Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan: ----Art. 199---Constitutional petition---Evacuee property---Purchase request by subsequent vendees---Scope and maintainability---Petitioners, successors of Noor Muhammad (a vendee from one Abdul Sattar), challenged the order of the Full Board, Board of Revenue, Punjab, rejecting their application to purchase evacuee land---Allotment in favour of Abdul Sattar was cancelled in 1975 on grounds of fraud, and the order attained finality---Petitioners failed to establish valid title or produce any document proving their predecessor’s purchase from Abdul Sattar---High Court held that once original allotment stood cancelled, subsequent purchasers could not claim better title---Petitioners had no locus standi to seek purchase of resumed evacuee land. (b) Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882): ----S. 41---Bona fide purchaser---Protection denied where vendor has no title---Petitioners’ claim as bona fide purchasers rejected as they purchased land from Abdul Sattar whose title had already been extinguished by cancellation of allotment---Subsequent vendees cannot acquire better title than their vendor---Protection under S.41 not available where title is void ab initio---Reliance placed on: • Muhammad Yamin v. Settlement Commissioner (1976 SCMR 489) • Province of Punjab v. Syed Ghazanfar Ali Shah (2017 SCMR 172) • Abdul Hamid v. M.B.R. (1994 CLC 1160) (c) Public Property and Evacuee Land: ----Disposal---Mandatory mode of disposal---Open public auction---Evacuee properties vest in the Provincial Government post repeal of evacuee laws and must be disposed of via transparent, unrestricted public auction---Private sales or discretionary allotments by officials are void---Chief Settlement Commissioner has no jurisdiction to alienate such land by private treaty---Reliance placed on: • Malik Allah Ditta v. Member Board of Revenue (2022 CLC 414 DB) • Muhammad Ramzan v. Member (Revenue) Chief Settlement Commissioner (1997 SCMR 1635) • American International School System v. Mian Muhammad Ramzan (2015 SCMR 1449) • Member Board of Revenue v. Sagheer Muhammad Khan (C.P. No.709-L/2009, decided 02.01.2015) (d) Evacuee Property and Displaced Persons Laws (Repeal) (Amendment) Act, 2022 (XXI of 2022): ----S. 3---Transfer of property---All evacuee land stood transferred to the Government for public purposes---Post-2022 amendment, evacuee land cannot be permanently disposed of except for public use---Jurisdiction to sell or allot such land no longer vests with the Chief Settlement Commissioner or Board of Revenue---Held, any application for purchase post-2022 amendment is incompetent. (e) Judicial Precedent and Public Interest: ----Custodianship of public property---Courts’ role in protecting state assets---Courts must ensure that public assets are not transferred illegally, through collusion or in violation of transparent procedures---Public property must be dealt with in accordance with law and for public benefit only---Reliance placed on: • Provincial Government v. Shabbir Hussain (PLD 2005 SC 337) • Muhammad Sharif v. Settlement Commissioner (2007 SCMR 707) • Iffat Jabeen v. D.E.O. (2011 SCMR 437) • Dr. Iqrar Ahmad Khan v. Dr. Muhammad Ashraf (2021 SCMR 1509) ----Disposition: Writ petition dismissed; no illegality, jurisdictional defect, or violation of public interest found in impugned order. ----Quote: Article 199 of Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973--- Sale of resumed evacuee land to the subsequent purchase from the fraudulent allottee whose allotment was cancelled--- Under Section 3 of the Evacuee Property and Displaced Persons Laws (Repeal) (Amendment) Act, 2022 (XXI of 2022), the Notified Officer/ Chief Settlement Commissioner or the Full Board of Board of Revenue has no jurisdiction to dispose of resumed evacuee land through private treaty or any other mode. It is only the Provincial Government which may utilize such resumed evacuee land only for public purpose--- Writ Petition dismissed.

Summary: (a) Constitutional Petition – Challenge to Denial of Purchase Request: —Evacuee property—Right to purchase—Request rejected by Full Board, Board of Revenue—Petitioners (successors of Noor Muhammad) sought to purchase land allegedly bought from Abdul Sattar, whose allotment had long been cancelled—Held: Once the allotment of evacuee land to Abdul Sattar was cancelled in 1975 and upheld by higher courts, petitioners as vendees had no locus standi or entitlement to purchase evacuee land—Writ petition dismissed. PIA v. Aziz ur Rehman Chaudhary 2016 SCMR 14 followed. (b) Limitation – Purchase of Evacuee Land: —Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958—Evacuee Property and Displaced Persons Laws (Repeal) Act, 1975—Application for purchase must be filed by 30.06.2003—No application by Noor Muhammad or successors within time—Held: Right to seek purchase extinguished after lapse of statutory period—Subsequent applications after cutoff date were legally untenable. (c) Bona fide Purchaser – No Better Title Than Vendor: —Transfer of Property Act, 1882, S. 41—Petitioners claimed protection as bona fide purchasers from Abdul Sattar—Held: Abdul Sattar's allotment was declared bogus and cancelled—Purchasers cannot derive a better title than their vendor—Protection under S.41 not attracted where original allottee had no lawful title. Muhammad Yamin v. Settlement Commissioner 1976 SCMR 489; Abdul Hamid v. MBR 1994 CLC 1160; Province of Punjab v. Syed Ghazanfar Shah 2017 SCMR 172 relied on. (d) Disposal of Evacuee Property – Mode: —Public Auction—Held: Once property vests in Government under Repeal Act, it must be disposed of through open public auction in accordance with law and not through private sale or discretionary orders—Order of Chief Settlement Commissioner allowing private sale was void. Malik Allah Ditta v. Member, BOR 2022 CLC 414; Muhammad Ramzan v. Member Revenue 1997 SCMR 1635; AIS v. Mian Ramzan 2015 SCMR 1449 followed. (e) Evacuee Property Repeal (Amendment) Act, 2022 – Effect: —S. 3—All evacuee properties, whether urban or agricultural, stood transferred to Government for public purposes—Held: After 2022 amendment, jurisdiction of Chief Settlement Commissioner and Full Board ceased—Disposal only permissible by Government for public purposes, not private individuals. Definition of "public purpose" explained with reference to Black’s Law Dictionary. (f) Custody of Public Property – Judicial Duty: —Courts must safeguard public interest in state assets—Held: Courts must ensure public land is not disposed of unlawfully—Favouritism, collusion, or deviation from transparent auction processes renders such transactions void. Provincial Government v. Shabbir Hussain PLD 2005 SC 337; Muhammad Sharif v. Settlement Commissioner 2007 SCMR 707; Iqrar Ahmad Khan v. Muhammad Ashraf 2021 SCMR 1509 followed. ----Disposition: Writ petition dismissed; impugned order of Full Board upheld; evacuee land not open to private purchase; to be disposed of by government only for public purposes.

Summary: Bail granted ---- (a) Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 – Art. 185(3); Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) – Ss. 497, 498; Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 – S. 7 —Pre-arrest bail—Delay in nomination—Supplementary statement—Further inquiry—Rule of consistency Petitioner, not named in FIR No. 103/2023, was implicated a month later through a supplementary statement based on social media content (tweets/audio/video clips) alleging criminal conspiracy in the May 9, 2023 events. Supreme Court held that the evidentiary value of such material and its delayed introduction falls within the domain of trial. No recovery made from petitioner; he had cooperated with investigation and alleged mala fide on part of police was not entirely baseless. Held, case called for further inquiry. Additionally, co-accused in same FIR had already been granted pre-arrest bail. Rule of consistency also applied in petitioner’s favour. Cited Case: • Imtiaz Mehmood v. The State, Crl. P. No. 1165/2024, decided 17.04.2025 (applied) (b) Criminal Procedure—Pre-arrest bail—Grant on grounds of further inquiry—Police harassment—Consistency with bail of co-accused Court found no recovery from petitioner nor evidence of abscondence; delay in implication and social media-based accusation necessitated deeper inquiry. Rule of consistency invoked as similarly placed co-accused had already secured relief. Held, ad-interim bail confirmed and petition converted into appeal and allowed. Disposition: Leave granted—Petition converted to appeal and allowed—Ad-interim pre-arrest bail confirmed Petitioner directed to cooperate in investigation. Observations held to be tentative and not binding at trial.

Summary: Acquittal ----- (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860), S. 302(b) — Conviction Based on Circumstantial Evidence — Standards for Judicial Confession — Reversal of Conviction Murder trial based on circumstantial evidence — Petitioners were convicted by Trial Court under S. 302(b), PPC; one sentenced to death and the other to life imprisonment — High Court converted death sentence to life imprisonment — Supreme Court observed that prosecution’s case was entirely dependent on circumstantial evidence and retracted judicial confessions — Judicial confessions held inadmissible due to non-compliance with legal requirements — Magistrate failed to mention whether accused were given time for reflection or that they made confessions voluntarily — No independent corroboration found — Medical evidence did not support confessional statements — It is settled law that in circumstantial evidence, all links in the chain must be unbroken, and confessions must be voluntary, truthful, and corroborated — In absence of credible and unbroken chain of evidence, conviction is not sustainable — Petitioners acquitted on benefit of doubt. Cited Cases: • Ch. Barkat Ali v. Major Karam Elahi Zia 1992 SCMR 1047 • Sarfraz Khan v. The State 1996 SCMR 188 • Asadullah v. The State PLJ 1999 SC 1018 • Altaf Hussain v. Fakhar Hussain 2008 SCMR 1103 • Tariq Pervez v. The State 1995 SCMR 1345 • Muhammad Akram v. The State 2009 SCMR 230 (b) Criminal Trial — Judicial Confession — Requirements for Admissibility — Confession Discarded Judicial confession — Legal prerequisites not followed — Magistrate did not record whether accused were given sufficient time for reflection or whether confession was made voluntarily without police presence — No mention in official reports of compliance with S. 164 Cr.P.C. safeguards — Supreme Court held that judicial confessions, when not recorded in accordance with law and unsupported by medical or other corroborative evidence, cannot form basis for conviction — Retracted confession without corroboration carries no evidentiary value. (c) Criminal Trial — Circumstantial Evidence — Principle of Continuous Chain — Failure to Prove Prosecution Case Beyond Reasonable Doubt Conviction in circumstantial evidence case — Legal requirement that each piece of evidence must form part of an unbroken chain — Any break in chain warrants acquittal — In present case, multiple contradictions and inconsistencies in evidence — Confessional statements uncorroborated — No recovery or direct linkage to the crime — Benefit of doubt must be extended where prosecution fails to exclude hypothesis of innocence — Supreme Court reaffirmed that even a single unresolved doubt is sufficient for acquittal — Conviction set aside. Disposition: Appeals allowed — Judgment of High Court and conviction under S. 302(b), PPC set aside — Petitioners Obaidullah and Zubair Ahmed acquitted of all charges — To be released unless required in another case — Connected criminal petitions for enhancement of sentence dismissed as infructuous.

Summary: (a) Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 – S. 113(2)(c) Minimum tax—Adjustment—Assessed losses—Scope of "actual tax payable" Held, minimum tax paid under Section 113(1) can only be carried forward under Section 113(2)(c) if it exceeds a non-zero actual tax payable under Part I, Division II of the First Schedule—Provision does not apply where no tax was payable due to declared business losses—Language of the statute is clear and unambiguous—There is no scope for liberal or equitable interpretation in fiscal statutes—Literal rule applies. ➤ Relied on: Allied Bank Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax (2023 SCMR 1166), Pakistan Television Corporation v. CIR (2017 SCMR 1136), Star Textile Mills Ltd. v. Govt. of Sindh (2002 SCMR 3561) (b) Fiscal Statutes—Interpretation Strict construction—No equity in tax laws—Court cannot read into or recast provisions Held, fiscal provisions must be interpreted strictly—Courts cannot introduce equitable considerations or assume legislative intent not clearly expressed—Departure from literal interpretation in tax laws would be impermissible. ➤ Reiterated: Province of Punjab v. Muhammad Aslam (2004 SCMR 1649), Hiraj & Co. v. CST (1971 SCMR 128), Molasses Trading & Export v. Federation of Pakistan (1993 SCMR 1905) (c) Fiscal Legislation—Prospective vs Retrospective Operation Finance Act, 2021—Substituted proviso to S. 113(2)(c)—Retrospectivity rejected Held, the substituted proviso introduced via Finance Act, 2021 allowing carry-forward even where no tax is payable is not retrospective—No express enactment or necessary intendment for retrospective effect—Taxpayers with zero tax liability prior to 2021 not entitled to carry-forward of minimum tax. ➤ Followed: Zila Council Sialkot v. Abdul Ghani (PLD 2004 SC 425) (d) Circular Interpretation—S. 206 of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 FBR Circular No.17/2004—Nature and limitation Held, FBR’s Circular explaining benefits of S. 113(2)(c) post-2004 amendment cannot override plain statutory language—Circular merely reiterates minimum tax regime’s operation for liquidity support—Does not authorize carry-forward for years with zero tax liability. ➤ Legal principle: Circulars are advisory and subordinate to express statute; cannot confer rights contrary to law. (e) Precedent Conflict—High Courts Divergence—Resolution by Supreme Court Differing interpretations—Lahore, Sindh, Islamabad High Courts Held, views taken by Lahore and Islamabad High Courts holding that minimum tax can be carried forward even where no tax was payable are incorrect—Sindh High Court correctly interpreted the law—Section 113(2)(c) benefits not available where no tax was payable—Islamabad High Court’s characterization of provision as “remedial and retrospective” is erroneous. Disposition: Civil Appeals No. 743/2014, 1954/2019 & 404/2020 allowed—Judgments of Sindh High Court upheld. Civil Petitions No. 10-L/2017, 3688-L/2019, 3689-L/2019, 746-L/2021, 3503/2022 converted to appeals and allowed—Judgments of Lahore and Islamabad High Courts set aside. CMA No. 13838/2021 dismissed as infructuous.

Summary: (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898) ----S. 497(1)---Bail---Post-arrest bail---Supplementary statement---Social media content---Further inquiry---Rule of consistency Accused not nominated in FIR and implicated later via supplementary statement based on social media content—Prosecution alleged conspiracy using tweets/audio/video clips—Held, admissibility and evidentiary value of digital material yet to be determined at trial—Delay in recording FIR and supplementary statement also unexplained—Petitioner in custody since May 2023 while trial still ongoing—Prima facie case fell within domain of further inquiry—Rule of consistency also attracted as co-accused granted pre-arrest bail by Supreme Court on similar grounds—Post-arrest bail granted subject to surety—Observations tentative and not to influence trial. Cited Case: • Order dated 17.04.2025 in Imtiaz Mehmood’s case (co-accused) (b) Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 (XXVII of 1997) ----S. 7---Terrorism---Allegation of criminal conspiracy---Implication through digital/social media content---Scope for bail Allegation against petitioner of hatching conspiracy to incite violence on 9th May 2023 through social media—Court held that determination of whether such material satisfies threshold of terrorism under S.7 of ATA is to be evaluated at trial—Prolonged incarceration without trial not justified where doubt arises as to evidentiary sufficiency—Held, anti-terrorism provisions do not bar bail where case otherwise falls within purview of further inquiry under S. 497 Cr.P.C. (c) Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 ----Art. 10-A---Fair trial---Undue delay in conclusion of trial---Effect on bail Prosecution's failure to conclude trial within reasonable time despite accused's incarceration since May 2023—Held, prolonged pre-trial detention undermines fair trial guarantees—Bail cannot be withheld merely to punish accused—Delay partly attributable to prosecution and not solely to defence—Right to liberty and presumption of innocence emphasized—Post-arrest bail granted accordingly.

Summary: "Scope and extent of the jurisdiction of Banking Mohtasib and widespread misconceptions attached thereto" ---- (a) Constitution of Pakistan (1973) —-Art. 199(a)(ii)—Banking Mohtasib—Judicial review—Unauthorized electronic fund transfers (EFTs)—Constitutional petitions were filed by banks challenging orders of the Banking Mohtasib and decisions of the President of Pakistan affirming the Mohtasib’s recommendations to reimburse customers—Petitions involved disputes relating to “authorized push payment” frauds where customer funds were withdrawn upon their instructions allegedly induced by deception—Held, scope of judicial review is limited to assessing whether Mohtasib exercised jurisdiction within statutory bounds—Courts will not determine facts, but can remand when Mohtasib fails to properly assess jurisdiction or examine the merits of contributory negligence and statutory burden of proof. (b) Banking Companies Ordinance, 1962 —-Ss. 82A(3), 82B(4) & 82B(5)—Banking Mohtasib—Jurisdiction—Scope—Held, Mohtasib has lawful authority to entertain complaints relating to banking malpractices, fraud in fund transfers, and unauthorized withdrawals—Jurisdiction is quasi-judicial in nature—Mohtasib may receive evidence on affidavit and issue commissions—The 2018 judgment in United Bank Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan (2018 CLD 587) did not curtail Mohtasib’s jurisdiction but emphasized that binding findings on disputed questions of fact cannot be made—Determining what constitutes a “disputed question of fact” lies within Mohtasib’s domain based on case-specific context. (c) Payment Systems and Electronic Fund Transfers Act, 2007 —-Ss. 40 & 41—Unauthorized EFTs—Burden of proof—Held, while banks bear burden under S. 41 to show that EFTs were authorized, Mohtasib must also consider customer’s role in sharing sensitive data (PINs, OTPs, passwords)—Contributory negligence and failure to report promptly are relevant—Strict liability should not be imposed without addressing comparative negligence—Mohtasib erred by uniformly shifting liability without contextual findings—Remanded for proper inquiry. (d) Federal Ombudsmen Institutional Reforms Act, 2013 —-Ss. 14 & 67—Representation to President vs. statutory appeal—Remedy of representation before President may override or supersede internal appellate remedies under S. 82E of the 1962 Ordinance—Question of whether both remedies are concurrent or in conflict left open for future adjudication. (e) Banking law—Remand of complaint—Unauthorized EFTs—Scope of redress —Held, Mohtasib failed to distinguish between (i) cases involving clear unauthorized EFTs, and (ii) those requiring detailed factual inquiry due to customer conduct—Mohtasib also failed to assess whether courts of general jurisdiction would be more appropriate forums under S. 50 of the 2007 Act—Matter remanded for afresh decision after due opportunity to parties to produce affidavits, evidence, and documents. Disposition: Petitions allowed; impugned orders of the Mohtasib and President of Pakistan set aside. Complaints remanded to the Banking Mohtasib for fresh adjudication in accordance with law.

Summary: Federal Excise Act (VII of 2005)--- ----S.38---Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001), S. 134-A---State-Owned Enterprises (Governance and Operations) Act (VII of 2023), S.2(o)---Adverse orders passed against State-Owned Enterprises---Remedy---Pakistan International Airline Corporation (PIAC) is a State Owned Enterprise (SOE) in terms of State Owned Enterprise (Governance and Operations) Act, 2023, and pursuant to S. 38 of Federal Excise Act, 2005 read with S. 134A of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001, a mechanism has been provided for SOE to approach Federal Board Revenue (FBR) in respect of adverse orders passed by the Inland Revenue Department ; it is mandatory for SOE to go for Alternate Dispute Resolution (ADR) , whereas the limit of Rs. 50 Million is not applicable ; which is applicable in the matter of Applicant (PIAC) being a SOE ; and matter may be referred to Dispute Resolution Committee (Committee)---High Court referred to the matter to FBR to form a Committee for final decision---Special Federal Excise Reference Application was disposed of accordingly. Commissioner Inland Revenue, Corporate Zone, Regional Tax Officer, Islamabad v. M/s. Islamabad Electric Supply Company Limited, (IESCO), Islamabad (Civil Petition No. 2106 of 2024); M/s. State Life Insurance Corporation of Pakistan v. The Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, Karachi and others (Civil Appeals Nos. 649, 650, 651, 652 of 2022) and M/s. Trading Corporation of Pakistan v. The Commissioner of Income Tax, Karachi (Civil Petitions Nos. 886-K, 887-K and 888-K of 2023) ref. Uzair Shoro for Applicant. Zakia Jatoi holding brief for Ameer Bakhsh Metlo for Respondent.