Summary: The appeal pertains to a lawsuit filed by the appellant against Orix Leasing Pakistan Limited for declaration, injunction, and damages. The appellant challenges the transaction conducted through an account he maintained with Orix Investment Bank Pakistan Limited. The terms and conditions of the account opening form and the nature of the relationship between the appellant and the respondent are under consideration. The court notes that the appellant's suit was dismissed by the trial court and this dismissal was upheld by the appellate court. However, upon review, the court finds that the relationship between the appellant and the respondent does not fall under the definition of "customer" and "finance" as stated in the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001. Therefore, the court determines that the suit was wrongly dismissed and should be treated as a case for ordinary civil jurisdiction, rather than being governed by the specific provisions of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001. The court allows the appeal, sets aside the impugned orders of the lower courts, and remands the case back to the trial court for further consideration and to decide the matter on its merits. The trial court is directed to expedite the proceedings and aim to dispose of the case within six months.

Summary: In principle, the Courts cannot play the role of assessing body and sit in judgment over subjective evaluation; however, can examine whether the required objective criterion for promotion was followed or otherwise in a suitable case subject to grave illegality and perversity in the action of the authority having domain to the affairs

Summary: 1. writ petition, ordinarily, not maintainable against concurrent findings of two forums below.2. Work charged employees of Hyderabad Development Authority can approach Labor Court for regularisation and back benefits

Summary: Appeal Allowed---The appellant is restrained from using its registered trademark "Rami" due to the proceedings before the Registrar of Trademarks initiated by the respondent. The respondent sought an interim injunction against the appellant's use of the trademark while the opposition proceedings were pending. The appellant's counsel argues that the trademark "Rani" had not been in use for a substantial period, while the appellant's trademark "Rami" had been in use since 2008. The counsel also points out that the proceedings before the Registrar were ongoing and that the injunction granted by the Single Judge effectively stymied those proceedings. The respondent's counsel, on the other hand, contends that the appellant's trademark is deceptively similar to theirs and that the appellant's trademark should never have been registered. Ultimately, the Judges concluded that the interim injunction granted by the learned Single Judge is not sustainable. They determine that the order goes beyond preserving the status quo and grants final relief at an interim stage, which is not justifiable. Therefore, they set aside the Impugned Order and revive the application for the determination of the injunction, directing that it be re-evaluated by a learned Single Judge in accordance with the law.

Summary: [Customs Act, 1969 (336)] Had it been registered then perhaps the lawful presumption would have attached to such registered document but no such document constitute evidentiary value for the purposes of theimpugned order passed by the Tribunal as such data of all the aforesaid documents are different and distinguishable and are not reconcilable.The impugned orders, at least of the Tribunal, is not clear at all, particularly as to on what basis the vehicle is being released as the Motor Vehicle Tax Slip, Annexure-D to the memo of Reference, discloses the identity of the subject vehicle as Toyota Crown as against claimedvehicle Toyota Surf Jeep.

Summary: Issue: The petitioners challenged the summons issued under Section 176(1)(b) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, by the Deputy Director of Intelligence & Investigation (IR), arguing that such powers could not have been conferred upon the Deputy Director and questioning the vires of the SRO No.115(I)/2015 dated 9th February, 2015.Holding: The High Court disposed of the petitions, directing that the petitioners/assessee may respond to the impugned notices/summons with explanations and documents as required, and an opportunity for a hearing should be provided to reach a just and fair conclusion.Reasoning: The Court found that the Deputy Director was empowered to issue the summons under Section 176(1)(b) of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, by SRO No.115(I)/2015. The Court clarified that while the department could inquire about unexplained amounts and seek explanations, it was premature to consider such amounts as laundered money without satisfactory explanations from the assessees. The Court emphasized that non-declaration of an asset under the Ordinance is not a scheduled offence under the Anti-Money Laundering Act, 2010 (AMLA-2010), unless proven otherwise. The Court disagreed with the petitioners' counsel that the officers had no jurisdiction to issue notices/summons for explanations under Section 176(1)(b) of the Income Tax Ordinance.Legal Precedents Cited:The Court referred to a Supreme Court decision, PLD 2021 SC 1, to discuss the provisions under the Anti-Money Laundering Act, 2010, regarding the presumption of guilt for money laundering offenses and the procedure for investigating money laundering.Order: The High Court disposed of the petitions with directions for the petitioners to submit their replies to the impugned notices/summons and for the respondents/department to provide a hearing opportunity, aiming for a just and fair conclusion. --- ''[Anti-Money Laundering Act, 2010 (Section 9), Anti-Money Laundering Act, 2010 (Section 5), Anti-Money Laundering Act, 2010 (Section 3 ), Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 (Section 230)] The powers primarily were exercised under Section 176(1)(b) of Income Tax Ordinance, whereas investigation undertaken in terms of Section 9(1) of Anti-Money Laundering Act, 2010 by the investigating officer could commence, provided that the investigating officer acted, not later than seven days from the date of order of attachment made under sub-section (1) of section 8 or,seizure of property under section 14 or section 15, on service of a notice of thirty days on the person concerned which may also be an assessee, however, no such pre-qualification exists.We are therefore, of the view that unexplained amount which came in and went out of the account, could be inquired about and an explanation could be sought but until and unless an explanation is forwarded by the assesse to the dissatisfaction of the officer concerned, it is inconceivable at the said premature stage that it was laundered money which is defined under Anti-Money Laundering Act, 2010. Any amount which is not accounted or not considered astaxable amount not necessarily be the laundered money having meaning under AMLA-2010.''

Summary: ECL Matter----The case revolves around a petitioner named Muhammad Haseeb Fatani who challenged the placement of his name on the Exit Control List (ECL) under the Exit from Pakistan (Control) Ordinance, 1981. The case involved several financial institutions including Summit Bank Ltd, Bank Islami Ltd, and Muslim Commercial Bank. The court ultimately dismissed the petitioner's request to have his name removed from the ECL. The court cited various reasons for its decision, including the fact that the petitioner had failed to appear in criminal proceedings related to the financial claims against him. The court also considered the petitioner's status as a fugitive from the law.

Summary: KPT-fresh show cause notice--allegations of misconduct--It is a well-settled principle of law that a public Servant has no vested right to call in question the disciplinary proceedings in Writ Petition. During arguments, we have been informed that the petitioners service has not yet been dispensed with under the disciplinary proceedings, however, they are at liberty to conclude the disciplinary proceedings (if not earlier concluded) within a reasonable time under law after providing an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner.

Summary: Directions given by Division Bench comprising Mr. Justice Muhammad Ali Mazhar and Mr. Justice Amjad Ali Sahito in C.P.No.D-5920 of 2015 to the I.G. Sindh for implementation of SOP for sampling and preservation of DNA samples in rape, sodomy and sexual violence cases.

Summary: In the High Court of Sindh at Karachi, a petition was filed under Sections 284 and 287 of the Companies Ordinance, 1984 for the transfer of specific portions of the undertaking of petitioner No.1 (referred to as the transferor company) to petitioner No.2 (referred to as the resulting company) in accordance with a Scheme of Arrangement. Petitioner No.1 was engaged in various business activities, while petitioner No.2 acted as a holding company. The companies aimed to restructure by demerging specific assets of petitioner No.1 to petitioner No.2 based on an approved Scheme of Arrangement. The Scheme of Arrangement delineated the division of assets, liabilities, and obligations, with the demerged assets transferring to petitioner No.2. In exchange, shares of petitioner No.2 would be issued to transferring shareholders. The shareholders of both companies approved the scheme through meetings, and the requisite formalities were adhered to. The Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP) raised certain objections, but these were addressed, including obtaining a no-objection certificate from a creditor. The SECP Assistant Director (Law) acknowledged the compliance with the scheme's provisions. The court discussed principles for approving such schemes, emphasizing the interests of shareholders and creditors. The court found that all necessary procedures were met and that the scheme was reasonable, fair, and not in violation of the law. The court also noted the importance of Competition Commission approval under the Competition Act 2010. Consequently, the court sanctioned the Scheme of Arrangement, allowing the transfer of assets from petitioner No.1 to petitioner No.2, subject to Competition Commission approval if required.