Summary: (a) Limitation Act, 1908 (IX of 1908): ----Ss. 5, 14---Condonation of delay---Appeal filed before the wrong forum---Good faith and due diligence---Scope. Petitioners challenged an arbitration award, but their appeal was filed before the wrong forum. The appellate court dismissed the appeal as time-barred, and the High Court upheld this decision. The petitioners sought condonation of delay under S. 14 of the Limitation Act, 1908, arguing that they pursued the appeal in good faith. The Supreme Court held that condonation under S. 14 requires proof of due diligence and good faith, which were absent in this case. Petitioners failed to justify the delay of nearly two years and did not provide a reasonable explanation. The Court emphasized that government departments are treated like ordinary litigants and cannot claim special treatment regarding limitation laws. Ignorance, negligence, or mistake do not excuse non-compliance with statutory time limits. ----Cited Cases: Messrs SKB-SNK Joint Venture Contractors v. WAPDA (2022 SCMR 1615) East Pakistan v. Abdul Hamid Darfi (1970 SCMR 558) Commissioner of Income Tax v. Rais Pir Ahmad Khan (1981 SCMR 37) Federation of Pakistan v. Niaz Ahmad (1997 SCMR 959) Mst. Khadija Begum v. Mst. Yasmeen (PLD 2001 SC 355) (b) Arbitration Act, 1940 (X of 1940): ----S. 14(2)---Arbitration award---Objections dismissed by trial court---Confirmation of award as rule of court---Finality of arbitral proceedings---Scope. Respondents filed an application under S. 14(2) of the Arbitration Act, 1940, and the matter was referred to arbitrators. The award was made a rule of the court, and objections raised by the petitioners were dismissed. The appellate court and the High Court affirmed the award, rejecting the appeal as time-barred. The Supreme Court upheld the finality of arbitration awards, emphasizing that once an award is confirmed by a trial court and upheld on appeal, further challenges must strictly comply with procedural limitations. (c) Civil Courts Jurisdiction---Pecuniary Limits---Determination of Appellate Forum: ----West Pakistan Civil Courts Ordinance, 1962 (W.P. Ordinance II of 1962), S. 18---Jurisdictional value for appeals---Forum determination---Scope. The High Court correctly transferred the appeal to the District Judge as the claim amount was below Rs. 50 million, falling under the pecuniary jurisdiction of civil courts under S. 18 of the West Pakistan Civil Courts Ordinance, 1962. The Supreme Court held that there was no ambiguity in the law regarding forum determination, and filing an appeal before the wrong forum due to negligence does not warrant condonation of delay. ----Cited Cases: Ghulam Ali v. Akbar alias Akoor (PLD 1991 SC 957) Abdul Ghani v. Mst. Mussarat Rehana (1985 CLC 2529) (d) Legal Principle---Law of Limitation and Judicial Precedents: ----Statute of repose---Equity does not override limitation laws---Duty of litigants to act diligently. The Supreme Court reaffirmed that limitation laws must be strictly adhered to, and litigants must act with due diligence. The principle of repose ensures that litigation is brought to a final conclusion within prescribed time limits. ----Cited Cases: Akhtar Nasir Ahmed v. Province of Punjab (PLD 2024 SC 1268) Khushi Muhammad v. Mst. Fazal Bibi (PLD 2016 SC 872) Kiramat Khan v. IG, Frontier Corps (2023 SCMR 866) Imtiaz Ali v. Atta Muhammad (PLD 2008 SC 462) ----Disposition: Petition dismissed, as no reasonable justification for condonation of delay was presented. Leave to appeal refused.

Summary: (a) Limitation--- ----Fiscal laws---Principle of limitation is a crucial component of tax law, designed to ensure certainty, finality, and procedural discipline in legal proceedings---Limitation prescribes statutory time frame within which legal actions, including tax assessments and recovery proceedings must be initiated---Primary objective of limitation laws is to prevent undue delay, eliminate uncertainty and protect taxpayers from indefinite exposure to liability---Principle of limitation in tax law serves as a critical safeguard against arbitrary and indefinite proceedings, ensuring procedural fairness and adherence to statutory mandates---Interpretation of limitation provisions depends on legislative intent and statutory language---Where tax statutes prescribe a definitive time frame using prohibitive or restrictive language, such provisions are deemed mandatory, rendering any action beyond the prescribed period invalid---Such approach prevents tax authorities from exercising unfettered discretion in initiating or concluding proceedings outside the statutory framework. (b) Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Sales Tax on Services Act (XIX of 2022)--- ----S. 71---Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Finance Act (XXI of 2013), Ss. 40 & 68---Reference---Tax and assessment---Limitation---Adjournment period---Time frame---Dispute was with regard to exclusion of period attributed to taxpayer by seeking adjournments---Validity---Statutory provisions governing exclusion of time due to adjournments sought by taxpayer, are enshrined in Ss. 40(4) & 68(5) of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Finance Act, 2013---Both provisions share similar language in principle but a fundamental distinction exists: provision of S. 68(5) of Finance Act, 2013 explicitly imposes a maximum cap of thirty days on exclusion of time due to such adjournments, whereas provision of S.40(4) of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Finance Act, 2013 does not prescribe any such limitation---Such distinction is pivotal in determining correct computation of limitation period in each case---Appellate Tribunal Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Revenue Authority, while interpreting provisions of Ss. 40 & 68 of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Finance Act, 2013, failed to consider that Show Cause Notices issued to taxpayer stemmed from audit, which fell within the ambit of S.40 of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Finance Act, 2013, rather than S.68 of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Finance Act, 2013---By applying thirty-day cap on the exclusion of time due to adjournments obtained by taxpayers, the Tribunal had misinterpreted the law---Correct legal approach required the Tribunal to assess the matter under S.40 of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Finance Act, 2013 wherein no such cap was prescribed, and the period consumed due to adjournments sought by taxpayers was to be excluded in its entirety---Reasoning of Appellate Tribunal Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Revenue Authority was flawed as it improperly applied statutory cap to S.40 of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Finance Act, 2013 to adjudication that was only applicable under S.68 of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Finance Act, 2013, thereby rendering its decision legally unsustainable---High Court remanded the matter to Appellate Tribunal Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Revenue Authority for reconsideration, as the assessment was made within the prescribed limitation period---High Court directed Appellate Tribunal Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Revenue Authority to re-evaluate the case while duly accounting for all relevant documentation in computing the limitation period in accordance with the applicable provisions of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Finance Act, 2013, and where found to be in time, proceed to decide the cases on merit---Reference was allowed in circumstances. Messrs Tri-Star Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Trisa Burstenfabrik AG Triengen and another 2023 SCMR 1502 and Commissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-II, Regional Tax Office (RTO), Mayo Road, Rawalpindi and another v. Messrs Sarwaq Traders, Adamjee Road, Rawalpindi 2022 SCMR 1333 rel. Barrister Atif Rahim Burki for Petitioner. Imran Javed, Shahid Jan and Nadia Gul for Respondent. Date of hearing: 6th February, 2025. JUDGMENT SYED MUDASSER AMEER, J.- Introduction: 1. This and the connected eight reference applications have been filed by the Director General Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Revenue Authority (DG, KPRA) under Section 71 of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Sales Tax on Services Act, 2022 against similar orders of the same date, i.e., 16.06.2022 raising the same question of law pertaining to limitation for adjudication and interpretation of Sections 40 and 68 of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Finance Act, 2013. Since the same questions of law and interpretation are involved, we intend to decide all the 09 reference applications through this consolidated judgment. 2. The details of the connected reference applications are given below; S. No. Case No. Title 1. Sales Tax Ref. No.95/2022 DG KP Revenue Authority v. M/s Bee Line 2. Sales Tax Ref. No.96/2022 DG KP Revenue Authority v. M/s Haleem Telecom 3. Sales Tax Ref. No.97/2022 DG KP Revenue Authority v. M/s Reyan Telecom 4. Sales Tax Ref. No.98/2022 DG KP Revenue Authority v. M/s Ideal Trader and Developers 5. Sales Tax Ref. No.99/2022 DG KP Revenue Authority v. M/s Jadoon Communications 6. Sales Tax Ref. No.100/2022 DG KP Revenue Authority v. M/s Blue Dot 7. Sales Tax Ref. No. 101 / 2022 DG KP Revenue Authority v. M/s Ashrafia Communication 8. Sales Tax Ref. No.102/2022 DG KP Revenue Authority v. M/s Haroon Traders Facts of the Case: 3. In all these cases, the adjudication was concluded apparently beyond the statutory limitation period prescribed by law. However, if the days attributable to adjournments sought by the taxpayer are excluded from the computation of the prescribed period, the adjudication would then fall within the legally provided timeframe. The determination of whether the adjudication is time-barred thus hinges upon the exclusion of the period of delay caused by the taxpayer's own requests for adjournments, as permissible under the applicable legal provisions. 4. It is also pertinent to highlight that adjudication under the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Finance Act, 2013, may be conducted either under Section 40 or Section 68, with each section providing distinct parameters for the exclusion of time attributable to adjournments sought by the taxpayer. The applicability of these provisions directly impacts the computation of the statutory limitation period, thereby determining whether the adjudication falls within the legally prescribed timeframe. Legal Framework: 5. Since the matter involves the interpretation of Sections 40 and 68 of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Finance Act, 2013, it is appropriate to reproduce the text of these provisions for ready reference; "40. Assessment of tax.---(1) Where on the basis of any information acquired during an audit, inquiry, inspection or otherwise, an officer of the Authority is of the opinion that a registered person has not paid the tax due on taxable services provided by him or has made short payment, the officer shall make an assessment of the tax actually payable by that person and shall impose a penalty and charge default surcharge in accordance with sections 64 and 65. (2) No order under subsection (1) shall be made unless a notice to show-cause is given to the person in default within five years from the end of the tax period to which the assessment relates specifying the grounds on which it is intended to proceed against him and the said officer shall take into consideration the representation made by such person and provide him an opportunity of being heard if the person so desires. (3) An order under subsection (1), shall be made within one hundred and twenty days of issuance of the show-cause notice or within such extended period as the officer may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, fix: Provided that such extended period shall ordinarily not exceed sixty days. (4) In computing the period specified in subsection (3), any period during which the proceedings are adjourned on account of a stay order or proceedings under section 89 or the time taken through adjournments by the person shall be excluded. (5) An order passed under subsection (1), may be further amended as may be necessary when on the basis of any information acquired during an audit, inquiry, inspection or otherwise, the officer is satisfied that- (a) any tax has been under-assessed or assessed at a low rate; or (b) any taxable service provided by the person has escaped assessment. (6) The Collector may amend, or further amend any order passed under subsection (1) or (5), if he considers that the order is erroneous or prejudicial to interest of Justice. (7) The provisions of subsections (2), (3) and (4) shall be applicable to an order passed under subsections (5) and (6). (8) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, the Authority may prescribe thresholds, parameters, standards and basis for assessment of supply value and the assessment of tax. ... 68. Recovery of tax not levied or short-levied.---(1) Where by reason of inadvertence, error, misconstruction or for any other reason, any tax or charge has not been levied or has been short levied, the person liable to pay such amount of the tax or charge shall be served with a notice, within three years of the relevant tax period requiring him to show cause for non-payment of the amount specified in the notice. (2) Where by reason of some collusion, abetment, deliberate attempt, mis-statement, fraud, forgery, false or fake documents- (a) any tax or charge has not been paid or is, short paid, the person liable to pay such tax shall be served with a notice within five years of relevant tax period, requiring him to show cause for non-payment of such tax; and (b) Any amount of the tax is refunded which is not due, the person obtaining such refund shall be served with a notice within five years of the receipt of such refund to show cause against the recovery of such refund. (3) The officer shall, after considering the objections of the person served with a notice under subsection (1) or (2) or if the objections are not received within the stipulated period, determine the amount of the tax or charge payable by him and such person shall pay the amount so determined. (4) Any order under subsection (3) shall be made within one hundred and twenty days of issuance of the notice to show-cause or within such extended period as the officer may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, fix provided that such extended period shall not ordinarily exceed sixty days. (5) In computing the period specified in subsection (4), any period during which the proceedings are adjourned on account of a stay order or proceedings under section 89 or the time taken through adjournments by the petitioner not exceeding thirty days, shall be excluded." (Underlining supplied) 6. In the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Finance Act, 2013, Section 40 and Section 68 outline distinct procedures for tax assessment and recovery, each applicable under specific circumstances. Section 40 of the KP Finance Act, 2013 empowers the tax authorities to conduct audits of registered persons to ensure compliance with the Act. If discrepancies or non-compliance are identified during the audit, the authorities can issue an assessment order to recover any unpaid taxes. The process is initiated by a show-cause notice to the taxpayer, and providing an opportunity for the taxpayer to respond before any assessment is finalized. Section 68 on the other hand addresses situations where a taxpayer fails to submit the required tax return. In such instances, the tax authorities are authorized to make an assessment based on the available information and proceed to recover the assessed tax. This provision ensures that tax obligations are enforced even when taxpayers do not fulfill their duty to file returns. 7. The key distinction between Sections 40 and 68 of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Finance Act, 2013, lies in their scope, applicability, and procedural framework. Section 40 governs tax assessments that arise from audit proceedings, whereas in contrast, Section 68 pertains to cases where a taxpayer fails to file a tax return within the prescribed timeframe. This fundamental difference dictates how and when each section is invoked. Section 40 applies post-audit, following an investigative process, whereas Section 68 is triggered by non-filing, allowing for an ex parte determination of liability in case no reply/objection is received. 8. A particularly significant procedural distinction arises between subsection (4) of Section 40 and subsection (5) of Section 68, both of which regulate the exclusion of time consumed due to adjournments obtained by the taxpayer in the computation of the statutory limitation period. Section 40(4) provides for an unrestricted exclusion of time for adjournments sought by the taxpayer. This provision reflects the legislative intent to prevent taxpayers from exploiting procedural delays to evade assessment. On the other hand, Section 68(5) imposes a restrictive ceiling, explicitly capping the maximum permissible exclusion of time due to taxpayer-sought adjournments at thirty days. This limitation recognizes the distinct nature of best judgment assessments, balancing administrative efficiency with taxpayer rights. The erroneous application of the thirty-day restriction provided under Section 68(5) to an audit-based assessment under Section 40 not only misconstrues the statutory framework but also frustrates the legislative intent, resulting in a miscalculation of the limitation period and an incorrect legal determination. Therefore, any assessment arising from audit proceedings must strictly adhere to the procedural mechanism outlined under Section 40, and any deviation that introduces an extraneous limitation period warrants judicial correction. Principle of Limitation in Tax Law: 9. The principle of limitation is a crucial component of tax law, designed to ensure certainty, finality, and procedural discipline in legal proceedings. It prescribes the statutory time frame within which legal actions, including tax assessments and recovery proceedings, must be initiated. The primary objective of limitation laws is to prevent undue delay, eliminate uncertainty, and protect taxpayers from indefinite exposure to liability. However, courts have clarified that limitation does not operate in an absolute manner in all circumstances and must be interpreted in light of the governing statute. 10. The Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in the case titled Messrs Tri-Star Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Trisa Burstenfabrik AG Triengen and another reported as 2023 SCMR 1502 held that; "7. In order to comprehend the true spirit of any provision, whether it is mandatory or directory, the conception, acumen and stratagem of the Act and the enabling Rules should be considered for proper resolution. If we virtually converse in the differentiation and eccentricity flanked by 'mandatory' and 'directory' provisions, then we have to scrutinize the pith and substance and not exclusively the form. Sometimes a provision in the legislation seems to be mandatory, but substantially it is directory and, inversely, sometimes a provision seems to be directory but in quintessence it is found to be mandatory for compliance therefore, for all practical purposes, it is the fundamental nature which counts and should take preference and affinity more than the form. If a provision gives a power as well as a duty, it is mandatory and the enabling text of law and rules should be interpreted as obligatory so that the underlying principle and raison d'etre is not contravened or flouted. ... 10.5. Province of Punjab through Secretary, Excise and Taxation Department, Lahore and others v. Murree Brewery Company Limited and another (2021 SCMR 305). This Court referred to some foreign precedents that the test to determine whether a provision is directory or mandatory is by ascertaining the legislative intent behind the same. The general rule expounded by this Court is that the usage of the word 'shall generally carries the connotation that a provision in mandatory in nature. However, other factors such as the object and purpose of the statute and inclusion of penal consequences in cases of non-compliance also serve as an instructive guide in deducing the nature of the provision. If the provision is couched in prohibitive or negative language, it can rarely be directory, the use of peremptory language in a negative form is per se indicative of the interest that the provision is to be mandatory." 11. Similarly, in the case titled Commissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-II, Regional Tax Office (RTO), Mayo Road, Rawalpindi and another v. Messrs Sarwaq Traders, Adamjee Road, Rawalpindi reported as 2022 SCMR 1333, the apex Court while discussing the interpretation of fiscal statues, held; "5. The rationale, as we understand, for prescribing a time frame is to ensure that tax matters be resolved at the earliest, within the relevant tax year, so that the taxpayer satisfies its liability and the Department is able to collect revenue, within the relevant tax year. This is important because taxes pay for public goods and services and is one of the main sources of revenue for the State. Consequently, the intent of the legislature is to obligate the Commissioner (Appeals) to decide the appeal within 180 days. The question is whether this obligation is mandatory or is it directory. We find that its mandatory as the first time frame given under section 45-B(2) is 120 days, which is extendable, meaning that, the Commissioner can exercise discretion and extend the time where required. The only caveat is that reasons have to be given in writing, so that the discretion is not misused and is not exercised arbitrarily. The second time frame under section 45-B(2) is for extending 120 days by 60 days and nothing beyond 60 days. With the help of negative language, the legislature has created an obligation on the Commissioner (Appeals) to decide the appeal in a total of 180 days where the appeal is not decided within 120 days. This obligation renders the section mandatory as the Commissioner (Appeals) cannot go beyond 180 days, as the Commissioner's discretion is curtailed if the time needs to be extended beyond 120 days. Consequently, the obligation fixed on the Commissioner (Appeals) to decide the matter within 180 days is mandatory and not directory. 6. Now, the question is what happens if the Commissioner (Appeals) does not decide the matter within the 180 days. To our mind, since this is a mandatory provision, if a decision is made beyond the 180 days as prescribed under section 45- B(2) of the Act, then such a decision made beyond the prescribed period is an invalid decision. This is because the statute requires the appeal to be decided within 180 days, hence, it has to be decided in the prescribed period. A similar view has already been taken in the case of Messrs Mujahid Soap and Chemical Industries (Pvt.) Limited v. Customs Appellate Tribunal, Bench-I, Islamabad and others (2019 SCMR 1735) where the provision under consideration was Section 179 of the Customs Act, 1969, which is pari materia to the provisions under consideration under the Act, which reads as follows: "S. 179(3) The cases shall be decided within one hundred and twenty days of the issuance of show-cause notice or within such period extended by the Collector for which reasons shall be recorded in writing, but such extended period shall in no case exceed sixty days." This Court concluded that the understanding of law is for the taxing authority to decide the matter within the prescribed 180 days. In another case, reported as The Collector of Sales Tax, Gujranwala and others v. Messrs Super Asia Mohammad Din and Sons and others (2017 SCMR 1427), this Court has held that the ultimate test to determine whether a provision is mandatory or directory is that of ascertaining the legislative intent. The Court found that while the use of the word 'shall' is not the sole factor which determines mandatory or directory nature of a provision, it is certainly one of the indicators of legislative intent. Other factors include the presence of penal consequences in case of non-compliance, but perhaps the clearest indicator is the object and purpose of the statute and the provision in question. The Court concluded that it is the duty of the Court to garner the real intent of the legislature as expressed in the law itself. 7. In this case, the intent of the legislature is clear, to regulate and control the time frame within which an appeal must be decided. The second proviso to section 45-B(2) of the Act limits the discretion of the Court, by providing that the extension period cannot be extended beyond 60 days. The restrictive words used, restricts the powers of the Commissioner and also shows that the intent of the legislature was mandatory and not discretionary. We also note that where the law regulates the manner in which public officials have to exercise power vested in them, then such provisions have to be interpreted in its legislative context. In this case, where the public authority is empowered to create a liability against a taxpayer, then such exercise of power must be performed within the prescribed time. This Court has already dealt with a similar issue on whether a provision is directory or mandatory in the case reported as Province of Punjab through Conservator of Forest, Faisalabad and others v. Javed Iqbal (2021 SCMR 328) where the Supreme Court concluded that the intent of the legislature was relevant and to ascertain if its non-compliance causes injustice or inconvenience. The Court also finds that negative language used in a statute where it imposes a statutory duty on a public official means that the provision is mandatory even if no penalty is prescribed for it." 12. The principle of limitation in tax law serves as a critical safeguard against arbitrary and indefinite proceedings, ensuring procedural fairness and adherence to statutory mandates. The interpretation of limitation provisions depends on legislative intent and statutory language. Where tax statutes prescribe a definitive time frame using prohibitive or restrictive language, such provisions are deemed mandatory, rendering any action beyond the prescribed period invalid. This approach prevents tax authorities from exercising unfettered discretion in initiating or concluding proceedings outside the statutory framework. Analysis of Limitation in Sections 40 and 68: 13. Sections 40(4) and 68(5) of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Finance Act, 2013, govern the exclusion of time due to adjournments sought by the taxpayer, yet they contain distinct provisions with significant legal implications. Section 40(4) explicitly stipulates that the entire period consumed due to adjournments sought by the taxpayer shall be excluded from the computation of the prescribed limitation period, without any restriction on the number of days that may be excluded. In contrast, Section 68(5) introduces a specific limitation by capping the maximum period that may be excluded due to adjournments obtained by the taxpayer at thirty days. This distinction is of critical legal significance, as it delineates separate frameworks for the computation of limitation under different proceedings. However, in the present case, the Appellate Tribunal KPRA erroneously applied the thirty-day cap prescribed under Section 68(5) to a matter governed by Section 40, which does not impose any such restriction. This misapplication of law resulted in an incorrect computation of the limitation period, ultimately leading to an erroneous decision. Such an incorrect interpretation not only contravenes the express legislative intent behind these provisions but also vitiates the adjudicatory process, warranting rectification of the legal error. Doctrine of Substantive Justice v. Procedural Compliance: 14. The legal system operates on two fundamental doctrines, Substantive Justice and Procedural Compliance. While both are essential for maintaining the rule of law, they serve distinct purposes and often come into conflict when courts are called upon to decide cases involving procedural irregularities. The Doctrine of Substantive Justice prioritizes fairness, equity, and the real intent behind the law over rigid procedural requirements. It ensures that justice is not denied due to mere technical lapses and emphasizes the actual rights and entitlements of parties rather than their ability to comply with legal formalities. On the other hand, the Doctrine of Procedural Compliance underscores the importance of following established legal procedures to maintain uniformity, predictability, and order in the legal system. It ensures that legal processes remain structured, preventing arbitrary decision-making and upholding the principle that laws must be applied consistently. Procedural rules serve as safeguards against bias, errors, and abuse of power, guaranteeing that all parties are treated equally under the law. However, a rigid application of procedural compliance can sometimes result in injustice, particularly when minor procedural lapses lead to the dismissal of meritorious claims. 15. The tension between these doctrines arises when courts must decide whether to prioritize procedural regularity or substantive justice. In many cases, courts attempt to strike a balance, recognizing that while procedures are necessary for an orderly legal system, they should not become barriers to delivering justice. In the case at hand, the Appellate Tribunal KPRA accepted the taxpayer's appeal by treating the assessment under section 68 instead of section 40, despite the Show-Cause Notice indicating that it was issued as a result of audit proceedings. Strict procedural adherence would necessitate that the assessment be conducted under Section 40 of the KP Finance Act, 2013, as the Show Cause Notice was issued following an audit. However, the Appellate Tribunal's decision to treat the assessment under section 68, which is typically invoked when a taxpayer fails to file a return, suggests a departure from strict procedural norms. Nonetheless, it is crucial to recognize that while Substantive Justice seeks fair outcomes, it should not undermine the importance of Procedural Compliance. Procedures are established to ensure fairness, transparency, and consistency in the application of the law. Deviating from these procedures without compelling justification can lead to unpredictability and may set a precedent that could be misused in future cases. 16. The Appellate Tribunal's misapplication of Section 68(5) to a case governed by Section 40 of the KP Finance Act, 2013 demonstrates a fundamental error in legal interpretation, where procedural compliance was compromised in an attempt to achieve a purportedly fair outcome. However, the doctrine of Substantive Justice cannot be invoked to override clear legislative provisions, particularly where statutory language unambiguously prescribes distinct procedural frameworks. Procedural Compliance serves as the backbone of a just and predictable legal system, ensuring that adjudication is conducted within the bounds of statutory mandates. By imposing a limitation period that does not exist under Section 40, the Tribunal departed from the express intent of the law, thereby undermining the legitimacy of the adjudicatory process. Correcting this error is essential not only to uphold legal certainty but also to reinforce the principle that justice must be administered within the confines of the law, rather than through an erroneous application of equitable considerations. Consequently, the Tribunal's decision warrants reversal to restore procedural and legal correctness. Conclusion and Decision: 17. The upshot of the above discussion is that the statutory provisions governing the exclusion of time due to adjournments sought by the taxpayer are enshrined in Sections 40(4) and 68(5) of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Finance Act, 2013. Although both provisions share similar language in principle, a fundamental distinction exists: Section 68(5) explicitly imposes a maximum cap of thirty days on the exclusion of time due to such adjournments, whereas Section 40(4) does not prescribe any such limitation. This distinction is pivotal in determining the correct computation of the limitation period in each case. 18. The Appellate Tribunal KPRA, while interpreting Sections 40 and 68 of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Finance Act, 2013, failed to consider that the Show-Cause Notice issued to the taxpayer stemmed from an audit, which falls within the ambit of Section 40 rather than Section 68 of the said Act. Consequently, by applying the thirty-day cap on the exclusion of time due to adjournments obtained by the taxpayer, the Tribunal has misinterpreted the law. The correct legal approach required the Tribunal to assess the matter under Section 40, wherein no such cap is prescribed, and the period consumed due to adjournments sought by the taxpayer is to be excluded in its entirety. Thus, the Tribunal's reasoning is flawed as it improperly applied a statutory cap to section 40 adjudication that is only applicable under Section 68, thereby rendering its decision legally unsustainable. 19. When the findings of the Appellate Tribunal are examined in light of the correct interpretation of the relevant legal provisions, it becomes evident, albeit based on the limited documentation available, that the assessment was made within the prescribed limitation period. Thus, for the reasons stated above, the instant reference applications are allowed, and the matter is remanded to the Appellate Tribunal KPRA for reconsideration. The Tribunal is directed to re-evaluate the case while duly accounting for all relevant documentation in computing the limitation period in accordance with the applicable provisions of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Finance Act, 2013, and where found to be in time, proceed to decide the cases on merit. MH/66/P Case remanded.

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) ----O. V, R. 20, O. IX, R. 13, Limitation Act, Art. 164 Substituted service and ex parte proceedings---Legality of ex parte decree and effect of improper service---Petitioner challenged the ex parte decree passed in favor of respondent, contending that the service of summons was not duly effected as required under Order V, Rule 20, CPC---Trial Court resorted to substituted service without fulfilling the mandatory requirement of recording the process server’s statement---Held, that substituted service can only be effected when ordinary summons cannot be served or defendant deliberately avoids service, and such satisfaction must be recorded by the Court before resorting to alternate methods---Failure to adhere to this requirement renders the ex parte decree null and void---Trial Court’s order setting aside the ex parte decree was upheld by the High Court and Supreme Court. Cited Cases: - Sana Jamali v. Mujeeb Qamar (2023 SCMR 316) - Syed Muhammad Anwar Advocate v. Sheikh Abdul Haq (1985 SCMR 1228) (b) Administration of justice--- ----Effect of procedural lapses on adjudication---Principle of Audi Alteram Partem reaffirmed---Supreme Court emphasized that every litigant must be provided a fair opportunity to present their case, and technicalities should not be allowed to obstruct justice---Trial Court’s failure to ensure proper service of summons warranted setting aside of the ex parte decree. Cited Cases: - Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa v. Muhammad Anwar Khan (2014 YLR 485) - Mst. Afzal Begum v. Y.M.C.A. (PLD 1979 SC 18) (c) Limitation and procedural fairness--- ----Scope of Order IX, Rule 13, CPC, and Article 164 of the Limitation Act---Question of limitation for filing an application to set aside an ex parte decree discussed---Held, that limitation begins from the date when the defendant acquires knowledge of the decree, provided the service of summons was not duly effected---High Court’s findings that respondent had no knowledge of proceedings were upheld. Cited Cases: - Government of Balochistan v. Nawabzada Mir Tariq Hussain Khan Magsi (2010 SCMR 115) - Sher Wali Khan v. Mst. Khosh Begum (2011 CLC 421) (d) Court’s obligation to rectify procedural errors--- ----Doctrine of "actus curiae neminem gravabit" applied---Legal principle that no one should suffer due to an error of the court reaffirmed---Supreme Court reiterated that procedural lapses by the Court must not prejudice any party and such errors must be corrected to ensure fair administration of justice. Cited Cases: - Muhammad Sharif v. MCB Bank Limited (2021 SCMR 1158) - Faqir Muhammad v. Khursheed Bibi (2024 SCMR 107) Disposition: Leave refused; petition dismissed.

Summary: (On appeal against the judgment dated 27.02.2015 passed by Peshawar High Court, Bannu Bench in C. R. No. 90-B of 2009). Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)--- ----Ss.42 & 54---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Ss. 19, 20 & First Sched., Art. 148---Suit for declaration, injunction and redemption of mortgage---Limita tion---Mortgage rights, purchase of---Effect---Petitioner / defendant purchased mortgage rights of suit property which was owned by respondents / plaintiffs---Held, that possession of petitioner / defendant over mortgaged property acted as an acknowledgement under Section 20(2) of Limitation Act, 1908 and period of fresh limitation had started running afresh---Purchase of mortgage rights from mortgagee also acted as acknowledgement under Section 19 of Limitation Act, 1908---Purchase of mortgage rights by petitioner / defendant had given a fresh start of limitation to respondent / plaintiff---Suit for redemption filed by respondents / plaintiffs was covered by both provisions of law i.e. Sections 19 and 20(2) of Limitation Act, 1908 and was well within the time and had rightly been so held by Courts below---Mortgagee was in possession and because of purchase of mortgage, fresh cause of action and fresh start of limitation had accrued to respondent / plaintiff---Petitioner / defendant purchased mortgagee rights which would confirm the fact that his right under prescription was not mature even till the cut-off date---Respondent / defendant could ask for redemption of his property from the charge of mortgage---Supreme Court declined to interfere in judgment and decree passed against petitioner / defendant---Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused. Nawaz Ali Khan and another v. Nawabzada and others PLD 2003 SC 425; Maqbool Ahmad v. Governm, ent of Pakistan 1991 SCMR 2063; Abdul Haq v. Ali Akbar and others 1999 SCMR 2531; Nawaz Ali Khan and another v. Nawabzada and others PLD 2003 SC 425; Durrani and 35 others v. Hamidullah Khan and 15 others 2007 SCMR 480; Muhammad Hussain and others v. Wahid Bakhs through Legal Heirs 2004 SCMR 1137 and Bilawar Khan v. Amir Sabar Rahman and others PLD 2013 Pesh. 38 ref. Shah Faisal, Advocate Supreme Court and Haji Muhammad Zahir Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Petitioner. Salahuddin, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents. Date of hearing: 13th January, 2025.

Summary: Limitation Act (IX of 1908--- ----S.3 & First Sched., Art. 181---Constitution of Pakistan, Arts.23 & 24---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S. 115---Execution application, filing of---Commencement of period of limitation---Determination---Executing Court dismissed the application under S. 3 of the Limitation Act, 1908, (Act) treating the execution application within time, whereas,the Appellate Court overturned the decision of the Executing Court---Validity---Civil revision was finally decided by the High Court on 22.02.2020; six months thereafter the Execution Application was filed and since the revisional proceeding was also covered by the principle of merger, hence, the Execution Application was within time and was not adversely affected by Art. 181 of the Act---Appellate Court did not appreciate the case law in overturning the decision of the Executing Court, thus, the impugned order was illegal and could not be sustained---Once the judgment and decree is given in favour of an individual, which has attained finality, in particular concerning his proprietary right, it cannot be eclipsed, except, when there is an express provision of substantial law, but that too requires liberal interpretation, so that the legitimate ownership right is safeguarded, because proprietary rights are governed and protected under Arts.23 & 24 of the Constitution and not merely by an ordinary statute---Order of the Appellate Court was set aside and that of the Executing Court was restored---Civil revision was allowed, in circumstance. Maulvi Abdul Qayyum v. Syed Ali Asghar Shah and 5 others 1992 SCMR 241 and Bakhtiar Ahmed v. Mst. Shamim Akhtar and others 2013 SCMR 5 rel. Director General (Headquarters) Civil Works Organization, Rawalpindi through Authorized Officer v. Muhammad Afsar and others 2021 CLC 909; Ferozuddin and 11 others v. Mazhar Hussain Shah and 5 others PLD 2009 Kar. 397; Hakim Muhammad Buta and another v. Habib Ahmed and others PLD 1985 SC 153 and Mst. Noor Jehan and others v. Miss Shahnaz and 3 others PLD 2020 Sindh 652 ref. Malik Waseem Iqbal for Applicant. Syed Ehsan Raza for Respondent No. 1. Nemo for Respondents Nos. 2 and 3. Date of hearing: 30th January, 2024. Judgment Muhammad Faisal Kamal Alam, J .--- Through the present Civil Revision Application, the Appellant has challenged the Order dated 09.09.2022 [the "Impugned Order"] passed in Civil Appeal No.184 of 2021, whereby, the Order dated 17.09.2021 of the learned Executing Court [in Execution Application No.13 of 2020] dismissing the Application of present Respondent No.1, filed under Section 3 of the Limitation Act [1908], has been overturned, as a result of which the above Execution Application of the Appellant has been dismissed. 2. Mr. Malik Waseem Iqbal, Advocate, representing the Applicant(s), has argued that the limitation of three years, in terms of Article 181 of the Limitation Act, would be counted when the last order was passed, which is of 22.02.2020, by this Court in Revision Application No.39 of 2014 preferred by the present Respondent No.1, dismissing the same and maintaining the Judgment and Decree of the Appellate Court, in favour of the Applicant. The Execution Application is filed on 19th August 2020, that is, six months after the above Order [passed in Revision proceeding], and is within time. In support of his arguments, he has cited the case law reported in_ i. 1992 SCMR 241 [Maulvi Abdul Qayyum v. Syed Ali Asghar Shah and 5 others] Abdul Qayyum case ii. 2013 SCMR 5 [Bakhtiar Ahmed v. Mst. Shamim Akhtar and others] - Bakhtiar case iii. 2021 CLC 909 [Director General (Headquarters) Civil Works Organization, Rawalpindi through Authorized Officer v. Muhammad Afsar and others]; and iv. P L D 2009 Karachi 397 [Ferozuddin and 11 others v. Mazhar Hussain Shah and 5 others]. 3. On the other hand, Syed Ehsan Raza, Advocate, representing Respondent No.1, has controverted the above arguments and has supported the Impugned Order. Contended that Execution proceeding initiated by the Applicant itself is time barred as it is filed after a period of three years in violation of Article 181 [ibid]; because the limitation period is to be counted from date when the first time the Applicant got the Decision in his favour, that is, through the Judgment and Decree dated 3rd March 2014, given by the Appellate Court; which was maintained by this Court in the above Revision Proceeding and in the intervening period since no stay was operating, thus, the above Execution Proceeding should have been filed much earlier [three years after the Appellate Court Decision of 03.03.2014], but, initiated after six years, is barred by time; that Respondent No.1 [judgment debtor] should not be at mercy of decree holder/ the Applicant, as far as the implementation of judgment and decree is concerned. He has cited the following case law_ i. P L D 1985 Supreme Court 153 [Hakim Muhammad Buta and another v. Habib Ahmed and others]; and ii. P L D 2020 Sindh 652 [Mst. Noor Jehan and others v. Miss Shahnaz and 3 others] - Mst. Noor Jehan. 4. Undisputed facts are that present Applicant has filed Suit No.409 of 2005 against the Respondents, inter alia, for declaring Sale Agreement dated 09.01.1999 between the Respondents as forged and fictitious document and direction to Respondent No.1 [Muhammad Ayoub] for handing over the subject property to the Applicant, which the latter has purchased through a Sale Deed executed by Respondent No.3 [Mrs. Parveen]; subsequently, Respondent No.1 also instituted a Suit No.896 of 2007 and both Suits were decided by a consolidated Judgment dated 30.03.2013, dismissing the Suit of present Applicant and decreeing that of present Respondent No.1, which Judgment was challenged by the Applicant by filing two Civil Appeals Nos.137 and 140 of 2013, which were decided by the Appellate Court in favour of the Applicant, by decreeing the Applicant's Suit and dismissing the Suit filed by Respondent No.1 vide Judgment and Decree dated 03.03.2014, which was challenged by the Respondent No.1 in Civil Revision Application No.39 of 2014, before this Court, but unsuccessfully and the Judgment dated 22.02.2020 of this Court has upheld the Appellate Decision. These Judgments are available at pages-107, 203 and 309 of the Lis record. 5. The Applicant filed Execution Application No.13 of 2020, presented on 19.08.2020, for implementation of the Judgment and Decree dated 3rd March 2014 [of the Appellate Court], which was maintained in Revision [supra], was opposed by the Respondent No.1, inter alia, by filing the Application under Section 3 of the Limitation Act [1908], that the Execution proceeding itself is time barred as it is filed after a period of three years from the Judgment and decree in violation of Article 181 of the Limitation Act. After hearing the parties, the learned Executing Court vide Order dated 17.09.2021 [at page-25-C] dismissed the above Application of Respondent No.1, which is overturned through the Impugned Order. 6. Pr?cis of the case law cited by the Applicant's Counsel is that rule of merger equally applies to the decree passed in revisional jurisdiction [besides the Appellate Court]. The issue at hand has been comprehensively decided in the Abdul Qayyum case [supra] in which an execution petition was filed on 5th January 1987, after the judgment and decree of the High Court dated 18.11.1986 was pronounced; the Decree of the Trial Court was of 27th April 1981, which was challenged in appeal unsuccessfully [vide order dated 18.10.1981], followed by the above revision order of the High Court. The executing court declined the request of respondent [of the reported judgment] and allowed the Execution which was appealed against without any success, but, eventually in the revisional jurisdiction the learned High Court reversed the decisions emanating from the Execution Proceeding. While interpreting Article 181 [of the Limitation Act], it is held, that the time period will start when the right to accrue arise to file the execution, which "legitimately arises when Revision against a decision of the lower Court is, one way or other, disposed of."; whereas, in Bakhtiar's case [ibid] the Honourable Supreme Court has further clarified that time to file the Execution proceeding will start when finally a matter is decided through appeal or revision by the High Court and the time consumed in pursuing civil petition before the Supreme Court, unless the impugned decision is under suspension, is not excluded from computing the limitation; the CPLA [Civil Petition Leave to Appeal] was dismissed, because, the petitioner filed the execution petition on 3rd December 2007, after the leave refusal Order dated 31st March 2005, whereas, through the judgment dated 17th March 2003, the civil revision preferred by the same petitioner was partly accepted / decreed; the Apex Court is of the view that the right accrued to file the execution proceeding from the date of judgment of the High Court. 7. The crux of the case law relied upon by the Respondent's Counsel is about the scope of Revisional Jurisdiction of this Court under Section 115 of C.P.C., which is different from appellate jurisdiction and is restricted; during pendency of civil revision in the High Court, the Executing Court decided the execution proceeding, as no stay was operating, is approved by this Court [the reported judgment of Mst. Noor Jehan, ibid, is cited by the Respondent's counsel, to augment his arguments, that even a Civil Revision was pending before this Court, where no stay was granted, the Applicant could have pursued his execution application, but he did not, hence, the same is barred by Limitation]; Section 3 of the Limitation Act is mandatory and it is the duty of the Court to notice the point of limitation, whether the plea of limitation was raised or not and that the waiver of the question of limitation is not permissible, even where the period of limitation is prescribed by a special or a local law. 8. To the facts of present Lis, the case law cited by the Applicant's counsel is applicable, because, undisputedly Civil Revision was finally decided by this Court on 22.02.2020, six months thereafter the Execution Application was filed [as discussed in the foregoing paragraphs], and since, the revisional proceeding is also covered by the principle of Merger as held above, hence, the Execution Application was within time and is not adversely affected by Article 181 of the Limitation Act. The Appellate Court did not appreciate the case law in overturning the Decision of the Executing Court and thus the Impugned Order is illegal and cannot be sustained. 9. The present Lis should also be looked at from another angle. Once the Judgment and Decree is given in favour of an individual, which has attained finality, in particular concerning his proprietary right, cannot be eclipsed, except, when there is an express provision of substantial law, that also requires liberal interpretation, so that the legitimate ownership right is safeguarded, because proprietary rights are governed and protected under Articles 23 and 24 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, and not merely by an ordinary statute. 10. Consequently, the Impugned Order of the Appellate Court is set aside and that of the Executing Court, is restored. SA/M-15/Sindh Revision allowed.

Summary: Arbitration Appeal: U/s 39 against order of court wherein wherein the award was declared barred by law and application for making rule of court was dismissed. (a) Arbitration Act, 1940 (the “1940 Act”) — Article 178 of the Limitation Act, 1908 — Applicability to Arbitrator’s Filing of Award: Under Article 178 of the Limitation Act, 1908, the limitation period of 90 days for filing an arbitration award applies only to applications filed by a party before the Court seeking a direction to the Arbitrator to file the award. The said limitation period does not apply where the Arbitrator files the award on his own or upon a party’s request. The Arbitrator is not under a statutory obligation to file the award within the limitation period prescribed in Article 178, nor does any limitation run against a party requesting the Arbitrator to file the award. (Muhammad Shafi v. Muhammad Sabir, PLD 1960 Lahore 591; Sindh Industrial Trading Estates v. Sindh Employees Social Security Institution, 1993 MLD 1258; Besrock (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Pakistan Steel Mills Corporation, 2013 CLD 719 applied). (b) Scope of Section 14(2) of the Arbitration Act, 1940 — Role of Arbitrator in Filing the Award: Under Section 14(2) of the 1940 Act, an Arbitrator may file the award in Court either at the request of a party or upon the Court’s direction. Where the Arbitrator files the award voluntarily, there is no requirement for an application from a party nor does any limitation period apply. (Champalal v. Mst. Samrathbai, AIR 1960 SC 629; Balwant Singh v. Partap Singh, AIR 1968 Punjab & Haryana 265 followed). (c) Effect of Erroneous Filing Before an Incompetent Court — Re-filing and Limitation Considerations: Where an Arbitrator files an award before a Court lacking pecuniary jurisdiction, and the award is returned for filing before the competent Court, the delay in re-filing does not render the award time-barred under Article 178. A bona fide mistake in filing before an incorrect forum does not nullify the arbitration proceedings. (Muhammad Hassan v. Muhammad Anwar, AIR 1968 Patna 82; Vaseem Construction Co. v. Province of Sindh, 1991 CLC 1081 applied). (d) Right of Appeal Under Section 39 of the 1940 Act — Maintainability of Appeal Against Order Holding Award “Barred by Law”: An appeal under Section 39 of the 1940 Act lies only against specific orders enumerated therein. An order declaring an arbitration award “barred by law” does not fall within the appealable categories under Section 39. However, where the Court’s decision effectively results in a refusal to exercise jurisdiction, a revision under Section 115 CPC is maintainable to correct such an illegality. (Capital Development Authority v. Khuda Bakhsh, 1994 SCMR 771; Muhammad Hanif v. Muhammad, PLD 1990 SC 859 followed). (e) Conversion of Appeal into Revision Petition — Powers of High Court to Correct Jurisdictional Errors: To prevent failure of justice and unnecessary litigation, the High Court converted the appeal into a revision petition under Section 115 CPC and set aside the order declaring the award time-barred. The case was remanded for a decision on merits regarding pending applications for making the award a rule of Court. (Oil and Gas Development Corporation v. Clough Engineering Ltd., 2003 YLR 353; Muhammad Ramzan v. Fatima, PLD 2004 Lahore 17 applied). ----Disposition: Appeal converted into Revision Petition — Impugned Order dated 28.11.2023 set aside — Matter remanded to the lower Court for decision on merits.

Summary: High Court Appeal No. 33 of 2005, decided on 18th December, 2024. (a) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)--- ----First Sched., Arts. 91, 120 & 142---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O. I, Rr. 3 & 9---Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), Ss. 42 & 55---Suit for declaration, possession and mandatory injunction---Unauthorized possession and creation of trust over amenity plot of respondent-society---Objections as to maintainability of suit on the points of limitation and misjoinder and non-joinder of necessary parties were raised by the appellants ---Validity---Primary or substantial reliefs sought by the appellants were the declaration of ownership and recovery of possession, while the cancellation of the trust deed was merely incidental or ancillary to the substantial reliefs, thus, Art. 142 of the Limitation Act, 1908 (Act), was disregarded while computing the time as per Art. 120 of the Act, which provided a period of six years from the date of unauthorized possession of the subject property and gaining knowledge of the alleged trust deed, which was mentioned in the plaint as 06.02.1993 and as the suit was instituted on 29.10.1998, thus, the same was well within limitation---Secretary General and key office bearers of the trust were parties to the suit, which implied that the trust was indeed a participant in the proceedings and it fulfilled the judicial objective of ensuring that all necessary parties were before the court for effective and proper adjudication of the controversy---Objections as to limitation and misjoinder and non-joinder of parties were repelled and High Court Appeal was dismissed, in circumstances. Mst. Hameeda Bibi and 3 others v. Ch. Atta Ullah PLD 1998 Lahore 183 rel. (b) Trusts Act (II of 1882)--- ----S. 3---Unauthorized creation of trust and execution of trust deed without the consent and knowledge of owner---Validity---S. 3 of the Trusts Act, 1882, delineates a trust as an obligation annexed to property ownership, originating from a confidence reposed in and accepted by the owner for the benefit of another party---Respondent/society being owner of the property never consented to create the trust, which directly contradicted the fundamental premise of trust law, namely, the requisite consent and confidence between parties---Society, in its capacity as the original owner (or author of the trust), had no intention of establishing such an obligation, and the absence of its consent nullified the legitimacy of the trust deed. (c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----O. XV, R. 3---Suit for declaration, possession and mandatory injunction was decreed on the basis of legal issues---Plea of not framing of factual issues and not recording of evidence---Validity---During the pendency of suit appellants did not raise any objection nor expressed any desire to adduce evidence, rather, they argued the matter on legal issues---Although adducing evidence is a right of a party, yet the court cannot compel or drag a party to produce evidence---Wisdom behind enacting the provision of O.XV, R. 3, C.P.C., is to ensure early disposal of cases based on documentary evidence, thereby saving the court's precious time and avoiding unwarranted litigation---All the issues framed by the Trial Court were legal, which delved into the root of the subject matter and did not involve questions of fact, thus, objection of appellants qua non-framing of factual issues and non-recording of evidence was without any merit and the Court acted within the purview of O.XV R. 3, C.P.C., ensuring judicial efficiency and fairness---High Court Appeal was dismissed, in circumstances. Muhammad Younus and 2 others v. Government of Pakistan through Chief Secretary N.As Gilgit and 4 others 2010 GBLR 107 rel. Muhammad Saleem Mangrio for Appellants. Faisal Siddiqui for Respondents. Dates of hearing: 10th and 26th September, 2024.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan (1973) ----Arts. 185(3), 114, 151 & Order XLVII, Rule 1, C.P.C. Review application—Consent order—Scope and maintainability—Limitation—Grounds for review—Presumption of correctness attached to judicial proceedings. Petitioner filed a Civil Petition for Leave to Appeal under Art. 185(3) of the Constitution against an order passed by the Sindh High Court dismissing the review application filed under Order XLVII, Rule 1, C.P.C., read with Sections 114 and 151, C.P.C. The petitioner challenged an earlier consent order disposing of a Civil Revision Application, arguing that neither the petitioner nor his counsel gave consent for such disposal. The review application was filed after the statutory limitation of 20 days provided under Article 162 of the Limitation Act, 1908, and no application for condonation of delay was submitted. Furthermore, no affidavit from the petitioner or his counsel was attached to substantiate the claim that consent was not given. The Supreme Court held that consent orders recorded in open court cannot be reviewed without substantial evidence proving the absence of consent. It emphasized that judicial orders enjoy a presumption of correctness and sanctity, and mere allegations without supporting affidavits or evidence cannot be grounds for review. The review jurisdiction under Order XLVII, Rule 1, C.P.C., is limited to errors apparent on the face of the record, which was absent in this case. ---- Cited Cases: Dr. S.M. Qaim v. Raisul Hassan Naqvi (1981 SCMR 950) Allah Dita v. Bashir Ahmed (1997 SCMR 181) Muhammad Yaqoob v. Deputy Settlement Commissioner (Land) (1981 SCMR 519) Faizur Rehman v. Rahman Ud Din alias Mirza (1997 SCMR 1301) (b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) ----Order XLVII, Rule 1 & Sections 114, 151—Scope of Review—Consent orders—Error apparent on the face of record. The Court reaffirmed that the scope of review under Order XLVII, Rule 1, C.P.C., is narrow and confined to correcting errors apparent on the face of the record. It cannot serve as a substitute for an appeal or re-hearing of the case. In cases of consent orders recorded in open court, subsequent claims of lack of consent must be supported by affidavits from the parties or their counsel. Mere allegations, unsupported by evidence, cannot form the basis for reviewing a consent order. (c) Limitation Act (IX of 1908) ----Art. 162—Limitation for review application—Condonation of delay. The limitation period for filing a review application under Article 162 of the Limitation Act is 20 days. Failure to file within this period without seeking condonation of delay renders the application liable to dismissal. (d) Administration of Justice—Sanctity of judicial orders. Presumption of correctness and sanctity is attached to judicial proceedings, orders, and judgments. Such orders cannot be lightly impeached unless there is clear evidence of fraud, misrepresentation, or error apparent on the face of the record. Allegations without affidavits or supporting documents are insufficient to challenge the validity of judicial orders. ---- Disposition: Civil Petition for Leave to Appeal dismissed in limine.

Summary: A BPS-20 Office is aggrieved his nomination has been superseded by CSB. (a) Constitutional Law — Maintainability of Writ Petition — Bar of Jurisdiction under Article 212 of the Constitution: The bar under Section 4 of the Federal Services Tribunal Act, 1973, does not apply where the dispute pertains to the fitness of a civil servant for promotion, rather than the terms and conditions of service. A civil servant has a fundamental right to fair consideration for promotion, which is distinct from the right to promotion itself. Consequently, the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 199 is not ousted in such cases. (Orya Maqbool Jan v. Federation of Pakistan, 2014 SCMR 817; Secretary Establishment Division v. Aftab Ahmed Maneka, 2015 SCMR 1006 applied). (b) Right to Fair Consideration for Promotion — Due Process and Article 10A of the Constitution: A civil servant has the right to be considered for promotion in a fair and just manner, which includes the right to confront and rebut any adverse material used against him. Consideration of intelligence agency reports at the CSB meeting without prior notice to the officer and without affording an opportunity to contest the allegations violates the principles of due process and fair trial under Article 10A of the Constitution. (I.A. Sherwani v. Government of Pakistan, 1991 SCMR 1041; Tariq Aziz-ud-Din case, 2010 SCMR 1301 followed). (c) Central Selection Board (CSB) — Role in Promotion — Application of Arbitrary Discretion: Under Rule 18(3)(b) of the Civil Servants Promotion Rules, 2019 (CSPR), only 30 marks are allocated to the CSB’s collective judgment, while the remaining 70 marks are based on quantified performance evaluations (PERs and TERs). The CSB exceeded its authority by disregarding the quantification criteria and awarding disproportionate deductions based solely on intelligence reports. The CSB's decision violated the structured framework of the CSPR and constituted an arbitrary exercise of discretion. (Muhammad Zafeer Abbasi v. Government of Pakistan, 2003 PLC (CS) 503 applied). (d) Intelligence Reports in Promotion Decisions — Legality and Evidentiary Value: The use of intelligence reports that are not commissioned under applicable rules, lack verifiable evidence, and are not disclosed to the officer prior to the CSB meeting renders them legally infirm and ultra vires the fundamental rights to due process and information under the Constitution. The introduction of intelligence reports at the final stage of promotion consideration, without prior confrontation or verification, amounts to a denial of natural justice. (PIA v. Nasir Jamal Malik, 2001 SCMR 934; Abdul Hafeez Abbasi v. PIHC, 2002 SCMR 1034 followed). (e) Amendment to the Civil Servants Promotion Rules, 2019 — Validity and Scope of Rule 2(p) and Rule 4(5): The 2022 amendment to the CSPR introduced Rule 2(p) (defining Special Vetting Agency (SVA)) and Rule 4(5) (allowing CSB to consider intelligence reports of SVAs). However, these rules fail to specify the weightage of intelligence reports in the overall promotion criteria and do not provide procedural safeguards for officers to contest such reports. The vagueness of these rules exposes both the CSB and civil servants to arbitrary decisions, lack of transparency, and potential abuse. (f) Confidentiality of Intelligence Reports — Conflict with Fundamental Rights: There is no legal provision in the CSPR that grants confidentiality to intelligence reports used in promotion decisions. Any attempt to keep such reports secret violates the fundamental rights to information (Article 19A) and due process (Article 10A) of the Constitution. Information that adversely affects a person’s career cannot be classified as confidential without affording the affected individual an opportunity to contest it. (g) Failure to Provide a Transparent Promotion Process — Impact on Bureaucracy and Governance: The unfettered reliance on unverifiable intelligence reports in civil servant promotions creates a chilling effect, making officers susceptible to external pressures, political influence, and coercion by intelligence agencies. The lack of procedural safeguards for officers to defend against adverse reports undermines bureaucratic independence and good governance. (Managing Director (Power), WAPDA v. Muhammad Luqman, PLD 2003 SC 175 applied). (h) Remedy and Directions to the Central Selection Board (CSB): The CSB’s decision dated 01.08.2023 superseding the petitioner was set aside, and the immediately next CSB meeting was directed to reconsider the petitioner’s promotion to BPS-21 strictly in accordance with the marking and ranking criteria stipulated in CSPR, without reliance on the intelligence reports that were neither disclosed nor substantiated. -----Disposition: Writ Petition Allowed — Impugned CSB Decision dated 01.08.2023 Set Aside — Petitioner’s Case to be Reconsidered in the Next CSB Meeting in Accordance with CSPR, Excluding Intelligence Reports Not Previously Disclosed or Substantiated.

Summary: Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----O. VI, R. 17 & O. XXIII---Partition Act (IV of 1893), S.4---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), First Sched., Art. 120---Land Revenue Act (XVII of 1967), S. 172---Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), Ss. 42, 8, 54---Suits for declaration, perpetual-cum-mandatory injunction, restoration of possession, and partition---Technical defects, removal of---Substantial justice---Scope---Both suits were decreed by the trial court through consolidated judgment and decrees, but the appeals preferred by the respondents were accepted by the appellate court on the grounds that the first suit was not maintainable due to being barred by time and that correction of revenue records fell under the exclusive jurisdiction of revenue courts per S. 172 of the Land Revenue Act, 1967 and the second suit was dismissed as the petitioner did not seek partition of the entire property or implead the entire proprietary body, rendering it not maintainable---Validity---In the first suit, the petitioner sought not only declaration, permanent-cum-mandatory injunction, and possession, but also challenged the validity of the mutation as illegal and without bearing on their rights, thus falling outside the purview of S. 172 of the Land Revenue Act, 1967---Second suit could not be dismissed for partial partition or non-impleadment of the entire proprietary body, as the entire property and necessary parties could be included in the larger interest of justice rather than dismissing it on technical grounds---If the suit was defective, the law provided a mechanism for removal thereof under O. VI, R. 17 and O. XXIII, C.P.C---No suit should be dismissed for misjoinder or non-joinder of parties---Courts are mandated to adjudicate the matter in dispute based on the facts and rights of the parties involved---High Court, without addressing the merits of the case, set aside the appellate court's findings and remitted the matter to the Trial Court with directions to allow the petitioner to remedy the technical defects---Civil revision was disposed of accordingly. Mst. Zohran Bibi and others v. Ghulam Qadir and others 2022 MLD 250; Chaudhary Muhammad Munir and others v. Election Tribunal Mandi Bahauddin and others 2009 SCMR 1368 and Mazullah Khan v. Mst. Taraja Begum and others 2020 YLR 2206 rel. Muhammad Alam Khan and Atta Ullah Khan (Tangi) for Petitioner. Aqil Muhammad Khan for Respondents. Date of hearing: 2nd December, 2024.