Summary: (a) Land Acquisition Act (I of 1894)--- ----S.54---Limitation Act (IX of 1908) S.5---Appeal---Limitation---Condonation of delay--- Scope---Appellants assailed judgment and decree passed by Trial Court---Appeal was filed after a delay of 05 months---Appellants had not been able to sufficiently explain the inordinate delay within the parameters of law and the only reason furnished by the appellants was that they had been unable to accord the necessary sanctions from law department timely- --In the absence of any valid explanation of the delay for each and every day, the appeal was not maintainable---Appeal was dismissed. (b) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)--- ----S.5---Dismissal of suit, instituted, after period of limitation---Scope---Where an appeal is not filed within stipulated period, it creates valuable rights in favour of the opposite party, such valuable rights cannot be taken away unless very strong, convincing and solid grounds are shown for condoning the delay. Government of Pakistan through Ministry of Works and another v. Messrs Malbrow Builders, Contractor, Sialkot 2006 SCMR 1248 and Imtiaz Ali v. Atta Muhammad and another PLD 2008 SC 462 rel. Shahid Baloch, Additional A.G. for Appellants

Summary: The case revolves around the respondent being accused of submitting fake medical claims and falsifying documents, resulting in their removal from service by the petitioner. The petitioner asserts that the Full Bench's decision was based on erroneous factual assumptions and legal misapplication. The respondent's counsel supports the Impugned Judgment, claiming that the Single Bench should have independently verified the evidence and not solely relied on the evidence before it. The respondent's counsel also argues that there was no need for witnesses in this case and that the disciplinary proceedings initiated by the petitioner were time-barred. After reviewing the arguments and records, the Court concludes that the respondent had not seriously disputed the facts presented by the petitioner. The Court observes that the respondent did not provide documents, witnesses, or a substantial challenge to the charges during the inquiry. Therefore, the Court finds no basis for the Full Bench to disregard the uncontroverted evidence and substitute it with presumptions. The Court also examines the alleged delay in the case, finding that the petitioner's initiation of disciplinary proceedings was not time-barred. The Court further notes that the respondent's case is distinguishable from the precedent cited by the Full Bench. In light of these considerations, the Court rules that the Impugned Judgment was based on erroneous assumptions and misapplication of the law. The Court sets aside the Impugned Judgment and returns the secured amounts to the petitioner. The reasons for the Court's decision are provided in this document.

Summary: Background: The petitioner filed a civil revision petition challenging the judgments and decrees of the Civil Judge and District Judge of Dera Ghazi Khan. The case revolved around a property initially mortgaged to an evacuee (Panjumal) in 1887-88, with the petitioner asserting rights of redemption. The petitioner claimed that after the evacuee left Pakistan in 1947, the land was wrongly allotted to a third party without addressing the petitioner's redemption rights. The lower courts dismissed the suit for being barred by limitation, leading the petitioner to seek revision. -----Issues: 1- Whether the petitioner's right of redemption was barred by the limitation period. -----2- Whether the time period from 1947 (when the evacuee left Pakistan) could be excluded for the purposes of the limitation under Section 13 of the Limitation Act. -----3- Whether there was any acknowledgment within the limitation period that would restart the limitation under Section 19 of the Limitation Act. -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The court held that the suit for redemption was time-barred under Article 148 of the Limitation Act, which allows a 60-year period for filing such suits. The mortgage was created in 1887-88, and the limitation expired in 1947. The petitioner failed to show any acknowledgment or action within this 60-year period that could extend or revive the limitation. The petitioner's argument for excluding the period after 1947 (when the evacuee left Pakistan) under Section 13 of the Limitation Act was rejected. The court clarified that the exclusion applies only when the defendant leaves within the limitation period, which had already expired before 1947. The court found no evidence of any acknowledgment made within the original limitation period (60 years from 1887) that would restart the limitation under Section 19 of the Limitation Act. As such, the petitioner's right to redeem the property had lapsed. The court dismissed the civil revision petition, affirming the judgments of the lower courts. -----Citations/Precedents: Ghulam Muhammad and 3 others v. Member, Board of Revenue Punjab, Lahore and 16 others (PLD 2005 Lahore 119) Muhammad Hanif and another v. Ghulam Rasool through L.Rs and others (2005 SCMR 1004) Abdul Haq v. Ali Akbar and others (1999 SCMR 2531) Samar Gul v. Central Government and others (PLD 1986 Supreme Court 35) Allah Ditta and others v. Sardar Khan and others (PLD 1997 Lahore 716) Muhammad Akhtar v. Mst. Manna and 3 others (2001 SCMR 1700) Malik Muhammad Hussain v. District Returning Officer and Others (2008 SCMR 488) Sheikh Muhammad Sadiq v. Elahi Bakhsh and 2 others (2006 SCMR 12) Firm Sriniwas Ram Kumar v. Mahabir Prasad and other (A.I.R. (38) 1951 Supreme Court 177) Muhammad Zaman and 8 others v. Abdul Malik Khan and 7 others (PLD 1991 Supreme Court 524) Udhavji Anandji Ladha & others v. Bapudas Ramdas Darbar (A.I.R (37) 1950 Bombay 94) Allah Dawaya and others v. Ghulam Mustafa and others (1990 CLC 1990) Nazeef v. Abdul Ghaffar and others (PLD 1966 Supreme Court 267) Kata Mir and others v. Mst. SHO Begum and others (2003 SCMR 589) Ghazi Marjan etc v. Alam Gul etc (PLJ 2009 Peshawar 102)

Summary: Background: This civil appeal was filed by Raja Muhammad Bashir Khan against the judgment and decree passed by the District Judge Neelum on 28.11.2014. The case concerns a dispute over land in Mirpura Tehsil Athmuqam, where the appellant claimed that the land was transferred to his father through an oral sale, followed by an agreement to sell dated 25.03.2004. The appellant sought a decree for declaration and perpetual injunction, or alternatively, specific performance of the contract. The respondents contested the suit, and the trial court dismissed the case under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC), leading to this appeal. ----Issues: 1- Whether the agreement to sell dated 25.03.2004 can form the basis for a decree of declaration or specific performance of the contract. 2- Whether the suit is barred by limitation under the relevant provisions of the Limitation Act. 3- Whether the suit was rightly dismissed under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC for not disclosing a cause of action. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: The court dismissed the appeal, affirming the decision of the District Judge Neelum. The key points of the court's reasoning were as follows: Agreement to Sell and Declaration: The court held that a decree for declaration cannot be granted based on an agreement to sell. An agreement to sell does not confer ownership rights but merely indicates a future intention to transfer the property. The court emphasized that such an agreement, if fully executed, would require registration under the Registration Act, especially when the consideration and possession have been completed. In this case, the agreement dated 25.03.2004 was treated as a defective sale deed, which was not registered as required by law, rendering it inadmissible as evidence. Specific Performance of the Contract: The court observed that the appellant's claim for specific performance was untenable because the agreement to sell was essentially a completed transaction that should have been registered. Additionally, the court noted that the appellant did not pursue the registration of the sale deed within the stipulated three-month period and remained inactive for nearly a decade before filing the suit. As such, the suit was deemed hopelessly time-barred under Article 113 of the Limitation Act, which requires action to be taken within three years from the date fixed in the agreement or from the time the plaintiff had notice of the defendant's refusal. Dismissal under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC: The court found that the suit did not disclose a valid cause of action and was thus rightly rejected under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC. The appellant failed to provide any evidence of the respondents' refusal to perform their part of the contract within the required timeframe, and the suit was barred by limitation. The court concluded that the suit was legally flawed from its inception and that the trial court's decision to dismiss it was correct. The appeal was dismissed with the judgment of the District Judge Neelum being upheld. ----Citations/Precedents: 2016 SCR 1712: Confirmed that a decree for declaration cannot be passed based on an agreement to sell. 1994 CLC 132: Discussed the consequences of non-registration of an agreement to sell and its inadmissibility as evidence. PLJ 2004 Lahore 975: Clarified that limitation begins from the date fixed in the agreement or when the plaintiff had notice of the refusal of performance. The appeal was dismissed, and the judgments of the lower courts were affirmed as being in accordance with the law.

Summary: Background: The petitioner filed a civil revision under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, challenging the appellate court's decision, which upheld the trial court's refusal to set aside an ex-parte judgment and decree dated 07.12.2009. The original suit, filed by the respondent on 03.04.2006, was for specific performance of an agreement to sell land dated 30.03.2005, which the petitioner had allegedly failed to honor. -----Issues: 1- Whether the ex-parte proceedings and judgment and decree dated 07.12.2009 should be set aside. ----2- Whether the petitioner's application to set aside the ex-parte judgment was time-barred under the Limitation Act. ----3- Whether the ex-parte judgment based on an unwritten agreement is valid. ----4- Whether the petitioner had a valid excuse for not attending court proceedings and filing the application late. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: --Applicability of Limitation Act: The petitioner argued that Article 181 of the Limitation Act, which allows a three-year period to file an application, applied to the case. However, the court determined that Article 164 of the Limitation Act, providing a 30-day period to set aside an ex-parte decree, was applicable. Since the petitioner was aware of the proceedings, the application filed after 9 months was time-barred. --Failure to Establish Sufficient Cause for Delay: The petitioner claimed that he was under the mistaken impression that the next court hearing was on 04.01.2010 instead of 04.12.2009. However, the court found this excuse implausible and insufficient to justify the delay. The petitioner failed to explain his prolonged inaction after allegedly learning about the case in January 2010. --Ex-Parte Decree Validity: The petitioner's argument that the ex-parte decree was void because it was based on an unwritten agreement was rejected. The court noted that unwritten agreements are valid under the law if supported by credible evidence. In this case, the respondent had provided oral and documentary evidence to support the agreement. The petitioner's lack of diligence and failure to explain the delay in filing the application led the court to uphold the ex-parte judgment. The court emphasized that valuable rights accrued to the respondent due to the petitioner's inaction. The civil revision was dismissed, and the concurrent findings of the lower courts were upheld. -----Citations/Precedents: Messrs Rehman Weaving Factory (Regd.) Bahawalnagar v. Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan (PLD 1981 SC 21) Honda Atlas Cars (Pakistan) LTD v. Honda Sarhad (Pvt.) LTD (2005 SCMR 609) Secretary Education Department, Government of N.W.F.P., Peshawar and others v. Asfandiar Khan (2008 SCMR 287) Shahid Pervaiz alias Shahid Hameed v. Muhammad Ahmad Ameen (2006 SCMR 631)

Summary: (a) Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001---- ----S. 22---Banking appeal---Suit for recovery of agricultural finance---Dismissal of suit as time-barred---Bank filed suit for recovery of Rs.3,73,462 against customer on basis of agricultural loan allegedly availed in 1992, with expiry date of finance facility fixed as 07.01.1993---Banking Court dismissed suit as barred by limitation---High Court maintained dismissal, holding that recovery suit instituted on 28.07.2014 was far beyond prescribed limitation period. (b) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)---- ----Art. 132, First Schedule---Suit to enforce payment of money charged upon immovable property---Mortgage of landed property---Limitation period---Loan was obtained against mortgage of landed property, therefore, suit to enforce payment of money charged upon immovable property was governed by Art.132, Part VIII, First Schedule, Limitation Act, 1908---Limitation period was twelve years from date when outstanding amount became payable. (c) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)---- ----Art. 132---Starting point of limitation---Expiry date of finance facility---Where finance facility expired on 07.01.1993, limitation for filing recovery suit commenced from date when amount became due/payable on expiry of facility---Bank was required to institute suit within twelve years, i.e., up to 2005---Suit filed in 2014 was barred by time. (d) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---- ----O. VII, R. 6---Suit filed after limitation---Pleading grounds for exemption---Where suit is instituted after expiration of prescribed limitation period, plaint must show grounds upon which exemption from limitation is claimed under Ss.6 to 20, Limitation Act, 1908---Bank’s plaint did not plead any ground for exemption or fresh starting point of limitation---Suit was liable to dismissal. (e) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)---- ----Ss. 3, 19 & 20---Acknowledgment/payment---Fresh limitation---Requirements---Bank argued that limitation should run from fresh point because customer deposited Rs.17,000 acknowledging liability---High Court rejected contention because no such plea was taken in plaint and no document showed acknowledgment in writing, in customer’s handwriting or signed by him within limitation period---Fresh limitation could not be claimed. (f) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)---- ----S. 19---Acknowledgment of liability---Condition precedent---Acknowledgment must be made before expiry of prescribed limitation period and must be in writing signed by party against whom right is claimed---No material was produced to show acknowledgment by customer within limitation period---S.19 could not rescue time-barred claim. (g) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)---- ----S. 20---Part payment---Credit entry in account---Requirement of handwriting/signature---Any payment relied upon to extend limitation must be acknowledged in handwriting of, or in writing signed by, person making payment---Mere alleged credit entry or assertion of deposit without signed acknowledgment did not constitute valid part payment for fresh limitation. (h) Pleadings---- ----Fact not pleaded cannot be proved---Limitation exemption---Effect---Where plaintiff did not plead payment/acknowledgment or facts attracting Ss.19 or 20, Limitation Act, 1908, it could not later prove such unpleaded facts through evidence or argument---Court need not frame issue on limitation exemption where necessary foundational facts were absent from plaint. Cited Case: • Saddaruddin through LRs v. Sultan Khan through LRs and others 2021 SCMR 642 (i) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)---- ----S. 3---Mandatory duty of Court---Limitation not pleaded as defence---Effect---Every suit instituted after prescribed limitation period must be dismissed even if limitation is not set up as defence---Court is under bounden duty to notice limitation because S.3 is mandatory in form. (j) Limitation---- ----Not mere technicality---Accrual of right by lapse of time---Once limitation expires, a right accrues in favour of opposite party by operation of law and cannot lightly be taken away---Bank’s delayed claim could not be entertained merely on equitable or technical grounds. Cited Case: • Asad Ali and 9 others v. The Bank of Punjab and others PLD 2020 SC 736 (k) Banking suit---- ----Ex parte proceedings against customer---Court’s duty to examine limitation---Customer was proceeded ex parte before Banking Court, yet Court was bound to examine whether bank’s suit was within limitation---Suit being barred by limitation was rightly dismissed even without contest by customer. (l) Banking appeal---- ----Appellate interference---Time-barred recovery suit---Scope---Bank failed to controvert that loan facility was availed in 1992, expired on 07.01.1993, and suit was filed in 2014---No pleaded or proved acknowledgment/part payment saved limitation---High Court found no illegality in Banking Court’s dismissal of suit. Disposition: RFA No.119 of 2017 was dismissed; ex parte judgment and decree dated 22.09.2016 passed by Banking Court-I, Multan dismissing ZTBL’s recovery suit as barred by limitation were maintained; no order as to costs.

Summary: Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 (ITO) (a) Section 170(4)—Refund claims and statutory timeframe ----The 60-day timeframe prescribed under Section 170(4) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, for passing a refund order is directory, not mandatory, where the taxpayer has recourse to an appellate remedy under Section 170(5)(b). Failure to pass the order within the stipulated period does not render the claim automatically approved. (b) Section 170(5)(b)—Right of appeal against inaction ----Section 170(5)(b) allows a taxpayer to file an appeal if a refund order is not passed within the prescribed 60 days. This appellate remedy underscores legislative intent to prevent automatic approval of refund claims due to administrative delays. (c) Mandatory vs. directory timeframes in tax statutes ----The Supreme Court's principles in Sarwaq Traders (2022) and Super Asia (2017) guide the interpretation of statutory timeframes. A provision is mandatory if the legislative language is restrictive or contains penal consequences for non-compliance. However, the absence of such language or the existence of an alternative remedy, as in Section 170(5)(b), suggests a directory nature. (d) Legislative intent and redundancy avoidance ----Interpreting the 60-day timeframe in Section 170(4) as mandatory would render Section 170(5)(b) redundant. Statutory construction principles require giving effect to all provisions, ensuring harmonious interpretation. (e) Case law applicability ----Judgments like Sarwaq Traders and Mujahid Soap are distinguishable as they involved statutes with restrictive language ("in no case exceed") not present in Section 170(4). The absence of such language and the presence of an appellate mechanism support the directory nature of the provision. Disposition: The 60-day timeframe under Section 170(4) is directory, not mandatory. The taxpayer’s failure to utilize the appellate remedy under Section 170(5)(b) precludes reliance on the department’s inaction to claim refund approval by default. The question of law is answered in favor of the Revenue and against the taxpayer. Cited Cases: Commissioner Inland Revenue, Zone-II v. M/s Sarwaq Traders (2022) Collector of Sales Tax, Gujranwala v. Messrs Super Asia Mohammad Din and Sons (2017 SCMR 1427) Mujahid Soap and Chemical Industries v. Customs Appellate Tribunal (2019 SCMR 1735). Held: The 60-day timeframe under Section 170(4) does not result in automatic approval of refund claims. The provision is directory, ensuring taxpayers exercise their right to appeal under Section 170(5)(b) for expeditious resolution.

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) ----S. 100----Second Appeal----Scope and grounds----Principles. Second appeals under Section 100, C.P.C., can only be entertained when decisions by the lower courts are contrary to law, fail to address material issues of law, or exhibit substantial procedural defects. Mere reappraisal of evidence or factual findings is outside the scope of second appellate jurisdiction. Cited Case: • Bahar Shah v. Manzoor Ahmad (2022 SCMR 284). Disposition: Appeal dismissed; findings upheld. (b) Muhammadan Law----Essentials of a valid gift----Delivery of possession. For a valid gift under Muhammadan law, delivery of possession is a mandatory condition unless specific exceptions apply. In the absence of possession, the gift cannot be deemed complete. The requirement of delivery of possession may only be dispensed with under certain circumstances, such as proof of mutation or registered deeds. In the instant case, no evidence of possession, mutation, or valid transfer was provided. Cited Cases: • Hafiz Tassaduq Hussain v. Muhammad Din (PLD 2011 SC 241) • Mst. Umar Bibi v. Bashir Ahmad (1977 SCMR 154). Disposition: Gift claim dismissed; lower court findings upheld. (c) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877) ----S. 22----Specific performance----Grant of relief----Liquidated damages. The inclusion of a liquidated damages clause in a sale agreement does not bar the grant of specific performance. Courts may exercise discretion to grant specific relief based on the overall evidence and circumstances. In this case, specific performance was upheld due to the buyer’s compliance with material terms and admission of the agreement by the seller. Cited Case: • Muhammad Naeem Shafi v. Mst. Shamim Akhtar (2022 CLC 744). Disposition: Specific performance granted. (d) Evidence Act (I of 1872) ----Ss. 79 & 80----Proof of documents----Admissibility of additional evidence. Additional evidence sought to challenge a sale agreement was rejected as the execution of the agreement was admitted by the party seeking to challenge it. Admitted facts do not require further proof. Cited Case: • Mst. Rehmat v. Mst. Zubaida Begum (2021 SCMR 1534). Disposition: Application for additional evidence dismissed. (e) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) ----O. XLI, R. 22----Cross-objections----Limitation. Cross-objections must be filed within 30 days of notice of the appeal’s hearing. Delay beyond the limitation period renders cross-objections time-barred. In the instant case, the husband's cross-objections were correctly dismissed as they were filed beyond the statutory time limit. Disposition: Cross-objections dismissed. (f) Family law----Validity of gift----Non-transferable property. A gift involving non-transferable property is inherently invalid under law. In this case, the plot was non-transferable at the time of the alleged gift, further invalidating the transaction. Disposition: Gift claim dismissed. (g) Judicial discretion----Concurrent findings----Limited interference by appellate courts. In cases involving concurrent findings of fact by trial and appellate courts, the scope of second appellate jurisdiction is narrowly confined to legal errors or procedural irregularities. Disposition: Appeal dismissed.

Summary: Dismissal From Service---Barred By Time---Dismissed --- The Tribunal had dismissed the petitioner's appeal (Appeal No.388(P)CS of 2019) in limine, citing that it was barred by time. The case involves the petitioner, a Signal Operator with Khyber Rifles, who was implicated in the arrest of an individual with recovered US Dollars. Subsequently, the petitioner faced disciplinary actions, including imprisonment and demotion, and filed appeals. The Peshawar High Court dismissed a constitutional petition for lack of jurisdiction, leading to the appeal before the Tribunal. The petitioner argues for the condonation of delay, asserting a genuine belief in approaching the High Court. The legal analysis involves scrutiny of the petitioner's appeals' timeliness, application of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, and the contention that there is no limitation against a void order. The court, after examining the arguments, emphasizes the need for due diligence in choosing the appropriate forum, rejects the petitioner's claim of ambiguity in the law, and asserts that limitation applies even to orders that are not void. Ultimately, the court upholds the Tribunal's decision to dismiss the appeal on the grounds of being time-barred.

Summary: (Detailed Judgement on Limitation) Computation of period of limitation prescribed by Section 12 mainly deals with appeals, application for leave to appeal, application for review judgment and application to set-aside an Award and these proceedings have the minimum time period prescribed in the Limitation Act which ranges between 15 to 90 days excluding the time consumed for obtaining the certified copies. Prolonging the restricted period of limitation which would frustrate the very purpose by which the legislature has curtailed the period of suspense and uncertainty for the litigants to ensure their peace of mind. Appeal Dismissed.