce any evidence—Held, bald denial not substantiated by evidence has no legal weight—Benefit under S. 382-B Cr.P.C. granted in view of sentence reduction from death to life imprisonment. (c) Evidence—Ocular account—Medical and forensic corroboration—Minor discrepancy in injury locale—Legal effect Complainant and PW-2 described firearm injury to chest; postmortem revealed entry wound in upper abdomen—Held, such minor variance immaterial due to close anatomical proximity and human estimation during stressful events—Forensic evidence confirmed firearm used by appellant matched recovered crime empties—Testimony of court witnesses present at hospital was natural, impartial, and fully corroborative. (d) Principle of Estoppel—Maxims—Self-defence claim—Inapplicability where aggressor initiates violence Appellant claimed self-defence—Rejected by court—Held, a person who initiates the attack cannot claim benefit of self-defence—Appellant’s own act of retaliatory violence upon seeing injured relatives does not justify fatal shooting—Court referred to legal maxims: Nullus commodum capere potest de injuria sua propria and Commodum ex injuria sua nemo habere debet. Disposition: Appeal dismissed with modification—Conviction under S. 302(b), PPC maintained—Death sentence converted to life imprisonment—Murder Reference answered in negative—Compensation and default sentence upheld—Benefit of S. 382-B Cr.P.C. allowed.

Summary: If it has been established that during trial, prosecution has changed the venue of receipt of injuries of the deceased i.e. occurrence then it is fatal for the case of prosecution; if identification of the unknown accused is based on the external appearance then without detail of the facial features, identification through identification parade is of no legal efficacy.

Summary: (i) The provision of Section 22(3) of the Punjab Rent Premises Act, 2009 is directory in nature. (ii) A party cannot be compelled to deposit the rent in Court until and unless relationship of landlord and tenant is established. ---- (a) Punjab Rented Premises Act, 2009 (VII of 2009): ----S. 22(3)---Nature of provision limiting number of witnesses---Directory or mandatory---Scope---Interpretation of the phrase “affidavits of not more than two witnesses”---Provision under S. 22(3) of the Act, though couched in mandatory terms, held to be directory in nature---Held, interpretation of such provisions is governed by legislative intent rather than language alone---Where no penal consequences are provided, even use of the word “shall” may not render a provision mandatory---Provision is to be interpreted in light of the scheme and purpose of the Act, convenience of procedure, and absence of injustice or prejudice---Purpose of restricting number of witnesses is to ensure expeditious disposal of rent matters and not to curtail fair hearing---Permission to produce additional witness, therefore, held not to cause prejudice, especially where right of cross-examination remains intact. ----Cited Cases: • Commissioner Inland Revenue v. Messrs Sarwaq Traders 2022 SCMR 1333 • Orient Power Company (Pvt.) Ltd. v. SNGPL 2021 SCMR 1728 • Province of Punjab v. Conservator of Forests 2021 SCMR 328 • Province of Punjab v. Murree Brewery Company Ltd. 2021 SCMR 305 (b) Punjab Rented Premises Act, 2009 (VII of 2009): ----S. 24---Deposit of rent---Jurisdiction of Rent Tribunal---Where relationship of landlord and tenant is denied by the respondent---Scope---Held, Rent Tribunal is not empowered to direct deposit of rent under S.24 until existence of tenancy relationship is positively established---In instant case, respondents claimed to have rented property from third party (caretaker with power of attorney), and had already vacated premises---Tribunal rightly refrained from directing deposit of rent---Petitioner, if successful in establishing tenancy, may recover rent through execution proceedings---No jurisdictional defect found in impugned orders. ----Cited Case: • Mian Umar Ikram-ul-Haque v. Dr. Shahida Hasnain 2016 SCMR 2186 / PLJ 2017 SC 1 (c) Constitution of Pakistan, 1973: ----Art. 199---Constitutional petition---Interference by High Court---Scope---No jurisdictional defect, legal infirmity, or perversity pointed out in orders of courts below---Concurrent findings supported by law and facts---Petition dismissed in limine.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Arts.2-A, 4 & 10-A---Employment---Dismissal from service, challenge to---Non-holding of regular inquiry---Principle of natural justice, violation of---Absence of personal hearing---Effect---Employee to be reinstated in circumstances---Brief facts were that the petitioner was a ‘lecturer’ and was issued an explanation letter and a show-cause notice regarding residing outside the college premises despite alleged permission; he was dismissed from service and his departmental appeal remained undecided, whereupon he invoked constitutional jurisdiction under Art. 199 of the Constitution---The issue before the High Court was “whether the dismissal order had been passed in violation of the principles of natural justice, particularly the requirement of fair hearing?”---Held: There was no denial of the fact that the explanation letter and show cause notice had been issued by the single person i.e. respondent No.4 and thereby he himself acted as complainant and a judge, without any inquiry into the allegations against petitioner and without affording him any opportunity of personal audience---Hence, without touching other merits of the case, the matter was sent back to the respondent No.4 to conduct a proper inquiry into the allegations against petitioner, if so desired, and then decide the case---In the meanwhile, the petitioner was reinstated into service and he was entitled to current salaries---Constitutional petition was allowed, in circumstances. (b) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art.10-A---Right to fair trial---Maxims “audi alteram partem” and “nemo judex in re sua”---Meaning and scope---The first principle is a highly effective rule devised by the Courts to ensure that a statutory authority arrives at a just decision and it is calculated to act as a healthy check on the abuse or misuse of power---Hence its reach should not be narrowed and its applicability circumscribed---The purpose of this rules is to prevent miscarriage of justice---This principle when conjoins with the maxim ‘nemo judex in re sua’ these constitute the basic elements of a fair hearing as enshrined in Art. 10-A of the Constitution, for fair trial and justice which is not the preservice of any particular class of people or institution, but is shared in common by everyone. (c) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Arts.2-A, 4 & 10-A---Principles of natural justice, adherence to---Scope---Adherence to the principles of natural justice by the authority would normally depend upon; (i) There should be proper application of mind and scrutiny of the records before it, by the authority to enable it to record its satisfaction in terms of the law on the subject; (ii) It should pass a speaking order which would at least prima-facie show that the authority concerned has applied its mind to the various contentions or points of determination raised before it; (iii) No one should be condemned unheard and principle of audi alteram partem is read in every statute as its part if right of hearing has not been specifically provided therein. (d) Administration of justice--- ----Natural justice---Definition---The phrase “natural justice” is not capable of a static and precise definition---It cannot be imprisoned in the straight-jacket of a cast-iron formula---Historically, ‘natural justice’ has been used in a way which implies the existence of moral principles of self-evident and unarguable truth---Rules of natural justice are not embodied rules---Being means to an end and not an end in themselves, it is not possible to make an exhaustive catalogue of such rules---But two fundamental maxims of natural justice are pre-eminently necessary to ensure that the law is applied impartially, objectively and fairly---Described in the form of Latin tags these twin principles are, (i) audi alteram partem and (ii) nemo judex in re sua. Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa through Chief Secretary and others v. Muhammad Khurshid 2021 SCMR 369 rel. (e) Natural justice, principles of--- ----Principles of natural justice are applicable to domestic administrative tribunals and specially the authorities which are discharging quasi-judicial or administrative functions. PLD 2004 SC 441 rel. (f) Employment--- ----Dismissal from service---Non-holding of regular inquiry---Effect upon dismissal order---Effect of setting aside of dismissal order upon employment status of the employee---Reinstatement---Scope---In said circumstances the employee would be reinstated into service with entitlement to current salaries---Though the employer would be at liberty to conduct proper inquiry into the allegations against the employee. Salimullah Khan Ranazai and Asad Aziz Mehsud for Petitioner. Ghulam Muhammad Sappal, Additional Advocate General (for Officials of Provincial Government) for Respondents. Junaid Ahmad Khan for Respondent No.4 Kamran Gul for Respondent No.5. Date of hearing: 5th May, 2025.

Summary: (a) Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Public Service Commission Regulations, 2017--- ----Reglns.3(b), 11 & 19(f)(ii)---Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1989, R.13---Appointment---Mechanism for assessing academic qualification/eligibility of a candidate---Determination---Consideration of candidates having qualification higher than the one prescribed in the relevant field of studies---Discretion of Commission---Scope---Contention of the petitioner was that one candidate having higher qualification prescribed for appointment had wrongly been shortlisted for interview for the reason that Regln.19(f)(ii) of KPK Public Service Commission Regulations, 2017 (Regulations) was in direct conflict with Regln.3(b) and 11 of the Regulations and R. 13 of the KPK Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1989 (Rules)---Validity---Candidate possessing a higher qualification than the one prescribed could not be deemed ineligible for lacking the requisite qualification---Regulation 19(f)(ii) was neither ultra vires the Constitution nor inconsistent with any provision of law, and fell squarely within the permissible scope of delegated legislation, as it did not override or contradict the fundamentals of the enabling framework---It merely supplements the recruitment process by allowing consideration of higher qualifications in the relevant field, and administrative detail well within the Commission's regulatory competence thus, petitioner had failed to establish any legal infirmity or constitutional violation warranting interference by High Court---Petitioner' placement at serial No. 6 on the merit list, below the top five candidates shortlisted in accordance with Regln. 24(a) did not give rise to any enforceable right, especially when the Commission's action was found to be consistent with law and procedure---No illegality could be attributed to the decision of the Public Service Commission---Constitutional petition was dismissed, in circumstances. Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa through Secretary Communication and Works Department, Peshawar v. Bacha Alam Khan 2022 SCMR 718 rel. (b) Interpretation of statutes--- ---Statute and Rules---Interpretation---Scope---Interpretation of statute, which leads to unreasonable or inconvenient results should not be adopted when a more rational construction is available---Principles which regulate the interpretation of a statute must be taken to regulate the interpretation of the rules as well. Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes by P. St. J. Langan 1969: Twelfth Edition, p. 199; Bennion on Statutory Interpretation 2013: Sixth Edition, p. 237; Punjab Province v. Nisar Ahmad PLD 1960 (W.P.) Lah. 801; Dilawar Shah Roghani v. North-West Frontier Province through Secretary, Works and Services Department. Government of N.-W.F.P., Peshawar and 2 others 2006 CLC 15 and Dr. Avtar Singh and Dr. Harpreet Kaur in Introduction to Interpretation of Statutes (2009, Third Edition, pp. 69-70) rel. (c) Interpretation of statutes--- ---Conflict in statutory provisions---Interpretation---Principle of harmonious construction---Scope---Where two or more provision appear to be in conflict, they must be interpreted in such a manner as to give effect to all, thereby maintaining coherence and integrity of the legislative scheme as a whole. Collector of Customs, Customs House, Karachi v. Syed Rehan Ahmed 2017 SCMR 152; MKB Spinning Mills (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan 2018 PTD 2364 and Multan Electric Power Co. Limited (MEPCO) v. Commissioner Inland Revenue (WHT), Regional Tax Officer, Multan 2016 PTD 2567 rel. (d) Legislation--- ----Delegated legislation---Extent and scope---Extent of delegated legislation depends on the nature and detail of the parent statute---Where the statute provides a detailed framework, the scope for delegated legislation is narrow; conversely, where the statute lays down general principles, broader delegation is permissible to fill in administrative and procedural details---Delegated legislation serves to ease legislative burden and respond flexibly to evolving circumstances---Underlying assumption is that while the legislature sets the policy, the Executive is empowered to work out the operational specifics. Muhammad Fahad Malik v. Pakistan Medical and Dental Council PLD 2018 Lah. 75 and Jameel Sweets v. Federation of Pakistan and others 2020 PTD 752 rel. (e) Legislation--- ----Delegated legislation---Vires---Determination---Rules and regulations in conflict with principal statute---Effect---While determining vires of delegated legislation, it must be examined whether it exceeds the authority granted by the parent statute, whether the prescribed procedure for its formulation was followed, and whether it aligns with the object of the enabling law---Rules and regulations, being forms of subordinate legislation, cannot override or contradict the principal statute---Their purpose is to elaborate on procedural details, not to alter the core provisions of the parent law---While such rules may be treated as part of the statute for practical application, they retain their subordinate character and may only be struck down if found repugnant to the purpose or established principles of the parent legislation. Commissioner Inland Revenue, Lahore v. Coca Cola Pakistan Limited, Lahore 2022 PTD 1400 and Lahore Development Authority v. Ms. Imrana Tiwana 2015 SCMR 1739 rel. Ashfaq Ahad Daudzai for Petitioner. Waqar Orakzai, A.A.G. along with Mehtab Gul, Law Officer, KP Public Service Commission for Respondents. Date of hearing: 5th May, 2025.

Summary: Recognition and Enforcement (Arbitration Agreements and Foreign Arbitral Awards) Act (XVII of 2011)--- ----S.6---Enforcement of foreign Award---Corporate veil, non-lifting of---Principle---Applicant sought enforcement of foreign arbitral award against M/s K-Electric (Company in Pakistan), which was not party to proceedings before London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA)---Plea raised by the applicant was that M/s K-Electric (Company in Pakistan) was ultimately owned by the company party to the arbitration, therefore, corporate veil was required to be lifted---Validity---There was no allegation that ownership structure was designed in some way to create a façade or a sham or to perpetuate a fraud---There was also no allegation that M/s K-Electric (Company in Pakistan) was acting as an agent of any of the companies in the ownership structure---Even if one was to consider it as “Single Economic Unit”, that too could not be sustained as ownership structure had clearly indicated that there was no one entity that was controlling all of the other entities in the structure; the ultimate ownership was divided among three companies and each was working for their own independent benefits---Where the veil was lifted, liability of the obligation usually would come to vest on the parent company---If plea of the applicant was sustained then liability on the contractual and statutory obligation would inversely come to be on the subsidiary company which would be altogether unique---Messrs K-Electric (Company in Pakistan)was neither a respondent nor was a party to the arbitration proceedings before LCIA and would clearly plead ignorance of such proceedings, let alone on any contractual and statutory obligation of respondent company---Ownership structure had in principle been in place for many years without objection from the applicant company and it could not be that the purchase of the share, held by one company, in respondent company, should be considered as an event to necessitate lifting of the veil---High Court declined to lift the veil as there was no legal basis of the same---Entire cause of action in respect of enforcement of award was in the Cayman Islands and outside the jurisdiction of (Sindh) High Court---With regard to the application for enforcement of award, (Sindh) High Court was forum non convenience and lacked jurisdiction---Application was returned in circumstances. Bank of Credits and Commerce and others v. Asrar Hassan 2007 SCMR 852; Syed Ashraf Agha v. Muhammad Sarwar 2008 CLC 852; Ansar Hussain Siddiqui and others Abrar Hussain Siddiqui and others PLD 2008 Kar. 536; PLD 1968 Kar. 480; Muhammad Ramzan (Deceased) through L.R. and others v. Nasreen Firdous and others PLD 2016 SC 174; China International Water and Electric Corporation (CWE) P.R China v. National Highway Authority 2023 CLD 140; Louis Dreyfus Commodities Suisse S.A. v. Acro Textile Mills Ltd. PLD 2018 Lah. 597; Orient Power Co. (Private) Ltd. v. Sui Northern Gas Pipeline Ltd. PLD 2019 Lah. 607; Global Quality Foods (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Hardee’s Food Systems, Inc. PLD 2016 Sindh 169; Raziq International (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Panalpine Management Ltd. PLD 2014 Kar. 175; The President v. Mr. Justice Shaukat Ali PLD 1971 SC 585; Printing Corporation of Pakistanv. Province of Sindh and others 1990 PLD 176; Union Council, Ali Wahan, Sukkur v. Associated Cement (Pvt.) Limited 1993 SCMR 468; Water and Power Development Authority through General Manager and Project Director, Ghazi Barotha Hyedro Power Project and Another v. Administrator, District Council Swabi and 5 others 2005 PTD 627; Karachi Development Authority v. Central Board of Revenue 2005 PTD 2131; Province of NWFP through Secretary Local Government and Rural Development Peshawar v. Pakistan Telecommunication Corporation PLD 2005 SC 670; Water and Power Development Authority v. Administrator, District Council, Swabi 2005 SCMR 487; Muhammad Hanif Abbasi v. Jahangir Khan Tareen PLD 2018 SC 114; National Accountability Bureau v. Murad Arshad PLD 2019 SC 250; Nagina Films Ltd. v. Usman Hussain 1987 CLC 2263; Associated Cement (State Cement Corporation of Pakistan (Pvt.) Limited v. Government of Sindh 1992 MLD 1730; Central Insurance Company Ltd. v. M. T. Tasman Spirit 2004 CLD 695; Messrs Sakhi Dattar Cotton Industries and Oil Mills through Authorized Partner 2006 CLD 191; Pub Corporation v. Water and Power Development Authority through Managing Director PLD 2009 Kar. 139; State life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan v. Fazal and Sons (Pvt.) Ltd. 2010 CLC 1895; In the Matter of: International Complex Projects Limited and another 2017 CLD 1468; Add Oil (Private) Limited and another v. State 2018 CLD 15; Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan v. Natover Lease Refinance Limited 2023 CLD 225; Mohammad Ahmad Ansari v. Interglobe Commerce Pakistan (Pvt.) Ltd. 2023 CLD 570; Salahuddin and 2 others v. Frontier Sugar Mills and Distillery Ltd., Tokht Bhai and 10 others PLD 1975 SC 244; Federal Government Employees Housing Foundation through Director General Islamabad and another v. Muhammad Akram Alizal, Deputy Controller, PBC, Islamabad 2002 PLC (C.S.) 1655; Aitchison College, Lahore through Principal v. Muhammad Zaubair and another PLD 2002 SC 326; Ziaullah Khan Niazi v. Chairman, Pakistan Red Crescent Society 2004 SCMR 189; Pakistan Red Crescent Society v. Syed Nazir Gillani PLD 2005 SC 806; Pakistan International Airline Corporation and others v. Tanweer-ur-Rehman and others PLD 2010 SC 676; Pir Imran Sajid v. Managing Director/General Manager (Manager Finance) Telephone Industries of Pakistan 2015 SCMR 1257; Pakistan Olympic Association v. Nadeem Aftab Sindhu 2019 SCMR 221; Lungowe v. Vedanta Resources plc [2019] UKSC 20; VTB Capital plc v. Nutritek International Corp (2013) UKSC 5; Chandler v. Cape ple (2012) EWCA Civ 525 UKSC 20; Lubbe v. Cape Plc (2000) UKHL 41; Caparo Industries PLC v. Dickman (1990) UKHL 2; Adams v. Cape Industries plc (1990) Ch 433; Woolfson v. Strathclyde Regional Council [1978] UKHL 5 and DHN Food Distributors Ltd. v. Tower Hamlets London Borough Council [1976] 1 WLR 852 rel. Farjad Ali Khan for Applicant. Dates of hearing: 14th, 21st and 28th April, 2025.

Summary: (a) Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act (VIII of 1974)--- ----Arts. 42-B & 44---Writ petition, filing of---Laches, doctrine of---Scope---A former Prime Minister of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJ&K) filed writ petition calling into question the claim to premiership of the incumbent Prime Minister of the AJ&K---Held: Present petition was filed after lapse of 2 years of election of the incumbent Premier---Although there is no estoppel against law and warrant of the Court can be asked for against occupier of the position public office, but conduct of petitioner is one of the relevant factors, thus the petitioner has to cross the barrier of laches as well---Whether a constitutional petition in a High Court can be filed after delay of 3 months sans furnishing reasonable explanation for condonation of delay and in case of affirmation, won't the ratio decidendi of the Honorable Supreme Court handed down in Syed Altaf Hussain Bukhari v. Zeeshan Shaukat (2022 SCR 1088) be flouted which is binding on everyone throughout AJ&K in view of Art. 42-B of the AJ&K Interim Constitution, 1974?---Said law point required to be resolved---Present constitutional petition was admitted for regular hearing. The Jumma Masjid, Mercara v. Kodimaniandra Deviah AIR 1962 SC 584; Zarai Taraqiati Bank Limited v. Said Rehman 2013 SCMR 642; Syed Manzoor Hussain Gillani v. Sain Mullah, Advocate PLD 1993 SC AJK 12; Muhammad Tahir v. Chairman Board of Governors 2022 MLD 1294 and Syed Altaf Hussain Bukhari v. Zeeshan Shaukat 2022 SCR 1088 ref. (b) Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act (VIII of 1974)--- ----Art. 44---Writ of quo warranto---Scope and effect---A former Prime Minister of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJ&K) filed writ petition of quo-warranto calling into question the claim to premiership of the incumbent Prime Minister of the AJ&K---Held: Writ of quo warranto is issued in a case to determine the right of a person holding an office, directing him to disclose under what authority of law he is holding that office---Purpose of writ of quo warranto is to ensure that a public office is occupied by an authorized person and not by that person who usurped the office---Proceedings of writ of quo-warranto are not strictly adversarial in nature, such proceedings are inquisitorial and anybody can come forward by saying that occupation of public office is contra-jus---But the grant of relief in writ jurisdiction is a matter of “discretion” even in case of quo-warranto and the High Court can test the bona fide of the relator to see if he has come with clean hands or not---A writ of quo-warranto, in particular, is not to be issued as a matter of course on sheer technicalities let alone on a doctrinaire approach---In a writ of quo-warranto, petitioner is regarded merely as a “whistle blower” against usurpation of a public office---Power of judicial review becomes duplex, when a matter is brought before the Court regarding adherence of the constitutional provisions; and the High Court always remains slow to adopt a doctrinaire or technical approach, but simultaneously guiding principles/ ratio decidendi of the Apex Court are liable to be followed as a beacon of light---Said law points were to be resolved in the present case---Present Constitutional Petition was admitted for regular hearing. Ghulam Mustafa Mughal, President Central Bar Association, Muzaffarabad v. Azad Government 1992 MLD 2083; Jawad Ahmad Mir v. Prof. Dr. Imtiaz Ali Khan, Vice-Chancellor, University of Swabi, District Swabi, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa 2023 PLC (C.S.) 813; Dr. Kamal Hussain v. Muhammad Sirajul Islam PLD 1969 SC 42 and Barrister Sardar Muhammad v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2013 Lah. 343 ref. (c) Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act (VIII of 1974) --- ----Arts. 29(6) & 29(7)---Constitutions of Pakistan, Art. 53(7)---Constitution of India, Art. 94---Azad Jammu and Kashmir Assembly---Concept of 'resignation' from the Office of the Speaker, absence of---A former Prime Minister of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJ&K) filed writ petition of quo-warranto calling into question the claim to premiership of the incumbent Prime Minister of the AJ&K since April 20, 2023, demanding to know by what authority the latter was holding office---Held: At the threshold of the controversy laid a pivotal question going to the roots of the case that in view of Art. 29(7) of Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution, 1974 (‘the AJ&K Interim Constitution, 1974’), the office of the Speaker or Deputy Speaker is deemed to be 'vacant' only in two eventualities i.e. either he ceases to be a member of the Assembly or he is removed from office by way of resolution of the Assembly; except this, no other eventuality is provided to hold the office of the Speaker as vacant, thus what is the cumulative effect and aftermath of Art. 29(7) read with Art. 29(6), wherein concept of 'resignation' from the office of the Speaker is evinced coupled with having a juxtapose glance/analysis of the corresponding Article of the Constitution of Pakistan i.e. Art. 53(7) and Constitution of India i.e. Art. 94---It is abundantly clear from bare reading of Art.29(7) of the AJ&K Interim Constitution, 1974, that the Legislature has avoided to insert the eventuality of 'resignation' in Art. 29(7) which is specifically provided in both the corresponding Articles of the Constitutions of Pakistan i.e. Art. 53(7) and Constitution of India i.e. Art. 94---Celebrated canon of construction of the constitutional provisions is to read the Articles of the Constitution in a way to harmonize all other sister provisions of the Constitution in order to explore and reach the wisdom of the Constitution---Certain (number of) law points needed to be resolved --- In order to resolve the said law points, the present Constitutional Petition was admitted for regular hearing. Jamal Din v. Haji Muhammad Aslam PLD 1965 Lah. 503 ref. (d) Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act (VIII of 1974 )--- ----Arts. 17(2) & 44---Election of Prime Minister---Assembly proceedings, determination of---A former Prime Minister of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir (sitting Member of Legislative Assembly) filed writ petition calling into question the claim to premiership of the incumbent Prime Minister of the AJ&K (Mr. Sardar Tanvir Ilyas Khan) since April 20, 2023, demanding to know by what authority the latter was holding office---Mr. Sardar Tanvir Ilyas Khan, former Prime Minister of AJK&K was ousted from his position on April 11, 2023 by a court order (reported as Robkar Adalat v. Tanvir Ilyas PLD 2023 High Court AJ&K 75)---Was the Assembly "in session" on the eve of the former Premier's ouster on April 11, 2023, as per Art. 17(2) of the AJ&K Interim Constitution, 1974, such that the election of a new Prime Minister could proceed "forthwith" in view of Art. 17(2)?; and if the Assembly was not "in session", did the President summon the Assembly within 14 days as mandated under Art. 17(2) in order to elect a new Prime Minister?---Said law point was to be resolved---Present constitutional petition was admitted for regular hearing. (e) Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act (VIII of 1974) --- ----Arts. 4(4)(19) & 44---Issuance of writ of quo-warranto, seeking of---Right to fair trial---Scope---A former Prime Minister of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir/AJ&K (sitting Member of Legislative Assembly) filed writ petition of quo-warranto calling into question the claim to premiership of the incumbent Prime Minister of the AJ&K (Mr. Sardar Tanvir Ilyas Khan)---Held: In a writ of quo-warranto, generally the office holder is asked to explain by what authority of law he is holding the said office and the authority is also questioned that by what authority of law the person holding the public office is appointed (in the present case, elected)---The election of the Premier is challenged in the present petition, even though the incumbent enjoys the support of 48 out of 53 Members of the Legislative Assembly (MLAs')---Therefore, by adhering to the constitutional guarantee incorporated in Art. 4(4)(19) qua 'right to fair trial', all the voters/Members of the Legislative Assembly (MLAs') are arrayed as "Necessary party" in the line of respondents, except petitioner---High Court directed Office to obtain list of all the MLAs' who voted in favour of the respondent-office holder and inserted their names in the line of real-respondents, except petitioner---Certain law points were required to be resolved---Constitutional petition was admitted for regular hearing. Raja Ayaz Ahmed along with Petitioner in person. Sheikh Masood Iqbal, Advocate General for the State of Azad Jammu and Kashmir. Raja Muhammad Saeed Khan and Haider Rasheed Mughal, A.A.G. for Azad Government. Sheikh Attique-ur-Rehman and Muhammad Asad Khan for Respondent No. 1. Ansar Khan Tahir, Legal Advisor for Law Department.