Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan—Art. 199 Execution proceedings—Judicial discretion—Conduct of Court-appointed auctioneer—Scope and interference by High Court—Petitioner challenged the order of the Executing Court dismissing his objection petition without considering partial satisfaction of decree—Petitioner had deposited Rs.506,000/- out of the decretal amount of Rs.1,000,000/- including Rs.300,000/- paid to Court-appointed Auctioneer (respondent No.4), who failed to submit his report and was replaced—Petitioner sought refund and remedy—Respondent No.4 acknowledged receipt of funds and repaid part in cash and rest through post-dated cheques, which were handed to petitioner’s counsel—Held, that High Court does not interfere in execution matters lightly, but in present case, Court intervened to ensure justice due to the acknowledged misconduct of Court Auctioneer and partial satisfaction of decree—Petition was not pressed after restitution was achieved and was accordingly disposed of. Disposition: Petition disposed of. (b) Administration of Justice—Court-appointed officials—Standards for appointment—Misconduct of Advocate acting as Court Auctioneer—Guidelines issued—Court observed that respondent No.4, an Advocate acting as Court Auctioneer, committed misconduct by receiving Rs.300,000/- from petitioner’s surety without depositing or reporting to Court—Such acts undermine judicial process and trust—Court stressed that appointments of Advocates in auxiliary judicial roles (e.g., Auctioneer, Local Commissioner, Receiver, Liquidator) should not be made arbitrarily—Appointees must reflect the authority and integrity of the Court—Court issued directions that such appointments must be made with due care, ensuring: Competency and Expertise: Legal and procedural knowledge in line with High Court Rules & Orders; Professional Integrity: Clean past record and absence of disciplinary issues; Accountability and Transparency: Ability to act impartially and safeguard parties’ rights and assets. Court further directed circulation of this judgment to all District & Sessions Judges across Punjab for strict compliance and sent copy to Punjab Bar Council for appropriate disciplinary action against respondent No.4. Disposition: Directives issued for future appointments; disciplinary reference ordered.

Summary: Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance (XLVI of 2001)--- ----S. 9(2)---Bankers' Books Evidence Act (XVIII of 1891), Ss. 2(8) & 4---Plaint---Statement of Account to be "supported by"---Requirement---Scope ---Verification/attestation of Statement of Account---Procedure---Customers filed appeal as the Banking Court, after dismissing their application to leave to defend, decreed suit against them, relying on submitted documents---Validity---Pertinently, S. 9(2) of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 ('the Ordinance 2001') provides that the plaint shall be "supported" by a "Statement of Account" which shall be duly certified under S. 2(8) of Bankers' Books Evidence Act 1891 ('the Act 1891')---The "Statement of Account" is a continuous daily posted record showing in detail all debits , credits and balance as on the close of the period , giving dates and description, permitting customer to verify the Bank's record with his own---Therefore, the "statement of account" is a basic document that is filed by a financial institution before the Court in discharge of its mandatory duty under S. 9(2) of Ordinance, 2001---If such "statement of account" is not filed along with the plaint, a customer will obviously remain totally unaware of the record---In the present case, the Statement of Account filed by the Respondent-Bank with plaint in the suit, being incomplete and unsubscribed by the principal accountant or manager, did not fulfill the mandatory requirement of the provisions of S. 9(2) of the Ordinance 2001 and Ss. 2(8) & 4 of Bankers' Books Evidence Act 1891 ('the Act 1891'), therefore, the same did not qualify as a "Statement of Account" duly certified under the Act 1891, as it did not contain the details of entire transactions between the respondent /Bank and appellants/customers during finance limit period---Besides, Statement of Account was undated and had been subscribed allegedly by an attorney of the Respondent-Bank instead of being subscribed by its principal accountant or the manager, as required under S. 2(8) of the Act 1891---It was only the principal accountant or the manager of the financial institution who alone could certify the statement---Hence, a Statement of Account signed/subscribed by the Attorney of the bank cannot be treated as a duly certified copy within the meaning of S. 2(8) of the Act 1891---It appeared that the Trial/Banking Court had ignored the mandatory provisions of S. 9(2) of the Ordinance, 2001 and Ss. 2(8) and 4 of the Act, 1891 while decreeing the suit of the Respondent and had wrongly treated the Break-up of Account as Statement of Account which did not contain the requisite information and detail as required under proper statement of account; hence, the impugned judgment/decree passed by the Trial Court was not sustainable in law---Appellate / High Court set-aside the judgment and decree as well as dismissal order of application for leave to defend the suit and remanded the case to the Banking Court to decide the application of the appellants for leave to defend as well as the suit afresh, while the respondent-Bank would be at liberty to file proper Statement of Account in terms of S. 9(2) of the Ordinance, 2001 and Ss. 2(8) & 4 of the Act 1891, and in such case, the appellants may raise/file such objections thereon as they may deem fit---Appeal, filed by customer, was allowed accordingly. Elbow Room and another v. MCB Bank Limited 2014 CLD 985; United Bank Limited v. Messrs Ilyas Enterprises through Proprietor Ilyas Malik and 2 others 2004 CLD 1338 and C.M. Textile Mills (Pvt.) Limited through Chairman v. Investment Corporation of Pakistan 2004 CLD 587 ref. Saalim Salam Ansari for Appellants. Khalid Mahmood Siddiqui and Ghulam Rasool Korai for Respondent. Date of hearing: 14th January, 2025.

Summary: (a) Punjab Government Rules of Business, 2011--- ----Cl. 5---Co-operative Societies Act (VII of 1925), S. 43---Constitution of Pakistan, Arts.129 & 139(3)---Complaints of financial mismanagement and administrative irregularities against a cooperative housing society-- -Power of Chief Minister to order initiation of inquiry---Scope---High Court accepting society’s plea that only Registrar of cooperative societies could hold inquiry against the society---Legality---Acting upon the complaint received against working of a cooperative housing society, the Chief Minister directed his inspection team to conduct an inquiry---The society challenged this inquiry before the High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution, contending that the Chief Minister had no authority to order such inquiry since the Cooperative Societies Act, 1925 provided its own mechanism for supervision and inquiry---The High Court accepted the society’s plea and set aside the inquiry proceedings---Against High Court’s decision, the Government of Punjab filed the present petition before the Supreme Court---Pivotal question requiring determination before the Supreme Court was as to “Whether the Chief Minister, under Clause 5(2) of the Punjab Government Rules of Business, 2011, possessed the legal authority to initiate or order an inquiry into the affairs of a cooperative society registered under the Cooperative Societies Act, 1925, notwithstanding the specialized supervisory mechanism prescribed under the said Act”?- --Held: It was clear from clause5 sub-clause (2) that Chief Minister could call for any case or information from any department, attached department or regional office---In this regard, complaint made to the Chief Minister’s inspection team or the Chief Minister for probing into the affairs of the society, fell within the sphere of Cooperative Laws, wherein the secretary cooperative societies was the overall in-charge---Clause 5 permitted Chief Minister to call for record and issue directions to government departments---This function was administrative in nature and did not amount to statutory intervention---However, the inquiry could not usurp the functions of the Registrar of the authorities empowered under the Act---While the High Court correctly identified the supremacy of the Act in terms of substantive regulation, it erred in concluding that Chief Minister had absolutely no authority to order or initiate an inquiry or call for information even through competent department---The Constitutional and administrative role of the Chief Minister had to be given its due effect---Judgment of the High Court was not sustainable as it has construed Clause 5 ibid in a restricted manner and had made the referred power of the Chief Minister dormant wherever there was statutory regulatory scheme work---Chief Minister was not excluded from calling information or record pertaining to the cooperative societies or any provincial department or attached department under Clause 5 of the Rules---Leave to appeal was granted and present petition was converted into appeal which was accordingly allowed. (b) Co-operative Societies Act (VII of 1925)--- ----S. 43---Punjab Government Rules of Business, 2011, Cl. 5---Complaints against working of a cooperative housing society---Holding of inquiries into affairs of a society---Jurisdiction of Registrar of cooperative societies---Powers of Chief Minister to order an inquiry into affairs of a society---Scope---The Cooperative Societies Act, 1925 is a special enactment designed to regulate the formation, operation and supervision of Cooperative Societies in Pakistan---It vests with supervisory and regulatory powers in the Registrar of the Cooperative Societies and the Provincial Government---Section 43 of the Act empowers the Registrar, either on his own motion, or upon the complaint to hold inquiries into the working of a society---However, a complaint made to Chief Minister’s inspection team of the Chief Minister for probing into the affairs of the society falls within the sphere of cooperative laws---Chief Minister is not excluded from calling information or record pertaining to the cooperative societies or any provincial department or attached department under Clause 5 of the Rules. (c) Interpretation of statutes--- ----It is well settled principle of statutory interpretation that where subject statute provides a complete code and procedure for redressal of grievance then it takes precedence over general or executive provision. (d) Interpretation of statutes--- ----The fundamental principle of statutory interpretation is that apparent conflict between general and special law should be resolved through harmonious construction. Awais Ahmed Qazi, Addl. A.G., Punjab for Petitioners. Waqar A. Sheikh, Advocate Supreme Court along with Syed Fawad Shah, Sr. Law Officer and Rai Mudassar Nawaz, Law Officer, (for respondent No. 1) Date of hearing: 25th April, 2025. AAMER FAROOQ, J.--- This judgment arises out of a petition for leave to appeal filed by the Government of Punjab against the judgment dated 16.09.2015, passed by the Lahore High Court, wherein the learned High Court allowed the writ petition filed by T&T Employees Ideal Cooperative Housing Society Limited ("the Society") and held that the Chief Minister of Punjab did not possess the requisite legal authority to initiate or order an inquiry into the affairs of the said society.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----S. 498---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 352 & 337-A(iii)---Assault or criminal force used against another person, not grave provocation, shajjah-i-hashimah---Ad-interim pre-arrest bail, recalling of---Cancellation of bail---Scope---Allegations against the accused-petitioner were that he beat the complainant with fists and kicks, as a result whereof he got hit on his nose---Perusal of the impugned order of the Court below revealed that the grounds made basis for the confirmation of the ad-interim pre-arrest bail already granted to the respondent/accused was nothing more but deeper appreciation of the record which was unwarranted at the bail stage---Court below had held the case of accused as one of further inquiry and even did not touch the basic ingredient of mala fide or ulterior motives for false implication of the accused, which was a sine qua non for confirmation of pre-arrest bail---Pre-arrest bail being an extra-ordinary relief can only be extended in the cases where an accused does not prima-facie appear to have committed a non-bailable offence, particularly when only oral allegations are levelled in the FIR---Thus, the Court below fell into error while passing the impugned order, which called for the interference of the High Court---No mala fide was apparent on the record regarding false implication of the accused in the instant case, as such, the very ingredient for the confirmation of pre-arrest was lacking---Resultantly, pre-arrest bail granted to the accused was recalled. Murad Khan v. Fazal-e-Subhan and another PLD1983 82; Sarwar Sultan v. The State and another PLD 1994 SC 133; Muhammad Azam v. The State PLD 1996 SC 67 and Ashir Wasim Babar v. The State 2006 SCMR 407 rel. Malik Akhtar Nawaz Khattak for Petitioner. Muhammad Asghar Khan, Ahmadzai, Addl. A.G for the State. Abdul Jabbar Khan for Respondent. Date of hearing: 25th April, 2025.

Summary: C.P.L.A No. 402-P of 2023 (Against the judgment dated 17.03.2023 passed by the Peshawar High Court, Peshawar in W.P. No. 4180-P of 2022). Per Syed Mansoor Ali Shah, J; Muhammad Ali Mazhar and Shahid Bilal Hassan, JJ. agreeing. (a) Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (Appointment, Deputation, Posting and Transfer of Teachers, Lecturers, Instructors and Doctors) Regulatory Act (XII of 2011)--- ----S. 3---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 188---Supreme Court Rules, 1980, O.XXVI & O.XXVIII, R.3---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S. 114---Review jurisdiction---Scope---Appointment, posting and transfer---Imposing of costs---Petitioner sought review of judgment passed by Supreme Court with regard to determination of place of residence for employment purposes---Validity---Power of review, as articulated in Article 188 of the Constitution and governed by Supreme Court Rules, 1980 ('Rules') and C.P.C. is not an open invitation to revisit judgments merely on the basis of dissatisfaction with the outcome---It is a limited jurisdiction, exercised with great caution and circumspection---Conditions for filing a review petition are specifically enumerated and they do not extend to re-arguing points of law or fact that have already been conclusively determined---Petitioner did not disclose any new or important evidence nor pointed any error that was apparent on the face of record---Issues raised by petitioner were mere reiteration of arguments that had already been considered and rejected by Supreme Court---Supreme Court declined to review its earlier judgment, as there was no ground made out for review and petitions were frivolous and vexatious---Supreme Court imposed cost under Order XXVIII, Rule 3 of Supreme Court Rules, 1980 upon petitioner for squandering valuable time of Supreme Court---Review petition was dismissed. District Education Officer (Female) Charsadda and others v. Sonia Begum and others 2023 SCMR 217; Justice Qazi Faez Isa v. President of Pakistan PLD 2022 SC 119; Messrs Habib and Co. v. Muslim Commercial Bank PLD 2020 SC 227; Engineers Study Forum v. Federation of Pakistan 2016 SCMR 1961; Government of Pun jab v. Aamir Zahoor-ul-Haq PLD 2016 SC 421; Haji Muhammad Boota v. Member (Revenue) BOR 2010 SCMR 1049; Mehdi Hassan v. Province of Punjab 2007 SCMR 755; Anwar Husain v. Province of East Pakistan PLD 1961 Dacca 155; Ghulam Murtaza v. Abdul Salam Sheikh 2010 SCMR 1883; Haji Muhammad Boota v. Member (Revenue) BOR 2010 SCMR 1049; Abdul Rauf v. Qutab Khan 2006 SCMR 1574; Nawabzada Muhammad Amir Khan v. Controller of Estate Duty PLD 1962 SC 355; Pakistan International Airlines v. Inayat Rasool 2004 SCMR 1737; Noor Hassan Awan v. Muhammad Ashraf 2001 SCMR 367; Kalsoom Malik v. Assistant Commissioner 1996 SCMR 710; Abdul Majeed v. Chief Settlement Commissioner 1980 SCMR 504; Inter Quest Informatics Services v. Commissioner of Income Tax 2025 SCMR 257; Mukhtar Mai v. Abdul Khaliq 2019 SCMR 1302; Zakaria Ghani v. Muhammad Ikhlaq Memon PLD 2016 SC 229; Jamshoro Joint Venture v. Khawaja Muhammad Asif 2014 SCMR 1858; Suja A Thomas, 'Frivolous Cases' (2010) 59(2) DePaul Law Review 633; Cooter and Gell v. Hartmax Corp 496 U.S. 384 (1990); Wormer. 765 F.2d 86 (7th Cir. 1985); Cropper v. Smith (1884) 25 Ch D 700 (affirmed in Prince Abdulaziz v. Apex Global Management Ltd 120141 UKSC 64); De Cruz Lee v. Lee 2015 ONSC 2012; Irmya v. Mijovick 2016 ONSC 5276; British Columbia (Minister of Forests) v. Okanagan Indian Band, 2003 SCC 71; Sanford Levinson. 'Frivolous Cases: Do Lawyers Really Know Anything at All?' (1986) 24(2) Usgoode Hall LJ 353; Sanjeev Kumar Jain v. Raghubir Saran Charitable Trust 2012 (1) See 455; Bakht Biland Khan v. Zahid Khan PLD 2024 SC 1273; S.M. Sohail v. Sitara Kabir-ud-Din PLD 2009 SC 397; Lutfullah Virk v. Muhammad Aslam Sheikh PLD 2024 SC 887; National Highway Authority. Islamabad v. Messrs Sambu Construction 2023 SCMR 1103; Capital Development Authority v. Ahmed Murtaza 2023 SCMR 61; Javed Hameed v. Aman Ullah 2024 SCMR 89; Zakir Mehmood v. Secretary, Ministry of Defence 2023 SCMR 960; Pirbhai v. Singh 2011 ONSC 1366; Vinod Seth v. Devinder Bajaj (2010) 8 SCC 1; Pandurang Vithal Kevne v. Bharat Sanchar 2024 1NSC 1051 and Ashok Kumar Mittal v. Ram Kumar Gupta (2009) 2 SCC 656 rel. (b) Supreme Court Rules, 1980--- ----O.XXVIII, R.3---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), Ss. 35 & 35A---Costs, imposing of---Object, purpose and scope---Consistent imposition of meaningful and proportionate costs rooted in statutory authority, judicial discipline and Constitutional imperatives is essential to deter abuse of process and restore procedural integrity. Per Muhammad Ali Mazhar, J. agreeing (c) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art. 188---Supreme Court Rules, 1980, O.XXVI---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S. 114---Review jurisdiction---Scope---Every judgement rendered by Court of law is presumed to be a solemn and conclusive determination of all points arising out of the lis---Irregularities if any which have no significant effect or impact on outcome would not be sufficient to warrant review---If incongruity or ambiguity is of such a nature as to transmute the course of action from being one in aid of justice to a process of injustice then a review decision may be instituted for redressal to demonstrate error if it is found floating conspicuously on the surface of the record---Mere desire for rehearing of the matter cannot constitute sufficient ground for the grant of review which by its very nature cannot be equated with the right or remedy of appeal---Sanctity and finality of judicial determinations must not be compromised by mere persistence of litigants or mechanical issuance of advocate certificates---Review jurisdiction is not a fall back for unsuccessful litigants to reopen a lis but a narrowly confined judicial tool intended to correct palpable and consequential mistakes. (d) Constitution of Pakistan--- ----Art. 188---Supreme Court Rules, 1980, O.XXVI---Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908), S. 114---Review---Phrase "error apparent on the face of record"---Scope---Orders based on an erroneous assumption of material facts or those made without adverting to a provision of law or reflecting departure from undisputed construction of law and the Constitution may amount to an error apparent on the face of the record and can be rectified. Commissioner Inland Revenue Z-III, Corporate Regional Tax Office, Tax House, Karachi v. Messrs MSC Switzerland Geneva and others 2023 SCMR 1011 = 2023 SCP 150 rel. Shah Faisal Ilyas, Addl. AG, KPK for Petitioners. Nemo for Respondents. Umer A. Ranjha, Judicial Law Clerk and Ms. Uzma Zahoor, Research Officer, Supreme Court of Pakistan. Date of hearing: 25th April, 2025.

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) --- ----O.VII, R 11 --- Specific Relief Act (I of 1877) , Ss.12 & 42 --- Limitation Act (IX of 1908), First sched., Art.113 --- Suit for declaration along with specific performance of agreement to sell ---Limitation --- Where target date for performance of agreement to sell was not fixed, limitation of three years would run from the date of vendor's refusal --- Limitation being mixed question of law and facts, effect of ---Recording of evidence where limitation is a mixed question of law and facts---Rejection of plaint ---Pre-requisites---Precessor-in-interest of the petitioners (deceased vendor) in 1984 entered into agreement to sell with the respondents/plaintiffs (vendees) and target date thereof for performance of the same was fixed as six months from the date of agreement --- Performance of the agreement to sell was delayed due to some clerical mistake in revenue record due to which sale deed could not be executed ---Suit was filed after eleven years when the petitioners allegedly refused performance two days prior to its institution --- Reason for such day cited by the respondents was that an ancillary dispute had been pending at revenue forum---Trial Court rejected the plaint deeming the suit time-barred and lacking cause of action --- Whereas, appellate court accepted the appeal and remanded the matter for decision on merits --- Successors of the original vendor challenged the decision of the appellate court in the present civil revision petition --- Pivotal point for determination before the High Court was as to "whether the plaint in a suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell (stipulating only a six-month time frame without a specific date), could be rejected under Order VII, Rule 11 of C.P.C. on the sole ground of limitation, despite the plaintiff's/respondent's (vendee) express assertion that the petitioners/vendors refused to perform their part just two days before the suit was filed; and whether such plea of limitation, being dependent on disputed facts, required framing of issues and recording of evidence rather than outright rejection of the plaint"--- Held: Under O.VII, R.11, C.P.C. the plaint could be rejected only if from the statement in plaint, it did not disclose any cause of action or was barred by law or was incorrectly valued for the purpose of court fee or insufficiently stamped and on being required to make up the deficiency within time allowed to the plaintiff to make up the deficiency, if plaintiff failed to do the needful within the time allowed, then plaint could be rejected, which was not the case in the present matter---In the present case, perusal of plaint showed that the same disclosed a cause of action--- The plaintiffs/respondents alleged the execution of sale agreement, payment of earnest money, delivery of possession and the execution of document and that they were ready and willing to perform their part ---The agreement did not mention any specific date for the performance of obligation thereunder rather a period of six months was mentioned in the agreement which did not mean any specific date --- Being so, the period of limitation in this case prima facie fell in second part of Art. 113 of Limitation Act, 1908 which provided for three years from the date when the vendee had the notice of refusal to perform by the vendor --- In the present case theplaintiffs/respondents claimed that two days before the filing of suit the petitioners/defendant refused to perform the agreement and this being so ex-facie the plaint could not be rejected on the plea of limitation --- It needed to be proved by evidence as to when plaintiffs/respondents had notice of refusal to perform the agreement by petitioners/defendants --- As to the argument of limitation the objection being mixed question of law and fact the same could not be decided without evidence --- The view taken by the appellate court was in accordance with law, whereby, the judgment and decree rejecting the plaint was set aside and the matter was remanded to Trial Court for decision on merits--- Revision petition being without any substance was dismissed, in circumstance. Irshad Ali v. Sajjad Ali and 4 others PLD 1995 SC 629 rel. (b) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877) --- ----S.12 --- Limitation Act (IX of 1908), First sched., Art.113 --- Suit for specific performance of agreement to sell --- Limitation --- Computation --- Article 113 of Limitation Act, 1908 contemplates the period of three years for the specific performance of contract from the date fixed in the agreement for performance or if no such date is fixed, when the plaintiff has the notice that the performance is refused --- If specific date is not given in the agreement to perform the same, the case will fall in second part of Art. 113 of Limitation Act, 1908 which provides for three years from the date of notice of refusal to perform. Mst. Bibi Khatoon and 7 others v. Abdul Jalil PLD 1978 SC 213 rel. Muhammad Anwar and 8 others v. Bahan and another 2000 YLR 378; Mst. Kulsoom 6 others v. Mrs. Marium and 6 others 1988 CLC 870 and Mst. Nazar Rauf and 3 others v. Dr. Riaz Ahmad and another PLD 1988 Lah. 390 ref. Majid Karim Khokhar for Petitioners. Nemo for Respondents. Order Rasaal Hasan Syed, J .--- Petitioners in this revision petition have challenged the judgment dated 06.6.2011 of learned Addl. District Judge, Pindi Bhattian, District Hafizabad whereby appeal of respondents/plaintiffs was accepted and judgment and decree passed by trial court for rejecting the plaint was set aside and the case was remanded for decision in accordance with law. 2. Plaintiffs/respondents instituted a suit for declaration along with specific performance of agreement of sale dated 04.7.1984 claiming that in terms of agreement the petitioners/defendants had agreed to sell the suit property for consideration of Rs.30,000/-, received a sum of Rs.20,000/- as earnest money in the presence of witnesses and possession was delivered to the respondents/plaintiffs who had raised valuable construction in the form of shops, etc. The agreement was executed by Lal son of Ali Muhammad (defendant No.1) on behalf of Mst. Bashiran Bibi (defendant No.2 now deceased and represented by her legal heirs i.e. petitioners herein) and that they had committed to execute the registered sale deed within six months from the agreement. It was asserted that later the execution of sale deed was postponed on the pretext that due to some clerical mistake in the revenue record regarding parentage of Mst. Bashiran Bibi the sale deed could not be executed. The petitioners/defendants later claimed that Mst. Bashiran Bibi had filed an application before the Collector for settlement of dispute with Allah Yar, etc. and it was assured that after the settlement of dispute, she would execute a sale deed. It was claimed that the defendants kept on apprising the plaintiffs/respondents that the dispute on the Revenue side was not settled as yet and thus on this pretext obligation to execute the sale deed was postponed and that two days before the filing of suit they refused to perform their part under the sale agreement, in result, the suit for specific performance was being filed. 3. Mst. Bashiran Bibi filed an application under Order VII, Rule 11, C.P.C. for rejection of plaint on the ground that suit for declaration to enforce the agreement of sale was not maintainable, it was barred by time as it was filed after 11 years, and that the plaintiffs/respondents had no cause of action to file the suit. The application after reply was accepted by the learned Civil Judge and consequently the plaint was rejected with the observation that it was barred by time and that the plaintiffs/respondents had no cause of action or locus standi to file the suit and that the suit is not maintainable. Appeal filed thereagainst was accepted by learned Addl. District Judge, in result, the order of trial court dated 23.1.2010 rejecting the plaint was set aside, the suit was restored and the learned Civil Judge was directed to decide it after recording evidence of parties in accordance with law. Against this order the instant revision petition has been filed. 4. Heard. 5. The points raised by learned counsel for the petitioners have been considered in the light of material documents filed with the petition. Perusal thereof reveals that suit was instituted to enforce the sale agreement dated 04.7.1984. The claim of plaintiffs was that the transaction was settled in the presence of defendant and the witnesses and that the agreement was executed by Lal son of Ali Muhammad and that a sum of Rs. 30,000/- was paid at the time of execution of agreement, the sale transaction was to be completed within a period of six months and that the plaintiffs/respondents remained ready and willing to perform their part but the matter was postponed by the other side on the pretext that there was some confusion qua the name of Mst. Bashiran Bibi's father in the revenue record which would need necessary correction before the sale deed could be executed. Later, on the pretext of a dispute with Allah Yar, etc pending on Revenue side, the sale deed was postponed with the assurance that the needful would be done after settlement of such dispute. It was claimed that the possession was delivered to the plaintiffs/respondents who were in possession and had invested huge amount on the construction of shops, etc. The agreement shows that the period for execution of sale deed was fixed as six months and no specific date or year was mentioned therein. Plea of the petitioners was that the suit should have been filed within three years from the time fixed in the agreement i.e. six months from the date of agreement. 6. This plea found favour with the learned Civil Judge who assumed that the suit was barred by time; while the learned Addl. District Judge took a contra view that no time and date was given in the agreement, as such, a period of limitation would be three years from the notice of refusal to perform and in the plaint it was asserted that two days before the filing of suit the petitioners/defendants had refused to perform their part of agreement or to enforce the agreement and that while dealing with the application under Order VII, Rule 11, C.P.C. the facts given in the plaint had to be taken as such and, therefore, the suit was within time. 7. The view taken by the learned Addl. District Judge is in accordance with law. Under Order VII, Rule 11, C.P.C. the plaint could be rejected only if from the statement in plaint, it does not disclose any cause of action or is barred by law or is incorrectly valued for the purpose of court fee or insufficiently stamped and on being required to make up the deficiency within time allowed to the plaintiff to make up the deficiency, if plaintiff fails to do the needful within the time allowed, then plaint could be rejected, which was not the case here. In the instant case perusal of plaint shows that the same disclosed a cause of action. The plaintiffs/respondents alleged the execution of sale agreement, payment of earnest money, delivery of possession and the execution of document by Lal son of Ali Muhammad on behalf of Mst. Bashiran Bibi and that their readiness and willingness to perform their part. For all intents and purposes the plaint did disclose a cause of action. 8. As to the argument of limitation the objection being mixed question of law and fact the same could not be decided without evidence. Perusal of agreement shows that there is no specific date fixed for the performance of agreement for the purpose of registration of sale deed rather a period of six months was given. Article 113 of Limitation Act, 1908 contemplates the period of three years for the specific performance of contract from the date fixed in the agreement for performance or if no such date is fixed, when the plaintiff has the notice that the performance is refused. In the instant case the agreement does not mention any specific date for the performance of obligation thereunder rather a period of six months was mentioned in the agreement which does not mean any specific date. Being so, the period of limitation in this case prima facie falls in second part of Article 113 of Limitation Act, 1908 which provides for three years from the date when the vendee had the notice of refusal to perform by the vendor. In this case the plaintiffs/respondents claimed that two days before the filing of suit the petitioners/defendant refused to perform the agreement and this being so exfacie the plaint could not be rejected on the plea of limitation. It needs to be proved by evidence as to when plaintiffs/respondents had notice of refusal to perform the agreement by petitioners/defendants. In Irshad Ali v. Sajjad Ali and 4 orders (PLD 1995 SC 629) it was observed to the effect that question of limitation being mixed question of law and fact the evidence should have been recorded thereon and, thereafter, it should have been decided. Reference can also be made to Muhmmad Anwar and 8 others v. Bahan and another (2000 YLR 378), Mst. Kulsoom and 6 others v. Mrs. Marium and 6 others (1988 CLC 870), Mst. Bibi Khatoon and 7 others v. Abdul Jalil (PLD 1978 SC 213), Mst. Nazar Rauf and 3 others v. Dr. Riaz Ahmad and another (1988 PLD Lah. 390) that if specific date is not given in the agreement to perform the same, the case will fall in second part of Article 113 of Limitation Act, 1908 which provides for three years from the date of notice of refusal to perform. 9. The learned Addl. District Judge correctly observed that the issue of limitation should be decided after recording of evidence. The other objection raised by the petitioners before the court of first instance was that the agreement to sell does not convey any title, therefore, the suit for declaration is not maintainable and that Lal son of Ali Muhammad was neither a special nor general attorney of Mst. Bashiran Bibi while she herself had not signed the document, therefore, the plaintiffs/respondents had no cause of action or right to sue. In this context, suffice it to observe that the case of plaintiffs/respondents was that Lal son of Ali Muhammad had executed the agreement on behalf of Mst. Bashiran Bibi and, therefore, if petitioners denied such stance this could only be resolved by framing of issue and recording evidence and the objection could not sustain outrightly without evidence. The respondents were entitled to prove that the document was executed on the basis of some authority from Mst. Bashiran Bibi, particularly, when they alleged that the transaction was settled in the presence of Mst. Bashiran Bibi and the witnesses. Such disputed question of fact could only be resolved after evidence was allowed to be produced by the parties and plaint could not be rejected on mere allegations or assertion of denial. The learned Addl. District Judge rightly set aside the order of trial court and remanded the case for decision on merits after recording evidence of parties and in doing so no error of law or irregularity has been committed so as to warrant interference. 10. Resultantly, the revision petition being without any substance is dismissed. UN/M-76/L Revision dismissed.