Summary: (a) Child Marriage Restraint Act ( XIX of 1929)--- ----Ss. 2(a), 2(e), 8 & 9---Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948 (UDHR), Art. 16(2)---United Nation convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC), Art. 24(3)---Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Art. 16(2)---Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), Ss. 22-A & 22-B---Constitution of Pakistan, Art. 199---Constitutional petition---Child marriage---Registration of FIR---Ex-officio Justice of Peace, jurisdiction of---Petitioner / husband of minor was aggrieved of order passed by Ex-officio Justice of Peace on application of respondent / mother of minor to register a case against him for marrying her daughter who was a minor---Validity---Child marriage is a global human rights concern because it violates multiple fundamental rights, including the rights to equality, education, health, protection from violence, and right to free and full consent in marriage---Ex-officio Justice of Peace could issue directions to police authorities and the term “police authorities” has not been defined in Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 at some places, it uses expression “Officer in-charge of a Police Station”---Union Council was not a police authority, so it was beyond the jurisdiction of Ex officio Justice of Peace---Application of respondent / mother of minor under S.22-A(6), Cr.P.C. before Ex-officio Justice of Peace was not maintainable and his order was without jurisdiction---Proper course for Ex-officio Justice of Peace was to dismiss that application---Respondent / mother of minor was to approach the Union Council, which was under a legal obligation to act on the information and lodge a complaint before competent Court in accordance with S.9 of Child Marriage Restraint Act, 1929---On failure of Union Council, respondent / mother of minor could invoke Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court by seeking a writ of mandamus under Art.199 of the Constitution---High Court set aside the order passed by Ex-officio Justice of Peace---Constitutional petition was allowed in circumstances. Farooq Omar Bhoja v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2022 FSC 1; Edukanti Kistamna (Dead) through L.Rs and others v. S. Venkatareddy (Dead) through L.Rs. and others AIR 2010 SC 313; R (Quintavalle) v. Secretary of State for Health [2003] 2 AC 687 and Food Corporation of India v. M/s Kamdhenu Cattle Feed Industries AIR 1993 SC 1601 rel. (b) Public Functionaries--- ----Statutory duty---Performance---Where a statute confers a power upon a public authority for promotion of a public good, exercise of that power becomes a duty when the circumstances for its exercise arise. Julius v. Bishop of Oxford [1880] 5 App Cas 214 (HL); R(GC) v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2011] UKSC 21 and Chief Controlling Revenue Authority and Superintendent of Stamps v. Maharashtra Sugar Mills Ltd. AIR 1950 SC 218 rel. (c) Child Marriage Restraint Act (XIX of 1929)--- ----S.9---Child marriage---Union Council, duty of---Union Council, under S.9 of Child Marriage Restraint Act, 1929 is not expressly obliged to file a complaint before competent Court---Such obligation arises by necessary implication in light of interpretive principles of Superior Courts---When credible information regarding commission of an offence comes to its notice, the Union Council is legally bound to act---Provisions requiring a prior complaint or sanction before initiating criminal proceedings are not uncommon---Similar mechanisms exist under Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 and other special laws to protect against misuse and to preserve procedural integrity. Shahid Farooq Gondal, assisted by Rana Attique-ur-Rehman for Petitioner. Sittar Sahil, Assistant Advocate General for the State. Malik Muhammad Sajjad Nawaz for Respondent No. 3. Date of hearing: 30th April, 2025.

Summary: (a) Specific Relief Act (I of 1877) --- ----Ss.39 & 42---Contract Act (IX of 1872), Ss.188 & 214---Qanun-e-Shahadat (10 of 1984), Arts.17, 79, 80 & 129(g)---Suit for cancellation of general power of attorney and subsequent mutations along with declaration of inheritance rights by the widow---General attorney selling land to his real brother---Legality---Permission of principal, requirement of---Execution of general power of attorney, dispute over--- Proof---Onus---Beneficiary of the power of attorney had to prove its validity---Production of two attesting witnesses, requirement of---Non-production, consequences of---“GN” was the original owner of land and had two wives, “SB” and “NB”---From his first marriage with “SB” respondent/plaintiff and respondent /defendant were born, while from his second marriage with “NB” petitioners Nos.2 to 5/defendants were born--- “GN” passed away in 2006---During the process of inheritance, the husband of “SB” (respondent/defendant) discovered that before “GN’s” death, some land had already been transferred through sale and gift mutations by petitioner No.2/defendant while acting as attorney of his father “GN”, in favour of his brother i.e. petitioner No.3/defendant---“SB” then filed a suit seeking cancellation of these transactions and declaration of her inheritance rights---Issue was centered upon “whether the mutations in question were against law and facts having been passed with connivance of revenue authorities; whether plaintiff was entitled for decree for declaration along with consequential relief and whether power of attorney in favor of petitioner No.2 was bogus and ineffective”?---Held: Respondent/ plaintiff by producing trustworthy, reliable oral as well as documentary evidence substantially proved her case as per law---At the same time the burden to prove the execution of alleged power of attorney as well as valid incorporation of gift deed and sale mutations in question was shifted upon the petitioners/defendants to prove the validity of the said testimonies---The entire lis hinged upon the proof and validity of the power of attorney and the beneficiary of alleged power of attorney was required to prove the validity and execution of Ex.D-1 by producing the subregistrar who registered the said document but the said material witness was not produced and even the patwari and tehsildar who entered and sanctioned the alleged sale as well as gift mutations were also not produced---The petitioners/defendants also did not produce any attesting witness of gift mutation---Thus, non-production of above said material witnesses amounted to withholding of the best evidence and it was legally presumed that had the said witnesses been produced in the evidence, they would have deposed unfavorably against the petitioners/defendants, as such presumption under Art.129(g) of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984 clearly operated against them---Moreover, power of attorney was attested by only one witness whereas under Art.17 of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984 it was mandatory to produce two attesting witness and in case of any discord both attesting witnesses were required to give testimony in the court as required by Art.79 of Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984---Therefore, valid execution of the said document was not proved as per law---Moreover, if one witness had passed away the petitioners/defendants did not make any effort to prove the alleged power of attorney through the mode prescribed under Art.80 of the Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984---Even otherwise, alleged power of attorney was based on fraud and misrepresentation as such any subsequent transaction made on the basis of said document would have had no validity which were devoid of creating any rights and would have had no sanctity in the eyes of law---In absence of any solid foundation, the superstructure so built would have automatically crumbled down---Moreover, fraud vitiated most solemn proceedings and any edifice so raised on the basis of such fraudulent transaction, stood automatically dismantled and any ill-gotten gain achieved by fraudster could not be validated under any norms of law---Moreover, no specific permission of the principle “GN” was taken since petitioner/defendant (alleged general attorney) transferred land to his real brother ---Trial Court failed to appreciate legal and factual aspects of the case and dismissed the suit of the respondent/plaintiff whereas appellate court after discussing the facts as well as evidence through a well-reasoned judgment and decree had rightly allowed the appeal of the respondent and decreed her suit as prayed for---Further, in case of conflict between judgment between appellate court and Trial Court, the judgment of the appellate court was to be followed unless finding of appellate court was not supported by evidence---Civil revision being devoid of merit was dismissed, in circumstances. (b) Contract Act (IX of 1872) --- ----Ss.188 & 214---Attorney selling property to his close relative/blood relation---Permission of principal---Requirement---Scope---Attorney does not enjoy absolute power to sale/exchange/dispose of the property of his principal to his own close relative rather the exercise of such power is covenanted to obtain explicit and unequivocal permission from the principal to alienate the property to his blood relation/close relative. Jamil Akhtar and others v. Las Baba and others PLD 2003 SC 494; Muhammad Ashraf and 2 others v. Muhammad Malik and 2 others PLD 2008 SC 389; Mst. Naila Kausar and another v. Sardar Muhammad Bakhsh and others 2016 SCMR 1781 and Allah Bakhsh deceased through L.Rs and others v. Muhammad Riaz and others PLD 2025 SC 63 rel. (c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) --- ----S.115---Conflicting judgments of Trial Court and appellate court---Preference---In the event of conflict of judgments, findings of appellate court are to be preferred and respected, unless it is shown from the record that such findings are not supported by evidence. Muhammad Hafeez and another v. District Judge, Karachi East and another 2008 SCMR 398 and Rao Abdul Rehman (deceased) through legal heirs v. Muhammad Afzal (deceased) through legal heirs and others 2023 SCMR 815 rel. (d) Fraud--- ----Fraud vitiates the most solemn proceedings and any edifice so raised on the basis of such fraudulent transaction, stands automatically dismantled and any ill-gotten gain achieved by fraudster cannot be validated under any norms of law. Nawab Syed Raunaq Ali and others v. Chief Settlement Commissioner and others PLD 1973 SC 236; Lahore Development Authority v. Firdous Steel Mills (Pvt.) Limited 2010 SCMR 1097 and Sindh Irrigation and Drainage Authority v. Government of Sindh and others 2022 SCMR 595 rel. Muhammad Ahsan Bhoon, Khalid Pervez Warraich and Rana Abdul Sattar Khan for Petitioners. Muqtadar Akhtar Shabbir for Respondent. Date of hearing: 30th April, 2025.

Summary: (On Appeal from the judgment of the High Court dated 02.12.2024, passed in Revision Petition No. 414 of 2024). Azad Penal Code (XLV of 1860)---- ----Ss. 324, 341, 337-D, 337-F(iii) & 34---Offences Against Property (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance (VI of 1979), S.17(2)---Arms Act (XX of 1965), S.15---Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act (VIII of 1974), Art. 42---Appeal---Attempt to commit qatl-i-amd, wrongful restraint, causing jaifah, ghayr-jaifah-mutalahimah, common intention, harabbah, possession of unlicensed weapon---Accused/respondent was arrested in the said offences---Accused/respondent submitted bail application before the Court, which was dismissed---Accused/respondent filed revision petition against the said order before the High Court, which was allowed and he was admitted to bail---Validity---In the present case, it appeared from the record that the accused-respondent was not nominated in the FIR, rather his arrest was solely based on the disclosure of the principal accused, who was alleged to have fired the shot---At this stage, there was no independent or corroborative material to prima facie establish his presence or active participation at the scene of occurrence---Allegation of association with principal accused remained unsubstantiated and fell within the realm of further inquiry---Appellant had not demonstrated any legal infirmity or perversity in the impugned bail granting order of the High Court to justify interference---Prosecution shall be at liberty to approach the competent forum for cancellation of bail, if any fresh material surfaced during the trial---Appeal was disposed of, accordingly. M. Yaqoob Khan Mughal, Advocate for Appellant. Haider Rasheed Mughal, Asstt. Advocate-General and Sajid Maqbool, Advocate for Respondent. Date of hearing: 30th April, 2025.

Summary: Securities and Exchange Ordinance (XVII of 1969)--- ----Ss. 15A & 15B---Right issue---Scope---Underwriting---Scope---Trading / purchasing shares after becoming an insider, allegation of---A public listed company (Pak Electron Limited /PEL) announced a 120% right issue on August 15, 2013, offering 144 million ordinary shares at a price of Rs. 12.5 per share, including a premium of Rs. 2.50 per share ; however, prior to said announcement, said public listed company engaged first appellant / company on July 28, 2013 to arrange underwriting for the proposed right issue, but before the public disclosure of the right issue, appellant / company purchased 10,000 shares of public listed company at an average price of Rs. 19.8 per share, while its CEO (Second appellant) purchased a total of 8,190,000 shares at an average price of Rs. 19.72 per share in multiple transactions ; thus, insider trading was alleged---Appellants [Private Limited Company (Company) and its Chief Executive Officer (CEO)] were penalized by Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (Commission) for contravention of provisions of Ss. 15A & 15B of the Securities and Exchange Ordinance, 1969---Contention of the Appellants was that a right issue, in itself, did not necessarily affect share prices and the same (right issue ) did not qualify as inside information---Validity---The right issue announced by public listed company constituted price-sensitive information under S. 15B of the Securities and Exchange Ordinance, 1969 , as it had remained non-public until August 15, 2013---Contention of the appellants (that a right issue, in itself, did not necessarily affect share prices) was misconceived, as price sensitivity must be assessed in the light of prevailing market conditions---Record demonstrated that the appellants were privy to the non-public information concerning the right issue since July 29, 2013, and the CEO/second appellant proceeded to acquire substantial shares i.e. 8.200 million shares of public listed company during the period in which the information remained undisclosed i.e. from July 29, 2013 till August 15, 2013---The fact that the CEO / second appellant held the shares for an extended period before selling them did not absolve him of the liability as insider trading materializes the moment an insider takes any action on the basis of inside information, irrespective of whether a gain is ultimately realized -- Therefore, the contention of the appellants (that the right issue did not qualify as inside information) was untenable, and purchase of shares by second appellant while in possession of such information clearly constituted insider trading---Appellants were legally obligated to abstain from purchasing shares after becoming insiders---Contravention of S.15A of the Securities and Exchange Ordinance, 1969 was triggered the moment the appellants acted upon the undisclosed inside information, and the existence or absence of any resultant gain was immaterial to the establishment of liability---Furthermore, the Appellate Bench clarified that the correct amount to be surrendered to the Commission was Rs. 20.999 million and the reference to Rs. 22.999 million in the impugned order was acknowledged as a clerical error, which did not impact the validity or integrity of the findings therein---Appeal, being merit-less, was dismissed. Yawar Burki, Authoried Representative for Appellants. Sohail Qadri, Director/HOD, Adjudication-I, SECP, Muhammad Faisal, Assistant Director, Adjudication-I, SECP, Hammad Ahmed, Management Executive, Adjudication-I, SECP and Fazal ur Rahman, Management Executive, Adjudication-I, SECP for Respondent. Date of hearing: 19th March, 2025.

Summary: A company being licensed under The Punjab Poultry Productions Act, 2016 is still subject to the licensing requirements U/S 15 of The Punjab Food Authority Act, 2011. The Two statutes can coexist validly.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Complainant and injured eye witnesses if conceal vital facts of the occurrence then they cannot be relied for conviction and furthermore if medical evidence is not certain about time between injury and death as well as death and autopsy then it cannot be used in support/confirmation of ocular account qua time of occurrence as well as death.

Summary: i) Classification of Statutes; General & Special Statutes. -- ii) Tests of Repugnancy or Inconsistency between two Statutes or Provisions. -- iii) Irreconcilable Statutes or Provisions. -- iv) Repeal, Express or Implied. -- v) "leges posteriors priores contrarias abrognt (subsequent laws repeal prior contrary laws)" -- vi) Provisions contained in the NEPRA Act, 1997 will subside the conflicting provisions of Electricity Act, 1910 whenever there is conflict in two and both cannot be harmoniously construed, therefore, the opinions expressed in the judgments reported as "GEPCO and others v. Pakistan Television Corporation and others" (PLD 2018 Lahore 399) and "Faisalabad Electric Supply Company through Director v. Muhammad Jamil and 6 others" (PLJ 2017 Lahore 309), is correct enunciation of law on the subject.

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: Summary pending