Summary: Public Service—Recruitment qualifications—judicial review—Article 199 of the constitution of Pakistan, 1973—Devolution of health sector – scope of pleadings – consistency in judicial decisions. Petitioners challenged recruitment advertisement for PHC technicians (Multi- purpose), claiming EPI training certificate should suffice for eligibility. Court held that prescribing or enhancing qualifications lies within exclusive domain of competent authority. Amended rules requiring two-year diploma upheld. Argument on federal jurisdiction over EPI rejected due to health sector devolution post-18th Amendment. New constitutional issues raised during arguments not entertained as they were not pleaded. Similar writs already dismissed by same and coordinate benches. Petition found meritless and dismissed. Held: Petition dismissed. No infringement of fundamental rights. Qualifications legally amended. Judicial interference unwarranted.

Summary: Writ Petition. Service—Constitutional Jurisdiction—Bar of jurisdiction—Article 212 of the constitution—Civil Servant—claim for inclusion of temporary service for pensionary benefits—Maintainability of writ petition—Petitioner, an ex-civil servant, sought inclusion of his initial temporary service in computation of pensionary benefits—Held, matters relating to terms and conditions of civil servant fall exclusively within jurisdiction of service tribunal under article 212 of the constitution—High court has no jurisdiction to entertain such matters—Writ petition not maintainable and dismissed accordingly. (Writ Petition Dismissed)

Summary: Regular First Appeal Held: The functions of the Collector under the Land Acquisition Act1894, though administrative, but also quasi-judicial in nature. The Collector is a statutory authority empowered under the Land Acquisition Act 1894, to determine fair compensation whose decision is likely to prejudicially affect the landowners despite the fact that there is no lis or two contending parties and the contest is between the authority and the landowners, and he is required to act judicially under the Land Acquisition Act 1894. In simple terms, there are two contesting parties before the Collector: the landowners or interested persons, and the acquiring department or company. Therefore, the role of the Collector must be neutral, impartial, and fair-firstly, in the selection of suitable land, and secondly, in the assessment of fair compensation, without showing favour to either party. Moreover, while determining compensation, the Collector issues notices to landowners, invites objections, summons witnesses, compels the production of documents, hears objections, and resolves disputes arising during the acquisition process. The Collector is required to make decisions based on evidence and legal principles, exercising powers under the Land Acquisition Act of 1894 in a reasonable, fair, and just manner. Such decisions are subject to judicial review by the courts and must adhere to the principles of natural justice, including fair hearing, impartiality, and clear and cogent reasoning.

Summary: The court found that the dispute had already been adjudicated upon by competent courts in previous litigation, and the present suit was a repetition of issues already settled. The court examined four previous rounds of litigation between the parties, finding that the dispute had already been adjudicated upon. The court found that the property in dispute in the present suit was the same as that which was involved in the earlier rounds of litigation. The court emphasized the importance of finality in judicial decisions, citing the Latin maxim “Interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium” (it is in the interest of the State that there should be an end to litigation)

Summary: (a)Under the provisions of section 367(2) and (3), Cr.P.C, it was mandatory for the Court that after finding the accused guilty of one or more offences, upon recording conviction, separate sentence must be clearly awarded to the accused so convicted otherwise it would be illegal being in violation of the mandatory provisions. Law provided the passing of specific sentence for a distinct offence and if it was not awarded, it could not be construed that same was impliedly awarded as the very judgment to that extent became illegal and violative of the mandatory provisions of section 367(2) & (3), Cr.P.C. In the present case, no separate sentence was awarded to the accused persons under section 7(a), Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 by the Trial Court or the High Court. Such legal aspect of vital importance, conveniently escaped from the notice of the Trial Court and the High Court in the second round of the present case when the accused persons were seeking acquittal on the basis of compromise under section 302(b), P.P.C. alone. It could not be construed nor was it permissible under the law to hold that the accused persons were impliedly sentenced to imprisonment for life under section 7(a), Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 as well by applying the rule of implication. (b)The offence under Section 7 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 is non compoundable. However, courts must examine whether a separate charge was framed against the accused-respondent and whether he has been convicted and sentenced under that specific provision or under any other section of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860. A non-compoundable offence cannot be treated as compoundable by the court, for the simple reason that no amendment, deletion, insertion, or addition to the law can be made by the judiciary—this falls exclusively within the domain of the Legislature.

Summary: (a) Constitution of Pakistan ---- Arts. 4, 9, 10A, 14 & 25 --- Reinstatement of civil servant following unlawful compulsory retirement or removal from service --- Back benefits --- Doctrine of constructive continuity --- Scope and applicability. Supreme Court formally recognized and articulated the “doctrine of constructive continuity” in the context of service jurisprudence, holding that once a dismissal, removal, or compulsory retirement of a civil servant is declared unlawful, the individual shall be deemed to have remained in continuous service for all legal and financial purposes. This includes entitlement to full salary, allowances, increments, and pensionary rights, subject to lawful deductions or any substituted penalty. The Court emphasized that reinstatement must restore not only the position but also the economic status quo ante, and denial of back benefits, despite legal vindication, violates constitutional guarantees under Arts. 4, 9, 10A, 14, and 25. The judgment held that reliefs granted in such reinstatement cases are not discretionary but flow from the principles of fairness, legal restoration, and institutional integrity. Denial of back benefits was held to be legally and constitutionally unsustainable where reinstatement followed a finding of disproportionality in punishment or procedural irregularity without evidence of gainful employment during the intervening period. Cited Cases: • Muhammad Sharif v. Inspector General of Police, Punjab 2021 SCMR 962 • Inspector General of Police, Punjab v. Tariq Mahmood 2015 SCMR 77 • Chairman State Life v. Siddiq Akbar 2013 SCMR 752 • Umer Said v. District Education Officer (Female) 2007 SCMR 296 • Superintendent of Police v. Ijaz Aslam 2024 SCMR 1831 • Vice Chancellor Agriculture University v. Muhammad Shafiq 2024 SCMR 527 • Pakistan Peoples Party Parliamentarians v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2022 SC 574 • Secretary, Government of Punjab v. Khalid Hussain Hamdani 2013 SCMR 817 (b) Service laws --- Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974, S. 16 (second proviso) --- Determination of arrears of pay --- Scope and limits of discretion. The Supreme Court clarified that the discretion granted under the second proviso to S.16 of the Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1974 to determine arrears of pay upon reinstatement must be exercised in line with constitutional rights and settled judicial principles. Where the foundational order of dismissal or removal is found to be unlawful, the denial of arrears becomes impermissible. The Court held that the financial entitlements arising from reinstatement should reflect the modified or substituted penalty retrospectively, and the intervening period must be regularized to preserve pension, seniority, and other ancillary benefits. (c) Administrative law --- Constructive continuity --- Judicial recognition --- Doctrine introduced for coherence and consistency in reinstatement cases. The Court coined and introduced the doctrine of “constructive continuity” for the first time in Pakistani jurisprudence, drawing upon comparative principles such as the doctrine of “vanishing dismissal” from the United Kingdom. The Court held that constructive continuity ensures that reinstatement is not a hollow relief but one that fully restores the civil servant’s legal and service-related status, thereby offering a principled framework for future cases involving wrongful termination or disproportionate penalties. (d) Constitution of Pakistan --- Arts. 4 & 25 --- Proportionality and non-discrimination --- Substitution of penalty --- Effect on back benefits. Where a disciplinary penalty is found disproportionate and substituted with a lesser penalty, such as forfeiture of service years or censure, the substituted penalty must be treated as if it had been imposed ab initio. In such cases, denial of back benefits was held to be violative of the principles of proportionality and non-discrimination under Arts. 4 and 25 of the Constitution. The civil servant is entitled to service-related financial entitlements corresponding to the lesser penalty imposed. (e) C.P.L.A. No. 3453-L/2019 --- Compulsory retirement modified to forfeiture of two years of service --- Reinstatement ordered --- Intervening period treated as special casual leave without pay --- Legality. The petitioner, a Head Constable, was compulsorily retired but subsequently reinstated with a substituted penalty. No evidence was presented to suggest gainful employment during the intervening period, nor was reinstatement conditional. The Court held that denial of back benefits was unwarranted and violated constitutional guarantees. The impugned judgment was modified to grant full back benefits, subject to the modified penalty, from the date of original removal. (f) C.P.L.A. No. 23-L/2022 --- Removal from service for unauthorized absence --- Penalty modified to forfeiture of three years’ service --- Denial of back benefits --- Validity. The Tribunal found the original penalty of removal disproportionate and reinstated the petitioner with a substituted penalty. The Supreme Court held that denial of all back benefits despite the finding of disproportionality was unjustified. Petitioner was entitled to back benefits subject to the reduced penalty. The impugned judgment was accordingly modified. Disposition: Petitions converted into appeals and partially allowed. Impugned judgments modified to grant full back benefits to both petitioners, subject to their respective substituted penalties.

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) ---- S. 96, S. 107—Ex parte decree—Partial decree—Scope and appellate interference Appellant challenged ex parte judgment and decree dated 25.07.2024, whereby the trial court partially decreed the suit for recovery to the extent of Rs.113,000/- while dismissing the rest of the claim for markup allegedly accumulated over 51 years—Held, a partial decree is permissible only when based on comprehensive evaluation of evidence—In the instant case, trial court selectively relied on limited documentary proof (legal notice and courier receipt), while ignoring critical aspects of the claim and oral evidence—Such approach was inconsistent and arbitrary—Decree passed without judicial application of mind held unsustainable—High Court allowed appeal and set aside impugned judgment. Cited cases: Barkat Ali v. Muhammad Nawaz (PLD 2004 SC 489); Government of N-WFP v. Messrs Tahir Shoaib-Rashid Shoaib (1998 CLC 1680). (b) Civil trial ---- Appreciation of evidence—Ex parte proceedings—Obligation of trial court Even in ex parte proceedings, trial court is duty-bound to properly assess the plaintiff’s evidence—Held, unrebutted evidence does not relieve court from its obligation to evaluate credibility, sufficiency, and admissibility—Trial court’s reliance on fragments of evidence without cogent reasons and without addressing plaintiff’s oral statement rendered the decision legally flawed. Principle reaffirmed: Uncontested evidence must still be scrutinized in accordance with settled rules of appreciation. (c) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) ---- S. 107—Remand by appellate court—When justified Held, remand is appropriate where trial court failed to frame proper issues or assess evidence holistically—In present case, High Court invoked powers under S. 107 CPC and remanded matter to trial court to frame issues afresh, allow full opportunity for evidence, and decide within 3 months—Remand ordered to ensure complete and just adjudication. Statutory reference: S. 107 CPC—Appellate court may remand case where findings are based on misreading, non-reading, or absence of material evidence. Disposition: Appeal allowed—Impugned judgment and decree dated 25.07.2024 set aside—Case remanded to trial court for fresh decision after proper framing of issues and full recording of evidence—Trial court to conclude proceedings within three months of receiving certified copy of this order.

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code, 1908—S. 107, O. XLI R. 23 & R. 24, O. I R. 10—Remand of case—Addition of necessary parties at appellate stage—Scope and effect—Fair trial—Due process— Where necessary parties are impleaded for the first time at the appellate stage, the appellate court is justified in remanding the case to the trial court under O. XLI R. 23 CPC for fresh adjudication. In the present case, appellants filed a suit for declaration regarding their inheritance rights in ancestral property but failed to implead all legal heirs of the deceased. Upon recognition of this legal defect, the appellate court allowed impleadment and remanded the matter without deciding it on merits. The Lahore High Court upheld this approach, holding that the newly added parties must be afforded a fair opportunity to file written statements and lead evidence. Proceeding to decide the case without allowing the new parties to participate would amount to a denial of fair trial and breach of natural justice. Cited Cases: Mian Zafar Ali v. Mian Khursheed Ali (2020 SCMR 291) Mian Javed Akhtar v. Rana Muhammad Ismail (2024 YLR 251) Divisional Superintendent Pakistan Railways v. Taj Muhammad Khan (2024 CLC 1293) (b) Civil litigation—Fundamental importance of pleadings—Rights of newly impleaded parties—Natural justice— In civil disputes, pleadings are foundational to adjudication. The Court held that rights of parties added at the appellate stage cannot be bypassed. If such parties are not permitted to file pleadings or adduce evidence, it offends the principles of procedural fairness. The appellate court rightly exercised its discretion to remand the case, rather than proceed to decide it summarily, ensuring all parties have the opportunity to contest the matter in accordance with law. (c) Appellate court jurisdiction—Remand vs. direct adjudication—Discretionary power under O. XLI R. 24 CPC—Exercise of judicial mind— Although an appellate court may decide a case on its own if sufficient material is available on record, such discretion is subject to judicial limits. In cases involving procedural defects, such as omission of necessary parties at the trial stage, remand is preferable to safeguard due process. The court reiterated that no party should be condemned unheard, and the appellate court's discretion must be exercised in a manner that furthers substantive justice. Disposition: Appeal dismissed in limine. Impugned remand order upheld as lawful, procedurally correct, and grounded in the principles of fair trial and due process. ---- "When a party is impleaded at the appellate stage under Order 1 Rule 10 CPC, principles of natural justice necessitate remanding the matter to the trial court to afford the newly added party the opportunity to file pleadings, adduce evidence, and fully contest the matter. "

Summary: (a) Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908): ----S. 114, O. XLVII, R. 1---Review---Consent judgment---Presumption of correctness of judicial proceedings---Scope of review jurisdiction---Petitioner sought review of judgment dated 09.04.2025 on the ground that consent was never given for the order passed by the Court---Held, judicial orders recorded by a Judge carry a strong presumption of correctness and sanctity---Mere oral denial of consent without strong, unimpeachable evidence or affidavit from counsel is insufficient to rebut such presumption---Review jurisdiction cannot be used to challenge consent orders unless error is apparent on the face of record and rectifiable without reappraisal of evidence---Reliance placed on: • Fayyaz Hussain v. Akbar Hussain (2004 SCMR 964) • Syed Ali Ahmed Shah v. Syed Shoukat Hussain Shah (2025 SCMR 361) • Muhammad Nawaz v. Barkat Ali (PLD 2004 Lahore 21) (b) Review Jurisdiction: ----Scope---Consent order followed by compliance---Petitioner cross-examined witness on date fixed in consent order and only then challenged the order through review---Such conduct indicates acquiescence---Review cannot be used to indirectly seek rehearing or appeal on merits---Held, the review petition was meritless and amounted to an attempt to re-open concluded proceedings. (c) Judicial Proceedings---Presumption of Correctness: ----Judge’s record and statements---Binding nature---Statements of the presiding Judge regarding what transpired in Court are conclusive and cannot be rebutted by affidavits or informal accounts---Held, Judge’s account of parties' concurrence carries binding evidentiary weight unless rebutted with concrete material---Reliance placed on: • Westropp C.J. (1873) 10 Bom. HCR 75 • Reg v. Aaron Nellor • Muhammad Zaman v. Abdul Ghaffar (PD 1980 Lahore 582) (d) Cross-examination---Abuse of Process: ----Prolonged cross-examination as a tactic---Disapproval expressed---Court noted that counsel conducted cross-examination over multiple dates spanning nine separate hearings with forty (40) pages of questions on record---Such conduct found to exceed fair trial requirements and aimed at tiring witness---Judicial disapproval reiterated of manipulative cross-examination practices---Reliance placed on: • Muhammad Shafi v. The State (PLD 1967 SC 167) • Meera Shafi v. Ali Zafar (PLD 2023 SC 211) • Yar Muhammad Khan v. Bashir Ahmad (PLD 2003 Peshawar 179) (e) Review vs. Appeal---Distinction: ----Reappraisal of evidence not permissible---Review cannot be used to contest conclusions drawn on merit or to revisit judicial discretion exercised based on record analysis---Held, no error apparent on face of record was pointed out, nor was any violation of due process shown---Reliance placed on: • Mehmood Hussain Lark v. MCB Ltd. (2010 SCMR 1036) • Justice Khurshid Anwar Bhinder v. Federation (PLD 2010 SC 483) • Engineers Study Forum v. Federation (PLJ 2017 SC 38) ----Disposition: Review petition dismissed; no error apparent on face of record; consent judgment upheld.

Summary: (a) Punjab Consumer Protection Act, 2005: ----S. 28(4)---Limitation for filing consumer complaint---Scope of judicial discretion--- Complaint filed beyond 30-day period under Section 28(4) CPC—Petitioner argued bar of limitation and sought summary dismissal—Court held that while primary limitation period is thirty days from accrual of cause of action, the first proviso to Section 28(4) confers judicial discretion to extend such limitation upon sufficient cause—Second proviso provides upper limit of one year from date of service/product purchase where no warranty period is specified—Court emphasized that limitation under this provision is not absolute and is subject to judicial evaluation of cause shown—Held, factual assertions about negotiations warranted recording of evidence, making the question of limitation a mixed question of law and fact. Cited Case: Pak Suzuki Motors Co. Ltd. v. Faisal Jameel Butt (PLD 2023 SC 482); Muhammad Ashraf v. Sheikh Muhammad Akram (2022 CLD 638). (b) Punjab Consumer Protection Act, 2005: ----S. 35---Frivolous or vexatious complaints---Interpretation and application--- Petitioner also sought dismissal under Section 35 on ground that complaint was time-barred—Court held that merely being time-barred does not render a complaint frivolous or vexatious within meaning of Section 35—Defined terms “frivolous” and “vexatious” as actions lacking legal basis, filed to harass or cause undue inconvenience—Where genuine legal issues exist, including limitation disputes, they fall outside the purview of S. 35—Held, dismissal under this section requires a showing of bad faith or malice, not mere procedural defect. Cited Source: Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed.). (c) Civil Procedure: ----Limitation---Condonation of delay---Reconciliation proceedings---Effect on limitation--- Court observed that reconciliation efforts and communication between parties may constitute sufficient cause for condonation of delay—Held, such claims must be examined substantively rather than dismissed summarily—Trial court directed to assess delay condonation application under statutory criteria of Section 28(4), and render a reasoned decision at final adjudication. (d) Constitutional Petition: ----Art. 199---Interference with interim or discretionary orders of Trial Court--- Petitioner challenged dismissal of its application for summary rejection—High Court declined to interfere, holding that where discretion is lawfully exercised and issue requires evidence, constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 cannot be invoked to pre-empt trial stage determination—Petition dismissed in limine. -----Quote: In a complaint filed under Section 25 of the Punjab Consumer Protection Act, 2025 ("the Act"), objection of limitation was taken in terms of Section 28(4) of the Act and application under Section 35 of the Act was filed for summary dismissal of the complaint, which was dismissed by the Trial Court through impugned order. Held that there is no cavil to the legal position that the limitation period provided under Section 28 (4) of the Act, for filing a claim, is 30 days from the date of accrual of cause of action. However, the said period of limitation is not so absolute as to leaving no room for filing claim beyond the stipulated period of 30 days as evident from the first proviso to Section 28(4) of the Act, which vests discretion within the Court to allow a claim to be filed within such time as the Court may allow if it is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not filing the complaint within the specified period. Similarly, the second proviso lays down an upper ceiling of 60 days from the expiry of warranty or guaranty and if no period is specified one year from the date of purchase of the product or providing of services. Thus, the legislature in its wisdom has conferred discretion for extending the limitation for filing of a claim beyond the stipulated period of 30 days. Suffice to observe that such discretion is to be exercised in judicial manner. In the present case, it is not denied that a contractual warranty clause existed. The case of Pak Suzuki Motors Company Limited through Manager v. Faisal Jameel Butt and another (PLD 2023 SC 482) relied upon by the petitioner is hardly of any help to the case of the petitioner as the August Supreme Court while upholding the view of this Court rendered in case reported as Muhammad Ashraf v. Sheikh Muhammad Akram etc. (2022 CLD 638) enunciated that the statutory period of 30 days is to run from the date of accrual of cause of action. However, the said case, by no means denuded the Trial Court from its discretionary power of extension of limitation period vested under the law. Further held that Section 35 of the Act pertains to summary dismissal of the frivolous and vexatious claims and a complaint that is barred by time may ultimately fail on legal grounds, but it does not, on that count becomes frivolous or vexatious when relationship of customer-service provider is admitted.