Summary: Recall of an ad-interim injunction on repeated requests for adjournments, in order to regulate procedure of court for ensuring presence of petitioner to argue application for interim relief is not a final order ordinarily challengeable before higher forum unless shown to be perverse, against the law and facts of the case or suffering from illegality or jurisdictional defect. 67Writ Petition- Miscellaneous- Rent 520-25 TANVEER AMJAD TAHIR VS SHAHID MEHMOOD ETC Mr. Justice Mirza Viqas Rauf 17- 12- 2025 2025 LHC 7864

Summary: Constitution of Pakistan, 1973—Arts. 141, 142(a), 142(c), 143, 175F(3), 185(3)—Constitution (Eighteenth Amendment) Act, 2010—Constitution (Twenty-Seventh Amendment) Act, 2025—Excise Duty on Minerals (Labour Welfare) Act, 1967—S. 3—Balochistan Finance Act, 2020—S. 7—Legislative competence—Provincial autonomy—Labour welfare—Excise duty on minerals—Doctrine of pith and substance—Doctrine of double aspect legislation—Cooperative federalism—The Federal Constitutional Court considered whether the amendment made through S. 7 of the Balochistan Finance Act, 2020 to S. 3 of the Excise Duty on Minerals (Labour Welfare) Act, 1967, enhancing the rate of duty on minerals, was beyond the legislative competence of the Provincial Assembly of Balochistan on the ground that duties of excise fall within the exclusive federal domain under Entry 44 of the Federal Legislative List. The Court held that, after the Eighteenth Amendment, legislative power is distributed such that the Federation legislates only on subjects enumerated in the Federal Legislative List, while residual subjects vest exclusively in the Provinces; labour welfare, not being part of the Federal Legislative List, is therefore a provincial subject. The Court further held that the 1967 Act, when read as a whole and especially in light of its preamble, was enacted not merely to impose a fiscal levy, but to finance measures for promoting the welfare of labour employed in the mining industry. Accordingly, although the statutory mechanism employed was the levy and collection of excise duty, the dominant constitutional purpose and essential character of the legislation lay in labour welfare, which squarely fell within provincial competence. The amendment made by the Province was, therefore, not unconstitutional merely because it touched upon a fiscal instrument also known to federal legislative entries. Constitutional law—Doctrine of pith and substance—Incidental encroachment—Validity of legislation—The Court reaffirmed that where legislative spheres appear to overlap, the true nature and character of the impugned law must be determined through the doctrine of pith and substance. A law does not become invalid merely because it incidentally trenches upon a field otherwise assigned to another legislature; only a substantial encroachment disturbing the constitutional distribution of powers may render it ultra vires. Applying that doctrine, the Court held that the impugned provincial amendment did not amount to an impermissible invasion of federal legislative authority, because its real object was to support labour welfare in the mining industry and the enhancement of the levy was only a means adopted to advance that constitutionally legitimate provincial purpose. Constitutional law—Doctrine of double aspect legislation—Same subject viewed from different constitutional aspects—The Court also invoked the doctrine of double aspect legislation and explained that a single subject may, in one aspect and for one purpose, fall within federal competence, and in another aspect and for another purpose, fall within provincial competence. Thus, while the levy of excise duty as a fiscal subject may ordinarily fall within the federal domain, the same measure, when examined from the standpoint of labour welfare and public interest in relation to mine workers, may validly operate within the provincial sphere. In such circumstances, both legislative aspects may co-exist in constitutional harmony, and the Court should prefer an interpretation that sustains rather than destroys legislation enacted by democratically elected bodies. Federalism—Post-Eighteenth Amendment constitutional structure—Cooperative federalism—The Court emphasized that the post-Eighteenth Amendment constitutional arrangement broadens provincial autonomy and reflects a commitment to participatory and cooperative federalism. The Federation and Provinces are not to be viewed as functioning in isolated compartments; rather, constitutional interpretation should favour harmonious operation of their respective powers. A rigid or formalistic reading that disregards the practical interaction of fiscal measures and welfare objectives would be inconsistent with the constitutional design. The impugned amendment, therefore, was held to represent a lawful and harmonious exercise of legislative power in furtherance of a legitimate provincial objective. Case references—Prafulla v. Bank of Commerce (AIR 1947 PC 28); Multiple Access v. McCutcheon (1982 CanLII 55 (SCC)); Sui Northern Gas Pipelines v. S.K. Pvt Limited (2025 SCMR 570); DG Khan Cement v. The Province of Punjab (2014 PTD 478); Pakistan College of Law v. University of the Punjab (W.P. No. 45178 of 2017, Lahore High Court). Petition dismissed—Leave refused—The Federal Constitutional Court held that the amendment introduced by S. 7 of the Balochistan Finance Act, 2020 did not fall outside the legislative competence of the Provincial Assembly of Balochistan. The petition was accordingly dismissed, leave was refused, and no order as to costs was made.

Summary: Constitution of Pakistan, 1973--- ----Arts. 8, 10A, 175F, 199, 202A & Third Schedule---Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, S. 109-A---Constitution (Twenty-Sixth Amendment) Act, 2024---Constitution (Twenty-Seventh Amendment) Act, 2025---Challenge to vires of statutory provision---Jurisdiction of Constitutional Bench vis-à-vis Regular Bench under erstwhile Art. 202A---Dominant object theory---Ad-interim order suspending operation of law---Maintainability of challenge thereto---Petitioner, after availing 2018 Amnesty Scheme and declaring ownership of foreign company, was issued notice under S.109-A, Income Tax Ordinance, 2001---He challenged both vires of said provision and the notice issued thereunder before Sindh High Court, which initially granted ad-interim restraint against passing of any final adverse order---Later, Constitutional Bench of High Court recalled said interim order on ground that courts ought not suspend operation of law, particularly in revenue matters---Before Federal Constitutional Court, principal question was whether Constitutional Bench, under erstwhile Art. 202A, possessed jurisdiction to entertain matter whose dominant relief was declaration that impugned law was ultra vires---Held, challenge to vires of statute, in substance, sought relief under Art.199(1)(a)(ii), namely declaration that law was “without lawful authority” and “of no legal effect”, and not merely a direction under Art.199(1)(a)(i) or enforcement of fundamental rights simpliciter---Under pre-27th Amendment regime, such matter did not fall within exclusive jurisdiction of Constitutional Bench---Only forum competent to grant final relief could competently grant interim relief; therefore, Constitutional Bench lacked jurisdiction from the outset and its order recalling the earlier ad-interim order was without jurisdiction---Court further held that ad-interim order which had effect of suspending operation of law could validly be brought in challenge before this Court, as until law is finally declared ultra vires it must ordinarily continue to operate---However, in view of subsequent constitutional amendment, exclusive writ jurisdiction now vests in Constitutional Benches and similar matters would henceforth lie before such Benches---Matter was remanded to Sindh High Court for fresh decision by competent Bench in accordance with law. Kh. Muhammad Fazil v. Mumtaz Munnawar Khan Niazi (deceased) through legal heirs (2024 SCMR 1059); Attock Cement case (2024 SHC 1302); Benazir Bhutto v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 1988 SC 416); Rahim Shah v. Chief Election Commissioner (PLD 1973 SC 24); Federation of Pakistan v. Aitzaz Ahsan (PLD 1989 SC 61); Marbury v. Madison (5 U.S. 137 (1803)) rel. (a) Constitution of Pakistan, 1973---Art. 202A (as it stood before Twenty-Seventh Amendment)---Jurisdiction of Constitutional Benches of High Courts---Scope--- Under erstwhile Art.202A, Constitutional Benches were not vested with entire writ jurisdiction under Art.199 but only with limited classes of matters specified therein---Therefore, question whether matter was to be heard by Constitutional Bench or Regular Bench had to be determined by reference to true nature of relief claimed. (b) Constitutional jurisdiction---Dominant object theory---Application--- For determining proper forum under former Art.202A, Court must examine pleadings, prayer clause and ultimate effect of relief sought so as to ascertain dominant or substantive relief, while treating merely consequential relief as ancillary---Such exercise is judicial in nature and not dependent upon drafting alone. (c) Challenge to vires of statute---Nature of relief--- Where petitioner assails validity of statutory provision and seeks declaration that same is contrary to Constitution, dominant relief is one under Art.199(1)(a)(ii), namely that impugned law is “without lawful authority” and “of no legal effect”---Such relief is, in substance, in nature of certiorari / declaratory judicial review, even if consequential directions are also sought. (d) High Courts---Power of judicial review---Inherent constitutional authority--- Power of High Court to strike down law ultra vires Constitution is inherent in constitutional scheme and flows from its role as guardian of Constitution, read with judicial oath and constitutional supremacy---Such authority is not negated merely because relief of declaration is not textually set out in identical terms in every clause of Art.199. (e) Interim relief---Competence of forum--- Interim relief may only be granted by forum competent to render final decision on lis---Consequently, where Constitutional Bench lacked jurisdiction to decide vires challenge under former Art.202A, it also lacked competence to pass or recall interim orders in relation thereto. (f) Ad-interim order suspending operation of law---Propriety and challenge thereto--- As a general constitutional principle, until a law is finally declared ultra vires, it should ordinarily continue to operate in normal course---An interim order having effect of suspending operation of law, especially in revenue matters, is therefore open to challenge before this Court and cannot be shielded merely because it is ad-interim in form. (g) Twenty-Seventh Constitutional Amendment---Effect--- After enactment of Constitution (Twenty-Seventh Amendment) Act, 2025, exclusive writ jurisdiction under Art.199 now lies with Constitutional Benches of High Courts, and Regular Benches no longer possess such jurisdiction---Accordingly, a case of like nature would now fall to be heard by Constitutional Bench. (h) Remand---When warranted--- Where impugned order has been passed by a Bench lacking jurisdiction, proper course is to set aside such order and remit matter for fresh adjudication by competent Bench in accordance with law. Petition allowed; impugned order set aside; matter remanded for decision by competent Bench of Sindh High Court in accordance with law.

Summary: The substitution of words "District Judge" with "District Court" in Section 13 through the Defamation (Amendment) Act, 2004, read with Section 6(2) of the Civil Courts Ordinance, 1962, leaves no ambiguity that an Additional District Judge, once entrusted with the matter, exercises concurrent judicial authority. Consequently, the trial of cases under the Defamation Ordinance, 2002 does not remain exclusive to the District Judge. 149Civil Revision- Civil Revision (Against Decree) u/s. 115, C.P.C. 392-17 :MUNIR AHMED VS :MST. TOHEEDA TUL HASSAN Mr. Justice Mirza Viqas Rauf 12-11- 2025 2025 LHC 6531

Summary: The aforementioned provision lays down the general rule that civil courts have inherent jurisdiction to entertain and try all civil suits unless a specific statutory bar either express or implied has been enacted to oust such jurisdiction. The phrase "civil nature" has been interpreted broadly by the courts to include all matters that involve the determination of civil rights and obligations. Accordingly, in the absence of any express or implied statutory bar, and in view of the fact that the Rent Tribunal does not have jurisdiction over disputes arising after the termination of the tenancy, the appropriate forum for seeking redressal in such matters remains the civil court. Thus, the remedy for the aggrieved party lies before the civil court, which is empowered under Section 9 CPC to adjudicate upon the matter. 163Civil Revision- Civil Revision (against Decree)- Declaration 768-16 CHAIRMAN BOARD OF INTERMIDIATE VS RABIA KHALID ETC Mr. Justice Anwaar Hussain 03- 11- 2025 2025 LHC 6545

Summary: The Punjab Healthcare Commission is duly empowered to regulate and control the pricing of healthcare services rendered by healthcare establishments including diagnostic facilities and laboratories throughout the Province of Punjab. The objections raised to the validity of the Punjab Healthcare Commission (Pricing of Healthcare Services) Regulations, 2023, are thus found to be untenable. 168Writ Petition- Local Government- Price Control 6195-25 MUHAMMAD JAMIL ZAHID VS FEDERATION OF PAKISTAN ETC. Mr. Justice Abid Hussain Chattha 29- 10- 2025 2025 LHC 6200

Summary: Judiciary cannot be termed as establishment and quota on the basis of minority or gender cannot be allotted in it except as provided by the Rules of Judicial Commission of Pakistan under the purview of diversity 185Civil Revision 50934/25 Abdul Rehman Vs Muhammad Ishtaq Mr. Justice Ahmad Nadeem Arshad 21- 10- 2025 2025 LHC 6157

Summary: Articles 59 and 84 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984----Comparison and signature & Thumb impression.-------- Modern forensic tools must be utilized to uncover the truth and uphold substantive justice over procedural technicalities------ Judicial discretion must be exercised to ensure fair adjudication, even if the alleged signatory is deceased------------- When the authenticity of a disputed document forms the core of a legal dispute, especially involving allegations of forgery, courts are duty-bound to seek expert opinion under Articles

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan ----Art. 185(3), read with Protection against Harassment of Women at the Workplace Act, 2010----Leave to appeal----Concurrent findings of statutory fora and High Court----Scope of interference----Standard in leave jurisdiction----Petitioner, an Assistant Clinical Instructor, challenged concurrent findings of the Federal Ombudsperson, the President of Pakistan (in representation under S.11 of the Act) and the Islamabad High Court, whereby he was found guilty of harassment and dismissed from service with compensation awarded to the complainant----Held, that in leave jurisdiction under Art.185(3), the Supreme Court interferes only where a question of law of public importance arises or where concurrent findings are shown to be the result of misreading, non-reading of evidence or perversity; mere difference of view is insufficient----Record reflected that Ombudsperson conducted a fresh inquiry after finding the original departmental committee improperly constituted; evidence was re-recorded, including reliance on an FIA forensic report of an audio recording; petitioner was afforded notice, disclosure of material, right of cross-examination and a reasoned determination by the Ombudsperson, the President and the High Court----High Court rightly found that successive applications/letters narrating continuing harassment constituted a complaint in substance under S.8 of the Act and justified cognizance----Concurrent findings were reasoned, evidence-based and not shown to be perverse or unsupported by record----No question of law of public importance arose; leave was, therefore, declined and the petition dismissed. (b) Constitution of Pakistan ----Art. 13(a)----Double jeopardy----Applicability to departmental/disciplinary proceedings----Prior inquiry and fresh statutory process----Effect----Petitioner contended that, since an earlier inquiry committee had not imposed a penalty, a fresh inquiry before the Federal Ombudsperson violated Art.13(a) of the Constitution----Held, that Art.13(a) is attracted to successive criminal prosecutions and punishments for the same offence; departmental or statutory disciplinary processes are remedial and regulatory in nature and do not amount to “criminal prosecution” for the purposes of Art.13(a)----Where a prior inquiry is irregular in constitution or procedure, a de novo process before the competent statutory forum is permissible and does not offend finality principles or the constitutional protection against double jeopardy----In the present case, the Federal Ombudsperson lawfully found the initial inquiry committee improperly constituted and conducted a fresh inquiry herself; this did not constitute double jeopardy nor bar the exercise of statutory jurisdiction. Relied on: Dr. Sohail Hassan Khan v. DG (Research) Livestock and Dairy Development Department, Punjab (2020 SCMR 1708). (c) Protection against Harassment of Women at the Workplace Act, 2010 ----Ss. 2(h), 3, 8 & 11----Complaint and cognizance----Form of complaint----Due process requirements----Standard of review----Complaint was made by a BSc Nursing student against her clinical instructor (petitioner) regarding harassment; after an initially defective inquiry, the complainant approached the Federal Ombudsperson who treated her written applications and repeated representations as a complaint under S.8 of the Act----Held, that a complaint under the Act is not confined to a rigid form; repeated written representations narrating continuing harassment may, in substance, satisfy the requirement of a complaint and justify cognizance, provided the respondent is given full opportunity to answer the allegations----Due process in this context demands notice, disclosure of the material to be relied upon, the right to cross-examine and a reasoned determination----Record showed that these requirements stood satisfied; petitioner’s plea that he was condemned unheard was without substance----Orders of the Ombudsperson (imposing major penalty of removal and Rs.500,000/- compensation), the President (dismissing representation) and the High Court (dismissing writ) were concurrent, reasoned and based on evidence, including forensic analysis; no ground for interference in leave jurisdiction was made out. (d) Protection against Harassment of Women at the Workplace Act, 2010 ----Ss. 2(h) & 2(b)(f)----Sexual harassment----Nature, forms and standard----Educational/clinical settings----Fiduciary-like duties of instructors----An instructor charged with clinical and academic supervision stands in a position of trust akin to a fiduciary, characterised by asymmetry of power, dependence for professional progression, and vulnerability of students relying on instructors for learning, clinical exposure and references----Such a relationship generates heightened duties: to avoid conflicts between personal gratification and students’ interests; not to exploit authority to solicit or normalize sexualised or gender-demeaning conduct; to maintain a safe learning environment; to respect confidentiality; and to act honestly in institutional processes, including inquiries under the Act----Misconduct in this setting is not a mere breach of discipline but a betrayal of institutional trust that corrodes professional integrity, undermines merit-based progression and deters families from permitting daughters to pursue education and training----Act and its definition of harassment under S.2(h) (including unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favours, sexually demeaning attitudes, hostile environment and gender-based discrimination) focus judicial attention on impact and environment rather than explicit solicitation alone; harassment that weaponizes power imbalances in any workplace offends dignity at its core----Courts must therefore apply the Act with vigilance in educational and clinical contexts, recognising heightened standards and wider societal stakes. Cited cases: Raja Tanveer Safdar v. Mrs. Tehmina Yasmeen (PLD 2024 SC 795); Muhammad Din v. Province of Punjab (PLD 2025 SC 354). (e) Constitution of Pakistan ----Arts. 9, 14(1), 25(2), 34 & 37(e)----Dignity, equality and protection of women at workplace----International obligations (CEDAW, ILO)----Interpretive approach----Scope and impact----Act is grounded in Arts.14, 25(2), 34 and 37(e) of the Constitution and reflects Pakistan’s international commitments, including CEDAW, ILO Convention No.190 on Violence and Harassment and other instruments affirming the right to just and favourable conditions of work free from violence and harassment for all workers, including informal and domestic workers----Constitutional guarantee of dignity under Art.14 is read in light of classical and contemporary accounts treating dignity as an organising value of the legal order and is supported by Qur’anic injunctions affirming innate honour, common origin and the inviolability of life, property and honour----Operational test derived by the Court is whether the act or rule objectifies or degrades the person, invades bodily or decisional autonomy, erases voice in matters vitally affecting them or denies conditions necessary for meaningful participation in family, community and civic life----Harassment that exploits power imbalances violates this test and offends dignity, equality and social justice obligations under the Constitution----Purposive interpretation, as recognised in Benazir Bhutto v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 1988 SC 416) and Darshan Masih (PLD 1990 SC 513), mandates giving full effect to these rights in the context of workplace harassment. (f) Protection against Harassment of Women at the Workplace Act, 2010 (as amended in 2022) ----Ss. 2(b)(f) & 2(h), read with definition of “accused”----Informal sector, agricultural labour and domestic work----Inclusive definition of “employee” but restrictive concept of “accused”----Statutory incongruity----Need for legislative reform----Amendments in 2022 broadened S.2(b)(f) so that “employee” now includes regular, contractual, part-time, temporary, freelance, piece-rate, gig workers, students, performers, artists, sportspersons, interns, trainees, domestic workers, home-based workers and apprentices, whether paid or unpaid, voluntary or otherwise----Further amendments in clause (g) extended potential liability to persons procuring services or labour (including freelancers), operators of online/remote businesses and households benefiting from home-based workers----Held, that despite this inclusive definition of “employee”, operative scope of liability remains constrained by the definition of “accused” as “an employee or employer of an organisation”, thereby excluding many agricultural settings, individual farms and households which do not qualify as “organisations”----Women working under landowners, landlords or farmers may thus fall outside the Act’s complaint and redress architecture, notwithstanding their inclusion as “employees”----This statutory misalignment is particularly troubling given rural socio-economic realities, poverty and heightened vulnerability of women and minor girls in field conditions, and warrants urgent legislative attention so that informal and agricultural workers receive effective, enforceable protection in line with international standards and Pakistan’s constitutional obligations. (g) Constitution of Pakistan ----Arts. 9, 14, 25(2), 34 & 37(e), read with Protection against Harassment of Women at the Workplace Act, 2010----Structural vulnerabilities of women in agrarian and informal sectors----Directions to Federation and Provinces----To render protections under the Act meaningful for all women across Pakistan and to harmonise domestic law with constitutional guarantees and international commitments, Supreme Court recorded grave concern over the limited reach of the Act in agricultural and informal settings and issued detailed directions to the Federation and the Provinces----Held, that failure to effectively extend protection to such workplaces compromises Arts.14(1), 25(2), 34 and 37(e) of the Constitution, given that women constitute a substantial and often under-recognised component of the agricultural and informal labour force----Court directed, inter alia, that: (i) the Federation, through Ministries of Law & Justice and Human Rights and Provincial Law Departments, shall within six months review and, where necessary, propose amendments to expand the definition of “workplace” to all sites of labour, formal or informal, including fields, farms, households and public spaces incidental to work, and further clarify the definition of “employee”; (ii) each Province shall establish District and Tehsil-level Harassment Protection Cells under Provincial Ombudspersons to receive and investigate complaints from rural and informal sectors; (iii) mobile complaint units be deployed in agricultural and peri-urban districts; (iv) Labour and Agriculture Departments devise a monitoring framework for enforcement of the Act across agricultural workplaces; (v) relevant Federal and Provincial departments develop programmes addressing child labour, rural poverty and awareness of workplace rights; and (vi) police receive specialised training on harassment-related offences and ensure safe transportation of minor girls to and from educational and training institutions----These directions are of general application and aim to operationalise the remedial spirit of the Act and the constitutional mandate. (h) Education sector, transport and institutional safeguards ----Safe access and complaint mechanisms for female students----Directions----In furtherance of the Act and constitutional guarantees of dignity and equality, Supreme Court directed that: (i) all drivers/riders providing transport to educational institutions (whether private or contractual) must be registered in governmental data; (ii) law enforcement agencies shall not permit unregistered drivers/riders to pick and drop girls from educational institutions; (iii) a permit system shall be initiated and maintained on a monthly basis, with a bar on persons having criminal records from operating as drivers/riders for such institutions; and (iv) transport authorities shall ensure that no harassment is caused to female students in transportation----Court further directed that all educational institutions where female students are educated shall establish harassment complaint cells and designate faculty members to hear harassment-related matters----These directions seek to reduce vulnerability in transit and to institutionalise accessible complaint mechanisms in educational settings. (i) Administration of justice ----Open justice, privacy and protection of victims of sexual harassment----Anonymisation and reporting restrictions----Balancing Article 14 with transparency----Having regard to Art.14 (dignity) and the principle of open justice, tempered by the need to protect victims of sexual harassment and to encourage reporting, Supreme Court directed that: (i) for all public versions of the judgment and any future reporting or citation, the complainant shall be anonymised as “Ms. K.S.” and all identifying particulars redacted by the Registry; (ii) no person shall publish, broadcast or disseminate any material likely to lead to identification of Ms. K.S. or student witnesses, save as permitted by further order of the Court or the Ombudsperson in enforcement proceedings; and (iii) in any remitted or collateral proceedings, forums concerned shall consider in camera hearings and controlled access to sensitive evidence to preserve privacy and dignity----These observations and directions are of general application and do not disturb the concurrent findings inter partes. (j) Protection against Harassment of Women at the Workplace Act, 2010 ----Penalties and remedies----Removal from service and compensation----Scope of interference in leave jurisdiction----Federal Ombudsperson, upon de novo inquiry, imposed major penalty of removal from service and ordered payment of Rs.500,000/- as compensation to the complainant; representation to the President under S.11 of the Act and writ petition before the High Court were dismissed; Supreme Court found that petitioner’s conduct had been adjudicated through lawful procedures based on evidence and cross-examination, that the concurrent findings aligned with the legislative intent to preserve dignity in learning environments and that no violation of due process or miscarriage of justice was evident----Held, that no perversity or misreading of evidence had been demonstrated; no question of law of public importance arose; leave to appeal was declined and the petition dismissed in terms of short order dated 17.10.2025.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan ----Art. 10-A (fair trial & due process)---Quasi-judicial proceedings before statutory tribunals---Impartiality and appearance of fairness---Held, Art. 10-A guarantees not only actual fairness but the appearance of fairness; adjudication must be free from bias and from any structural imbalance that disadvantages a party---Where a statutory chairperson who has already voted in the cause is further empowered to break a tie by a “second” or casting vote, the arrangement undermines impartiality and public confidence and offends Art. 10-A. (b) Competition Act, 2010 ----S. 24(5)---Casting vote of Chairperson---Scope---Reading down---Commission’s dual roles distinguished (administrative vs adjudicatory)---Held, S. 24(5) confers a casting vote to resolve equality of votes; however, to preserve Art. 10-A fairness in adjudicatory/quasi-judicial proceedings, the provision is read down to apply only to the Commission’s administrative or internal matters---In adjudication determining civil rights/obligations (e.g., post-show-cause proceedings under S. 30), each member’s vote must carry equal weight; no member may exercise a “double vote.” (c) Administrative law / Natural justice ----Bias—Structure of decision-making bodies—Equal weight of members’ votes---In adjudicatory forums, a chairperson’s casting vote after already expressing an opinion creates an appearance of bias and violates the equal-weight principle inherent in fair trial guarantees---Tribunal correctly set aside the Chairperson’s casting-vote decision rendered to resolve a deadlock in a four-member bench. (d) Comparative jurisprudence (persuasive only) ----Competition law—Casting vote in adjudication—Reference to Indian law---Delhi High Court declared unconstitutional the provision granting a casting vote to the chairperson in quasi-judicial decisions under S. 22(3) of the Indian Competition Act, 2002; the Indian legislature later omitted the casting-vote words (Act 9 of 2023). This comparative reasoning reinforces limiting such powers to non-adjudicatory matters. (e) Appellate review—Remand directions ----Tribunal’s approach examined---While upholding the setting aside of the Chairperson’s casting-vote decision in adjudication, the Supreme Court modified the consequential directions: instead of remitting to the Commission for rehearing by the Chairperson/another non-signatory member, the matter is remanded to the Tribunal to decide afresh after full hearing, within ninety days, uninfluenced by prior opinions. Held: (i) The Chairperson of the Competition Commission has no authority to exercise a casting vote in quasi-judicial/adjudicatory proceedings; S. 24(5) of the Competition Act, 2010 is read down to administrative/internal matters to conform with Art. 10-A. (ii) The Tribunal rightly set aside the Chairperson’s casting-vote decision; however, its direction remitting the matters to the Commission is modified—cases are remanded to the Tribunal to decide afresh within ninety days after hearing all parties. No order as to costs. Cited Cases: • Suo Motu Case No. 4 of 2010, PLD 2012 SC 553 • Mahindra Electric Mobility Ltd. & others v. CCI & others, 2019 DHC 2043-DB (Delhi High Court) Disposition: Appeals partly allowed—Chairperson’s casting-vote in adjudication held impermissible; Tribunal’s annulment of casting-vote decision upheld; remand modified—matters sent to the Tribunal for fresh decision within ninety days; no costs.