Summary: The dispute revolves around a property transfer via a registered deed (No. 1916 dated October 30, 1963) in favor of Mst. Asif Ara Begum as dower. The respondents sought a declaration of invalidity regarding this deed and claimed entitlement to the property as inheritance from their father. The court ruled that the revision petition was not time- barred, as the decree sheet was prepared on February 27, 2023, and the revision petition was filed on March 15, 2023, within the 90-day limit. The court examined the deed`s validity and held that it was fully established and proved. The deed`s execution by three brothers (Atta Muhammad, Deen Muhammad, and Sultan Muhammad) was upheld, and it was ruled that the entire suit property was transferred to Mst. Asif Ara without exclusion. The provisos to Article 79 of the Qanoon-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, do not require to call attesting witnesses for a registered document unless its execution is specifically denied by the executants. The executants of the deed did not question the deed`s execution during their lifetime, making it unnecessary to produce attesting witnesses. The respondent`s challenge to the deed was barred by limitation, as their father, Atta Muhammad, did not challenge the deed during his lifetime.

Summary: Objection petition filed by the petitioners under section 47 CPC was time-barred, as it was filed beyond the three-year limitation period specified in article 181 of the limitation act, 1908. The decree was passed on April 23, 2013, and the objection petition was filed on January 6, 2020, which was clearly beyond the limitation period. The court also found that the grounds raised by the petitioners in their objection petition did not relate to the execution, satisfaction, or discharge of the decree, which is a prerequisite for invoking the jurisdiction of the executing court under section 47 CPC. The petitioners' objections were related to pre-decree stages and did not constitute valid grounds for objection under section 47 CPC. The court noted that the petitioners had participated in the proceedings before the trial court and had failed to raise objections at the appropriate time. The court held that the petitioners could not raise new grounds in the objection petition that were not raised earlier. The court distinguished the case law relied upon by the petitioners, which related to arbitration cases where a formal order of reference was passed under the arbitration act, 1940. The court held that these cases were not applicable to the present case, where a civil suit was filed and both parties consented to refer the matter to arbitration. The court upheld the impugned judgment and decree, holding that they were substantially drawn in accordance with the law. The court also noted that mere formal errors of procedure would not vitiate the final outcome, as mandated by section 99 of the civil procedure code, 1908.

Summary: The court held that the 6% interest per annum would be calculated and paid to the landowners only on the enhanced value fixed by the Referee Court, and not on the total value already paid to the landowners. Furthermore, the court dismissed the appeals on the ground of limitation, finding that the appellants had failed to provide a plausible explanation for the delay of 27 days in filing the appeals. In reaching its decision, the court relied on the amended Section 28 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, which provides for the payment of rent or interest on the enhanced compensation amount. The court also drew support from previous judgments of the Supreme Court of Pakistan, including “Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa through Chief Secretary, Peshawar and others Vs. Yousaf Khan and others”; (2022 SCMR 1836). Additionally, the court applied the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1908, which require that delays in filing appeals be explained with plausible explanations for each and every day. Ultimately, the court dismissed the appeals, concluding that the 6% interest per annum would be calculated on the enhanced value fixed by the Referee Court, and that the appeals were barred by limitation due to the appellants; failure to provide a plausible explanation for the delay in filing the appeals.

Summary: Civil revision filed by Mst. Bakht Haram Bibi, challenging the judgment and decree passed by the learned appellate Court. The dispute centered on the ownership and possession of certain land, which was initially owned by the petitioner`s predecessor-in- interest, Quwat Khan. The court found that the petitioner failed to prove that Quwat Khan was suffering from any serious disease or was defrauded during the course of attestation of the mutations. The marginal witnesses to the mutations were not examined properly, and the petitioner denied executing a mutation in favor of respondent’s No. 1 to 3. However, the respondents failed to prove the execution of the mutation through firm, cogent, reliable, and trustworthy evidence. The court gave preference to the findings recorded by the first appellate Court, as the findings of the two courts below were at variance. The court ultimately dismissed the civil revision, upholding the judgment and decree of the learned appellate Court.

Summary: (a) Family Courts—Jurisdiction of appellate court—Scope of interference ----Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964), S. 7(2)—Appeal—Direction by appellate court to fix interim maintenance allowance when no such order was under challenge—Legality—Appellate court, while dismissing appeal relating only to production of USB as additional evidence, directed Family Court to fix interim maintenance allowance of minor—Held, jurisdiction not vested in appellate court to issue such direction in collateral proceedings since order dated 11.03.2023 declining fixation of interim maintenance had neither been appealed nor was in issue before appellate court—Such direction impliedly set aside a subsisting order without adjudicating its legality and was therefore unsustainable. (b) Collateral proceedings—Finality of unchallenged orders ----Principle of past and concluded transactions—Orders attaining finality cannot be reopened collaterally—Once order dated 11.03.2023 declining interim maintenance was not challenged before appellate or constitutional forum, it attained finality and could not be indirectly nullified in subsequent proceedings. Cited Cases: • 1980 CLC 664 (Karachi) • PLD 1980 Lahore 767 • PLD 1978 Karachi 851 (c) Family Court—Regulation of its own procedure— ----Family Courts Act (XXXV of 1964), S. 7(2)—Scope—Family Court competent to regulate its own procedure; higher courts ordinarily refrain from interfering in procedural or interlocutory matters unless manifest injustice is shown. Cited Cases: • 2016 SCMR 1821 (Lt. Col. Nasir Malik v. ADJ Lahore) • 2014 SCMR 1365 (Muhammad Tabish Naeem Khan v. ADJ Lahore) • 2011 SCMR 1361 (Farzana Rasool v. Dr. Muhammad Bashir) (d) Principles of justice— ----Expeditious disposal—Trial court directed to decide pending matter expeditiously, ensuring fair opportunity to both parties, observing that “justice delayed is justice denied” and “justice hurried is justice buried”; balance to be maintained between the two principles. (e) Disposition— ----Constitutional petition disposed of—Impugned appellate order modified to extent of direction for fixing interim maintenance allowance—Trial court directed to proceed and decide main case on merits without unnecessary adjournments—Order not to preclude Family Court from determining interim maintenance subsequently if found justified—Respondents’ right to avail legal remedies preserved.

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908): ----S. 115—Concurrent findings of fact—Scope of revisional jurisdiction—Concurrent findings of both the courts below rejecting petitioner’s claim based on alleged family settlement and panchayat—No direct or credible evidence of such panchayat produced—Held, concurrent findings based on proper appreciation of evidence do not warrant interference in revision—High Court declined to reappraise evidence—Petition dismissed. (b) Limitation Act (IX of 1908): ----Arts. 14 & 120—Limitation—Challenge to Permanent Transfer Deed (PTD)—Petitioner filed suit in 1979 to challenge PTD issued in 1965—Held, even under either Art.14 (one year) or Art.120 (six years), suit was hopelessly time-barred—Petition dismissed on ground of limitation—Relied on: Muhammad Din v. Deputy Settlement Commissioner 2022 SCMR 1481. (c) Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958: ----Ss. 22 & 25—Civil Court’s jurisdiction—Scope—Dispute relating to ownership of evacuee property and challenge to PTD—Held, exclusive jurisdiction lies with Settlement Authorities—Ouster clause of S.25 bars civil suits—Petitioner’s failure to approach Settlement Authorities was fatal—Civil Court had no jurisdiction—Relied on: PLD 1962 SC 42; PLD 1965 SC 404; PLD 1984 SC 213; 2004 SCMR 1640; 2017 SCMR 468. (d) Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958: ----P.T.D.—Effect—Transfer of evacuee property through valid PTD—Challenge not maintainable through civil suit—Proper forum was appellate and revisional jurisdiction under the 1958 Act—Even omission of Rule 7 of 1961 Rules did not revive civil court jurisdiction—PTD could only be challenged before designated settlement hierarchy—Relied on: CP 104 of 1965; PLD 1966 Lahore 33. (e) Evacuee Property and Displaced Persons Laws (Repeal) Act, 1975: ----Pending proceedings before 30.06.1974—Jurisdiction of Notified Officer—Scope—Held, Notified Officer under Repeal Act could decide only pending proceedings as of cutoff date—No fresh challenge to PTD maintainable post-repeal in such cases—Only remedy was writ jurisdiction or approaching civil court in limited circumstances—Petitioner did not fall within scope. ---Disposition: Revision petition dismissed. No misreading, non-reading or legal infirmity found in concurrent findings of courts below. Civil suit barred by limitation and ousted by special law. ----Cited Cases: • Syed Abdur Rashid v. Pakistan PLD 1962 SC 42 • Muhammad Ismail v. Mst. Shamsun Nisa CP 104 of 1965 • PLD 1965 SC 404 • Sher Bahadar Khan v. Qazi Islam-ud-Din PLD 1984 SC 213 • Muhammad Saleem v. Sardar Ali 2004 SCMR 1640 • Ahmad Din v. Muhammad Shafi PLD 1971 SC 762

Summary: Bail denied ----(a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860) ---- Ss. 377-A & 377-B ---- Sexual abuse of a minor by a mosque Imam ---- Definition of sexual abuse ---- Delay in FIR ---- Medico-legal examination ---- Similar allegations in prior FIRs ---- Bail declined. Allegation against the petitioner, an Imam, was that he lured a 9-year-old boy into his room after Maghrib prayer and engaged in obscene conduct amounting to attempted sodomy. The contention of delay in lodging the F.I.R. was not considered sufficient to justify bail, as incidents involving family honour and child abuse often face delayed reporting due to societal stigma and fear. Seven other F.I.Rs containing similar allegations had already been registered against the petitioner, displaying a recurring pattern and state of mind relevant under Art. 27 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984. The term “sexual abuse” under S. 377-A, PPC includes a wide range of conduct—fondling, caressing, exhibitionism, voyeurism—regardless of consummation, and is applicable even in the absence of a medico-legal report, especially where disclosure was delayed by the victim due to fear. Victim’s statement under S. 164, Cr.P.C. showed maturity and was corroborated by other evidence. Circumstances showed the petitioner was a habitual offender, and the gravity and nature of the offence shocked public morality. Held, prima facie case existed falling under the prohibitory clause of S. 497, Cr.P.C.; thus, post-arrest bail was rightly declined. Cited Provisions: • Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 377-A & 377-B • Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), Ss. 164 & 497 • Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984, Art. 27 Disposition: Bail petition dismissed.

Summary: Conviction maintained ---- (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860), S. 302(b) — Imprisonment for life upheld — Eyewitness testimony — Minor medical inconsistencies immaterial Appellant was convicted for the murder of Haji Muhammad Mahfooz by causing a firearm injury to the neck — Conviction under S. 302(b), PPC was initially punished with death, later commuted to life imprisonment by the High Court — Supreme Court upheld conviction and sentence — Ocular account provided by complainant and another eyewitness was found to be consistent, confidence-inspiring, and corroborated by medical evidence — Minor discrepancies between medical and ocular versions (regarding entry and exit wounds) held inconsequential — Eyewitnesses were closely related to the deceased, yet their testimony was not discarded in absence of any enmity or motive for false implication — No legal infirmity or misreading of evidence found in concurrent judgments of courts below — Appeal dismissed. Cited Cases: • Asfandiyar v. The State 2021 SCMR 2009 • Muhammad Abbas v. The State 2023 SCMR 487 • Azhar Hussain v. The State 2022 SCMR 1907 • Ahamsher Ahmad v. The State 2022 SCMR 1931 • Ali Taj v. The State 2023 SCMR 900 • Muhammad Iqbal v. The State 1996 SCMR 908 • Naeem Akhtar v. The State PLD 2003 SC 396 • Faisal Mehmood v. The State 2010 SCMR 1025 • Muhammad Ilyas v. The State 2011 SCMR 460 • Abid Ali v. The State 2011 SCMR 208 (b) Criminal Trial — Relationship of Witnesses with Deceased — Presumption of Substitution Rejected Eyewitnesses were brother and close relative of deceased — Defence plea that witnesses were "interested" rejected by Supreme Court — Held, mere relationship does not render a witness untrustworthy where testimony is otherwise credible — Proposition that close relatives falsely implicate an innocent person while sparing the actual killer deemed inherently improbable in absence of animosity or malice — Courts to assess credibility based on intrinsic worth and coherence of testimony, not status of the witness. (c) Criminal Trial — Minor Discrepancies — Medical vs Ocular Account — Test of Probative Value Inconsistencies between medical and ocular evidence (regarding angle and exit of bullet wound) held immaterial — Such minor variances do not nullify trustworthy direct evidence — Courts reiterated principle that reliable ocular testimony can be preferred over inconclusive medical details — Human memory cannot reproduce events like a tape recorder — Discrepancies must be material and go to root of prosecution case to benefit the defence. Disposition: Appeal dismissed — Conviction under S. 302(b), PPC upheld — Sentence of life imprisonment maintained — Petition for suspension of sentence dismissed as infructuous.

Summary: Acquittal granted --- (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860) ----S. 302(b) Murder—Benefit of doubt—Nighttime occurrence—Conviction based on identification by torchlight—No torch recovered during investigation—Held, identification by eyewitnesses lacked evidentiary support and could not be accepted without corroboration—Prosecution's failure to prove safe identification undermined its case—Appeal allowed and conviction set aside. (b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) ----S. 154—Delay in lodging FIR—Effect—Crime reported to police with an unexplained delay of 14 hours despite the police station being merely 9 miles away—Held, undue and unexplained delay in FIR registration raised suspicion about deliberation and fabrication—Benefit of delay extended to accused. (c) Evidence Act (I of 1872) ----S. 134—Testimony of injured eyewitness—Standard of proof—Prosecution’s reliance on injured witness Abid Hussain to corroborate presence at scene—Doctor who treated the injury not produced, and the co-accused who allegedly caused injuries was acquitted—Held, evidence of injured witness not reliable unless independently corroborated, which was absent in present case—Prosecution failed to meet burden of proof. (d) Penal Code (XLV of 1860) ----S. 302(b)—Principle of parity—Disbelieved eyewitnesses—Two co-accused assigned effective roles acquitted by Trial Court—Same eyewitnesses relied upon to convict appellant—Held, where witnesses are disbelieved against co-accused with similar roles, conviction of another on basis of same testimony without independent corroboration is legally unsustainable. (e) Criminal Trial—Prosecution Evidence ----Human conduct—Prosecution witnesses’ inaction after murder—Held, prosecution’s account inconsistent with natural human conduct—No immediate response by complainant party after the killing weakened credibility of eyewitnesses’ version—Further added doubt to prosecution’s narrative. (f) Criminal Trial—Motive ----Failure to prove motive—Prosecution alleged motive based on prior abduction—High Court found motive unproved—Held, once prosecution sets up a motive, it must prove it—Failure to prove motive weakens entire prosecution case—Prosecution must suffer consequences, not the defence. Disposition: Appeal allowed—Conviction and sentence set aside—Appellant acquitted by giving benefit of doubt and ordered to be released if not required in any other case.

Summary: (a) Punjab Sales Tax on Services Act, 2012 (PSTS Act): ----Ss. 2(38), 2(45), 3, 6(1)-(3), 7(1), 10---Security services---Sales tax on services---Scope and valuation---Whether reimbursed salaries paid by recipients of service to service providers for onward payment to security staff are taxable---Held, under Section 6(3) of PSTS Act, services rendered by employees in their capacity to employers do not constitute economic activity---Security personnel remain employees of service providers, not recipients, and merely reimbursing salaries does not make such payment taxable---Tax is leviable only on the component representing economic activity of service provider, not on reimbursed salaries---Construing “gross amount” in Section 7(1) to include salaries contradicts Section 6(3), violates settled statutory interpretation principles, and renders exclusion clause redundant---Interpretation must be harmonized with scheme of statute and Constitution. ----Cited Case: • Sindh Revenue Board v. Quick Food Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. 2023 SCMR 1776 (b) Constitutional Law: ----Art. 70(4) & Fourth Schedule, Entry 49---Scope of legislative competence---Sales tax on services---Held, after 18th Amendment, power to legislate on sales tax on services lies exclusively with the Provinces, as an exception to Entry 49 of Federal Legislative List---This power cannot be extended to tax components not constituting services, such as reimbursements for salaries---Only the service component, not ancillary transfers of funds unrelated to core service, falls within provincial taxing power. Cited Case: • Sami Pharmaceuticals (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Province of Sindh CP No. 5220-2017 (c) Fiscal Statutes—Interpretation: ----Principles---Absurdity, redundancy, and common sense---Scope---Held, courts must avoid interpretations that lead to absurd results, render provisions redundant, or flout common sense---Statutory provisions should be interpreted harmoniously to give effect to the legislative intent---In fiscal statutes, no implication or presumption is permissible beyond what is explicitly stated---Reimbursed salaries do not form part of taxable value unless expressly included. ----Cited Cases: • Allied Bank Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax 2023 SCMR 1166 • Mrs. Naila Naeem Younus v. Indus Services Ltd. 2022 SCMR 1171 • Gas Masters CNG Station v. Federation of Pakistan 2019 PTD 25 • SKB v. Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue 2019 PTD 776 • Ahsan Khan v. Govt. of Punjab 2023 CLC 825 (d) Administrative Law—Service Tax Practice: ----Scope---Salaries reimbursed by service recipients to service providers---Held, for determining value of taxable service, only the portion representing value-added service is relevant---Administrative difficulties in identifying the taxable component must be addressed in accordance with guidelines laid down by Supreme Court---Open market value or clear contractual bifurcation to be used for delineation. ----Cited Case: • Quick Food Industries Case 2023 SCMR 1776 (para 12)