Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Article 199 of Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973--- Sale of resumed evacuee land to the subsequent purchase from the fraudulent allottee whose allotment was cancelled--- Under Section 3 of the Evacuee Property and Displaced Persons Laws (Repeal) (Amendment) Act, 2022 (XXI of 2022), the Notified Officer/ Chief Settlement Commissioner or the Full Board of Board of Revenue has no jurisdiction to dispose of resumed evacuee land through private treaty or any other mode. It is only the Provincial Government which may utilize such resumed evacuee land only for public purpose--- Writ Petition dismissed. 501Writ Petition- Banking & Finance- Miscellaneous 983-25 UBL VS PRESIDENT ETC Mr. Justice Asim Hafeez 02- 05- 2025 2025 LHC 2736 2025 CLD 834 [Lahore (Rawalpindi Bench)]

Summary: Criminal Petition No. 1175 of 2024, decided on 2nd May, 2025. (On appeal against the order dated 03.10.2024 of the Lahore High Court, Lahore passed in Crl. Misc. No. 48510-B of 2024). (a) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----S. 497(2)---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 324, 395, 436, 427, 290, 291, 337-L(2), 109, 120-D, 121, 121-A, 131, 146, 153, 153-A, 153-B, 505, 148, 149 & 34---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), S. 7---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 185(3)---Attempt to commit qatl-i-amd, dacoity, mischief by fire and explosive substance, causing damage or loss of fifty rupees or more through mischief, public nuisance, hurt, abetment, criminal conspiracy, attempt to wage war, attempting to seduce a soldier, rioting, giving provocation with intent to cause riot, promoting enmity between different groups, public mischief, rioting armed with deadly weapons, unlawful assembly, common intention, act of terrorism---Post-arrest bail, grant of---Further inquiry---Petitioner was not nominated in FIR for the occurrence of 9th May 2023---Petitioner was implicated by the complainant in his supplementary statement on the basis of tweets/audio/video clips on social media---Admissibility, relevancy and evidentiary value of the supplementary statement of the complainant as well as the alleged tweets/audio/video clips on social media were yet to be determined at the trial which had not yet concluded despite lapse of almost two years---Thus, bail could not be withheld as mere punishment---Petitioner had been arrested for the allegation of hatching the criminal conspiracy for the occurrence of 9th May, 2023---Allegation was yet to be proved by the prosecution at trial---Prosecution had yet to explain the delay of three days in lodging FIR as well as delay of about one month by the complainant for making the supplementary statement---On the basis of tentative assessment of the material so far available on record, the case against the petitioner also fell within the ambit of further inquiry---Petitioner was also entitled for grant of bail on the rule of consistency as co-accused had already been granted bail by the Court for the same allegations in the same FIR---Petition was converted into appeal and same was accepted, in circumstances and accused was granted bail. (b) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----S. 497---Bail order---Observations of Court---Scope---Observations made in a bail order are tentative in nature and should not influence merits of the case at the trial. Shabid Masud, Advocate Supreme Court and Moiz Tariq, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner. Zulfiqar Abbas Naqvi, Special Prosecutor, Punjab, Tariq Siddique, Additional Prosecutor General, Punjab, Dr. Javid Asif, Deputy Superintendent Police and Zahid Saleem, Inspector for the State. Date of hearing: 2nd May, 2025.

Summary: (On appeal against the judgment dated 21.10.2019 passed by the High Court of Balochistan, Quetta in Cr. Jail Appeals Nos. 52 and 54 of 2018, Criminal Revision No. 44 of 2018 and Criminal Acquittal Appeal No. 337 of 2018 and Murder Reference No. 5 of 2018). (a) Circumstantial evidence--- ----Circumstantial evidence---Scope---In case of circumstantial evidence, every circumstance should be linked with each other and it should form such a continuous chain that its one end touches the dead body and the other the neck of the accused---If any link in the chain is missing then its benefit must go to the accused. Ch. Barkat Ali v. Major Karam Elahi Zia and another 1992 SCMR 1047; Sarfraz Khan v. The State 1996 SCMR 188; Asadullah and another v. The State 1999 SCMR 1034 and Altaf Hussain v. Fakhar Hussain and another 2008 SCMR 1103 rel. (b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b) & 34---Qatl-i-amd, common intention---Re-appraisal of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Dealy of 11-days in lodging the FIR---Accused was charged for committing murder of the nephew of complainant---Accused was convicted by trial Court for qatl-i-amd and was sentenced to imprisonment for life---High Court maintained conviction and sentence awarded to accused---Validity---First Information Report was lodged against co-accused (since acquitted) whereas petitioners were not nominated therein---Furthermore, deceased was missing from his house since 11.06.2018 but the FIR was lodged on 22.06.2018, i.e. with the delay of 11 days from the alleged occurrence---No motive, whatsoever, was alleged in the FIR that as to why the co-accused (since acquitted) and his unknown companions had abducted deceased and committed his murder---Both the petitioners were later on implicated in this case on the alleged disclosure of co-accused (since acquitted) before the Investigating Officer wherein it was stated by the said co-accused that the petitioners had committed the murder of deceased---Circumstances established that the prosecution had failed to prove its case against the petitioners beyond the shadow of doubt---Appeals were allowed accordingly. (c) Criminal trial--- ----Confession, retraction of---Scope---Conviction and sentence of an accused could be maintained on the basis of a retracted judicial confession provided the said evidence appeared to be trustworthy and the same was corroborated by some independent evidence---However, if the retracted judicial confession of an accused was not corroborated by any independent evidence or the same had been recorded in violation of the law on the subject then conviction and sentence of an accused could not be sustained on the basis of said confession. Aala Muhammad v. The State 2008 SCMR 649; Muhammad Shafi v. Muhammad Raza 2008 SCMR 329; Muhammad Ismail v. The State 2017 SCMR 898 and Daniel Boyd v. The State 1992 SCMR 196 rel. (d) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b) & 34---Qatl-i-amd, common intention---Re-appraisal of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Confession, retraction of---Accused was charged for committing murder of the nephew of complainant---Accused was convicted by trial Court for qatl-i-amd and was sentenced to imprisonment for life---High Court maintained conviction and sentence awarded to accused---Validity---As per retracted judicial confession of petitioner, he committed the murder of deceased, due to the motive that about one year prior to the occurrence he received a phone call from co-accused (since Proclaimed Offender) who wanted to marry with him and informed the said petitioner that she was already engaged with deceased, therefore, the said petitioner should first commit the murder of deceased and then they could marry with each other, whereupon, the petitioner along with other petitioner, committed the murder of deceased, while taking him out of the village on the pretext of tracing out some article---In his judicial confession, petitioner further stated that after committing the murder of deceased, they (accused) dug a grave and put the dead body of deceased in the said grave and filled the grave of the deceased with earth---Judicial confession of other petitioner was also on the same lines---Insofar as the motive disclosed in the retracted judicial confessions of the petitioners was concerned, notable that no motive whatsoever was mentioned in the FIR, which was lodged after 11 days of the occurrence---Likewise, complainant, who was paternal uncle of deceased, and witness who was real brother of the deceased, had not uttered a single word in their statements before the Court that deceased was ever engaged with co-accused (since PO) or their marriage was going to be solemnized in the near future---Rather complainant and witness conceded during their cross-examinations that they had no previous enmity with the accused/petitioners---No other witness was produced to prove the alleged motive that deceased was ever engaged with the co-accused (since PO) or his marriage with the said co-accused was planned in the near future---No motive was put to the petitioners in their statements recorded under Section 342,Cr.P.C---No telephone numbers, SIM numbers, Call Data Record or transcript of the conversation of the accused with each other had been brought on the record---Keeping in view the said facts, there was no independent corroboration of retracted judicial confession of the petitioners with the motive part of the prosecution case---Circumstances established that the prosecution had failed to prove its case against the petitioners beyond the shadow of doubt---Appeals were allowed accordingly. (e) Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----S. 342---Examination of accused---Incriminating piece of evidence not put to the accused---Effect---If a piece of evidence is not put to an accused in his statement recorded under Section 342, Cr.P.C., in order to provide him a chance to produce his defence against the said evidence then such evidence cannot be used against the accused. Haji Nawaz v. The State 2020 SCMR 687 and Dr. Waqar Hameed v. The State 2020 SCMR 321 rel. (f) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b) & 34---Qatl-i-amd, common intention---Re-appraisal of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Recovery of weapon of offence---Accused was charged for committing murder of the nephew of complainant---Accused was convicted by Trial Court for qatl-i-amdand was sentenced to imprisonment for life---High Court maintained conviction and sentence awarded to accused---Validity---Record showed that a pistol was recovered---However, said pistol was neither recovered from the possession of petitioners, rather the same was recovered from the possession of one "KR"---Said "KR" had not been cited as a witness in this case to establish that the said pistol was ever handed over to him by the petitioners rather he had himself been made an accused in a separate case registered against him under the Arms Ordinance due to the recovery of said pistol from his possession---Insofar as the positive report of the Forensic Science Laboratory was concerned, it was noteworthy that no empty was recovered from the spot on 22.06.2018 when the dead body was recovered but the same were recovered after the arrest of the petitioners on 29.06.2018 from the same place wherefrom the dead body was recovered on 22.06.2018---Not understandable that if the empties were lying at the same spot wherefrom the dead body was recovered then as to why the prosecution witnesses had not noticed the said empties and recovered the same from the spot on 22.06.2018, when the dead body was recovered---Therefore, evident that the empties were not shown to be recovered and the same were not deposited in the office of Forensic Science Laboratory till the arrest of the petitioners and alleged recovery of pistol from the possession of "KR" on 29.06.2018---Thus, it was clear that the empties and the pistol were kept together at the Police Station and were deposited together in the office of Forensic Science Laboratory, therefore, the prosecution evidence qua the recovery of pistol and positive report of Forensic Science Laboratory was not worthy of reliance---Circumstances established that the prosecution had failed to prove its case against the petitioners beyond the shadow of doubt---Appeals were allowed accordingly. Daniel Boyd v. The State 1992 SCMR 196; Abdul Wahid v. The State 2023 SCMR 1278 and Sarfraz v. The State 2023 SCMR 670 rel. (g) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b) & 34---Qatl-i-amd, common intention---Re-appraisal of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Contradictions in the prosecution case---Accused was charged for committing murder of the nephew of complainant---Accused was convicted by trial Court for qatl-i-amd and was sentenced to imprisonment for life---High Court maintained conviction and sentence awarded to accused---Validity---There were glaring contradictions in the prosecution case because on the one hand it was alleged by the complainant in the contents of the FIR that it was co-accused (since acquitted) who was trying to bury the dead body of deceased, near the rainy drainage, which means that the said co-accused only attempted to bury the dead body of deceased, whereas on the other hand according to the retracted judicial confessions of the petitioners, the dead body of deceased was buried by them in a grave and the said grave was filled with earth---Complainant did not allege in the FIR that the present petitioners tried to bury the dead body of the deceased and the said allegation was levelled against co-accused (since acquitted) whereas according to the retracted judicial confessions of the petitioners, they (petitioners) not only successfully buried the dead body of the deceased in a grave but thereafter they also filled the said grave with earth---Noteworthy that even in his statement recorded by the Trial Court, the complainant neither named the petitioners nor attributed any role to them---Complainant categorically stated that in his application for registration of FIR he named co-accused (since acquitted) and some other accused---Moreover, the retracted judicial confessions of the petitioners regarding burial of the dead body of deceased in a grave and filling the said grave with earth had not been supported by the medical evidence---Medical Officer in his postmortem report or in his evidence recorded by the trial Court had not mentioned that he noticed any soil/earth on any part of the body of deceased or on his last worn clothes and, as such, the retracted judicial confessions of the petitioners were also not supported by the medical evidence---Circumstances established that the prosecution had failed to prove its case against the petitioners beyond the shadow of doubt---Appeals were allowed accordingly. (h) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b) & 34---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), S. 164---Qatl-i-amd, common intention---Re-appraisal of evidence---Benefit of doubt---Confession, recording of---Infirmities---Accused was charged for committing murder of the nephew of complainant---Accused was convicted by trial Court for qatl-i-amd and was sentenced to imprisonment for life---High Court maintained conviction and sentence awarded to accused---Validity---Judicial Magistrate while appearing before the trial Court as witness had stated that he unlocked the handcuffs of the petitioners and also sent the police out of his chamber when he recorded the judicial confessions of the petitioners but no such facts were mentioned in his reports---Moreover, in his statement before the Court or in his reports, Judicial Magistrate had not mentioned that as to how much time was given to the petitioners to think over before making their judicial confessions and after how much time they were again called and he satisfied himself that the petitioners were making their judicial confessions with their free will and without any pressure or coercion---Evident that judicial confessions of the petitioners were not recorded in accordance with the law---Even otherwise, there was no independent corroboration of the said judicial confessions---Said judicial confession had also not been supported by the medical evidence, therefore, the convictions and sentences of the petitioners could not be maintained on the basis of said retracted judicial confessions---Circumstances established that the prosecution had failed to prove its case against the petitioners beyond the shadow of doubt---Appeals were allowed accordingly. (i) Criminal trial--- ----Benefit of doubt---Principle---If there is a single circumstance, which creats doubt in the prosecution case then the same is sufficient to acquit the accused. Tariq Pervez v. The State 1995 SCMR 1345 and Muhammad Akram v. The State 2009 SCMR 230 rel. Qausain Faisal, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners (in J.Ps. Nos. 14 and 17 of 2020). Akram Sheikh, Senior Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners (in Cr.Ps. Nos. 1322 and 1323 of 2019). Baqir Shah, State counsel for the State. Date of hearing: 2nd May, 2025.

Summary: (Against Order dated 03.10.2024 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in Crl. Misc. No. 49721-B of 2024). Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898)--- ----Ss. 497(2) & 498---Penal Code (XLV of 1860), Ss. 324, 395, 436, 427, 290, 291, 337-L(2), 109, 120-D, 121, 121-A, 131, 146, 153, 153-A, 153-B, 505, 148, 149 & 34---Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997), S. 7---Attempt to commit qatl-i-amd, dacoity, mischief by fire and explosive substance, causing damage or loss of fifty rupees or more through mischief, public nuisance, hurt, abetment, criminal conspiracy, attempt to wage war, attempting to seduce a soldier, rioting, giving provocation with intent to cause riot, promoting enmity between different groups, public mischief, rioting armed with deadly weapons, unlawful assembly, common intention, act of terrorism---Pre-arrest bail, confirmation of---Further inquiry---Admittedly the petitioner had not been nominated in FIR for the occurrence of 9th May, 2023---Petitioner had been implicated in the supplementary statement of the complainant on the basis of tweets/audio/video clips on social media---Evidentiary value, as well as admissibility of the delayed supplementary statement of the complainant, as well as the tweets/audio/video clips on social media shall be determined at the trial after recording evidence---No recovery had been effected from the petitioner---Record revealed that the petitioner had co-operated with investigation of the case---Prosecution had yet to prove the allegation of hatching criminal conspiracy by the petitioner at the trial---Apprehension of the petitioner about his arrest by the police to create humiliation and harassment despite cooperating with investigation of the case could not be held to be vague or baseless---On the basis of tentative assessment of the material so far available on record, the case against the petitioner also fell within the ambit of further inquiry---For the same allegation co-accused had already been granted pre-arrest bail by the Supreme Court---On the basis of rule of consistency as well, the petitioner was held entitled for confirmation of his ad-interim pre-arrest bail---Petition was converted into appeal and same was accepted---Ad-interim pre-arrest bail granted to the petitioner earlier was confirmed, in circumstances. Petitioner in person along with Muhammad Latif Khan Khosa, Senior Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner. Muhammad Shahbaz Ali Khan Khosa, Advocate Supreme Court assisted by: Mustehsan Raza Awan, Advocate for Petitioner. Zulfiqar Abbas Naqvi, Special Prosecutor, Punjab, Tariq Siddique, Additional Prosecutor General, Punjab and Dr. Javaid Asif, DSP and Zahid Saleem, Inspector for the State. Date of hearing: 2nd May, 2025.

Summary: (Against judgment dated 07.05.2013 of the High Court of Sindh, Karachi passed in I.T.R.A. No. 132 of 2011). C.P.L.A. No. 10-L of 2017 COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, LAHORE Versus Messrs EDUCATIONAL EXCELLENCE LIMITED, LAHORE (Against order dated 18.10.2016 of the Lahore High Court, Lahore passed in I.T.R. No. 255 of 2016). C.M.A. No. 13838 of 2021 in C.P.L.A. No. 10-L of 2017 COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, LAHORE Versus Messrs EDUCATIONAL EXCELLENCE LIMITED, LAHORE (Application for impleadment) C.A. No. 1954 of 2019 DUBAI ISLAMIC BANK PAKISTAN LIMITED, KARACHI Versus PAKISTAN through Secretary Revenue and Ex Officio Chairman, Federal Board of Revenue, Islamabad and others (Against order dated 16.08.2019 of the High Court of Sindh, Karachi passed in C.P. No. D-5264 of 2019). C.A. No. 404 of 2020 ENGRO POLYMER AND CHEMICALS LIMITED, KARACHI Versus PAKISTAN through Secretary Revenue and Ex Officio Chairman, Federal Board of Revenue, Islamabad and others (Against order dated 06.02.2020 of the High Court of Sindh, Karachi passed in C.P. No.D-769 of 2020). C.P.L.A. No. 3688-L of 2019 FEDERAL BOARD OF REVENUE through Member (Legal), Islamabad and others Versus Messrs FOOD CONSULTS (PVT.) LIMITED, LAHORE and others (Against order dated 09,10.2019 of the Lahore High Court, Lahore passed in W. P. No. 136592 of 2018). C.P.L.A. No. 3689-L of 2019 FEDERAL BOARD OF REVENUE through Member (Legal), Islamabad and others Versus Messrs PANTHER TYRES LIMITED and others (Against order dated 09.10.2019 of the Lahore High Court, Lahore passed in W.P. No. 170401 of 2018). C.P.L.A. No. 746-L of 2021 COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, LAHORE Versus Messrs BIG FEED (PRIVATE) LIMITED, LAHORE (Against order dated 11.02.2021 of the Lahore High Court, Lahore passed in I.T.R. No. 8992 of 2021). C.P.L.A. No. 3503 of 2022 COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE, LEGAL ZONE, ISLAMABAD and others Versus Messrs PAKISTAN TOBACCO COMPANY LIMITED, ISLAMABAD and others (Against judgment dated 26.05.2022 of the Islamabad High Court, Islamabad passed in I.T.R. No. 45 of 2014). Civil Appeal No.743 of 2014 and Civil Petition No.10-L of 2017, Civil Miscellaneous Application No. 13838 of 2021 in Civil Petition No.10-L of 2017, Civil Appeals No. 1954 of 2019 and 404 of 2020, Civil Petitions Nos. 3688-L of 2019, 3689-L of 2019, 746-L of 2021 and 3503 of 2022, decided on 2nd May, 2025. (a) Interpretation of statutes--- ----Literal rule---Legislation---Powers of Court---Where words of statute are clear and unambiguous, provision should be given its plain and normal meaning, without adding or rejecting any words---Departure from literal rule, by making structural changes or substituting words in a clear statutory provision, under the guise of interpretation will pose a great risk as the changes may not be what the Legislature intended or desired---Court cannot recast or reframe legislation, as it has no power to legislate---Court cannot add words to a statute or read words into it which are not there unless principles of interpretation of statute require otherwise---Legislature means what it says and says what it means---It is the obligation of Courts of law to further clear intendment of Legislature and not to frustrate it by ignoring the same---Legislative wisdom cannot be replaced by the Judge's views. Star Textile Mills Ltd. v. Government of Sindh 2002 SCMR 356; Province of the Punjab v. Muhammad Aslam 2004 SCMR 1649 and Allied Bank Limited v. Commissioner of Income Tax 2023 SCMR 1166 rel. (b) Income Tax Ordinance (XLIX of 2001)--- ----Ss. 113, 120, 122 (5A) & First Schedule Part I, Division II---Circular No. 17 / 2004, dated 17-07-2004, issued by Federal Board of Revenue---Tax incentives---Payment of minimum tax---Carry forward tax credit---Appellant / taxpayer company was aggrieved of tax incentives and payment of minimum tax---High Court maintained the order passed by Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue declaring that expression "actual tax payable" in Section 113(2)(c) of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 meant that tax payable under Part I, Division II in First Schedule to Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 could be zero or otherwise, and that the excess amount of minimum tax which was paid over and above zero tax payable due to assessed losses for the years 2007 and 2008 was available for adjustment against appellant's / taxpayer's tax liability for the succeeding tax year---Validity---Verbiage of Circular No. 17 / 2004, dated 17-07-2004, issued by Federal Board of Revenue was unambiguous and clear as that of Section 113(2)(c) of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001---First sentence of Section 113(2)(c) of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 is a clarification as to the persons who are required to pay minimum tax---Mandate of Section 113(1) of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 that loss incurring companies and companies whose tax on income is assessed less than 0.5% of its declared turnover are to pay minimum tax---Circular No. 17 / 2004, dated 17-07-2004, issued by Federal Board of Revenue states that profit yielding companies paying [minimum] tax [which is] more than turnover tax do not get credit for their contribution to national exchequer [in the form of minimum tax] during the years of loss or lower income---This simply is a statement as to the state of affairs prevailing before insertion of Section 113(2)(c) of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 through Finance Act, 2004---Prior to such insertion, benefit of credit in the form of carry forward for adjustment against tax liability in subsequent tax years was not available to persons paying minimum tax under Section 113(1) of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001---Circular No. 17 / 2004, dated 17-07-2004, issued by Federal Board of Revenue does not state that benefit of such carry forward would also be available to companies paying minimum tax but having no tax payable due to losses---Circular No. 17 / 2004, dated 17-07-2004, issued by FBR also does not state that law had been amended to allow facility of carry forward of minimum tax on turnover for next five years to those companies paying minimum tax but having no tax payable due to losses---Even otherwise, circulars issued by FBR do not and cannot override explicit language of statute---Supreme Court declined to interfere in concurrent judgments passed by two Courts below---Appeal was dismissed. Messrs Pakistan Television Corporation v. Commissioner Inland Revenue 2017 SCMR 1136; B.P. Biscuit Factory Ltd. v. Wealth Tax Officer 1996 SCMR 1470; Molasses Trading and Export (Pvt.) Limited v. Federation of Pakistan 1993 SCMR 1905; Zila Council Sialkot v. Abdul Ghani PLD 2004 SC 425; Messrs Hirjani & Co. (Pakistan) Ltd. v. Commissioner Sales Tax 1971 SCMR 128; Star Textile Ltd. v. Government of Sindh 2002 SCMR 356; The Chief Land Commissioner v. Ghulam Hyder Shah 1988 SCMR 715 and Star Textile Ltd. v. Government of Sindh 2002 SCMR 356 rel. Muhammad Makhdoom Ali Khan, Senior Advocate Supreme Court assisted by Saad Mumtaz Hashmi, Advocate Supreme Court, Tariq Aziz, Advocate-on-Record, Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, Advocate-on-Record and Sh. Mehmood Ahmad, Advocate-on-Record for Appellants (in C.As. Nos. 743 of 2014, 1954 of 2019 and 404 of 2020). Muhammad Yahya, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner (via video link (Lahore)) (in C.P.L.As. Nos. 10-L of 2017 and 3689-L of 2019). Ibrar Ahmed, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioners (via video link (Lahore)) in C.P.L.As. Nos. 3688-L of 2019 and 746-L of 2021). Dr. Farhat Zafar, Advocate Supreme Court for Petitioner (in C.P.L.A. No. 3503 of 2022). Dr. Ikram ul Haq, Advocate Supreme Court for Applicants (via video link (Lahore)) (in C.M.A. No. 13838 of 2021). Munawar Ali Memon, Advocate Supreme Court and Mrs. Abida Parveen Channar, Advocate-on-Record for Respondents (via video link (Karachi)) (in C.A. No. 743 of 2014). Dr. Farhat Zafar, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents (in C.A. No. 1954 of 2019). Riaz Hussain Azam, Advocate Supreme Court for Respondents (in C.A. No. 404 of 2020). Nemo for Respondents (in C.P.L.As. Nos. 10-L of 2017, 3688-L of 2019, 3689-L of 2019, 746-L of 2021 and 3503 of 2022). Dr. Ishtiaq Ahmed Khan, Director General (Law), FBR, Islamabad. Ms. Kiran Masood, Additional Commissioner, FBR, Lahore (via video link (Lahore)). Date of hearing: 20th February, 2025.

Summary: ----S.12---Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Art. 84---Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882), S.53-A---Suit for specific performance---Agreement to sell---Execution---Proof---Possession of suit property delivered to the vendee---Effect---The respondents (vendees) entered into a sale agreement with the appellants (vendors) for sale of immoveable property---Respondent (vendee) paid earnest money and possession was handed over to him, with the remaining sale consideration to be paid in instalments---Despite full payment, the title was never transferred, constraining the respondents (vendees) to institute a suit for specific performance---The appellants (vendors) contested the suit, claiming that the respondents (vendee) were tenants and that the suit was barred by limitation---Suit was decreed by the Single Judge against which present appeal was instituted---Held: In evidence the respondents (vendees) submitted relevant receipts of payments of sale consideration to the appellants (vendors) and all such receipts were on the letter head of the company being run by appellants (vendors) and were signed by its late proprietor and he was the same person who had signed the agreement to sell---Regarding the signature of the late proprietor/signatory, the respondents (vendees) had got the same examined from the handwriting expert in terms of Art. 84 of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984---Said expert deposed positively that the receipts contained signatures of late proprietor who had also signed the agreement to sell---Such receipts were in bulk amount and could not be considered mere payments of rent by respondents (vendees)---Only ground taken by appellants (vendors) to defeat validity of such receipts was that they did not bear any date---Mere non-mention of date on the receipts did not invalidate the same or made them redundant in the eyes of law when otherwise contents thereof were established and the payments made through them were not specifically rebutted or refuted by the appellants (vendors) except the plea that they were made in respect of rent regarding which no evidence was put forth---The benefit of S. 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 was also available to the respondents (vendees) as they were put in possession at the time of sale agreement---Single Judge while decreeing the suit took into consideration all pieces of evidence adduced by parties, implication of relevant laws such as Art. 113 of Limitation Act, 1908 and S. 53-A of Transfer of Property Act, 1882 and concluded, duly supported by reasons, in favor of the respondents (vendees) and there was no justification to reverse the same---Appeal being without merit, was dismissed, in circumstances. (b) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877)--- ----S.12---Limitation Act (IX of 1908), First Sched., Art.113---Suit for specific performance of agreement to sell---Limitation---Scope---Article 113 of Limitation Act, 1908 stipulates that a suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell should be filed within three years from the performance date or if no such date is specified, then when the plaintiff notices that the performance has been refused. (c) Transfer of Property Act (IV of 1882)--- ----S.53-A---Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), S.12---Agreement to sell---Pre-requisites for taking benefit of S.53-A of Transfer of Property Act, 1882 stated---Benefit of the S. 53-A of the ibid Act becomes due in favor of the vendee when he is put in possession of the suit property at the time of the sale agreement---Four conditions/pre-requisites for seeking benefit of the S. 53-A ibid are that: (i) The contract must be in writing, signed by or on behalf of the transferor; (ii) The transferee should be in possession of the immoveable property covered by the contract; (iii) The transferee had done some act in furtherance of the contract; (iv) The transferee had either performed his part of the contract or was willing to perform his part of the contract. Muhammad Salman Noor for Appellants. Hamza Hidyatullah for Respondents.

Summary: (a) Banking Companies Ordinance (LVII of 1962)--- ----Ss. 82-B & 82-E---Federal Ombudsmen Institutional Reforms Act (XIV of 2013), S. 14---Banking Mohtasib (Ombudsman), jurisdiction of---Scope---Law entitles and empowers Mohtasib to adjudicate upon subject-matter complaints, wherein complainants alleged incidences of banking malpractices, violations of banking laws, rules, regulations and guidelines, instances of maladministration, fraud in relation to transfer of funds and complain against fraudulent or unauthorized withdrawals or debit entries in the accounts. (b) Federal Ombudsmen Institutional Reforms Act (XIV of 2013)--- ----S. 14---Payment Systems and Electronic Fund Transfers Act (IV of 2007), S. 41---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199---Constitutional petition---Banking Mohtasib---Jurisdiction---Electronic Fund Transfers---Contributory negligence and comparative negligence, principles of---Scope---Petitioners / banking companies were aggrieved of orders passed by Banking Mohtasib pertaining to unauthorized Electronic Fund Transfer (EFTs)---Customers asserted that they were deceptively and fraudulently induced by callers impersonating as bank or government officials, resulting into sharing of personal information, identity, access codes, one-time-pass codes (OTPs) on the assumption that information was required for the purposes of periodical checks---Banking Mohtasib directed petitioners / banking companies to reimburse / compensate the victims, i.e. the customers---Validity---Jurisdiction conferred on the Mohtasib is in the nature of quasi-judicial jurisdiction, where Mohtasib is entitled to receive evidence on affidavits, without necessity of strictly following evidentiary principles---One must not overlook, evidently the significant role of Mohtasib, which is to act as mediator for the purposes of resolving disputes amicably, which makes application and adoption of evidentiary principles inapplicable for such mediation proceedings---Provisions of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984 are not applicable to arbitration proceedings, which leads to an inference that meditators are not bound by the rigours of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984 - and so is the Mohtasib---Statute per se supports adjudication of questions of fact, to an extent and the extent is determinable by Mohtasib---Mohtasib ignored and overlooked to consider the effect and consequence of 'contributory negligence' and 'comparative negligence'---Absolute responsibility was shifted by Mohtasib on banks by placing reliance on S. 41 of Payment Systems and Electronic Fund Transfers Act, 2007---High Court set aside decisions made by Banking Mohtasib and orders of dismissal of representations of petitioners / banking companies by the President---High Court remanded the complaints of customers to Banking Mohtasib, for decisions afresh after affording opportunity to the parties to produce documents, affidavits and evidence, in support of their respective claims---Constitutional petition was allowed accordingly. Philipp v. Barclays Bank UK PLC [2023 UKSC 25]; Ghulam Mustafa v. Presiding Officer Special Court (Offences against Banks) Rawalpindi and others 2003 MLD 841; Hamza Raza v. The State and others 2014 CLD 1943; Naeema A. Sattar v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 2016 Sindh 311; Syed Mushahid Shah and others v. Federal Investment Agency and others 2017 SCMR 1218; Mushtaq Ahmed v. Judge Banking Offences Court No.02, Lahore and others 2019 CLD 318; Hamda Raza v. The State and others 2014 CLD 1493; United Bank Limited v. Federation of Pakistan and others 2018 CLD 587; Habib Bank Limited v. Federation of Pakistan and others 2022 CLD 769; Habib Bank Limited v. Muhammad Ayub Mengal and others 2022 CLD 1448; MCB Bank Limited through Authorized Attorney v. Federation of Pakistan through Director (Legal) President's Secretariat Aiwan-e-Sadar, Islamabad and 2 others 2023 CLD 333; Habib Bank Limited through Litigation Officer v. Federation of Pakistan through President Secretariat Islamabad and 2 others 2018 CLD 1152; Soneri Bank Limited through Constituted Attorneys/Authorized Officers and another 2013 CLD 1756 and Messrs Muslim Commercial Bank Ltd. through Lawful Attorney v. Federation of Pakistan through Director, (Legal-II), President's Secretariat and 2 others 2020 CLD 829 rel. M. Wisal Khan, Ahmad Hassan and Tanzeela Nazar for Petitioner (in this and connected Petitions Nos.3875, 3876, 910, 911 and 983 of 2024). Syed Hasnain Ibrahim and Saleem Iqbal for Petitioners (in connected Petitions Nos.2358/2021, 685/2022, 686/2022, 1484/2022, 1485/2022, 1802/2020 and 1803/2020). Barrister M. Shayan Homayon for HBL. Barrister Babar Shahzad Imran for Petitioners Allied Bank Limited (in connected petitions). Sagheer Ahmed for Petitioner (in connected W.P. No.1478/2022). Barkat Hussain for Petitioner (in connected W.P. No.518/2025). Haseeb Shakoor Paracha, Additional Attorney General. Ms. Hifza Bukhari, Deputy Attorney General. Qasim Abbas, Assistant Attorney General. Barrister Zain Mansoor, Assistant Attorney General. Syed Zain-ul-Abideen for Respondent No.5 (in connected W.P. No.911/2025). Barrister Raja Ammad Jillani, Muhammad Adeel Arshad, Abdul Hameed Qureshi and Raja Abid Mehmood for Respondent (in W.P. No.1485/2022). Ch. Attique-ur-Rasool for Respondent No.1 (in W.P. No.1018 and 1019 of 2025). Hafiz Muhammad Kalim Ullah for Respondent No.3 (in connected W.P. No.910/2025). Ziafat Kayani for Respondent (in W.P. No.1438/2019), in person. Changraiz Khan in person. Sheikh Iftikhar Ali in person (in W.P. No.938/2025). Dates of hearing: 28th March, 7th and 21st April, 2025.

Summary: The interpretation of Sections 94, 265-C, and 265-F of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.) has critical bearing on an accused person`s right to a fair trial and the Court’s obligation to ensure the proper administration of justice. Although distinct in scope, these provisions function in harmony to guarantee the accused’s access to documentary evidence essential for preparing a defence or confronting prosecution witnesses. The accused has the right to invoke Section 94 Cr.P.C. even prior to entering their defence, provided that the document sought is necessary or desirable for the inquiry or trial. Importantly, the document need not be part of the police record or in the accused’s possession or control. The purpose of Section 94 is to empower the Court to secure relevant material at any stage of the proceedings, if such material is essential to the fair adjudication of the case. Section 94 Cr.P.C. is general and overriding, and not constrained by the procedural stage or by Section 265-F. The accused should not be compelled to wait until the defence stage to obtain documents that could assist in cross-examination or weaken the prosecution’s case at an earlier point. Denial of access to such material risks undue delay, prejudice to the accused, or even a miscarriage of justice. While Section 265-C Cr.P.C. mandates that the accused be supplied with all relevant statements and documents, it is not exhaustive. Its scope cannot be read to restrict the wider and discretionary powers available under Section 94 Cr.P.C. Similarly, Section 265-F Cr.P.C. provides a supplementary right that supports, but does not limit, the broader authority under Section 94. Additionally, Section 540 Cr.P.C. grants wide discretionary powers to the Court to summon any person as a witness or recall or re-examine any person already examined, at any stage of the trial, if their evidence appears necessary for a just decision. This provision aligns with the spirit of Section 94 Cr.P.C., both ensuring that critical material or testimony may be brought before the Court in the interest of truth. Section 94 must be interpreted liberally, and a similar judicial philosophy applies to Section 540. Courts are reminded that their paramount duty is to uncover the truth, and if the appearance of a witness or production of a document would assist in doing so, they must not hesitate to act—either on application or Suo Motu. These provisions act as safeguards against the miscarriage of justice. The rights conferred by Sections 265-C and 265-F Cr.P.C. are reinforced by the Court`s authority to independently intervene when a critical evidentiary gap is identified, thereby fulfilling its inquisitorial duty to secure justice—particularly where inadvertence or negligence has resulted in the exclusion of essential evidence. Read collectively with Section 342 Cr.P.C., which protects the accused’s right to meaningfully explain any evidence against them, these sections form a comprehensive procedural framework aimed at ensuring a fair and transparent criminal trial. Ultimately, the judicial responsibility under Sections 94, 265-C, 265-F, 540, and 342 Cr.P.C. must be discharged in a harmonious and liberal manner, guided by the foundational principle that no person should be convicted unless guilt is established through a fair, just, and transparent process.

Summary: Summary pending