Summary: 522Tax (Writ) 13433/23 Ms GB Security Services Pvt. Ltd.through Gul Bahar Kayani Vs Federation of Pakistan etc Mr. Justice Sultan Tanvir Ahmad 28- 04- 2025 2025 LHC 2854 2025 PTD 1159 (Lahore High Court)

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: (Against the judgment dated 22.02.2016 in Criminal Appeal No. 66-J of 2011 and Murder Reference No. 73 of 201, passed by the Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench Rawalpindi). (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b) & 34---Qatl-i-amd, common intention---Reappraisal of evidence---Ocular account supported by medical evidence---Appellant was charged that he along with his co-accused committed murder of the brother of complainant---Ocular account of the incident had been furnished by complainant and a witness---Testimonies of said witnesses were consistent and corroborative with each other on all material particulars of the occurrence, including the date, time, place, and the modus operandi of the offence---Both the eye-witnesses unequivocally attributed the role of causing firearm injury on the person of the deceased to the appellant---As the occurrence took place in broad daylight and the appellant was previously known to the eye-witnesses, the possibility of mistaken identity stood excluded---Presence of the eye-witnesses at the spot at the time of occurrence had been satisfactorily explained and appeared natural---Both the eye-witnesses were subjected to lengthy and searching cross-examination, yet nothing material could be elicited to undermine their credibility or shake their evidence---No doubt, complainant was the real brother of the deceased and witness was a close relative but the defence failed to advance any plausible reason or motive for their alleged false implication of the appellant while sparing the actual perpetrator(s)---Proposition of wrongful substitution, in such circumstances where close relatives had witnessed the murder of their kin, was inherently implausible and was rarely encountered in criminal jurisprudence---Medical evidence furnished by Medical Officer, who conducted autopsy on the dead body of the deceased, fully supported the prosecution's case---According to the statement of Medical Officer, firearm injury rupturing the trachea of the deceased and causing severe bleeding resulted into the unnatural death of the deceased---Circumstances established that the prosecution had successfully established the guilt of the appellant beyond shadow of reasonable doubt---Appeal was dismissed accordingly. Asfandiyar v. The State and others 2021 SCMR 2009 and Muhammad Abbas and another v. The State 2023 SCMR 487 rel. (b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b) & 34---Qatl-i-amd, common intention---Reappraisal of evidence---Related and interested witnesses, evidence of---Reliance---Appellant was charged that he along with his co-accused committed murder of the brother of complainant---Allegedly, both the eye-witnesses were closely related to the deceased, therefore, were interested witnesses---Mere fact of a witness being related to the deceased did not, in itself, render the testimony unreliable or tainted---Interested witness is one who is motivated by some extraneous consideration or harbors an ulterior motive to falsely implicate an accused---In the instant case, the defence had not been able to bring on record any such motive that could suggest a false implication of the appellant---In the absence of any tangible material indicating enmity, malice, or ill-will, the testimony of related witnesses could not be discarded solely on the ground of relationship---Circumstances established that the prosecution had successfully established the guilt of the appellant beyond shadow of reasonable doubt---Appeal was dismissed accordingly. Azhar Hussain and another v. The State and others 2022 SCMR 1907 and Shamsher Ahmad and another v. The State and others 2022 SCMR 1931 rel. (c) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b) & 34---Qatl-i-amd, common intention---Reappraisal of evidence---Minor contradictions in the statement of witnesses---Inconsequential---Accused-appellant was charged that he along with his co-accused committed murder of the brother of complainant---The argument that statements of the eye-witnesses were riddled with material contradictions and discrepancies did not bear merit---There were only minor inconsistencies for instance, that the complainant in his report stated that the firearm injury was sustained on the front of the neck by the deceased, whereas in his Court testimony he deposed that the shot passed through and through and this assertion stood contradicted by the medical evidence which indicated the entry wound was on the upper part of the chest near the neck and the exit wound was located at the mid-back---Other than this defence was unable to point to any substantial contradiction capable of undermining the foundational structure of the prosecution's case---Even otherwise, Court was fully convinced qua the presence of the eyewitnesses at the spot at the time of occurrence and their testimony was trustworthy and confidence inspiring, therefore, such minor inconsistencies in the testimony of the eyewitnesses with the medial evidence would not be sufficient for acquittal of the appellant---Minor discrepancies or omissions, which did not go to the root of the prosecution's case, were to be treated as inconsequential---Evidence of the prosecution was to be evaluated on the touchstone of quality rather than quantity---Moreover, it was not the identity or status of the person testifying that determined the credibility of the evidence, but the content and coherence of the testimony itself---Therefore, it was the statement that was to be judged and not the person and it must be weighed on the scales of logic, consistency, and truthfulness---Circumstances established that the prosecution had successfully established the guilt of the appellant beyond shadow of reasonable doubt---Appeal was dismissed accordingly. Ali Taj and another v. The State 2023 SCMR 900; Muhammad Iqbal v. The State 1996 SCMR 908; Naeem Akhtar v. The State PLD 2003 SC 396; Faisal Mehmood v. the State 2010 SCMR 1025; Muhammad Ilyas v. The State 2011 SCMR 460 and Abid Ali v. The State 2011 SCMR 208 rel. Sardar Muhammad Ashfaq Abbasi, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Appellant. Muhammad Faiz Ahmad Cheema, Advocate Supreme Court for the Complainant. Tariq Siddique, Additional Prosecutor General, Punjab for the State. Date of hearing: 28th April, 2025.

Summary: (Against the judgment/order dated 18.04.2017 passed by the Lahore High Court, Multan Bench, in Crl. Appeal No. 15-J of 2013 and M.R. No. 28 of 2012). (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b) & 34---Qatl-i-amd, common intention---Reappraisal of evidence---Night time occurrence---Source of light not established---Accused were charged for committing murder of the deceased and causing injuries to the injured---Occurrence had taken place during the night and although the prosecution had mentioned availability of torch with the prosecution witnesses at the spot yet admittedly no torch had been secured during the investigation of this case---Thus, the claim of the alleged eye-witnesses regarding identification of culprits with graphic details of the incident appeared to be a claim which could be accepted only with a lump of salt---Circumstances established that the prosecution had failed to prove its case against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt---Appeal against conviction was allowed accordingly, and accused was acquitted of the charge. (b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b) & 34---Qatl-i-amd, common intention---Reappraisal of evidence---Delay of 14 hours in lodging the FIR---Consequential---Accused were charged for committing murder of the deceased and causing injuries to the injured---Occurrence took place on 30.11.2009 at about 9:00 p.m.---According to the record, the police station was situated at a distance of approximately 9-miles from the crime scene---However, the matter was brought to the notice of local police through the statement of complainant recorded on 01.12.2009 at about 1:05 p.m. after a delay of about 14 hours without any justifiable explanation, thus, a possibility regarding deliberations before lodging of the FIR could not safely be ruled out of consideration---Circumstances established that the prosecution had failed to prove its case against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt---Appeal against conviction was allowed accordingly, and accused was acquitted of the charge. (c) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b) & 34---Qatl-i-amd, common intention---Reappraisal of evidence---Co-accused acquitted in the same set of evidence---Effect---Ocular account doubtful---Accused were charged for committing murder of the deceased and causing injuries to the injured---Ocular account was furnished by three witnesses---Said witnesses unanimously attributed the injuries on the body of deceased to the appellant and co-accused---Similarly, all the three prosecution witnesses saddled other co-accused with the responsibility of inflicting two injuries with his hatchet on the head and shoulder of injured whereas the remaining accused persons were not ascribed overt act in the commission of the crime---It was not disputed that two co-accused of the appellant were attributed effective role of causing injuries to the deceased and injured had been acquitted of the charge---If the eye-witnesses had been disbelieved against some accused persons attributed effective roles then the same eye-witnesses could not be believed against another accused person attributed a similar role unless such eye-witnesses received independent corroboration qua the other accused person---Circumstances established that the prosecution had failed to prove its case against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt---Appeal against conviction was allowed accordingly, and accused was acquitted of the charge. (d) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b) & 34---Qatl-i-amd, common intention---Reappraisal of evidence---Non-production of Medical Officer---Accused were charged for committing murder of the deceased and causing injuries to the injured---Injured was being portrayed by the prosecution as a star witness on account of injuries on his body, which fact was projected by the prosecution as stamp of his presence at the time of occurrence---Injured witness had allegedly sustained injuries on his head and shoulder caused by co-accused, however, due to non-production of the concerned Medical Officer as well as acquittal of co-accused, no reliance could be placed on his evidence being shaky in nature---Even otherwise, it was not necessary that the injured witness had spoken the whole truth; he could not be relied upon unless corroborated, which was lacking in the instant case---Circumstances established that the prosecution had failed to prove its case against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt---Appeal against conviction was allowed accordingly, and accused was acquitted of the charge. (e) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b) & 34---Qatl-i-amd, common intention---Reappraisal of evidence---Unnatural conduct of witnesses---Accused were charged for committing murder of the deceased and causing injuries to the injured---Conduct allegedly exhibited by the complainant party was offensive to normal human conduct, taking into account the number of individuals from both factions at the time of the occurrence---Despite the absence of definitive guidelines regarding human conduct and behavior, it was reasonable to assume that the prosecution witnesses would not let the perpetrators go scot-free after the murder of their loved ones in the normal course of events, given the accepted standards of human behavior---Circumstances established that the prosecution had failed to prove its case against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt---Appeal against conviction was allowed accordingly, and accused was acquitted of the charge. (f) Criminal trial--- ----Motive---Scope---Prosecution though is not obliged to prove the motive in each and every case, however, once the motive is set up then it must be established---In case of failure to prove the motive, the prosecution must suffer its consequences and not the defence. Ms. Aisha Tasneem, Advocate Supreme Court and Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record for Appellant. Tariq Siddique, Additional Prosecutor General for the State. Date of hearing: 28th April, 2025.

Summary: Specific Relief Act (I of 1877) --- ----Ss.12 & 22---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), First Sched. Art.113 ---Suit for specific performance of agreement to sell immoveable property---Maintainability---Limitation period for filing such suit stated---Time not the essence of contract, principle of---Scope---Where time is not of the essence, vendee must prove date of refusal and efforts to seek performance---Three-year limitation starts from date fixed for performance or from notice of refusal --- Delay of each and every day in approaching the court has to be explained---Discretionary nature of specific performance, explained---Court is not bound to grant decree even if contract is otherwise enforceable --- The facts in brevity were that the present civil revision had arisen out of judgments and decrees passed by the Trial Court and the District court, respectively, whereby the respondent's (vendee) suit for possession through specific performance was decreed and upheld on appeal --- The suit was based on an agreement to sell dated 10.10.1995, allegedly executed by the deceased vendor, the predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners, in favour of the respondent (vendee) --- The deceased vendor, in his lifetime, filed written statement denying the execution of the agreement --- Six issues were framed, including one on the point of limitation (Issue No.4) --- After recording evidence, the Trial Court decreed the suit, and the appellate court upheld the judgment --- The pivotal question demanding consideration before the High Court was as to "whether a suit for specific performance, filed (17) years after an agreement without a fixed date for performance, was maintainable without specific evidence by the vendee proving as to when the notice of the vendor's refusal to perform the agreement was received and that he had duly and continuously demanded performance during the intervening period of (17) years" ---Held: Since no date was fixed for performance of the agreement to sell, therefore, it was for the respondent to have proved that when did he get the notice that deceased or the petitioners were refusing to perform the agreement --- It was the case of the respondent (vendee) that he had time and again approached the deceased (vendor) for performance of the agreement, however, neither any dates were mentioned in the plaint nor the names of any witnesses were mentioned wherefrom this could be culled out as to when and in presence of whom respondent (vendee) approached the deceased for performance of the agreement to sell as the time lag between the execution of the same and the filing of the suit was about seventeen years---Limitation for filing the suit by the respondent would start from the date when he had notice of refusal by the vendor and in the present case, since the respondent (vendee) neither in his plaint nor in his evidence was able to prove that when, at what time, in presence of whom, where and through whom he had approached the deceased (vendor) for performance of the agreement, therefore, he had failed to prove that he remained ready and willing to perform his part of the contract --- Art. 113 of the Limitation Act, 1908 clearly stipulated that where the time was essence of the contract, upon the expiry of the stipulated period the cause of action would accrue to the parties to file a suit, however, where no date was fixed for performance of the same, it would accrue for the plaintiff to file the suit when he had notice that the performance had been refused and in both the eventualities the period of limitation would be three years which would be counted from the expiry of stipulated period or the notice of refusal, as the case may be --- Another aspect which further weakened the stance of the respondent (vendee) was that it was for him to prove that upon execution of the agreement he had paid the complete sale consideration and got the possession of the property in dispute---Question was why he did not get the sale deed registered at the outset and if it was delayed (for seventeen years) what was the logical explanation as he had failed to explain the delay -- In such circumstances, since the respondent (vendee) had approached the court for seeking performance of the agreement to sell, therefore, being the beneficiary of the same the onus was upon him to prove that he was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract and the delinquency/refusal was on part of the deceased and since the contract was executed in the year 1995 and he filed the suit in the year 2012, therefore, it was also imperative for him to have explained the interregnum period so as to bring his case within the four corners of Article 113 of the Limitation Act 1908, which he had failed to prove --- Each and every day consumed for approaching a court beyond the period of limitation has to be explained, which the respondent had failed to do --- Even otherwise, relief of specific performance could not be granted, as under S.22 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877 it has been provided that the jurisdiction to issue a decree of specific performance is discretionary in nature as it is an equitable relief and the court is not bound to grant such relief merely because it is lawful to do so --- Since both the courts below failed to appreciate the true import of Art.113 of the Limitation Act, 1908, therefore, the impugned judgments and decrees could not be sustained----Present civil revision was allowed, the impugned judgments and decrees were set aside, and resultantly the suit filed by the respondent (vendee) stood dismissed. Khudadad v. Syed Ghanzafar Ali Shah alias S. Inaam Hussain and others 2022 SCMR 933; Saqib Ali v. Government of Punjab and others 2023 PLC (C.S.) 310; Shahin Shah v. Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa through Secretary Irrigation Department, Peshawar and others 2022 SCMR 1810; Lal Khan through legal heirs v. Muhammad Yousaf through legal heirs PLD 2011 SC 657; Qaiser Mushtar Ahmad v. Controller of Examination and others PLD 2011 SC 174; Muhammad Amjad v. Senior Superintendent of Police (Operations), Lahore and others 2010 PLC (C.S.) 838; Mrs. Zakia Hussain and another v. Syed Farooq Hussain PLD 2020 SC 401; Muhammad Abdur Rehman Qureshi v. Sagheer Ahmad 2017 SCMR 1696; Liaqat Ali Khan and others v. Falak Sher and others PLD 2014 SC 506; Shakeel Ahmed v. Mst. Shaheen Kousar 2010 SCMR 1507; Rab Nawaz and 13 others v. Mustaqeem Khan and 14 others 1999 SCMR 1362; Sirbaland v. Allah Loke and others 1996 SCMR 575; and Mrs. Mussarat Shaukat Ali v. Mrs. Safia Khatoon and others 1994 SCMR 2189 rel. Muhammad Shoaib Bhatti for Petitioners. Shahid Rafique Mayo for Respondent. Date of hearing: 28th April, 2025. Judgment Faisal Zaman Khan, J.--- Through this Civil Revision, judgments and decrees dated 18.03.2019 and 15.12.2020 passed by the learned Civil Judge, Chunian and the learned Additional District Judge, Chunian respectively have been assailed. By virtue of the former judgment, a suit for possession through specific performance filed by the respondent against the petitioners has been decreed and through the latter, the same has been upheld. 2. The facts giving rise to the present petition are that on the strength of an agreement to sell dated 10.10.1995 allegedly executed by Muhammad Ali (deceased), predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners in favour of the respondent, a suit for possession through specific performance was filed by the latter against the deceased, in which the deceased filed his written statement denying the agreement to sell. Out of the divergent pleadings of the parties, 06 issues were framed. Evidence pro and contra was led, thereafter through judgment and decree dated 18.03.2019 the suit was decreed. Feeling aggrieved, petitioners filed an appeal which was dismissed through judgment and decree dated 15.12.2020, therefore, this petition. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that respondent's suit was barred by time, however, both the courts below ignored this important fact, thus the impugned judgments and decrees cannot sustain and the same are liable to be set aside. 4. Replying to the above learned counsel for the respondent supports the impugned judgments and decrees. 5. Arguments heard. Record perused. 6. Perusal of the available record would show that the disputed agreement to sell, which was allegedly executed by the deceased in favour of the respondent was dated 10.10.1995, which was produced as Exh.PA whereas the suit for possession through specific performance was filed by the respondent on 21.11.2012. Since the agreement to sell was denied by the petitioners and they had also raised a preliminary objection with regard to the suit being barred by time, therefore, in this regard issue No.4 was framed by the trial court, which had been adjudicated upon by both the courts below against the petitioners. 7. For filing a suit for specific performance limitation is governed by Article 113 of the Limitation Act, 1908 ('Act'), which for ease of reference is reproduced hereunder:- Article Description of suit Period of Limitation Time from which period begins to run 113 For specific performance of a contra ct. Three years The date fixed for the performance, or, if no such date is fixed, when the plaintiff has notice performance refused. 8. The aforenoted provision clearly stipulates that where the time is essence of the contract, upon the expiry of the stipulated period the cause of action accrues to the parties to file a suit, however, where no date is fixed for performance of the same, it is for the plaintiff to file the suit when he has notice that the performance is refused. In both the eventualities the period of limitation shall be 03 years which shall be counted from the expiry of stipulated period or the notice of refusal (as the case may be). For reference reliance can be placed on Khudadad v. Syed Ghazanfar Ali Shah alias S. Inaam Hussain and others (2022 SCMR 933). 9. Placing the afore noted provision in juxta position with the facts of the present case, since the case of the respondent fall within the second category as no time was fixed in Exh.PA for performance of the agreement, therefore, it was for the respondent to have proved that when did he got the notice that deceased or the petitioners are refusing to perform the agreement. 10. In the above context, a perusal of the plaint would show that in paragraph No.4 it has been alleged by the respondent that he approached the deceased for performance of the agreement, however, the matter was delayed on the pretext that the deceased is unwell. Similarly, in paragraph No.5 it has been narrated that numerous times respondent approached the deceased for performance of the agreement, however, the deceased delayed the matter on one pretext or the other. It has been averred in paragraph No.6 that now the deceased has declined from performing the agreement. Continuing the above assertions in paragraph No.7 it is asserted that respondent numerous times himself and through others asked the deceased to perform the agreement but he has been delaying the matter and finally in paragraph No.8 (cause of action clause) it has been mentioned that a few days back deceased finally refused to perform the agreement. 11. Accumulative reading of the aforenoted paragraphs would show that it is the case of the respondent that he has time and again been approaching the deceased (himself and through others) for performance of the agreement, however, neither any dates have been mentioned in the afore-referred paragraphs nor the names of any witnesses have been mentioned wherefrom this would be culled out that when and in presence of whom respondent approached the deceased for performance of Exh.PA as the time lag between the execution of Exh.PA and the filing of rethe on suit is about 17 years and the limitation for filing the suit by the respondent would start from the date that he had notice of refusal by the vendor and in the present circumstances, since the respondent neither in his plaint nor in his evidence has been able to prove that when, at what time, in presence of whom, where and through whom (as in paragraph No.7 he allege that he has been approaching through others as well) approached the deceased for performance of the agreement, therefore, he has failed to prove that he remained ready and willing to perform his part of the contract and the delinquency was on the part of the deceased. 12. Another aspect which further weakens the stance of the respondent is that being a vendee, it was for him to prove that upon execution of Exh.PA he paid the complete sale consideration and got the possession of the property in dispute, why didn't he get the sale deed registered at the outset and if it was delayed (for 17 years) what was the logical explanation as he has failed to explain the delay. 13. In the afore-referred circumstances, since the respondent had approached the court for seeking performance of Exh.PA, therefore, being the beneficiary of the same the onus was upon him to prove that he was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract and the delinquency/refusal was on part of the deceased and since the contract was executed in the year 1995 and he filed the suit in the year 2012, therefore, it was also imperative for him to have explained the interregnum period so as to bring his case within the four corners of Article 113 of the Act, which he has miserably failed to prove. 14. The Supreme Court of Pakistan in judgments reported as Saqib Ali v. Government of Punjab and others (2023 PLC (C.S.) 310), Shahin Shah v. Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa through Secretary Irrigation Department, Peshawar and others (2022 SCMR 1810), Lal Khan through legal heirs v. Muhammad Yousaf through legal heirs (PLD 2011 SC 657), Qaiser Mushtar Ahmad v. Controller of Examination and others (PLD 2011 SC 174) and Muhammad Amjad v. Senior Superintendent of Police (Operations), Lahore and others (2010 PLC (C.S) 838) has held that each and every day consumed for approaching a court beyond the period of limitation has to be explained, which the respondent has miserably failed to do. 15. Even otherwise, relief of specific performance could not be granted, as under Section 22 of the Specific Relief Act, 1877 it has been provided that the jurisdiction to issue a decree of specific performance is discretionary in nature as it is an equitable relief and the court is not bound to grant such relief merely because it is lawful to do so. For reference reliance can be placed on judgments reported as Mrs. Zakia Hussain and another v. Syed Farooq Hussain (PLD 2020 SC 401), Muhammad Abdur Rehman Qureshi v. Sagheer Ahmad (2017 SCMR 1696), Liaqat Ali Khan and others v. Falak Sher and others (PLD 2014 SC 506), Shakeel Ahmed v. Mst. Shaheen Kousar (2010 SCMR 1507), Rab Nawaz and 13 others v. Mustaqeem Khan and 14 others (1999 SCMR 1362), Sirbaland v. Allah Loke and others (1996 SCMR 575) and Mrs. Mussarat Shaukat Ali v. Mrs. Safia Khatoon and others (1994 SCMR 2189). 16. For what has been discussed above, since both the courts below miserably failed to appreciate the true import of Article 113 of the Act and wrongly adjudicate upon issue No.4, therefore, the impugned judgments and decrees cannot sustain, hence, this civil revision is allowed, as a sequel to which the impugned judgments and decrees are set aside, resultantly, the suit filed by the respondent stands dismissed. UN/M-62/L Revision allowed.

Summary: Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)--- ----Ss.21(m), 39, 85, 108 & 133(1)---Reference---Loan to associated company---Salaries---Proof---Fact not assailed by authorities---Applicant / taxpayer contended that amount in question was never an income determined in terms of S. 108 of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 nor amount of loan given to an associated company could be deemed to be an income without a deeming clause---Validity---If associated concern had borrowed such money, then that associated concern would have paid interest, which could be claimed as an expense---Advanced amount as a loan never resulted in any ownership of property in the name of applicant / taxpayer, which was purchased by associated concern in its own name---This was not even a capital expense---High Court declined to interfere in the order passed by Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue, as it was justified in setting aside finding of Commissioner (Appeals)---High Court set aside order of Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue to the extent of salaries, as respondent / authorities had not assailed such finding of Assessing Officer in respect of payment of salaries and wages before the Commissioner (Appeals)---Amount which was not agitated by applicant / taxpayer, was correctly added to its income in terms of S. 21(m) of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001---Reference was dismissed accordingly. Commissioner of Income Tax, Companies-I, Karachi v. Messrs National Investment Trust Ltd. Karachi 2003 PTD 589; Commissioner of Income Tax, Peshawar Zone, Peshawar v. Messrs Siemen A.G 1991 PTD 488; Judgment dated 04.09.2024 passed in ITRA No. 205 of 2023 (M/s. Elahee Buksh & Company (Pvt.) Ltd. v. the Additional Commissioner (Audit-III) Inland Revenue, Range-A-III, MTO Karachi and 2 others) ref. Shams Mohiuddin Ansari for Applicant. Muhammad Aqeel Qureshi for Respondent. Date of hearing: 19th March, 2025.

Summary: Punjab Sales Tax on Services Act (XLII of 2012)--- ----Ss. 2(33), 3, 6(3) & 7 [as introduced through the Punjab Finance Act, 2014]---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 70(4), Fourth Schedule, Entry No. 49---Persons providing service for security purposes---Payment to Security personnel etc.---Whether tax leviable---Whether tax on entire invoice amount or not---"Gross amount"---Scope---Petitioners/ registered persons were providing service for security purposes ('service providers') at the sites described in the related agreements to the recipients of the services ('recipients of service')---Claim of the respondents-authorities was that the tax was leviable on the entire invoice amount including salaries or other allowances ('the salaries') that were paid by the service providers to security personnel, labour and manpower (the individuals)---Validity---Provisions of Punjab Sales Tax on Services Act, 2012 ('the Act, 2012') clearly reflect that for a service to be taxable, it must be an economic activity of the service providers conducted as a business, profession, or trade, whether or not for profit---The words "gross amount" in S. 7 of the Act, 2012 were introduced, through the Punjab Finance Act, 2014 to clarify that tax is to be levied on the amount that includes all the taxes or duties, Federal or Provincial besides sales tax on services---The words "gross amount of" if given construction to include the salaries results into redundancy of S. 6(3) of the Act, 2012---No provision of an enactment can be treated as redundant or surplus and should be given its meaning and effect---Courts should avoid any interpretation of an enactment or rules that flouts common sense and results into absurdity and the Court should always give effect to the same by interpreting it in the manner that is in accordance with the judicially presumed Parliamentary concern for common sense and justice---The Courts should also avoid clash of seemingly contradicting provisions and must harmonize the contradictory provisions by interpreting not only the provisions but also the wisdom of the legislature in order to give effect to both the provisions---Thus, respondents-authorities while demanding tax on the salaries of the individuals had also overlooked that while interpreting a taxing statute, one had to look into the words of the statute and then to interpret it in the light of what is expressed in the relevant provision as well as its surrounding provisions---What is not expressed cannot be implied---There is no room of import or imputing something in a fiscal statute---At the same time, when more than one interpretation is fairly and reasonably possible then one which leads to manifest absurdity or injustice must be avoided---The power to tax service is derived by the Province from Entry No. 49 of Fourth Schedule, under Art. 70(4) of the Constitution---Federal Government has exclusive power to legislate with respect to the federal legislation list and the Provinces can only make laws, which are not enumerated in the said list --The exception in the said entry permits the respondent-authorities to impose the sales tax purely on services---Thus, only the quantum and component of service is taxable and not the amount being reimbursed by the recipient as salaries of the individuals to the service providers---Constitutional petitions were allowed accordingly. Sindh Revenue Board through Secretary Government of Sindh, Karachi and others v. Messrs Quick Food Industries (Pvt.) Limited and others 2023 SCMR 1776; Ahsan Khan v. Government of the Punjab and others 2023 CLC 825; Muhammad Ahsan Ullah Khan and others v. Muhammad Sami Ullah Khan and others PLD 1964 (W.P.) Lahore 101; Maryon-Wilson's Will Trusts, Blofield v. St. Hill 1966 M.No. 4666 1968 Ch. 268; Messrs Gas Masters CNG Station v. Federation of Pakistan and others 2019 PTD 25; Allied Bank Limited v. The Commissioner of Income Tax, Lahore and others 2023 SCMR 1166; Messrs Saadullah Khan and Brothers (SKB) v. Appellate Tribunal of Inland Revenue and others 2019 PTD 776; Mrs. Naila Naeem Younus and others v. Messrs Indus Services Limited through Chief Executive and others 2022 SCMR 1171 and Sami Pharmaceuticals (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Province of Sindh and others (C.P No. 5220-2017) ref. Barrister Muhammad Hamza Akhtar and Syed Hasnain Abbas for Petitioner. Muhammad Nasim Saqlain, Assistant Attorney General for Respondent No.1. Salman Asif Warraich, Assistant Advocate General for Respondent No.2. Sajid Ijaz Hotiana, Tanzeel-ur-Rehman, Ali Javaid Bajwa, Abubakar Attique and Muhammad Nouman Yahya, Legal Advisors of Punjab Revenue Authority for Respondents No.3 to 5. Khurram Shahbaz Butt, Amicus Curiae. Date of hearing: 28th April, 2025.

Summary: (a) In Case a husband has naturalized by the Federal Government then he is required to take Oath of Allegiance under section 6 of the Naturalization Act while wife of such a person is only required to make declaration before the Magistrate and thereby convey her desire that she should be deemed a citizen of Pakistan. (b) NADRA cannot deprive a citizen of nationality for his alleged involvement in Anti-state activities.

Summary: Where online record is available then the revenue officials (from land record cell or SDC) should be allowed to produce same in evidence in Civil Courts and Patwari Halqa of the concerned Mauza should not be called to testify in evidence in routine, unless for some special circumstance, to be recorded in writing, the civil court deems it indispensable to call patwari halqa for appearance in court and testifying in respect of the controversy before the Civil Court.