Summary: (a) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)--- ----Challenge to mutation---Suit filed after twenty-two years---Unexplained delay---Effect---Mutation No.684 was sanctioned on 15.03.1980, whereas suit challenging the same was instituted on 16.05.2002 after lapse of more than twenty-two years---Plaintiff remained silent during such prolonged period and took no steps to question validity of mutation or underlying transaction---No convincing or legally acceptable explanation was furnished for such inordinate delay---Held, that person who sleeps over his rights for decades cannot subsequently seek to unsettle long-standing entries in revenue record and disturb settled rights of parties---Suit was hopelessly barred by limitation. Cited Cases: • Muhammad Miskeen and others v. Noor Muhammad and others 2011 SCMR 808 • Muhammad Hussain and others v. Muhammad Shafi and others 2008 SCMR 230 • Ghulam Haider and others v. Wali Muhammad and others 2008 SCMR 1425 • Atta Muhammad v. Maula Bakhsh 2007 SCMR 1446 • Dr. Muhammad Javaid Shafi v. Syed Rashid Arshad and others PLD 2015 SC 212 • United Bank Limited and others v. Noor-Un-Nisa and others 2015 SCMR 380 • Lahore Development Authority v. Mst. Sharifan Bibi and another PLD 2010 SC 705 • Sardar Anwar Ali Khan and others v. Sardar Baqir Ali through Legal Heirs and others 1992 SCMR 2435 (b) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)--- ----S. 39---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Art. 91---Fraudulent document or transaction---Suit for declaration/cancellation---Limitation---Plaintiff attempted to avoid bar of limitation by alleging that mutation was procured through fraud and misrepresentation---Held, that although fraud vitiates solemn acts, allegation of fraud must be specifically pleaded and strictly proved through reliable evidence---Where a document or transaction is alleged to have been obtained through fraud or misrepresentation, matter falls within S.39 of Specific Relief Act, 1877 and suit seeking declaration or cancellation must be filed within limitation prescribed under Art.91 of Limitation Act, 1908, i.e. three years from date when alleged fraud comes to knowledge of plaintiff---Plea of fraud could not be invoked merely to circumvent law of limitation. Cited Cases: • Mst. Zulaikhan Bibi through LRs and others v. Mst. Roshan Jan and others 2011 SCMR 986 • Muhammad Younus Khan v. Government of N.-W.F.P. 1993 SCMR 618 • Dr. Muhammad Javaid Shafi v. Syed Rashid Arshad and others PLD 2015 SC 212 (c) Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984--- ----Fraud, forgery and misrepresentation---Burden of proof---Mutation challenged after long delay---Plaintiff alleged that mutation was result of fraud, forgery and misrepresentation and had been sanctioned without his consent or authority---Trial Court and First Appellate Court, after appraisal of oral and documentary evidence, concurrently held that plaintiff failed to prove fraud through independent evidence---Held, that bald allegations of fraud were insufficient---Fraud being a question of fact had to be established by reliable, convincing and cogent evidence---Plaintiff’s long silence for more than two decades further undermined credibility of allegation. (d) Revenue record--- ----Long-standing mutation entries---Laches, limitation and third-party rights---Effect---Mutation in question remained incorporated in revenue record for decades without challenge and third-party rights had also come into existence---Held, that long-standing entries in revenue record ought not to be unsettled lightly, particularly where they remained unquestioned for considerable period and rights accrued on their basis---Challenges to old mutation entries after prolonged inaction must be viewed with great circumspection and ordinarily ought not to be entertained. Cited Cases: • Waris Khan and 18 others v. Col. Humayun Shah and 41 others PLD 1994 SC 336 • Mst. Grana through legal heirs v. Sahib Kamala Bibi PLD 2014 SC 167 (e) Revenue record--- ----Mutation incorporated in Jamabandi---Presumption of correctness---Burden to rebut---Once mutation was sanctioned and incorporated into Jamabandi, it formed part of regular revenue record and carried statutory presumption of truth---Plaintiff failed to produce convincing evidence to rebut such presumption---Held, that presumption of regularity and correctness attached to revenue entries could not be lightly displaced---Courts below rightly gave due weight to revenue record and held that plaintiff failed to discharge heavy burden required to dislodge presumption attached thereto. Cited Cases: • Abdul Ahad and others v. Roshan Din and others PLD 1979 SC 890 • Ghulam Haider and others v. Wali Muhammad and others 2008 SCMR 1425 • Muhammad Hussain and others v. Muhammad Shafi and others 2008 SCMR 230 (f) Land Revenue Act--- ----Mutation proceedings---Procedural irregularity---Effect on otherwise established sale transaction---Plaintiff raised objections regarding procedure adopted in attestation of mutation---Held, that even if certain procedural irregularities existed in attestation of mutation, such irregularities by themselves would not invalidate an otherwise established transaction of sale---Where authenticity and genuineness of underlying sale transaction is established, mere irregularity in mutation procedure does not affect binding effect of mutation---Technical defects in mutation process cannot defeat substantive rights where transaction is proved by credible oral and documentary evidence. Cited Cases: • Muhammad Ishaq and others v. Ghafoor Khan and another 2000 SCMR 519 • Muhammad Afzal and others v. Province of Punjab 2001 SCMR 593 • Nawab Din v. Giani 2008 SCMR 657 (g) Revenue record--- ----Mutation entries---Nature and evidentiary value---Mutation entries by themselves do not create title, but where underlying transaction is proved through credible evidence, such entries may validly reflect transfer of rights---In the present case, subordinate Courts examined oral and documentary evidence and concurrently held that transaction reflected in mutation was genuine and plaintiff had failed to establish fraud or misrepresentation---Held, that procedural objections regarding mutation proceedings could not annul transaction or justify setting aside concurrent findings recorded by subordinate Courts. (h) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----S. 115---Revisional jurisdiction---Concurrent findings of fact---Scope of interference---Trial Court and First Appellate Court concurrently held that mutation reflected genuine sale transaction, fraud was not proved and suit was time-barred---High Court, in revision, reassessed evidence and substituted its own conclusions without identifying misreading, non-reading, perversity or material illegality in findings of Courts below---Held, that revisional jurisdiction is supervisory and does not convert High Court into a third Court of fact---Concurrent findings of fact cannot ordinarily be disturbed unless based on misreading or non-reading of evidence, or suffering from perversity, illegality or material irregularity affecting merits of case---High Court exceeded settled limits of revisional jurisdiction. Cited Cases: • Sultan Muhammad and another v. Muhammad Qasim and others 2010 SCMR 1630 • Mst. Tayyeba Ambareen and another v. Shafqat Ali Kiyani and another 2023 SCMR 246 • Nawab Din v. Giani 2008 SCMR 657 • Muhammad Ishaq and others v. Ghafoor Khan and another 2000 SCMR 519 • Mst. Zaitoon Begum v. Nazar Hussain and another 2014 SCMR 1469 • Cantonment Board through Executive Officer, Cantt. Board Rawalpindi v. Ikhlaq Ahmed and others 2014 SCMR 161 • Muhammad Farid Khan v. Muhammad Ibrahim etc. 2017 SCMR 679 • Muhammad Sarwar and others v. Hashmal Khan and others PLD 2022 SC 13 • Mst. Zarsheda v. Nobat Khan PLD 2022 SC 21 • Salamat Ali and others v. Muhammad Din and others PLJ 2023 SC 8 • Mst. Farzana Zia and others v. Mst. Saadia Andaleeb 2024 SCMR 916 (i) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----S. 115---Misreading, non-reading and misappreciation of evidence---Distinction---Scope of revisional Court---Held, that misreading or non-reading of evidence may justify revisional interference where finding is perverse, absurd, jurisdictionally defective or contrary to law---Mere misappreciation or possibility of another view does not permit revisional Court to substitute its own conclusion for concurrent findings of Courts below---If facts have been justly tried by two Courts and both reached same conclusion, High Court should not revisit evidence merely to draw another conclusion. (j) Civil suit--- ----Challenge to mutation---Solitary statement of plaintiff versus documentary proof---Effect---Plaintiff alleged that he did not visit Patwari’s office on date of mutation but produced no independent witness and remained confined to his solitary statement---Mutation No.684 and Exchange Mutation No.683 were entered and sanctioned on same day with same identifying witnesses, which negated plaintiff’s stance---Held, that solitary statement was insufficient to dislodge documentary proof and revenue record produced by defendants---Subordinate Courts correctly concluded that plaintiff failed to prove fraud, forgery or misrepresentation. (k) Civil suit--- ----Suit for declaration, mandatory injunction and permanent injunction---Challenge to mutation after twenty-two years---Concurrent dismissal by Trial Court and First Appellate Court---High Court decreeing suit in revision---Supreme Court interference---Held, that cumulative effect of record showed that suit was hopelessly barred by limitation; allegations of fraud, forgery and misrepresentation remained unsubstantiated; mutation incorporated in revenue record for decades carried presumption of correctness; third-party rights had intervened; and High Court transgressed limits of revisional jurisdiction by interfering with concurrent findings without showing misreading or non-reading of evidence---Impugned High Court judgment could not be sustained. Disposition: Appeals were allowed. Judgment dated 21.11.2019 passed by Islamabad High Court was set aside. Concurrent judgments and decrees of Trial Court dated 17.03.2017 and First Appellate Court dated 11.11.2017 were restored. Civil suit filed by respondent No.1 stood dismissed. Pending CMAs were disposed of as infructuous. No order as to costs.

Summary: (a) Limitation Act (IX of 1908)---- ----Challenge to mutation after twenty-two years---Unexplained delay---Suit for declaration, mandatory injunction and permanent injunction---Mutation No.684 was sanctioned on 15.03.1980, whereas respondent No.1 instituted suit on 16.05.2002 after lapse of more than twenty-two years alleging fraud, forgery and misrepresentation---Supreme Court held that unexplained delay in challenging a mutation renders the claim legally untenable---Respondent remained completely silent for more than two decades and took no step to question validity of mutation or underlying sale transaction---No convincing or legally acceptable explanation was furnished for such inordinate delay---A person who sleeps over his rights for decades cannot subsequently seek to unsettle long-standing entries in revenue record and disturb settled rights of parties---Law of limitation is designed to bring certainty and finality to legal relations and prevent reopening of stale claims---Suit was clearly and hopelessly barred by limitation. Cited Cases: • Muhammad Miskeen and others v. Noor Muhammad and others 2011 SCMR 808 • Muhammad Hussain and others v. Muhammad Shafi and others 2008 SCMR 230 • Ghulam Haider and others v. Wali Muhammad and others 2008 SCMR 1425 • Atta Muhammad v. Maula Bakhsh 2007 SCMR 1446 • Dr. Muhammad Javaid Shafi v. Syed Rashid Arshad and others PLD 2015 SC 212 • United Bank Limited and others v. Noor-Un-Nisa and others 2015 SCMR 380 • Lahore Development Authority v. Mst. Sharifan Bibi and another PLD 2010 SC 705 • Sardar Anwar Ali Khan and 10 others v. Sardar Baqir Ali through Legal Heirs and 4 others 1992 SCMR 2435 (b) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)---- ----S. 39---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Art. 91---Fraud alleged in respect of mutation/sale transaction---Fraud vitiates all solemn acts, but must be specifically pleaded and strictly proved---Supreme Court reiterated that fraud vitiates solemn acts and any instrument, deed, judgment or decree obtained through fraud is a nullity, but allegation of fraud cannot be accepted on mere assertion---Fraud must be specifically pleaded and strictly proved through reliable evidence---Question of fraud involves finding of fact regarding conduct of party concerned---Even where fraud is alleged in relation to an instrument or transaction, party challenging such instrument is required to seek cancellation within prescribed limitation period---Where document is alleged to have been obtained through fraud or misrepresentation, matter falls within S.39 of Specific Relief Act and suit seeking declaration/cancellation must be filed within three years under Art.91 of Limitation Act from date when alleged fraud comes to knowledge of plaintiff---Respondent failed to produce convincing evidence of fraud and remained silent for more than two decades; plea of fraud could not be used to circumvent law of limitation. Cited Cases: • Mst. Zulaikhan Bibi through LRs and others v. Mst. Roshan Jan and others 2011 SCMR 986 • Muhammad Younus Khan v. Government of N.-W.F.P. 1993 SCMR 618 • Dr. Muhammad Javaid Shafi v. Syed Rashid Arshad and others PLD 2015 SC 212 (c) Qanun-e-Shahadat Order (10 of 1984)---- ----Proof of fraud, forgery and misrepresentation---Independent and reliable evidence required---Respondent alleged that Mutation No.684 dated 15.03.1980 was procured through fraud, forgery and misrepresentation and without his consent or authority---Trial Court and First Appellate Court, after appraisal of oral and documentary evidence, held that respondent failed to prove fraud, forgery or misrepresentation through independent evidence---Supreme Court held that such allegations remained unsubstantiated and were rightly disbelieved by subordinate Courts---Mutation No.684 and Exchange Mutation No.683 were entered and sanctioned on same day and identifying witnesses were the same, which negatived respondent’s stance that he had not visited office of Patwari on relevant date---Respondent remained confined to his solitary statement and did not produce independent witnesses sufficient to dislodge documentary proof brought on record. (d) Revenue record---- ----Long-standing mutation entries---Presumption of correctness---Jamabandi---Revenue entries remaining unquestioned for decades---Supreme Court held that long-standing entries in revenue record ought not to be unsettled lightly, particularly where they have remained unquestioned for considerable period and rights have subsequently accrued on their basis---Once mutation is duly sanctioned and incorporated into Jamabandi, it forms part of regular revenue record and carries statutory presumption of truth unless rebutted by strong and cogent evidence---Mutation in question remained part of revenue record for more than two decades without challenge---Respondent produced no convincing evidence to rebut presumption attached to revenue entries---Courts below were justified in giving due weight to revenue record and holding that respondent failed to discharge heavy burden required to displace statutory presumption. Cited Cases: • Waris Khan and 18 others v. Col. Humayun Shah and 41 others PLD 1994 SC 336 • Mst. Grana through legal heirs v. Sahib Kamala Bibi PLD 2014 SC 167 • Abdul Ahad and others v. Roshan Din and others PLD 1979 SC 890 • Ghulam Haider and others v. Wali Muhammad and others 2008 SCMR 1425 • Muhammad Hussain and others v. Muhammad Shafi and others 2008 SCMR 230 (e) Mutation---- ----Procedural irregularity in attestation---Effect on proved sale transaction---Mutation entries do not themselves create title, but where underlying transaction is proved through credible evidence, technical defects in mutation proceedings cannot invalidate transaction---Supreme Court held that even if certain procedural irregularities in attestation of mutation were assumed, such irregularities by themselves would not invalidate an otherwise established transaction of sale---Subordinate Courts examined oral and documentary evidence and concurrently held that transaction reflected in mutation was genuine and respondent had failed to establish fraud or misrepresentation---Procedural objections regarding mutation proceedings could not annul transaction or justify setting aside concurrent findings. Cited Cases: • Muhammad Ishaq and others v. Ghafoor Khan and another 2000 SCMR 519 • Muhammad Afzal and others v. Province of Punjab 2001 SCMR 593 • Nawab Din v. Giani 2008 SCMR 657 (f) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---- ----S. 115---Revisional jurisdiction---Concurrent findings of fact---Scope of interference---Trial Court and First Appellate Court concurrently dismissed suit after proper appraisal of oral and documentary evidence, holding that sale transaction was genuine, fraud was not proved and suit was barred by limitation---Supreme Court held that concurrent findings of fact cannot ordinarily be disturbed in revisional jurisdiction unless shown to suffer from misreading or non-reading of evidence, perversity, illegality or material irregularity affecting merits---Revisional jurisdiction is supervisory and does not convert High Court into third court of fact---High Court reassessed evidence and substituted its own conclusions without identifying misreading, non-reading, material illegality or perversity in findings of subordinate Courts---Such approach was inconsistent with settled limits of revisional jurisdiction and amounted to impermissible interference with concurrent findings of fact. Cited Cases: • Sultan Muhammad and another v. Muhammad Qasim and others 2010 SCMR 1630 • Mst. Tayyeba Ambareen and another v. Shafqat Ali Kiyani and another 2023 SCMR 246 • Nawab Din v. Giani 2008 SCMR 657 • Muhammad Ishaq and others v. Ghafoor Khan and another 2000 SCMR 519 • Mst. Zaitoon Begum v. Nazar Hussain and another 2014 SCMR 1469 • Cantonment Board through Executive Officer, Cantt. Board Rawalpindi v. Ikhlaq Ahmed and others 2014 SCMR 161 • Muhammad Farid Khan v. Muhammad Ibrahim, etc. 2017 SCMR 679 • Muhammad Sarwar and others v. Hashmal Khan and others PLD 2022 SC 13 • Mst. Zarsheda v. Nobat Khan PLD 2022 SC 21 • Salamat Ali and others v. Muhammad Din and others PLJ 2023 SC 8 • Mst. Farzana Zia and others v. Mst. Saadia Andaleeb 2024 SCMR 916 (g) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---- ----S. 115---Difference between misreading/non-reading and misappreciation of evidence---High Court’s limits in revision---Supreme Court reiterated that scope of appellate and revisional jurisdiction must not be confused---Revisional Court cannot upset finding of fact merely because another view appears more plausible---Interference is permissible only where finding is result of misreading, non-reading, perverse or absurd appraisal of material evidence, jurisdictional error, illegality or serious miscarriage of justice---If facts have been justly tried by two Courts and same conclusion has been reached concurrently, revisiting evidence in second appeal or revision to draw another conclusion would offend doctrine of finality---High Court cannot independently reassess evidence to supplant its own conclusion unless findings below are legally flawed. Cited Cases: • Sultan Muhammad and another v. Muhammad Qasim and others 2010 SCMR 1630 • Salamat Ali and others v. Muhammad Din and others PLJ 2023 SC 8 • Mst. Farzana Zia and others v. Mst. Saadia Andaleeb 2024 SCMR 916 (h) Revenue record / Limitation---- ----Third-party rights and finality of long-standing entries---Mutation remaining incorporated for decades---Effect---Supreme Court held that where revenue entries have remained unchallenged for prolonged period and third-party rights have intervened, challenges to such entries must be viewed with great circumspection and ordinarily ought not to be entertained---In present case, during long interregnum of over twenty-two years, third-party rights had come into existence, further strengthening need to uphold sanctity and finality of long-standing revenue entries---Belated suit challenging mutation could not be permitted to unsettle settled rights. Disposition: Appeals were allowed; judgment dated 21.11.2019 passed by Islamabad High Court in Civil Revision No.410 of 2017 was set aside; concurrent judgments and decrees of Trial Court dated 17.03.2017 and First Appellate Court dated 11.11.2017 were restored; civil suit filed by respondent No.1 was dismissed; no order as to costs; connected CMAs No.12138 and 12580 of 2019 and CMA No.2581 of 2022 were disposed of as infructuous.

Summary: ----Ss.3(9), 10, 11 & 22---Constitution of Pakistan, Arts.10-A, 14, 20 & 199---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), O.XX, Rr.1 & 6---Constitutional petition---Judicial separation/dissolution of marriage between Christian spouses---Scope and evidentiary discipline---Petitioner contracted Christian marriage and sought dissolution---Concurrent judgments dismissing petitioner’s petition for failing to prove allegation of adultery, challenge to---Legality---Courts below failing to evaluate other statutory grounds such as cruelty and desertion---Effect---Brief facts of the matter were that the petitioner/husband and respondent No.3/wife, both Christians by faith, contracted marriage; the petitioner initially filed a petition for dissolution/judicial separation under the (Christian) Divorce Act, 1869 before the Civil Court, which was dismissed and the appeal thereagainst was later withdrawn with permission to file afresh; he subsequently instituted a fresh petition under Ss. 7 & 10 of the Act, 1869 which was dismissed and the dismissal was maintained by the District Court; aggrieved, the petitioner invoked the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court challenging the concurrent findings of the courts below---Pivotal questions for determination were as to “whether the allegations of adultery and cruelty had been adjudicated after strict compliance with the evidentiary discipline required under the C.P.C. read with Ss. 10 & 12 of the Act, 1869?”; and “whether the plea of desertion was legally available on the facts and properly examined by the Courts below?”---Held: Impugned judgments were passed without fully considering the evidence, which amounted to non-compliance of the requirements of O.XX, Rr. 1 & 6 of the C.P.C.---To discuss or elaborate reliance upon an allegation of adultery in the absence of cogent and legally admissible evidence was not only contrary to the procedural mandate of the C.P.C. and the statutory safeguards of the Act, 1869 but also implicated the constitutional guarantee of dignity under Art.14 of the Constitution---Since it was admitted that the parties had been living apart, it became apparent that the constituent elements of desertion were not examined by the Courts below while framing issues---The matter therefore had to be remanded for proper framing of issues---The right of Christian citizens to seek dissolution or judicial separation through Civil Courts was a manifestation of their freedom to profess, practice and manage matters arising out of their religious law---In the present case, the courts below failed to examine the petitioner’s claim in the light of this constitutional mandate, as neither the ground of cruelty nor the admitted state of separation was analyzed within the statutory framework of Ss. 10 & 22 of the Act, 1869---Such omission constituted non-compliance of the procedural discipline of law and also infringed the petitioner’s right to fair trial and due process secured under Art.10-A, read with Art.4 of the Constitution---Concurrent judgments and decrees of the courts below were set aside---Matter was remanded to Trail Court for fresh adjudication---Constitutional petition was allowed, in circumstances. The Queen v. Leresche and another 1891 QB 2418; Azhar Abbas Haideri v. Government of the Punjab and others PLD 2022 Lah. 278 and PLD 2026 SC 53 ref. (b) Administration of justice--- ----The expectation that the judiciary must act to eliminate any form of injustice serves as a cornerstone of trust in the legal system---It is this ability to priorities substantial justice over mere technical compliance that fortifies the integrity and efficacy of our legal processes. Province of Punjab through the District Collector, Bhakkar v. Muhammad Chiragh and others PLD 2026 SC 53 rel. (c) Divorce Act (IV of 1869)--- ----Ss.10 & 22---Dissolution of marriage between Christian spouses---Scope---The bond of Christian marriage is treated as a solemn and enduring civil status, and its dissolution is not to be granted lightly---There exists no concept analogous to dissolution at will; relief is conditioned upon strict proof of statutory grounds. Mst. Parveen Amanual v. ADJ I and 2 others PLD 2009 Lah. 213 ref. (d) Divorce Act (IV of 1869)--- ----S.10---Dissolution of marriage---Statutory grounds---Proof---Requirement---Unless and until anyone of the grounds is not proved, marriage cannot be dissolved, meaning thereby, to get the dissolution of marriage, the party is required to allege and prove the allegation of adultery. Saima v. Additional District Judge PLD 2022 Lahore 214 and Mushtaq v. Mst. Fareeda 1979 CLC 457 ref. (e) Divorce Act (IV of 1869)--- ----Ss.10 & 22---Dissolution of Christian marriage---Desertion---Concept and essential ingredients---Desertion is not a mere physical separation, it consists of certain essential constituent elements, namely: i. the factum desired: the fact of separation; ii. the animus deserendi: the intention to permanently abandon the matrimonial union; iii. absence of consent of the other spouse; iv. absence of reasonable cause for such withdrawal; and v. the completion of the statutory period of desertion as required under the law---The concept may manifest either as actual desertion or constructive desertion, depending upon whether the abandonment arises from physical departure or from conduct rendering cohabitation impossible. (f) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art.199---Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court---Scope---In exercise of its constitutional jurisdiction under Art.199 of the Constitution, High Court can review the judgments to ensure that the lower courts acted in accordance with law and properly considered the evidence before them---However, High Court cannot assume the functions of a civil court to re-examine evidence or to pass a decree in favor of either party---The primary responsibility for determining the facts and granting relief rests with the Civil Court, which is empowered to adjudicate disputes based on the evidence and material placed before it---High Court under its discretionary writ jurisdiction under Art.199 of the Constitution, is neither an appellate forum nor a vehicle for re-appraisal of evidence meticulously recorded by the forums below---The Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court is not designed to undertake a roving exercise of re-evaluating factual findings or to substitute its own opinion for that of the Family Court and the Appellate Authority, who are the primary fact-finding tribunals entrusted with the appreciation of evidence---While the High Court retains the power to interfere where orders are suffering from jurisdictional defects, patent illegality, non-consideration of material evidence, or where the forums below have acted in violation of the law declared by the superior courts, it cannot embark upon a de-novo assessment of the evidence as if sitting in regular appeal---However, where the impugned judgment demonstrably overlooks crucial admissions and fails to apply settled legal principles, the appropriate remedy is not for the High Court to re-adjudicate the factual matrix itself, but to remand the matter for fresh determination in accordance with law. Shahbaz v. Fakhira Bibi 2021 MLD 1506; Tariq Javed v. Mst. Tahira Bibi and 2 others 2006 MLD 1956 and Tahir Umar v. Messrs Bata Shoe (Pakistan) Limited through Managing Director and 3 others 1991 MLD 1236 ref. (g) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art.20---Freedom to profess religion and to manage religious institutions---Constitutional guarantee---Scope---Article 20 of the Constitution has been interpreted as a broad guarantee of equal religious freedom for all citizens; Muslims and non-Muslims alike---Article 20 ensures both individual and collective rights of conscience, protecting citizens not only from interference by other religious groups but also from coercion within their own faith communities. PLD 2014 Supreme Court 699 rel. (h) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Arts.4 & 10-A---Fair trial and due process, right of---Procedural compliance---Constitutional obligation of the Courts---Scope---After insertion of Art.10-A of the Constitution in the list of fundamental rights, it has become obligatory upon the Court to adhere to the procedural steps and to avoid from doing anything which caused prejudice to the rights of the parties---Article 10-A of the Constitution provides right of fair trial and due process for determination of rights and obligations---It is also pertinent to mention here that Art.4 of the Constitution clearly states that it is inalienable right of every citizen to be treated in accordance with law and no action detrimental to the reputation, life, and liberty shall be taken except as per law. Taj Wali Shah v. Bakhti Zaman 2019 SCMR 84 and Syed Tahir Hussain Mehmoodi and others v. Agha Syed Liaqat Ali and others 2014 SCMR 637 rel. Muhammad Ahsan Khan and Mudassar Hassan for Petitioner. Muhammad Musarrat Nawaz Khan and Syed Haider Ali Shah for Respondents. Barrister Zain Mansoor, Assistant Attorney General, assisted by: Ms. Areej Omar Ramay for Respondents. Dates of hearing: 9th and 23rd February of 2026.

Summary: ----Preamble---Scope---Preamble to a statue is, though not an operational part of an enactment but it is a gateway which opens purpose and intent of the Legislature, which necessitated the legislation on the subject and also sheds clear lights on the goals which the Legislator aimed to secure through the introduction of such law---Preamble of a statue therefore holds a pivotal role for the purposes of interpretation in order to dissect true purpose of intent of law. Director General, FIA and others v. Kamran Iqbal and others 2016 SCMR 447; Ms. Tradhol International SA Sociedad Unipersonal v. Ms. Shakarganj Limited 2023 CLD 819; ABWA Knowledge Pvt Ltd and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 2021 Lah. 436; Chenab Flour and General Mills and others v. F.O.P through Secretary Revenue Division and others PLD 2021 Lah. 343; Messrs Jet Green (Pvt.) Limited v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 2021 Lah. 770; M.C.B. v. Adeel Shahbaz and others 2023 CLD 655; Pakistan Tehreek e Insaaf through Asad Umar v. Governor Punjab through Principal Secretary PLD 2023 Lah. 179=PLJ 2023 Lah. 467; Messrs Bahria Town Pvt v. District Consumer Court and others PLJ 2022 Lah. 199, PLD 2022 Lah. 488; F.O.P v. Nasir Munir Ahmed and others 2022 CLC 2072; Additional Registrar Company v. Al-Qaim Textile Mills Ltd 2021 CLD 931; Ch Fayyaz Hussain Wains v. Province of Punjab and others PLD 2022 Lah. 1 and Shaheen Merchant v. Federation of Pakistan and others 2021 PTD 2126 rel. (b) Foundation University Ordinance (LXXXVIII of 2002)--- ----Ss. 3 & 5---Zakat and Ushr Ordinance (XVIII of 1980), S.24---Deduction of Zakat---Exemption---Charitable institution---Proof---Petitioner / University was aggrieved of deduction of Zakat on its investments made with a financial institution---Plea raised by petitioner / University was that it was a charitable institution and was exempted from deduction of Zakat---Validity---Petitioner / University was established for paramount national interest to establish a center for advancement of education and learning of internationally acknowledged standards to the talented and deserving students of Pakistan---Petitioner / University was neither alleviated institution to the category of a charity nor there existed any operative provision in Foundation University Ordinance, 2002 for its declaration to be a charitable institution---Liability to Zakat was attached to prescribed assets held by a person or institutions defined under the law, subject to only those exemptions, which were expressly provided under S.24 of Zakat and Ushr Ordinance, 1980---Nature and character of petitioner / University, whether statutory, chartered, public service or otherwise, did not by itself create immunity, unless such immunity was grounded in the statute which the petitioner / University had failed to bring on record---Under the law, where the Legislature intended exemption, it had done so explicitly---Absence of such expression must be construed as deliberate---Petitioner / University did not place on record any specific document, nor pointed out any specific provision in its parent statute or in Foundation University Ordinance, 2002 granting exemption from Zakat liability---High Court in exercise of Constitutional jurisdiction declined to interfere in the matter as the petitioner / University failed to demonstrate any illegality in the letter issued by authorities holding petitioner / University liable to deduction of Zakat---Constitutional petition was dismissed in circumstances. Administrator General Zakat, Central Zakat Administration, Islamabad v. Pakistan Insurance Corporation through Secretary and others PLD 2016 SC 448; Liaquat National Hospital v. Province of Sindh and others 2019 SCMR 865 and Pakistan Telecommunication Employees' Trust v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 2017 SC 718 ref. Administrator General Zakat, Central Zakat Administration, Islamabad v. Pakistan Insurance Corporation through Secretary and others PLD 2016 SC 448 distinguished. Sayyid Murtaza Ali Pirzada with Syed Muaz Ali for Petitioner. Barrister Zain Mansoor, Assistant Attorney General for Respondents. Muhammad Irshad, Assistant Advocate General for Respondents. Binyamin Abbasi for Respondent No. 6 / Higher Education Commission. Nisar A. Mujahid, Advocate Supreme Court / Amicus Curiae. Dates of hearing: 18th November, 2025 and 20th February, 2026. (i) to decide teaching method and strategies in order to ensure the most effective educational and training programmes;

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----O. XXIII, R. 1---Withdrawal of suit---Abandoning of part of claim---Right of plaintiff---Scope---Plaintiff has inherent right to abandon a suit or any portion of his claim without seeking prior permission from Court---Such right comes with the caveat that once a suit or a part of it is abandoned, the plaintiff cannot initiate a fresh suit based on the same cause of action---Plaintiff cannot withdraw a suit while simultaneously reserving right to file a fresh suit on the same grounds. (b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----S. 11, O. II, R. 2 & O.XXIII, R.2---Withdrawal of suit---Permission to file fresh suit---Object, purpose and scope---Such permission, when granted by Court, serves to safeguard plaintiff from restrictive effects of Order II, Rule 2 and Section 11, C.P.C. (c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----O.VI, R. 17 & O.XXIII, R. 2---Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), Ss. 42 & 54---Suit for declaration and injunction---Judgment passed in suit withdrawn---Effect---Permission to file fresh suit---Court, duty of---Suit filed by appellants / plaintiffs was based upon a judgment and decree passed in an earlier suit which stood withdrawn at appellate stage by the then plaintiffs with permission to file fresh suit---Trial Court as well as High Court had dismissed the suit filed by appellants / plaintiffs on the ground that the judgment relied upon by them was not in existence, as that suit was withdrawn---Validity---Legislative intent governing discretion under Order XXIII, Rule 1(2) is outlined in two scenarios; one in which Court is convinced that a suit would inevitably fail due to some procedural defect, and the other where the Court recognizes sufficient grounds that warrant plaintiff’s ability to initiate a fresh suit concerning either the entirety of the subject matter or a portion of a claim---Clear obligation on Court has been imposed under Order XXIII, Rule 2 (b), C.P.C. to ascertain adequacy of grounds presented for permitting plaintiff to commence new suit regarding the same claim or part of a claim centered on identical cause of action---In fulfilling such duty, Court is mandated by Civil Procedure Code, 1908 to evaluate all pertinent factors, including implications of allowing a party to re-engage in litigation based on the same underlying issues---Such scrutiny becomes increasingly vital when the application is filed at appellate or second appellate stage---If leave is granted in such circumstances, it empowers unsuccessful plaintiff to evade any un-favourable decrees previously rendered against them, essentially allowing a fresh examination of the dispute from a clean slate---Appellants did not provide solid foundation nor presented supplementary documents to demonstrate their ability to establish title without reliance on the judgment passed in earlier suit which stood withdrawn---In absence of such critical material, returning the matter to Trial Court based solely on unsubstantiated assertions of appellants / plaintiffs would serve no practical purpose---Such action would risk creating unnecessary litigation and ultimately undermine the very essence of justice---Supreme Court declined to interfere in concurrent judgments and decree passed by the Courts below dismissing suit and appeal filed by appellants / plaintiffs---Petition for leave to appeal was dismissed and leave to appeal was refused. Haji Muhammad Boota and others v. Member (Revenue), Board of Revenue, Punjab and others PLD 2003 SC 979; Quinn v. Leathern (1901) AC 495; Trustees of the Port of Karachi v. Muhammad Saleem 1994 SCMR 2213; Muhammad Shakeel and others v. Additional District Judge and others PLD 2025 SC 572; Balida Kamayya and others v. Paragada Papayya and another AIR 1918 Mad. 1287; Mrs. Afroz Shah and others v. Sabir Qureshi and others PLD 2010 SC 913; Behari Lal Pal v. Srimati Baran Mai Dasi (1894) ILR 17 All 53; Becharam Chowdhuri and others v. Purna Chandra Chatterji and others AIR 1925 Cal. 845; Baisnab Das Mohanta v. Nani Gopal Das and others PLD 1963 Dacca 504; Garland v. Consumers’ Gas Co. (2004) 1 SCR 629; Raj Kumar Mahto v. Ram Khelawan Singh AIR 1922 Pat. 44; Haridey Nath Roy v. Ramchandra AIR 1921 Cal. 34; R v. Wilson (1983) 2 SCR 594; Danyluk v. Ainsworth Technologies Inc. (2001) 2 SCR 460; Alokeshi Banik v. Aftabuddin PLD 1963 Dacca 87 and Syed Muhammad Ali and others v. Syed Dabir Ali and others 2016 SCMR 2164 rel. Syed Qalb-i-Hassan, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rafaqat H. Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Appellants. Nemo for Respondents Nos. 1-4 and 6. Shaukat Hussain Raja, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondent No. 7. Date of hearing: 20th February, 2026.

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---- ----O. XX, R. 18---Suit for partition of property and separate possession of share---Preliminary decree---Mandatory declaration of shares---Supreme Court held that in a suit for partition, Court must adhere to procedure under Order XX, Rule 18, C.P.C. while issuing preliminary decree---Preliminary decree is meant to ascertain and declare shares of parties and to give further necessary directions for subsequent proceedings---It does not itself effect physical division of property among co-sharers; actual partition is carried out at final decree stage after inquiry in accordance with directions contained in preliminary decree---In present case, preliminary decree issued by Trial Court suffered from material irregularity because shares of parties were not specified or clarified---Such procedural shortcoming was overlooked by First Appellate Court and High Court, undermining validity of preliminary decree. (b) Partition---- ----Partial partition---Not maintainable---Co-owner’s right in every inch of joint holding---Supreme Court held that suit for partial partition is not maintainable---A co-owner cannot selectively choose and claim share in more valuable portions of joint property while excluding portions of lesser value---Every co-owner has ownership rights over every inch of joint holding corresponding to his share---Entire property corpus must be aggregated into a common pool under supervision of Court so that each co-owner receives allotted share fairly, keeping in view relative value, area, location and nature of properties---Allowing partition of only one selected property from joint estate would cause discrimination and inequity among co-sharers. Cited Cases: • Chandi Shah v. Barbara Shaha and others AIR 1930 Lahore 286 • Jan Muhammad and another v. Abdur Rashid and 5 others 1993 SCMR 1463 (c) Partition---- ----Joint family estate consisting of multiple properties---Family settlement alleged---Duty of Court to verify entire property corpus---Dispute related to estate left by deceased father of parties, allegedly comprising four houses---Petitioner consistently maintained that late father owned four distinct properties divided equally among three sons through family partition/family settlement, while respondent sought partition only of disputed house in petitioner’s possession---Supreme Court held that Trial Court failed to verify family settlement, description of each property, prior partition, status of disputed house, and improvements made to disputed house---Earlier High Court judgment in first round of litigation had specifically observed that these matters were to be determined when partition proceedings were initiated---Failure to examine such essential matters rendered preliminary decree fundamentally untenable. (d) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---- ----O. XX, R. 18---Partition proceedings---Preliminary decree and final decree---Distinct stages---Supreme Court explained that partition suit proceeds in phases---At preliminary decree stage, Court determines and declares rights/shares of parties and may issue necessary directions---At final decree stage, actual division is carried out after inquiry in accordance with preliminary decree---Where partition or separation cannot conveniently be carried out without further inquiry, Court must first pass proper preliminary decree declaring rights of all interested parties---Trial Court erred by allowing partition to proceed only in respect of disputed property without first determining overall estate, shares and status of other properties. (e) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---- ----S. 115---Revisional jurisdiction---Material irregularity in preliminary decree---High Court’s failure to correct error---Trial Court issued preliminary decree in favour of respondent No.1 and First Appellate Court maintained same---High Court dismissed revision, holding that respondent No.1 had right to select any property from estate for partition---Supreme Court held that such reasoning contravened settled principles governing partition and partial partition---Preliminary decree was marred by misinterpretation, oversight of evidence and misapplication of legal principles---High Court ought to have reversed decree and remanded matter for comprehensive reassessment of all issues. (f) Earlier litigation---- ----Findings in previous round of litigation---Effect in subsequent partition suit---In earlier suit for injunction, High Court had noticed uncertainty regarding whether petitioner intended to raise construction on ancestral land or purchased land and had held that description of houses, prior partition of ancestral property, status of additional land and improvements would be determined once partition proceedings were initiated---Supreme Court held that in subsequent partition suit, Trial Court and High Court failed to take those observations into account and proceeded only on disputed house---Such omission resulted in incomplete and legally defective adjudication. Disposition: Petition was converted into appeal and allowed; judgments and decrees of Courts below were set aside; matter was remanded to Trial Court to decide suit afresh in accordance with law, after taking into account observations of Supreme Court regarding declaration of shares, entire property corpus, family settlement, status of other properties and non-maintainability of partial partition; no order as to costs.

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---- ----S. 51---Execution of decree---Modes of execution---Money decree---Blocking CNIC of judgment debtor---Executing Court’s jurisdiction---Executing Court ordered blocking of judgment debtor’s CNIC until surety for decretal amount was furnished; High Court maintained order, treating CNIC blockage as a step towards execution of lawful decree---Supreme Court held that S.51, C.P.C. provides modes for execution of decrees and although clause (e) gives flexibility to execute decree “in such other manner as the nature of the relief granted may require”, such general power cannot be stretched so far that execution order loses contact with statutory provision---In case of simple money decree passed in summary suit, execution by blocking CNIC of judgment debtor was not permissible under S.51(e), C.P.C. (b) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---- ----S. 51(e)---General mode of execution---Scope and limits---Supreme Court held that clause (e) of S.51, C.P.C. confers necessary flexibility and latitude upon executing Court to ensure decree is satisfied, but such power remains controlled by nature of relief granted and statutory framework---Robust approach may be adopted to secure execution, but it cannot become so excessive that it deprives judgment debtor of essential aspects of ordinary life---Blocking CNIC for execution of money decree would be akin to permitting executing Court to block utilities such as electricity or water at residence or workplace of judgment debtor, which is not contemplated by execution law. (c) Constitutional / civil rights---- ----CNIC---Essential document for ordinary life---Blocking CNIC in civil execution proceedings---Supreme Court observed that CNIC is not a luxury or mere statutory requirement; in present times, it is essential for carrying on normal way of life in ordinary course---Curtailing a judgment debtor from access to CNIC for execution of money decree is not proper exercise of discretion or statutory power---High Court erred in concluding that blocking CNIC was permissible discretionary step towards execution. (d) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)---- ----O. XXI, R. 117 as inserted in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa---Power to block CNIC for compelling attendance/execution---Applicability outside Khyber Pakhtunkhwa---Supreme Court noticed that Peshawar High Court had inserted O.XXI, R.117 in C.P.C. as applicable in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, expressly permitting blockage of CNIC as mode of compelling judgment debtor’s attendance or completing execution proceedings---Court reserved opinion on constitutional or legal validity of such provision for appropriate case---However, said provision applies only in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and not in Sindh---Existence of such express provision shows that, absent specific statutory/rule-based authority, no such power can be implied into executing Court’s discretion or general execution provisions. (e) Execution proceedings---- ----Money decree---Judgment debtor’s CNIC blocked until surety furnished---Order without lawful basis---Executing Court had no jurisdiction to order blocking of CNIC of judgment debtor as a step towards execution of simple money decree---High Court’s refusal to interfere with such order was legally unsustainable---Order of CNIC blockage could not be justified under S.51(e), C.P.C. or any implied execution power. Disposition: Leave petition was converted into appeal and allowed; order of High Court of Sindh at Karachi dated 01.08.2023, which had upheld executing Court’s direction for blocking petitioner/judgment debtor’s CNIC, was set aside; Supreme Court held that no jurisdiction vested in executing Court in Sindh to block CNIC of judgment debtor for execution of simple money decree.

Summary: (a) Cantonments Rent Restriction Act (XI of 1963)---- ----S. 7---Determination of fair rent---Exclusive jurisdiction of Rent Controller---High Court while hearing appeal against dismissal of ejectment application enhanced rent from Rs.7,000 to Rs.70,000 per month---Supreme Court held that S.7 of Cantonments Rent Restriction Act, 1963 confers exclusive jurisdiction upon Controller to determine fair rent after application, inquiry and evidence---While hearing appeal against dismissal of ejectment application, High Court could affirm, reverse, set aside or modify findings of Controller, but could not assume original jurisdiction of Controller for fixation of fair rent---Appellate forum cannot exercise original jurisdiction unless expressly conferred by statute---Fixation of enhanced rent by High Court was without lawful authority and contrary to S.7 of the Act. (b) Cantonments Rent Restriction Act (XI of 1963)---- ----S. 7---Fair rent---Pleadings, issue and evidence---High Court’s enhancement of rent beyond controversy before it---Respondent-landlord had sought eviction on grounds of bona fide personal need and subletting; fixation of fair rent was neither pleaded nor framed as an issue nor supported by evidence---Rent Controller dismissed ejectment application but enhanced rent to Rs.7,000 per month---High Court upheld finding that landlord failed to establish bona fide personal need or subletting, yet enhanced rent to Rs.70,000 per month---Supreme Court held that High Court exceeded pleadings and acted without lawful authority, as no party had sought fixation of fair rent, no issue had been framed and no evidence had been led on such point. (c) Rent law---- ----Ejectment application---Bona fide personal need and subletting---Failure to prove grounds---Respondent-landlord’s original ejectment application was based on bona fide personal use/occupation and subletting---Rent Controller negatived both grounds after recording evidence, and High Court also held that landlord was not entitled to eviction because he failed to establish either ground---Supreme Court noted that once eviction grounds failed, High Court could not indirectly create a new foundation by enhancing rent in an appeal arising from dismissal of ejectment application. (d) Cantonments Rent Restriction Act (XI of 1963)---- ----S. 17(9)---Eviction for default---Artificial default created through unlawful rent enhancement---Effect---Landlord filed fresh eviction application alleging that tenant failed to pay post-enhancement rent fixed by High Court---Rent Controller invoked S.17(9) and ordered eviction, which High Court maintained---Supreme Court held that second ejectment order was wholly founded upon illegal fixation of rent by High Court---Where foundation is unlawful, superstructure built upon it cannot stand---Since rent enhancement order was void, alleged default was artificial and subsequent eviction order lacked lawful foundation; any possession taken under such eviction order was also void. Cited Cases: • Yousuf Ali v. Mohammad Aslam Zia PLD 1958 SC (Pak) 104 • Executive District Officer (Education), Rawalpindi v. Mohammad Younas 2007 SCMR 1835 • Rehmatullah and others v. Saleh Khan and others 2007 SCMR 729 (e) Appellate jurisdiction---- ----Rent appeal---Limits of appellate authority---Original jurisdiction not exercisable by appellate Court unless statute permits---Supreme Court held that appellate forum, while deciding appeal against ejectment order, cannot assume original jurisdiction for determination of fair rent unless statute expressly confers such power---High Court’s jurisdiction in appeal was confined to legality of Controller’s order dismissing ejectment application; it could not independently determine fair rent without application, inquiry and evidence before competent Rent Controller. (f) Cantonments Rent Restriction Act (XI of 1963)---- ----Ss. 7 & 17(9)---Original rent to continue until lawful revision---Restoration of possession---Since High Court’s order enhancing rent and subsequent eviction order were illegal, void and unsustainable, parties were directed to remain bound by original rent until revised by competent forum in accordance with S.7 of the Act---Possession was ordered to be restored forthwith to tenant if taken pursuant to eviction order passed by Controller. (g) Civil Procedure Code / Injunction proceedings---- ----Ad-interim order---Temporary injunction application pending before Trial Court---No interference by Supreme Court---In connected Civil Petition No.4867 of 2024, petitioner had challenged ad-interim order through appeal and revision, both unsuccessful---High Court, while dismissing revision, directed Trial Court to decide application for interim relief/temporary injunction strictly in accordance with law and expeditiously---Supreme Court found no illegality, irregularity or jurisdictional defect calling for interference; leave was declined. Disposition: Civil Petitions No.4036 of 2022 and 1860 of 2024 were converted into appeals and allowed; orders/judgments of lower fora relating to rent enhancement and subsequent eviction were set aside; parties were directed to remain bound by original rent until revised by competent forum under S.7 of Cantonments Rent Restriction Act, 1963; possession was ordered to be restored forthwith to petitioner-tenant if taken pursuant to eviction order; connected CMA stood disposed of. Civil Petition No.4867 of 2024 was dismissed and leave declined; no order as to costs.

Summary: (a) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)---- ----S. 42---Declaratory suit---Recruitment process---Candidate failing minimum eligibility threshold---No vested right---Respondents were excluded from merit lists for recruitment to posts of Primary School Teachers after failing to obtain minimum 40% marks in NTS test prescribed by recruitment policy dated 16.10.2017---Supreme Court held that declaratory decree can only be granted where plaintiff establishes an existing legal character or vested legal right which has been denied or threatened---S.42 does not permit adjudication of abstract questions or creation of rights where none exist---A candidate in competitive recruitment process has only right to fair, equal and non-discriminatory consideration, but no vested right to appointment or inclusion in merit list unless eligibility criteria are fulfilled---Failure to meet prescribed minimum marks extinguished even limited expectancy of consideration. (b) Recruitment policy---- ----Minimum qualifying marks in NTS test---Condition precedent for eligibility---Recruitment policy dated 16.10.2017 expressly provided that obtaining minimum 40% marks in NTS test was mandatory, otherwise candidate would not be eligible for post---Supreme Court held that requirement was unambiguous and left no room for departure---Courts below erred in disregarding express mandate of 2017 policy and relying upon earlier policy dated 30.04.2014, which had removed previous 50% marks requirement---Governing policy at relevant time was 2017 policy, and candidates who failed to secure 40% marks were ineligible for inclusion in merit list. (c) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)---- ----S. 42---Suit based on mere expectation---Not maintainable---Respondents’ claim was founded upon anticipation of inclusion in merit list despite failure to meet prescribed threshold---Supreme Court held that declaratory suit cannot be based on mere expectation or disagreement with policy; it must involve infringement of a subsisting right---Claim for inclusion despite non-fulfilment of criteria was, in substance, challenge to recruitment policy itself---Unless such policy was shown to be ultra vires, beyond authority of competent forum, or violative of constitutional guarantees, no enforceable legal right arose in favour of respondents. (d) Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Rules of Business, 1985---- ----R. 5(1)---Departmental policy---Competence of Minister---Recruitment standards---High Court had observed that directions issued by Provincial Minister regarding 40% marks requirement had no legal effect---Supreme Court held that under R.5(1) of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Rules of Business, 1985, framing of departmental policy falls within competence of Minister---Recruitment criteria emanated from policy framed by competent authority---In absence of finding that policy was ultra vires, beyond authority, or unconstitutional, prescription of minimum qualifying marks fell within domain of executive policy. (e) Constitutional jurisdiction / judicial review---- ----Recruitment policy---Executive domain---Limited scope of Court interference---Supreme Court held that where competent authority is empowered to frame policy relating to recruitment standards, such policy carries executive authority---Courts ordinarily refrain from interfering with such policy unless it is shown to be unconstitutional, ultra vires, beyond authority of competent forum, mala fide, or violative of constitutional guarantees---Courts below erred in substituting their view for express eligibility criterion prescribed by competent authority. (f) Estoppel---- ----Recruitment process---Candidate participating without protest---Challenge after failure---Respondents participated in recruitment process with full knowledge of prescribed 40% NTS qualifying threshold and raised challenge only after failing to secure required marks---Supreme Court held that candidate who voluntarily enters selection process under known terms cannot, after being unsuccessful, challenge criteria---Such conduct attracts doctrines of waiver, estoppel and acquiescence---Respondents were estopped from disputing eligibility requirements after participation without protest. (g) Civil litigation---- ----Declaratory suit versus constitutional challenge---Recruitment policy---Proper remedy---Supreme Court held that in absence of pre-existing legal right, declaratory suit under S.42 of Specific Relief Act, 1877 was not maintainable---Mere dissatisfaction with recruitment policy did not confer enforceable civil claim---Proper remedy, if any, was to challenge vires of policy through appropriate constitutional proceedings, not to seek declaration for inclusion in merit list despite failure to meet eligibility condition. Disposition: Petitions were converted into appeals and allowed; consolidated judgment of Peshawar High Court, Bannu Bench dated 23.09.2024, along with concurrent judgments and decrees of Trial Court and Appellate Court, were set aside; respondents’ suits seeking inclusion in PST merit lists despite failure to secure minimum 40% NTS marks stood dismissed; no order as to costs.

Summary: Alternative Dispute Resolution Act (XX of 2017)--- ----S. 3---Arbitration Act (X of 1940), Ss. 20 & 34---Cantonments Rent Restriction Act (XI of 1963),S. 17---Arbitration clause---Reference to Alternate Dispute Resolution---Certain disputes had arisen between the parties and petitioner sought appointment of an arbitrator---Respondent filed eviction petition before Rent Controller which was allowed against petitioner---Validity---Where foreign investment was involved, delays may jeopardize investor confidence and hamper inflow of modern technology, management practices and advanced marketing techniques into the country---High Court with the consensus of parties appointed a Mediator to resolve all outstanding disputes between the parties in line with the jurisprudential approach laid down by Courts---High Court directed the mediator to convene a meeting between parties and conclude the medication proceedings within a period of four weeks---Constitutional petition was disposed of accordingly. Messrs 5H INSAAT Ve Ticaret Anonim Sirketi's v. Secretary and others 2025 CLD 813 = PLJ 2025 Lah. 738; Messrs Mughals Pakistan (Pvt.) Limited v. Employees Old Age Benefits Institution through Director Law, Lahore and others PLD 2025 SC 1; Province of Punjab through Secretary C&W, Lahore and others v. Messrs Haroon Company, Government Contractor and others 2024 SCMR 947; Commissioner Inland Revenue v. Messrs RYK Mills 2023 SCMR 1856; Faisal Zafar and another v. Siraj-ud-Din and 4 others 2024 CLD 1; Netherlands Financierings Maatschappij Voor Ontwikkelingslanden N.V. (F.M.O.) v. Morgah Valley Limited and SECP PLD 2024 Lah. 315 = 2024 CLD 685; Strategic Plans Division and another v. Punjab Revenue Authority and others PLD 2024 Lah. 545; Muhammad Naseer Butt v. Additional District Judge, Lahore and others PLD 2025 SC 499; Messrs Sadiq Poultry (Private) Limited Federation of Pakistan and others v. First Habib Modaraba PLD 2025 Lah. 57=2025 CLD 90 and Mst. Ghazala Hussain and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others 2025 LHC 8219 rel. Barrister Syed Hassan Ali Raza, Advocate Supreme Court along with Syed Jarrar Hassan Kazmi and Ms. Zunaira Baz Khan for Petitioner. Ms. Afshan Ghazanfar, Advocate Supreme Court along with Respondent No. 2/Malik Khuda Baksh. Date of hearing: 16th February, 2026.