Summary: Background The petitioner filed a writ petition challenging an order from the Arbitration Council, which refused to issue a divorce certificate, arguing that both parties, residing in the U.S., were outside the Council’s jurisdiction. The petitioner argued that the marriage was solemnized and registered in Islamabad, and thus, only the Arbitration Council that registered the marriage had the authority to issue the divorce certificate under the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 (MFL Ordinance). During the petition, the petitioner presented documentation from a California court dissolving the marriage, and sought recognition of this divorce in Pakistan. -----Issues: 1- Extra-Territorial Jurisdiction: Does the Arbitration Council established under the MFL Ordinance possess extra-territorial jurisdiction to issue a divorce certificate for Pakistani citizens residing abroad when the marriage was registered in Pakistan? ----2- Recognition of Foreign Divorce: Should the Arbitration Council in Pakistan issue a divorce certificate based on a foreign court's divorce decree? -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: --Extra-Territorial Jurisdiction: The Court held that the Arbitration Council has extra-territorial jurisdiction over Pakistani citizens and citizens of Azad Jammu & Kashmir (AJK) based on Section 1(3) of the MFL Ordinance, as long as the marriage was registered within Pakistan. As the marriage was registered in Islamabad, the Arbitration Council in Islamabad retained jurisdiction, and its refusal to issue the divorce certificate due to the parties’ residence abroad was unsupported by law. --Recognition of Foreign Divorce: The Court concluded that foreign judgments, including divorce decrees, are recognized in Pakistan under Section 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) when specific criteria are met, such as jurisdiction and procedural fairness. Since both parties acknowledged the California court’s authority, and neither contested the judgment, the Arbitration Council was instructed to issue a divorce certificate in compliance with Pakistani law, affirming the dissolution of marriage. -----Citations/Precedents: Mst. Asma Bibi v. Chairman Reconciliation Committee and others (PLD 2020 Lahore 679) – Addressed jurisdiction for marriages registered in Pakistan. Muhammad Akram Nadeem v. Chairman, Arbitration Council/ADLG, Islamabad and others (2021 CLC 1947) – Confirmed extra-territorial jurisdiction of Arbitration Councils under the MFL Ordinance for Pakistani citizens abroad. Mst. Sadia Malik v. Chairman, Arbitration Council and another (2017 CLC Note 166) – Clarified jurisdictional authority of Pakistani Arbitration Councils. Dr. Masood Khan v. Chairman, Arbitration Council, Wah and others (PLD 1982 Lahore 532) – Addressed residency-based jurisdiction in divorce matters.

Summary: Matrimonial dispute, recall of khula decree---Interference under Section 12(2), Code of Civil Procedure, 1908---Petition challenging the recall of khula decree on grounds of misrepresentation---Petitioner, Fozia Mazhar, contested the reinstatement of marriage decree originally dissolved on grounds of khula, which was recalled on a purported joint application, later claimed to be misrepresented---Family Court initially granted dissolution based on khula with dower return, subsequently reversed on alleged joint application, despite lack of respondent?s signature or proper representation---High Courts upheld the decision, confirming no misrepresentation in the initial decree recall---Evidence from attorney and witnesses of the respondent supported claims of no compromise or consent for the joint application, leading to restoration of original khula decree---Supreme Court found no grounds to interfere with concurrent findings of lower courts, thereby dismissing the appeal and upholding the original dissolution of marriage. Key judicial precedents cited included Muhammad Arshad Anjum v. Mst. Khurshid Begum and others (2021 SCMR 1145), and Allah Dad v. Mukhtar and another (1992 SCMR 1273)---Petition dismissed, confirming no misrepresentation in recalling of khula decree.-----Issues:Whether Section 12(2) of C.P.C. can be invoked to challenge the judgment and decree passed by a Family Court under the Family Courts Act, 1964?Whether the High Court in the exercise of its constitutional writ jurisdiction rightly declined to not interfere in the concurrent findings of facts recorded by the courts below?Whether the recall of the decree of dissolution of marriage on the ground of khula was in violation of Section 7 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, read with Section 21 of the Family Courts Act, 1964?----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome:The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, upholding the decisions of the lower courts. It ruled that:Section 12(2) of C.P.C. is applicable in proceedings before Family Courts as per established jurisprudence allowing the general principles of C.P.C. to be applied.The High Court properly exercised its jurisdiction by not interfering with the concurrent factual findings of the lower courts, as such findings were based on substantial evidence indicating misrepresentation in the recall application.Addressing the recall of the decree under Section 7 of the Ordinance, in conjunction with Section 21 of the Act, was deemed unnecessary as the case was decided on the misrepresentation found in the recall application, making further discussion academic.-----Citations/Precedents:Syed Ali Nawaz Gardezi v. Lt.-Col. Muhammad Yusuf (PLD 1963 SC 51)Mst. Farida Parwin v. Qadeeruddin Ahmad Siddiqi (PLD 1971 Karachi 118)Mst. Rehmat Bibi v. Mst. Sharifan Bibi (1988 SCMR 1812)Muhammad Arshad Anjum v. Mst. Khurshid Begum (2021 SCMR 1145)Allah Dad v. Mukhtar (1992 SCMR 1273)Allah Rakha v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2000 Federal Shariat Court 1)Board of Governors, Area Study Centre for Africa and North America, Quaid-e-Azam University v. Ms. Farah Zahra (PLD 2005 Supreme Court 153)Barkhurdar v. Muhammad Razzaq (PLD 1989 Supreme Court 749)Sayed Abbas Taqi Mehdi v. Mst. Sayeda Sabahat Batool (PLJ 2010 SC 891)Muhammad Tabish Naeem Khan v. Additional District Judge, Lahore (2014 SCMR 1365)Shajar Islam v. Muhammad Siddique (PLD 2007 SC 45)Hamad Hassan v. Isma Bukhari (2023 SCMR 1434)Dobbs v. Jackson Women?s Health Org. (597 U.S. 215, 348)

Summary: Background:The court had previously directed the Prosecutor General of Punjab to confirm compliance with directions issued in a prior case titled "Shobi Iman v. The State, etc." regarding the eradication of child marriage and legal actions against violators. The Prosecutor General submitted a report outlining steps taken, including a proposal for monthly checks on marriage records at Union Council levels to combat child marriage, legal actions against violators, and the establishment of facilitation centers to expedite legal processes.----Issue:The main issue concerns the enforcement of laws against child marriage and the establishment of a comprehensive mechanism to ensure compliance with the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, and related penal laws.----Decision:The court appreciated the initiatives taken by the Prosecutor General but noted the absence of certain considerations. It directed the Prosecutor General to convene a meeting with senior police officials and the Director General of Local Government and Community Development to develop a more comprehensive mechanism. A fresh report is to be submitted by March 4, 2024, and the case is relisted for March 5, 2024. The alleged minor, Mst. Hareem Fatima, was presented in court from a shelter home. She expressed her desire to accompany her aunt, the petitioner, and was permitted by the court to do so.

Summary: The original suit filed by Mat. Zebun Nisa and her daughter sought declaration for their shares in the property against their dower and legal/sharia rights, respectively. The defendants resisted the suit, leading to multiple remands and the eventual dismissal of the suit.---Issue:Whether the offer by plaintiff No.1 (Mat. Zebun Nisa) to resolve the dispute through an oath on the Holy Quran and the subsequent acceptance and fulfillment of this offer by the defendants barred plaintiff No.1 from pursuing her claim further?Whether plaintiff No.2 (Ms. Hurmat) had a competent claim to her share in the property during the lifetime of Muhammad Sherin (her grandfather), given the provisions of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961?---Holding:The court held that plaintiff No.1 was estopped from pressing her claim further due to her offer to resolve the dispute through an oath, which was accepted and fulfilled by the defendants.The court found plaintiff No.2's claim to be incompetent and premature, as she had no locus standi to claim her share in the property during the lifetime of her grandfather, Muhammad Sherin.--Reasoning:The court reasoned that the principle of estoppel and the doctrine of election barred plaintiff No.1 from retracting her offer, which was duly accepted and fulfilled by the defendants. Additionally, the court referenced multiple precedents, including the Supreme Court cases, to reinforce the doctrines of estoppel, election, and the rights of property owners to alienate their property. For plaintiff No.2, the court noted that the suit was filed during the lifetime of Muhammad Sherin, making her claim for a share in his property incompetent and premature, as her legal right to inheritance had not yet materialized.---Rule of Law:The judgment relied on the principles of estoppel and election to bar claims that have been resolved by mutual agreement or where the claimant has made a definitive choice in resolving a dispute. It also emphasized the legal right of a property owner to alienate their property and the timing of inheritance claims under the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961.---Precedents relied by the court: Stir Miviib-Rehman Muhammad Hassani Washuk and others (PLD 2020 Supreme Court 718): This case established that once a litigant has chosen a certain course of action or abandoned a particular plea, they cannot reopen the matter simply because the initial choice did not yield favorable results.---Silver Star Insurance Company Limited Lahore through Chief Executive Vs. Messrs Kamal Pipes Industries, Lahore and another (2028 CLD 1342, Lahore): This case likely deals with the principles of estoppel and/or the finality of decisions made based on chosen remedies.---Zarai Taraqiati Bank Limited Vs. Devan Sugar Mills Limited and others (PLD 2018 Supreme Court 828): This case might discuss the implications of legal choices and the consequences of such choices on subsequent legal actions.---Lucky Cement Ltd. through Authorized Attorney Vs. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Revenue Division and 03 others (2021 PTD 835): This precedent might be related to the legal doctrine of estoppel or the principles governing the finality of decisions in commercial or tax-related disputes.----Ghulam Muhammad Vs. Mian Muhammad and another (2007 SCMR 231): This case affirmed the right of a Muslim owner to dispose of their property by way of gift, and such action cannot be contested by the heirs who are deprived of their shares as a result.---Br. Muhammad Javaid Shah Vs. Syed Rashid Arshad and others (PLD 2015 Supreme Court 212): This case likely discusses the principles of estoppel and waiver, particularly in the context of failing to object to a fact or action that could affect one's legal rights.

Summary: Issues:Whether the Chairman Union Council in Lahore has jurisdiction over the divorce proceedings of the petitioner, who resides in Germany.--The applicability of S.R.O.No.1086(K)61, enabling Pakistani Missions abroad to act as Arbitration Councils for Overseas Pakistanis, in light of the Islamabad High Court's ruling in Writ Petition No.21 of 2021.----Judgment:The Lahore High Court dismissed the petition, holding that the Chairman Union Council's denial of the divorce effectiveness certificate was lawful. The court reasoned that:The jurisdiction for divorce matters lies with the Union Council where the wife was residing at the time of the divorce pronouncement. In this case, both the petitioner and his wife were residing in Germany, placing the jurisdiction with the Pakistani Mission in Germany as per S.R.O.No.1086(K)61.The Islamabad High Court's ruling striking down the S.R.O. does not affect its applicability in Punjab, as judicial decisions are confined to the territorial jurisdiction of the issuing court.----Conclusion:The Lahore High Court found that the Union Council in Lahore lacked jurisdiction over the petitioner's divorce proceedings, given the couple's residence in Germany. The court upheld the procedural requirements and jurisdictional mandates of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, and associated rules, leading to the dismissal of the petition for a divorce effectiveness certificate.

Summary: Background: The petitioner, an overseas Pakistani woman, was married to the respondent in 2011. The marriage was registered in both Pakistan and Norway. The respondent later moved to Norway with a spouse visa, and the couple had a child together. In July 2022, the respondent contracted a second marriage in Pakistan without seeking formal permission from the petitioner. This prompted the petitioner to file a complaint under Section 6 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 (MFLO), through her special attorney, seeking action against the respondent for marrying without permission. The Family Court dismissed the complaint for being filed through an attorney, and the Additional District Judge upheld this decision on appeal. The petitioner then filed a constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan. -----Issues: Whether a complaint under Section 6 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, can be filed and prosecuted through an attorney. -----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: Filing of Complaint through Attorney: The court held that under criminal law, including Section 6 of the MFLO, complaints and criminal proceedings cannot be initiated or pursued through an attorney. Criminal law requires the personal involvement of the complainant, as the complainant must be someone who has personal knowledge of the facts and can testify to the offense. The court emphasized that criminal matters cannot be delegated to an attorney, as the attorney's testimony would be based on hearsay rather than personal knowledge. Relevance of Family Courts Act, 1964: The court referred to the Family Courts Act, 1964, which governs family matters, including those arising under the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961. While the act allows for representation through an agent in certain matters, it does not extend to criminal complaints like the one filed under Section 6 of the MFLO. The court cited relevant precedents that clarified that criminal complaints cannot be filed through attorneys. Dismissal of Petition: The court found that the lower courts were correct in dismissing the complaint for being filed through an attorney. The petitioner failed to show any legal error or irregularity in the lower courts' decisions. As a result, the constitutional petition was dismissed. -----Citations/Precedents: Muzaffar Nawaz v. Ishrat Rasool (2022 YLR 1920) Liaqat Ali Mir v. Additional Sessions Judge (2017 P Cr. L J 1026) Muhammad Qasim v. SHO Police Station Khudabad, District Dadu (2016 MLD 1238) Khalid Mehmood and others v. Safdar Iqbal (2017 P Cr. L J 1104) Usman Saleem v. Additional District and Sessions Judge III, Karachi East (2021 P Cr. L J Note 66) Ghazanfar Ali v. M. Zahid Hussain and others (PLD 2011 Lahore 179)

Summary: Background: The petitioner, invoked the constitutional jurisdiction of the Lahore High Court to challenge the orders dated 03.06.2022 and 31.10.2023 passed by the Judge Family Court, Lahore, and the Additional Sessions Judge, Lahore, respectively. The petitioner filed a complaint under Section 6(5) of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, accusing respondent Feroz Usmani of contracting a second marriage without permission while still married to her. Other respondents were accused of facilitating the marriage. ----Issues: 1- Whether the complaint against the remaining respondents, aside from Feroz Usmani, disclosed any offense under Section 6(5) of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961. 2- Whether the trial court and the additional sessions court erred in dismissing the complaint against the other respondents. 3- Whether the orders passed by the courts below are in accordance with the law and facts of the case. ----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome: ---Application of Mind by the Magistrate: The Additional Sessions Judge emphasized that the magistrate must be satisfied that a trial is necessary based on the available record before issuing a process to summon the respondents. The court found that no incriminating material was available on record against the respondents, except for Feroz Usmani. ---Strict Interpretation of Criminal Statutes: The court noted that the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, specifically Section 6(5), does not prescribe any offense or penalty against anyone other than the husband who contracts another marriage without permission from the Arbitration Council. The ordinance does not provide for any inchoate offenses such as attempt, solicitation, or conspiracy in relation to polygamy. ---Evidence and Cursory Statements: The complaint and cursory statements did not provide sufficient material to justify summoning the other respondents. The evidence provided by the petitioner was deemed insufficient to establish a prima facie case against them. ---Non-Applicability of Pakistan Penal Code: The court held that, being a special statute, the provisions of the Pakistan Penal Code, such as Section 109 for abetment, cannot be read into the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance to broaden the scope of the offense prescribed under Section 6(5). The Lahore High Court dismissed the writ petition, finding no illegality or jurisdictional error in the orders passed by the Family Court and the Additional Sessions Judge. The complaint against respondents other than Feroz Usmani did not disclose any offense under Section 6(5) of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961. The petition was dismissed in limine for being devoid of merit. -----Citations/Precedents: Mirza Shaukat Baig and others vs. Shahid Jamil and others (PLD 2005 Supreme Court 530) Ex-Lance Naik Mukarram Hussain and others v. Federal Government, Ministry of Defence through Chief of Army Staff and others (2017 SCMR 580) Basharat Iqbal v. Nargis Rehana (1993 MLD 571)

Summary: Against order of acquittal under section 249-A, Cr.P.C. criminal revision under section 439, Cr.P.C. is not competent. Similarly, writ petition against order of acquittal is also not competent in the light of section 417(2), Cr.P.C. --- The petitioner, Hajra Javaid Makhdoom, initiated the petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, seeking redress, specifically requesting a retrial and criminal revision in a case involving the respondent, Muhammad Tehmas Nasir.The petitioner's grievance revolved around a private complaint filed under section 6(5) of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, alleging that the respondent had contracted a second marriage without her consent. Subsequently, the Judicial Magistrate in Sargodha summoned the respondent to face trial under section 6(5) of the Ordinance. However, during the proceedings, the respondent submitted an application under section 249-A, Cr.P.C., contending that the petitioner's complaint was baseless and driven by ulterior motives.The magistrate accepted the respondent's application, leading the petitioner to file a criminal revision. This revision was later dismissed by the Additional Sessions Judge. The petitioner, dissatisfied with both decisions, filed the present writ petition, urging the Lahore High Court to refer the case back to the Judicial Magistrate for retrial and the criminal revision back to the Additional Sessions Judge.In the judgment dated December 19, 2023, Judge Muhammad Tariq Nadeem meticulously examined the legal aspects raised in the petition. The judge acknowledged the petitioner's contention that against an order of acquittal under section 249-A, Cr.P.C., a criminal revision was competent, citing "The State through Advocate-General, Sindh High Court of Karachi v. Raja Abdul Rehman" (2005 SCMR 1544) as a precedent.However, Judge Nadeem went on to analyze the relevant legal provisions, emphasizing section 417(2), Cr.P.C., which stipulates that an appeal lies against an order of acquittal. The judge observed that the petitioner had not satisfactorily addressed whether the order of acquittal under section 249-A, Cr.P.C., was amenable to criminal revision or could be challenged through a petition for special leave to appeal under section 417(2), Cr.P.C.The judgment delved into the interplay between sections 439, 439-A, and 417(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code, clarifying that while an appeal could be filed against an order of acquittal, no proceedings by way of revision could be entertained if an appeal was available. Additionally, the judgment underscored the distinction between criminal appeals and revisions, highlighting that a revision against an order of acquittal was not competent under section 439(4)(a), Cr.P.C.Judge Nadeem concluded that the criminal revision before the court of the Additional Sessions Judge was not competent, as the order of acquittal could only be challenged through the remedy provided in section 417(2), Cr.P.C. The judge dismissed the writ petition, asserting that a constitutional petition was not maintainable when a specific alternate remedy of appeal against acquittal existed.

Summary: Bail denied ---- Issues:The legality of marrying two real sisters concurrently.The permissibility of marrying a sister of the divorced wife during her Iddat period.----Holding/Reasoning/Outcome:The court dismissed Musawar Hussain's bail application, reasoning that the marriage with Sumaira while Humaira's Iddat was ongoing, parallels the unlawful act of marrying two sisters simultaneously, incurring criminal liability. Despite Musawar's claims of divorcing Humaira, the divorce deed's authenticity was questionable as it lacked proper registration and was not found in the stamp vendor's register. The court also addressed the initial registration of FIR under section 365-B PPC, clarifying that the complainant's allegations of abduction justified the FIR's cognizance. The court's observations are tentative, and the trial court is to decide the case based on trial evidence, uninfluenced by these preliminary findings.------Citations/Precedents:Surah Al-Nur (24:32) and Surah Al-Rum (30:21): Highlight the sacredness of marriage in Islam.Iftikhar Nazir Ahmad Khan and others v. Ghulam Kibria and others (PLD 1968 Lahore 587): Discussed the prohibitions on marriage within Islamic law.Adeela Bibi and another v. The State and others (PLJ 2012 Islamabad 140): Addressed the legal consequences of fasid (irregular) marriages.Surah Al-Nisa (4:23) and Sunan Tirmazi (Hadith No. 1129): Explicitly forbid marrying two sisters simultaneously.Muhammad Arif v. The State (PLD 1982 FSC 292): Emphasized the continuation of marital obligations during the Iddat period.Section 7(3) of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961: Outlines the conditions under which Talaq becomes effective.Kundan Mai v. The State (PLD 1988 FSC 89) and subsequent cases: Reinforced the legal principles concerning Talaq and remarriage during Iddat.

Summary: Mehr (dower) must be paid when demanded by the wife. Compensatory costs imposed on failure to pay it ----- The petitioner argued that since the marriage was still ongoing, the mehr was not payable. However, the court, led by Chief Justice Qazi Faez Isa, rejected this argument, citing Islamic principles and relevant legal provisions.The court highlighted the significance of mehr as an Islamic concept and pointed to Section 10 of The Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, which stipulates that the entire amount of the dower shall be payable on demand if no details are specified in the nikahnama. The judgment emphasized that mehr can be demanded during the marriage, and the husband is obligated to pay it.The court found that the impugned judgment aligns with the law, and the petitioner's defense was untenable. It criticized the petitioner for involving the respondent in litigation and causing unnecessary delays in reaching the Supreme Court. The court expressed concern about frivolous litigation hindering the judicial system.Leave to appeal was declined, and the petition was dismissed. The court imposed costs on the petitioner, including compensatory costs of one hundred thousand rupees, emphasizing the importance of making the petitioner act reasonably. The court warned that if the mehr and costs were not paid within one month, the Family Court could execute the order, potentially involving the attachment of the petitioner's properties.