Summary: (a) Registration Act, 1908 (as applicable in AJ&K) –– Ss. 17 & 35 –– Registrar/Sub-Registrar –– Scope of inquiry –– When registration may be refused. Where all executants personally appear (or are otherwise duly represented/identified) and admit execution, the registering officer “shall register” the instrument; questions of title/validity are foreign to the registration forum. Refusal can only rest on a statutory ground such as denial of execution. Imperfections in title, inter se disputes, or downstream civil consequences cannot furnish a basis to decline registration. Orders refusing to register the petitioner’s cancellation deed (Abtal-Nama) were set aside for being contrary to the statutory scheme and reflecting non-application of mind. — Janki Devi v. Dharam Nath Prasad, AIR 1984 Pat 149; Bihar Deed Writers Assn. v. State of Bihar, AIR 1989 Pat 144, ref. (b) Agency/Power of Attorney –– Contract Act –– Ss. 202–203 –– Revocation by principal. A principal retains the power to revoke a general power of attorney subject to statutory and contractual constraints. The petitioner’s execution of a cancellation deed (Abtal-Nama) was a cognizable act for registration; the registering authority was bound to process it in accordance with S.35 once formal requisites stood satisfied. (Observations in aid of the registration direction.) (c) Constitution of AJ&K (Interim), 1974 –– Art. 44 –– Alternate remedy –– Maintainability of constitutional petition. Availability of a statutory remedy (appeal/revision) does not ipso facto bar writ jurisdiction; the test is efficacy. Where the impugned administrative action is patently ultra vires the governing statute (Registration Act, s.35), constitutional correction is warranted notwithstanding pendency of civil proceedings. — Amanat Khan v. Sub-Registrar, 2002 CLC 127, followed. (d) Registration –– Nature of act –– Civil Court’s province preserved. Registration merely authenticates the factum of execution; it neither confers title nor adjudicates validity. Questions touching enforceability, competing leases, or contractual infractions (e.g., alleged violation of petroleum dealership terms) are for the Civil Court seised of the lis; the registrar cannot pre-judge such issues at the entry gate of registration. (e) Administrative law –– Ultra vires and procedural duty –– Consequence. An act required by statute to be performed in a particular manner must be so performed; departure renders it a nullity. Sub-Registrar’s and Registrar’s refusals, not anchored in any statutory ground under S.35, were ultra vires and liable to be quashed. Held: Writ petition accepted. Orders of the Sub-Registrar (19-03-2021) and District Registrar (23-04-2021) refusing registration of the petitioner’s cancellation deed (Abtal-Nama dated 11-03-2021) set aside. Application for registration shall be treated as pending; the registering officer is directed to process and decide it strictly in accordance with S.35 of the Registration Act within 30 days, leaving all questions of title/validity to the competent Civil Court.

Summary: If a person does not want to continue his status as Afghan Refugee the Federal Government or Commissioner Afghan Refugees or NADRA should have to no objection on such relinquishment. For said purpose Afghan Commissionerate was directed to devise a mechanism where a person can move an application at their offices or online and that same should be forwarded to Afghan Registration Cell of NADRA for cancellation of the POR card.

Summary: Prosecution's Failure to Prove Guilt beyond Doubt: . The prosecution relied on ocular account, confessions, CDR data, CCTV footage, and circumstantial evidence, but all were found unreliable or inadmissible . Flawed Ocular Account: . Complainant Abdul Jalal (PW-4) was not an eyewitness; he received information about the murder via phone. His later statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C. (implicating appellants) was recorded 13 days post-arrest, with no opportunity for cross-examination . Invalid Confessional Statements . Retracted confessions recorded after 13 days in police custody were deemed involuntary and coerced. The Magistrate failed to:Ensure voluntariness or absence of torture. No pre-confessionMedicalexamination of the appellants.Record confessions jointly (both appellants were present together).Address language barriers (Pashto-speaking accused vs. Urdu-speaking Magistrate . Admissibility of confessional statement of co-accused . Inadmissible Digital Evidence . CDR Data: Only showed tower locations, not precise presence . CCTV Footage: Collected improperly by revenue officials (not police), recovered after 10 days, and contained timing discrepancies (8:42 PM vs. alleged 8:20 PM incident). Chain of custody was broken, and forensic authentication was absent . Contradictory Medical Evidence . Multiple wounds on the deceased suggested firing from different angles, contradicting Dawood Khan’s confession that only Zubair Ahmad fired . Unreliable Circumstantial Evidence . Recovery of a Kalashnikov from Zubair Ahmad 6 days post-incident lacked plausibility (he could have disposed of it earlier) . Violation of Qanun-e-Shahadat Order . Key witness Asim (deceased’s companion) was not examined, invoking adverse inference under Article 129(g) . Benefit of Doubt . The court emphasized the principle: "Let hundred guilty be acquitted but one innocent not convicted."

Summary: Court has acquitted four accused persons, Kalim Ullah, Ikram Khan, Siraj, and Ijaz Ahmad, in a case involving dacoity and forgery. The court found that the prosecution`s evidence was unreliable, and the accused`s guilt was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The accused were implicated in the case based on CDR data and statements from the complainant, but the court noted that the identification of the accused was doubtful. Additionally, there was a significant delay in recording the statement of the complainant, which further weakened the prosecution`s case. The court gave the accused the benefit of doubt and acquitted them. In a connected appeal, the court also dismissed a claim regarding the confiscation of a vehicle allegedly used in the commission of the offense.

Summary: Now coming to the murasila-cum-FIR wherein it has been stated by the complainant in his report that when they reached near the Kacha Rasta in the fields of Rasool Khan it was 06:15 a.m, in the meanwhile, accused/appellant Inamullah s/o Samiullah armed with Kalashnikov and Samiullah s/o Malil who was empty handed came and at the command of Samiullah (acquitted co-accused), Inamullah /appellant started firing with his Kalashnikov at them with intention to commit their Qatl-e-Amd, as a result of the firing his deceased brother was hit and severely injured while he luckily escaped unhurt. When he came towards his brother, he succumbed to the injuries on the spot. Now if, at all the incident has taken place at 06:15 a.m, and according to the inquest report, the time of death is 06:45 a.m, now as has stated by the complainant in his murasila report that after the receipt of fire-arm injuries, the deceased died at the spot than if at all, he the deceased has succumbed to the injuries within 05 minutes, as has stated by the complainant " خموں کی تاب نہ لاکر جاں بحق ہوامجروح موقع پر ز " while on the other hand as per the information collected from the complainant by the police, Muhammad Noor Khan (PW-4) who drafted the murasila and prepared inquest report, according to him, the time of death of the deceased is 06:45 a.m which suggest that the incident was not witnessed by anyone including the complainant (PW-7). The second question which rises before the court is that it is in the evidence of PW-7 and confirmed from the statement of I.O (PW-8) that while going from the spot to the hospital, PS, Mira Khel falls on the way. If it was the case that the deceased succumbed to the injuries on the spot then there was no need to have taken his dead body to the hospital rather it was supposed to have been shifted to the PS directly and the report should have been recorded there in the PS, which is not the case of prosecution as the report has been recorded in the civil hospital Bannu, which is suggestive of the fact that the dead body was brought to the hospital by the co-villagers and thereafter, the attendance of complainant Jehangir Khan the brother of deceased was procured and his report was recorded. Another vital aspect of the case is the presence of complainant at the alleged time of incident, he has stated in his report that کہ امروز میں معہ برادرم فرمان علی پیٹرول پمپ اذاں شا ہ زمان گھر خود پیدل روانہ ہوئے Now in his cross-examination he improved his statement that he parked his tractor in the petrol pump and started with his deceased brother towards their home, if it was the case then at least the owner of the pump or any other servant should have been examined in support of the fact that the complainant had parked his tractor on the morning of the occurrence in the said petrol pump which fact has not been supported or investigated by the investigating officer (PW-8). There must be some physical circumstances regarding presence of the complainant at the time of incident with the deceased, but no independent corroborative piece of evidence has been collected in this respect by the investigating officer, which was his foremost duty. Even, other-wise, the complainant in his examination-in-chief as well as in his cross- examination has not explained as to for what purpose he has taken the tractor over the entire night for ploughing or taking some Bajri or any other item etc by using the tractor trolley, but that is not the case of prosecution. Another intriguing aspect regarding non-presence of the complainant is that it has been admitted in the cross-examination of the complainant that when he came after his brother after receipt of fire-arm injuries, he has succumbed to the injuries there and then and he took his brother in his lap and his hands and his clothes were besmeared with the blood of the deceased, if it was so the case, than as has been admitted by the investigating officer that he has not taken into possession the blood stained garment of the complainant into possession which could have easily proved the presence of the complainant at the time of occurrence with the deceased brother. Mere this fact that the deceased has received almost all the entry wounds of the same dimension coupled with the FSL report of the 06 empties to have been fired from one and the same weapon, this is not sufficient to prove the presence of the complainant. The complainant himself has to prove his presence at the spot through some physical circumstance. We have also observed that the deceased was aged about 34/35 years while the complainant is aged about 42/43 years old as is evident from his statement when examined as PW-7 before the court. This is not our tradition that a brother of younger age will go ahead from his elder brother. We have also observed that the murasila and the inquest report was recorded by one and the same police officer, but another fact creating a serious doubt regarding detail of the injuries recorded in the inquest report which has been recorded with some other ink which suggest that the inquest report was not prepared by the one and the same police officer and other-wise, reflects that the prosecution has concealed certain real facts from court. We have also observed from the site-plan that the deceased has been shown at Point No.1 while the complainant at Point No.2 and appellant at Point No.3 and the acquitted co-accused at Point No.4. This is the case of prosecution that if both were fired at by the accused as a result of which the deceased Farman Khan was hit while complainant luckily escaped unhurt which fact is not supporting by the Ex.PW-8/2, i.e, site-plan, as the distance between Point No.1 and 2 is hardly 5/6 paces, it means that the complainant was also in the firing range of the appellant and he was at the mercy of the appellant at the relevant time and there was no place for him to have taken shelter, thus, it reflect that the complainant if at all would have been present he would have never been spared by the assailant, as he was elder brother of the deceased. [Criminal appeal allowed, conviction of the accused by the lower fora is set-aside.]

Summary: Held: (1) The trial court failed to apply the correct legal standard by treating khula as conditional upon a subsequent talaq by the husband. (2) The punitive measures directed against the petitioner, in the absence of legal justification, are ultra vires and arbitrary. (3) It is settled law that once a decree for khula is passed by the competent court, the marriage stands dissolved and there remains no legal necessity to compel the husband to pronounce talaq, whether orally or in writing. The imposition of penal consequences i.e civil imprisonment and financial penalties are also beyond the statutory mandate conferred upon Family Courts under the relevant laws, unless explicitly sanctioned by legislative provisions or through binding judicial precedents. (4) A judge is duty-bound to decide cases strictly within the ambit of authority conferred by law. Any exercise of power beyond the statutory framework amounts to judicial overreach, which is antithetical to the rule of law and undermines the integrity of the judicial process. When a court steps outside its jurisdiction or renders a decision in contradiction to established legal principles, such a decision is void ab initio—a nullity in the eyes of law. (5) The judicial role is not one of personal discretion or subjective interpretation; rather, it entails interpreting and applying the law objectively, in line with binding precedent and statutory mandates. A judgment must reflect a logical and lawful reasoning process, not personal beliefs or considerations. Findings that fall outside the legal framework not only compromise the validity of the judgment but also erode public confidence in the justice system. (6) Accordingly, this petition is partially allowed to the extent of upholding the decree for dissolution of marriage on the basis of khula. However, the remaining portion of the impugned order, whereby unwarranted conditions were imposed upon the petitioner by the learned Civil Judge-I, Paharpur, D.I.Khan—including directives for pronouncement of written talaq, civil imprisonment, and imposition of daily compensation—is hereby declared to be erroneous, illegal, and without any lawful authority or statutory backing, hence, set aside. Consequently, this petition stands partly allowed in the above terms.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan---Art. 199---National Bank of Pakistan---Maintainability of constitutional petition by employee---Preliminary objection---Respondent-bank objected that National Bank of Pakistan Staff Service Rules, 2021 were non-statutory and that relationship between bank and employee was of master and servant, therefore writ petition was not maintainable---High Court held that National Bank of Pakistan was a statutory body established under National Bank of Pakistan Ordinance, 1949 and its employees were employees of a statutory corporation falling within purview of Art.199(5) of the Constitution---NBP, being a statutory corporation, was amenable to writ jurisdiction of High Court under Art.199 of the Constitution and its employees could invoke constitutional jurisdiction for redressal of grievances in service matters where proceeded against under applicable rules---Preliminary objection was overruled. Cited Cases: Muhammad Naeem v. Federation of Pakistan etc. 2023 SCMR 301. Muhammad Tariq Badr and another v. National Bank of Pakistan and others 2013 SCMR 314. Ramna Pipes and General Mills v. SNGPL 2004 SCMR 1274. (b) Constitution of Pakistan---Art. 199---National Bank of Pakistan---Employees of statutory corporation---Distinction from civil servants---Employees of National Bank of Pakistan are employees of a statutory corporation and not employees of Federal Government or civil servants under Civil Servants Act, 1973---Such distinction does not oust writ jurisdiction where NBP, as statutory corporation, is amenable to constitutional jurisdiction and disciplinary action is challenged as being without lawful authority---High Court could examine legality of disciplinary action taken by respondent-bank. Cited Case: Muhammad Naeem v. Federation of Pakistan etc. 2023 SCMR 301. (c) Service law---Departmental proceedings---Show cause notice and charge sheet---Penalty of downgrading by one step in pay scale---Inquiry Officer’s finding in favour of employee---Petitioner, appointed as OG-III Cash Officer, was served with show cause notice and charge sheet alleging misconduct and procedural irregularities during his posting as General Banking Officer at NBP Nawanshehr Branch---Petitioner submitted detailed reply denying allegations---Inquiry Officer, after examining record and statements of petitioner and management representative, concluded that charges could not be substantiated and recommended exoneration---Despite such finding, bank authorities imposed penalty of downgrading petitioner by one step in pay scale for one year---Penalty was held unsustainable. (d) Service law---Disciplinary inquiry---Alleged tampered bills/invoices and expense vouchers---Absence of forensic verification---Effect---Specific allegation against petitioner related to approval of fourteen expense vouchers allegedly supported by tampered bills and invoices---Inquiry Officer found that petitioner’s alleged signatures on questioned documents were neither subjected to forensic examination nor verified through any scientific or technical process---No conclusive proof established petitioner’s complicity in alleged misconduct---Allegations were ambiguous, speculative and doubtful, and charge appeared to rest on conjecture rather than tangible evidence---Disciplinary action based on such material was legally defective. (e) Natural justice---Fair inquiry---Disciplinary authority disagreeing with Inquiry Officer---Requirement of lawful and independent justification---Inquiry Officer had clearly recommended exoneration of petitioner after finding charges unproved---Respondent-bank authorities nevertheless punished petitioner without any additional or independent justification---Such action undermined principles of natural justice and fair inquiry---Order imposing penalty was arbitrary, unjustified and without lawful authority. (f) Constitution of Pakistan---Art. 199---Judicial review of disciplinary action---Penalty contrary to inquiry findings---Where disciplinary penalty was imposed despite absence of proof, lack of forensic verification, speculative allegations and favorable inquiry findings, High Court was competent to interfere in constitutional jurisdiction---Impugned disciplinary action was passed in contravention of due process and contrary to findings of Inquiry Officer and therefore could not be sustained in law. Disposition: Constitutional petition was allowed as prayed for; memorandum dated 03.03.2023 and order of competent authority dated 25.01.2024 were declared to be without lawful authority and were set aside.

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) --- Ss. 173 & 190 --- Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 382, 395, 455, 148 & 149 --- Framing/amendment of charge --- Scope and judicial discretion --- Legal propriety of revisional court’s direction to amend charge to include graver offences Framing of charge is based on prima facie assessment of the contents of the F.I.R., statements recorded under S.161, Cr.P.C., and the police report under S.173, Cr.P.C. In the present case, the Magistrate had originally framed a charge under Ss. 382 and 506, P.P.C., but the revisional court (Additional Sessions Judge) set aside that order and directed framing of charge under Ss. 395, 455, 148 and 149, P.P.C., which carry graver punishment. Petitioners challenged this direction through the instant petition. The High Court held that in terms of settled law, if a less serious charge is framed, the accused cannot be convicted of a graver offence unless the charge is amended, and opportunity is afforded to parties. However, where a graver charge is framed, and evidence establishes a lesser included offence, conviction may be recorded without a fresh trial. Since offences under Ss. 382 and 395, P.P.C. belong to the same family of offences, and the contents of the F.I.R. alleged armed entry into a petrol pump by 22–25 accused, hostaging of staff, removal of cash, CCTV equipment, cheque book, and weapons, the revisional court rightly found a prima facie case under Ss. 395, 455, 148 and 149, P.P.C. Reference was made to Ghulam Haider Buriro v. The State (2018 MLD 469). The High Court found no illegality or jurisdictional error in the revisional court’s order. Disposition: Petition dismissed in limine.

Summary: Since now offences crossing threshold of value not less than Rs.500 million are being dealt by amended National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, as per Section 5(o), therefore, while seeking guidance from the dictum laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in Agha SIRAJ KHAN DURRANI's case, it would be appropriate if all the matters pertaining to NAB issues are placed before and dealt by the Division Bench of this Court.

Summary: (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860): ----S. 302(b), 149---- Qatl-i-amd—Acquittal on benefit of doubt—Appellant convicted and sentenced to death; co-accused to life imprisonment under S. 302(b) read with S. 149, PPC—Trial court’s judgment reversed—Prosecution failed to justify over four-day delay in lodging FIR despite earlier entry of Rapat No.18 naming accused—Complaint later drafted after legal consultation, held suspicious—Eyewitnesses made dishonest improvements—Court held that such testimony was unreliable and insufficient for sustaining conviction, particularly in capital cases. Cited Cases: Muhammad Jahangir v. The State 2024 SCMR 1741; Dur Muhammad v. The State 2020 YLR 470. (b) Criminal trial: ----Delay in FIR---Effect--- Incident occurred on 30.05.2017; FIR lodged on 03.06.2017—Rapat No.18 already existed naming accused—No convincing explanation offered for delay or for failure to file FIR earlier—Court held delay to be fatal to prosecution and indicative of afterthought—FIR registered after legal and political consultation held to be fabricated. Cited Case: Muhammad Jahangir v. The State 2024 SCMR 1741. (c) Criminal trial: ----Ocular testimony---Injured witnesses---Value--- Eyewitnesses included injured parties—Court held that injuries alone do not guarantee truthfulness—Testimonies contradicted medical evidence and Rapat entry—One witness contradicted others about police and hospital proceedings—Court ruled that their presence and version lacked credibility and failed test of scrutiny. Cited Cases: Amin Ali v. The State 2011 SCMR 323; Nazir Ahmad v. Muhammad Iqbal 2011 SCMR 527. (d) Criminal trial: ----Medical evidence---Inconsistency with ocular account--- Medical officer observed two firearm wounds on deceased’s head; prosecution attributed only one—Second injury unaccounted for—Radiologist and DHQ hospital records not produced—Court held contradiction between medical and ocular evidence fatal to prosecution. Cited Case: Abdul Jabbar v. The State 2019 SCMR 129. (e) Criminal trial: ----Recovery of weapon---Forensic report---Reliability--- PFSA reports allegedly confirmed match between weapons recovered and crime empties—However, memos and witness statements contradicted recovery sites—IO failed to prove whether crime scene was secured for three days—Court held PFSA reports unreliable, especially where ocular evidence was disbelieved. Cited Case: Muhammad Hassan v. The State 2024 SCMR 1427. (f) Criminal trial: ----Motive---Failure to prove---Effect--- Prosecution alleged motive of land purchase dispute—However, no sale deed produced—Seller Shah Ali not examined—Court held that once motive is asserted, failure to prove it weakens prosecution—Motive held unsubstantiated and detrimental to case. Cited Case: Sarfraz v. The State 2023 SCMR 670. (g) Criminal trial: ----Improvement and contradictions---Effect on credibility--- All eyewitnesses made dishonest improvements and were confronted with earlier statements—Court held such enhancements were deliberate and aimed to align story with medical and forensic reports—Such contradictions made witnesses unworthy of credence. Cited Case: Muhammad Arif v. The State 2019 SCMR 631. (h) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898): ----S. 374---Murder Reference---Confirmation of death sentence--- Due to serious doubt cast on prosecution evidence, testimony of unreliable witnesses, and lack of corroboration from medical and forensic evidence, High Court declined to confirm death sentence—Murder reference answered in the negative and sentence not confirmed. (i) Criminal Law: ----Benefit of doubt---Standard of proof--- Court reiterated that even a single credible doubt must result in acquittal—Any unexplained contradiction in prosecution case entitles accused to benefit of doubt. Cited Cases: Tariq Parvez v. The State 1995 SCMR 1345; Muhammad Akram v. The State 2009 SCMR 230; Muhammad Imran v. The State 2020 SCMR 857.