Summary: When a party is impleaded at the appellate stage under Order 1 Rule 10 CPC, principles of natural justice necessitate remanding the matter to the trial court to afford the newly added party the opportunity to file pleadings, adduce evidence, and fully contest the matter. 470COS(B) 55735/22 Ms The Bank of Punjab etc Vs Hira Textile Mills Ltd etc Mr. Justice Abid Hussain Chattha 14-05- 2025 2025 LHC 3488

Summary: Summary pending

Summary: (a) Land Acquisition Act (I of 1894)--- ----Preamble---Acquisition of land---Object, purpose and scope---Primary aim of Land Acquisition Act, 1894 is to safeguard public funds. (b) Land Acquisition Act (I of 1894)--- ----Ss. 18 & 23---Acquisition of land---Compensation--- Determination---Compulsory acquisition charges---Corporate entity--- Appellant / landowner was aggrieved of compensation awarded for his land which was acquired by respondent / authority---Validity---District Collector failed to determine compensation in the award fairly and justly---Appellant / landowner successfully proved that he had developed a residential town on acquired land, and such fact was ignored by the Collector while determining the compensation---Both the parties failed to produce cogent and convincing evidence in support of their respective contentions---Referee Court appointed Commission which suggested compensation of Rs. 100,000/- per Marla---Referee Court relied on report of the Commission but it provided no reasons for reducing recommended amount to Rs. 30,000/- per Marla---Referee Court decreed compulsory acquisition charges at the rate of 15% without justification, despite the fact that evidence on record established that respondent authority had assumed the status of a company and in such cases applicable rate should be 25%---Compensation amount recommended by Local Commission was somewhat overestimated and exaggerated, as material facts were not properly considered by the Commission while determining the compensation---Referee Court reduced compensation amount drastically without providing sufficient justification---High Court keeping in view the evidence available on record, the Commission's report, and based on logical deductions and analogical reasoning determined Rs.50,000 per Marla as fair and just compensation and also enhanced compulsory acquisition charges to 25 %, as the respondent authority had acquired the status of a company---Interest at the rate of 6 % was treated as rental value---Appeal was allowed accordingly. Al-Baqara: 283. Translation reproduced from The Holy Qur'an with English Translation by Allama Abdullah Yusuf Ali, p. 72. (Lahore: Qudrat Ullah Co. Gunj Bakhsh Road, Urdu Bazar, Lahore). Publication date not mentioned; Federal Government Employees Housing Foundation v. Ghulam Mustafa 2021 SCMR 201; Malik Bashir Ahamd v. The Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Cabinet Division, Pak Secretariat, Islamabad and others, Writ Petition No. 308 of 2016, Islamabad High Court, Decided on 15.08.2016; Indian National Congress (I) v. Institute of Social Welfare and others AIR 2002 SC 2185; Fayed, R v. Secretary of State for Home Department [1997] 1 All ER 28; Kamranullah v. The Vice Chancellor Abdul Wali Khan University and others 2017 PLC (C.S.) Note 63, P.63; Sardar-ul-Mulk and others v. Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa through Secretary Higher Education Department and others. RFA No. 114-M/2021 decided on Dated 25.10.2022; Ali Khan and others v. Registrar, University of Malakand at Chakdara and others" RFA No. 70-M/2019, decided on 16.12.2022; Sarhad Development Authority N.W.F.P. (now KPK) through CEO (Officio) and others v. Nawab Ali Khan and others 2020 SCMR 265; Air Weapon Complex through DG v. Muhammad Aslam and others 2018 SCMR 779; Land Acquisition Collector, GSC, NTDC (WAPDA), Lahore and another v. Mst. Surraya Mehmood Jan 2015 SCMR 28; Province of Punjab through Land Acquisition Collector and another v. Begum Aziza 2014 SCMR 75; Askari Cement Limited (formerly Associated Cement Limited) through Chief Executive v. Land Acquisition Collector (Industries) Punjab and others 2013 SCMR 1644; Land Acquisition Collector, Abbottabad and others v. Gohar-ur-Rehman Abbasi 2009 SCMR 771; Ministry of Defence through Secretary, Government of Pakistan and others v. Syed Wajid Rizvi 2009 SCMR 105; Government of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Defense v. Mst. Ayesha Bibi (widow) 2024 SCMR 1323; Chairman Sarhad Development Authority, Peshawar v. Tafoor-ur-Rehman 2023 SCMR 2142; WAPDA through Chairman v. Alam Sher 2023 SCMR 981; Sarhad Development Authority v. Landowners 2020 SCMR 265; Muzaffar-ul-Mulk Khan v. Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa 2022 MLD 1879 and The Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa through Chief Secretary, Peshawar and others v. Yousaf Khan and others 2022 SCMR 1836 rel. Khalid Mehmood for Apellant. Nasir Mehmood for Respondent. Riaz Aslam Daavi, Sr. Research Officer for Assistance. Date of hearing: 14th May, 2025.

Summary: (a) Interpretation of statutes--- ----Word "shall"---Scope---Generally Courts have more readily concluded that in appropriate circumstances a "shall" is to be read as "may" (i.e., that the provision seemingly mandatory was in actuality directory) rather than the other way round. (b) Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)--- ----S. 74---Condonation of time limit---Scope---Matter was referred to Larger Bench of Supreme Court to consider whether judgment of three member Bench of Supreme Court given in case titled Collector of Sales Tax, Gujranwala and others v. Super Asia Mohammad Din and others, reported as 2017 SCMR 1427, 2017 PTD 1756 ('Super Asia Case') was correct---Validity---Double layer of protection accorded to the taxpayer shields him from unmeritorious claims and bogus show cause notices, which may be issued by concerned officer to harass and intimidate the former and/or for ulterior motives and purposes---Conclusion that the relevant provisions are mandatory help in ensuring that it is only a genuine case, based on substance and having (objectively) a reasonable prospect of success, of alleged non- or short payment of tax that is opened against the taxpayer---It is a bogus and false claim that concerned officer would wish to keep pending, for it to be as it were a Damocles' sword hanging over the taxpayer---Time bound closure of cases would help in reducing cases being brought for non-genuine reasons and purposes---For if the show cause notice is based on firm grounds and for lawful purposes then (subject of course to whatever reply the taxpayer may give thereto) it would be in the interest of the State (as represented by the adjudicating authority) to decide the same as expeditiously as possible, which would be well within the generous time periods allowed by the statute, as held in 'Super Asia Case'---If, in the end, a case is not made out then equally a responsible officer acting lawfully and truly motivated by public interest would wish to bring proceedings to a close as quickly as possible, which would again be within the time periods set out in the relevant provisions---Multi-layered protection, by way of mandatory periods of limitation, is not just well within the legislative power; it is the intent that is expressed in the relevant provisions, as rightly held in 'Super Asia Case'---Larger Bench of Supreme Court affirmed the decision of Supreme Court in case titled Collector of Sales Tax, Gujranwala and others v. Super Asia Mohammad Din and others, reported as 2017 SCMR 1427, 2017 PTD 1756, as it had correctly stated the law on all points. Collector of Sales Tax, Gujranwala and others v. Super Asia Mohammad Din and others 2017 SCMR 1427; 2017 PTD 1756; Wak Limited v. Collector Central Excise and Sales Tax and others 2018 SCMR 1474; Abbasi Enterprises Unilever Distributor Haripur v. Collector of Sales Tax and Federal Excise Duty 2019 SCMR 1989; Commissioner Inland Revenue and others v. Sarwaq Traders and others 2025 SCMR 341; A.J. Traders v. Collector of Customs and others PLD 2022 SC 817; Mujahid Soap and Chemical Industries Ltd. v. Customs Appellate Tribunal 2019 SCMR 1735; Commissioner Inland Revenue and another v. Sarwaq Traders and another 2022 SCMR 1333; 2022 PTD 1128; Federal Land Commission through Chairman v. Rais Habib Ahmed and others PLD 2011 SC 842 and Commissioner Inland Revenue v. Yasmeen Bano and others 2020 SCMR 1120 ref. (c) Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)--- ----S. 74---Condonation of time limit---Period of extension---Scope---Like all statutory powers the one conferred by Section 74 of Sales Tax Act, 1990 has to be exercised objectively---What is the period of extension appropriate in a given case or class of cases is not to be determined subjectively by Federal Board of Revenue but objectively and in accordance with settled principles of law. (d) Discretion--- ----Statutory discretion---Applicability---Statutory discretion is to be exercised by the authority or officer on which it is conferred; most fundamentally, it must be exercised reasonably. (e) Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)--- ----S. 74---Condonation of time limit---Period of extension---Exercise of discretion---Principle---Provision of Section 74 of Sales Tax Act, 1990 does not confer an open-ended power in such regard---Federal Board of Revenue cannot, on the basis of its own subjective assessment, grant an extension for however long a period it thinks fit---Matter must, and if it comes before a Court, certainly has to be looked at objectively---If the period is excessive (in the sense that it is not "appropriate" within the frame of the section) it may be declared to be unlawful and quashed. For the Private Parties Ali Sibtain Fazli, Advocate Supreme Court (in C.As. Nos. 634-636 of 2018). Ch. Hafeezullah Yaqoob, Advocate Supreme Court (in C.A. No. 1291 of 2018). Dl. Muhammad Khan Alizai, Advocate Supreme Court (in C.A. Nos. 1292-1294 of 2018). M. Ajmal Khan, Advocate Supreme Court (via video-link, Lahore) (in C.As. Nos. 1426 of 2019 and 1486 of 2021). Munawar-us-Salam, Advocate Supreme Court (via video-ink, Lahore). M. Shoaib Rashid, Advocate Supreme Court (via video-link, Lahore) (in C.A. No. 1128 of 2020). Ijaz Ahmed Awan, Advocate Supreme Court (via video-link, Lahore) (in C.As. Nos. 1388-1392 of 2017). Syed Naveed Amjad Indrabi, Advocate Supreme Court (in C.R.P. No. 154 of 2017). For Commissioner Inland / FBR Mrs. Kausar Parveen, Advocate Supreme Court (in C.As. Nos. 634-636 of 2018 and C.A. No. 1292 of 2018, 1428 of 2019, C.P.L.As. Nos. 2298-L, 2299-L of 2017, 2065-L of 2017 and 770-L of 2022).

Summary: Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908)--- ----Ss.96 & 107---Suit for recovery of amount---Appreciation of ex-parte evidence, principles of---Trial Court cannot rely on fragments of evidence instead of totality of evidence---Powers of the Appellate Court explained---Remanding of the matter by Appellate Court---The appellant filed a suit for recovery in which the respondents failed to appear and they were proceeded against ex-parte---The Trial Court recorded the appellant's ex-parte evidence and partially decreed the suit awarding only Rs. 1,13,000/- as principal, while dismissing the rest of the claim for lack of sufficient proof---The approach of Trial Court decreeing the suit to a limited extent on the basis of appellant's unrebutted testimony while simultaneously discarding the remainder of the claim appeared to be based on assumptions and selective reliance on the evidence without adhering to settled principles of appreciation of ex-parte evidence---The inconsistency in accepting certain parts of the appellant's evidence while discarding the rest, without cogent reasoning, rendered the judgment confusing and legally unsustainable and such exercise of discretion in a piecemeal manner amounted to a flawed application of judicial mind, which was not warranted under the law---Impugned decree suffered from a fundamental infirmity, as it was passed without proper consideration of the entire evidence on record --- A partial decree, while permissible in certain circumstances, could not be sustained when it selectively relied on fragments of evidence while disregarding material facts and documents crucial to a just adjudication --- The failure to evaluate the totality of the evidence resulted in a manifestly erroneous decision, prejudicing the rights of parties --- Judicial propriety demanded that courts examine all relevant evidence in a holistic manner before arriving at a conclusive finding --- Since the decree in question was rendered without such due consideration, it amounted to a miscarriage of justice ---Trial Court committed a grave legal error by passing an ex-parte decree without properly considering the available evidence on record --- The impugned judgment was rendered summarily, without any judicial determination of the merits of the case, as the court failed to evaluate the pleadings, the plaintiff's recorded statement, or any other material evidence --- In view of powers conferred under S.107 of C.P.C., the High Court under its appellate jurisdiction was of the considered view that a remand of the case was necessary for the proper adjudication of the real subject matter in dispute ---Appeal was allowed and the matter was remanded to the Trial Court to frame proper issues on the subject and then decide the lis after recording of evidence---Case remanded. Barkat Ali v. Muhammad Nawaz PLD 2024 SC 489 rel. Government of N.W.E.P. v. Messrs Tahir Shoaib-Rashid Shoaib 1998 CLC 1680 ref. Muhammad Zafar-ul-Hassan Joya for Appellant. Order Jawad Hassan, J .--- The Appellant/Plaintiff (the "Appellant"), through this Regular First Appeal under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (the "C.P.C.") has impugned the judgment and decree dated 25.07.2024, passed by the learned Civil Judge Ist Class, Rawalpindi, being illegal and unlawful. 2. Learned counsel for the Appellant submitted that the Appellant filed a suit for recovery of Rs.96710000/- against the Respondents/ Defendants. The Respondents/ Defendants did not appear in response to the summons/notice, hence, they were proceeded against ex-parte. The learned trial Court recorded the ex parte evidence of the Appellant and partially decreed the suit. Added that the claim of the Appellant remained unrebutted, even then the learned trial Court ignored the material facts and wrongly dismissed his claim of using the amount in question for 51 years, hence, the impugned judgment and decree is liable to be set aside. 3. Heard. Record perused. 4. Perusal of record shows that the Appellant filed the suit on 15.11.2023 and the Respondents were proceeded against ex-parte on 06.05.2024. Thereafter, the learned trial Court recorded the ex-parte evidence of the Appellant and proceeded to decide the matter on merits, culminating in the impugned judgment and decree dated 25.07.2024. It is evident that the learned trial Court evaluated the ex-parte evidence, which comprised primarily on a legal notice (Mark-P1) and a courier receipt (Ex.P1); and on that basis partially decreed the suit only to the extent of the principal amount Rs.1,13,000/-; while the remaining claim regarding markup was dismissed for want of sufficient oral and documentary proof. 5. Bare reading of the judgment also reveals that the learned trial Court acknowledged that no material evidence had been produced by the Appellant to substantiate the alleged oral commitment by the Respondents regarding payment in terms of gold or its market value in 1972. Despite this, trial Court proceeded to decree the suit to a limited extent on the basis of the Appellant's unrebutted testimony, while simultaneously discarding the remainder of the claim. Such an approach appears to be based on assumptions and selective reliance on the evidence without adhering to settled principles of appreciation of ex-parte evidence. The inconsistency in accepting certain parts of the Appellant's evidence while discarding the rest, without cogent reasoning, renders the judgment confusing and legally unsustainable. The exercise of discretion in a piecemeal manner amounts to a flawed application of judicial mind, which is not warranted under the law. 6. This Court finds that the impugned decree suffers from a fundamental infirmity, as it was passed without proper consideration of the entire evidence on record. A partial decree, while permissible in certain circumstances, cannot be sustained when it selectively relies on fragments of evidence while disregarding material facts and documents crucial to a just adjudication. The failure to evaluate the totality of the evidence has resulted in a manifestly erroneous decision, prejudicing the rights of parties. Judicial propriety demands that courts examine all relevant evidence in a holistic manner before arriving at a conclusive finding. Since the decree in question was rendered without such due consideration, it amounts to a miscarriage of justice. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the judgment reported as Barkatali v. Muhammad Nawaz (PLD 2004 SC 489), has held that "High Court is competent to reverse the findings of Appellate Court when it is based on insufficient evidence, misreading of evidence, non-consideration of material evidence, erroneous assumptions of facts and consideration of inadmissible evidence". Moreover, in light of the principles established in the judgment reported as Government of N-W.E.P. v. Messrs Tahir Shoaib-Rashid Shoaib (1998 CLC 1680), it is evident that the trial Court committed a grave legal error by passing an ex-parte decree without properly considering the available evidence on record. The impugned judgment was rendered summarily, without any judicial determination of the merits of the case, as the Court failed to evaluate the pleadings, the plaintiff's recorded statement, or any other material evidence; "it is apparent that the trial Court in passing the impugned decree acted illegally and without lawful authority. Consequently, this Regular First Appeal is accepted, the impugned judgment/decree is set aside and the case is remanded back to the trial Court to allow the parties to produce their evidence". 7. In view of powers conferred under Section 107 of CPC, this Appellate Court is of the considered view that a remand of the case is necessary for the proper adjudication of the real subject matter in dispute. The lower court's judgment fails to adequately address critical aspects of the evidence on record, resulting in an incomplete and inconclusive determination of the issues. To ensure a just and effective resolution, it is imperative that the case be remanded to the trial court. For ready reference provisions of law are hereby reproduced: 107. Powers of Appellate Court. (1) Subject to such conditions and limitations as may be prescribed, an Appellate Court shall have power: (a) to determine a case finally; (b) to remand a case; (c) to frame issues and refer them for trial; (d) to take additional evidence or to require such evidence to be taken. (2) Subject as aforesaid, the Appellate Court shall have the same powers and shall perform as nearly as may be the same duties as are conferred and imposed by this Code on Courts of original jurisdiction in respect of suits instituted therein. Consequently, the impugned judgment and decree cannot be allowed to hold the field, even to the extent of the partial decree of Rs.1,13,000/-. 8. In view of above, in order to advance the cause of justice and to prevent the miscarriage of justice, this appeal is allowed, impugned judgment and decree dated 25.07.2024 is hereby set aside and the case is remanded to the trial Court, who shall frame proper issues on the subject and then decide the lis after recording of evidence, within a period of three (03) months, after receipt of certified copy of this order. UN/A-39/L Case remanded.

Summary: (On appeal against judgment dated 24.08.201, 16.01.2017, 18.01.2017, 19.01.2017, 12.02.2015, 12.02.2015, 03.04.2019, 20.11.2014, 23.11.2015, 08.05.2017, 12.06.2017, 14.06.2017, 30.05.2017, 24.05.2017, 26.01.2021, 07.03.2022, 09.03.2022, 08.12.2020, 09.03.2022, 24.01.2022, 01.03.2022, 06.06.2012, 05.04.2012, 05.04.2012, 05.02.2012, 17.10.2023, 11.05.2023 and 22.03.2022 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore, Lahore High Court Bahawalpur Bench Bahawalpur, Lahore High Court, Multan Bench, Multan, Islamabad High Court, Islamabad, Peshawar High Court, Peshawar in STR No. 33 of 2005, ETR No. 1 of 2005 and STRs Nos. 10 of 2006, 01/2011/BWP, 02/2011/BWP, 02/2013/BWP, 03/2013/BWP, 03/2016/BWP, STR No.169/2012, 10/2011, 165/2013, 96/2013, 82/2012, , 23/2012, 24/2012, 14/2008, 21/2009, 185/2011, 116/2007, 127/2007, 42/2011, 01/2008, 212/2015, 81/2013, 126/2013, 78/2014, 32435/2017, 22/2012, 4925/2021, 157/2012, 77/2013, 173/2011, 36459/2021, 79765/2021, Customs Reference No. 29033/2019, Sales Tax References Nos. 73/2010, 101/2010, 75/2011, 13/2011, 11/2014, 23-P/2022, ETR No. 05/2011 and STR No.88/2011.) C.M.As.1917-L, 1918-L, 1919-L, 966-L and 964-L /2015 (Stay in C.As. Nos. 1388, 1389, 1390, 1391 and 1392 of 2017). C.R.Ps. 153 and 154/2017 (For review of judgment dated 31.03.2017 passed by this Court in C.A. No. 399 of 2013 and C.A. No. 682 of 2008.) C.M.A. 5471/2019 (Permission to file and argue) in C.R.P.Nil/2019 in C.A. No. 219 of 2011 (a) Interpretation of statutes--- ----Word "shall"---Scope---Generally Courts have more readily concluded that in appropriate circumstances a "shall" is to be read as "may" (i.e., that the provision seemingly mandatory was in actuality directory) rather than the other way round. (b) Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)--- ----S. 74---Condonation of time limit---Scope---Matter was referred to Larger Bench of Supreme Court to consider whether judgment of three member Bench of Supreme Court given in case titled Collector of Sales Tax, Gujranwala and others v. Super Asia Mohammad Din and others, reported as 2017 SCMR 1427, 2017 PTD 1756 ('Super Asia Case') was correct---Validity---Double layer of protection accorded to the taxpayer shields him from unmeritorious claims and bogus show cause notices, which may be issued by concerned officer to harass and intimidate the former and/or for ulterior motives and purposes---Conclusion that the relevant provisions are mandatory help in ensuring that it is only a genuine case, based on substance and having (objectively) a reasonable prospect of success, of alleged non- or short payment of tax that is opened against the taxpayer---It is a bogus and false claim that concerned officer would wish to keep pending, for it to be as it were a Damocles' sword hanging over the taxpayer---Time bound closure of cases would help in reducing cases being brought for non-genuine reasons and purposes---For if the show cause notice is based on firm grounds and for lawful purposes then (subject of course to whatever reply the taxpayer may give thereto) it would be in the interest of the State (as represented by the adjudicating authority) to decide the same as expeditiously as possible, which would be well within the generous time periods allowed by the statute, as held in 'Super Asia Case'---If, in the end, a case is not made out then equally a responsible officer acting lawfully and truly motivated by public interest would wish to bring proceedings to a close as quickly as possible, which would again be within the time periods set out in the relevant provisions---Multi-layered protection, by way of mandatory periods of limitation, is not just well within the legislative power; it is the intent that is expressed in the relevant provisions, as rightly held in 'Super Asia Case'---Larger Bench of Supreme Court affirmed the decision of Supreme Court in case titled Collector of Sales Tax, Gujranwala and others v. Super Asia Mohammad Din and others, reported as 2017 SCMR 1427, 2017 PTD 1756, as it had correctly stated the law on all points. Collector of Sales Tax, Gujranwala and others v. Super Asia Mohammad Din and others 2017 SCMR 1427; 2017 PTD 1756; Wak Limited v. Collector Central Excise and Sales Tax and others 2018 SCMR 1474; Abbasi Enterprises Unilever Distributor Haripur v. Collector of Sales Tax and Federal Excise Duty 2019 SCMR 1989; Commissioner Inland Revenue and others v. Sarwaq Traders and others 2025 SCMR 341; A.J. Traders v. Collector of Customs and others PLD 2022 SC 817; Mujahid Soap and Chemical Industries Ltd. v. Customs Appellate Tribunal 2019 SCMR 1735; Commissioner Inland Revenue and another v. Sarwaq Traders and another 2022 SCMR 1333; 2022 PTD 1128; Federal Land Commission through Chairman v. Rais Habib Ahmed and others PLD 2011 SC 842 and Commissioner Inland Revenue v. Yasmeen Bano and others 2020 SCMR 1120 ref. (c) Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)--- ----S. 74---Condonation of time limit---Period of extension---Scope---Like all statutory powers the one conferred by Section 74 of Sales Tax Act, 1990 has to be exercised objectively---What is the period of extension appropriate in a given case or class of cases is not to be determined subjectively by Federal Board of Revenue but objectively and in accordance with settled principles of law. (d) Discretion--- ----Statutory discretion---Applicability---Statutory discretion is to be exercised by the authority or officer on which it is conferred; most fundamentally, it must be exercised reasonably. (e) Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990)--- ----S. 74---Condonation of time limit---Period of extension---Exercise of discretion---Principle---Provision of Section 74 of Sales Tax Act, 1990 does not confer an open-ended power in such regard---Federal Board of Revenue cannot, on the basis of its own subjective assessment, grant an extension for however long a period it thinks fit---Matter must, and if it comes before a Court, certainly has to be looked at objectively---If the period is excessive (in the sense that it is not "appropriate" within the frame of the section) it may be declared to be unlawful and quashed. For the Private Parties Ali Sibtain Fazli, Advocate Supreme Court (in C.As. Nos. 634-636 of 2018). Ch. Hafeezullah Yaqoob, Advocate Supreme Court (in C.A. No. 1291 of 2018). Dl. Muhammad Khan Alizai, Advocate Supreme Court (in C.A. Nos. 1292-1294 of 2018). M. Ajmal Khan, Advocate Supreme Court (via video-link, Lahore) (in C.As. Nos. 1426 of 2019 and 1486 of 2021). Munawar-us-Salam, Advocate Supreme Court (via video-ink, Lahore). M. Shoaib Rashid, Advocate Supreme Court (via video-link, Lahore) (in C.A. No. 1128 of 2020). Ijaz Ahmed Awan, Advocate Supreme Court (via video-link, Lahore) (in C.As. Nos. 1388-1392 of 2017). Syed Naveed Amjad Indrabi, Advocate Supreme Court (in C.R.P. No. 154 of 2017). For Commissioner Inland / FBR Mrs. Kausar Parveen, Advocate Supreme Court (in C.As. Nos. 634-636 of 2018 and C.A. No. 1292 of 2018, 1428 of 2019, C.P.L.As. Nos. 2298-L, 2299-L of 2017, 2065-L of 2017 and 770-L of 2022). Ch. Muhammad Zafar Iqbal, Advocate Supreme Court (in C.As. Nos. 1290, 1293, 1294, 1295 of 2018 and C.As. Nos. 1388-1392 of 2017, 712 of 2013, C.P.L.As. Nos. 1411-L of 2022, 1285-L of 2022 and 2286-L of 2017). Abdul Razzaq Raja, Advocate Supreme Court (in C.A. No. 57 of 2020 and C.M.A. No. 5471 of 2021). Dr. Farhat Zafar, Advocate Supreme Court (in C.A. No. 732 of 2012). Mian Yousaf Umar, Advocate Supreme Court (via video-link, Lahore) (in C.As. Nos. 1424/2019, 1429/2019, 1430/2019, 852/2020, 436/2021 and C.P.L.A. No. 1604-L/2022). Malik Qamar Afzal, Advocate Supreme Court (in C.P. No. 5107/2023). Sarfraz Ahmed Cheema, Advocate Supreme Court (via video-link, Lahore) (in C.As. Nos. 1425/2019 and 1128/2020). Ahmed Pervez, Advocate Supreme Court (via video-link, Lahore) (in C.A. No. 1693/2021). Yahya, Advocate Supreme Court (via video-link, Lahore) (in C.A. No. 1291/2018). M. Saeed Tahir, Advocate Supreme Court (via video-link, Lahore) (in C.A. No. 1486/2021). Waqar A. Sh., Advocate Supreme Court (via video-link, Lahore) (in C.As. Nos. 1426 and 1427/2019). Izhar ul Haq, Advocate Supreme Court (in C.R.Ps. Nos. 153-154/17, C.As. Nos. 394/2013 and 399/2013). Ms. Saba Saeed, Advocate Supreme Court (in C.P.L.As. Nos. 1397-L/2022, 2473-2474-L/2022). Ishtiaq Ahmad, Advocate Supreme Court (in C.P. No. 592-P/2023) (via video-link, Peshawar). Dr. Ishtiaq, DG (Law), FBR. Dates of hearing: 21st and 28th April of 2025.

Summary: (a) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b), 324, 336, 337-F(iii), 337-F(vi), 148 & 149---Qatl-i-amd, attempt to commit qatl-i-amd, itlaf-i-salahiyyat-i-udw, ghayr-jaifah-mutalahimah, causing grievous hurt, rioting armed with deadly weapons, unlawful assembly---Appreciation of evidence---Delay of 10-hours and 20-minutes in lodging the FIR---Consequential---Accused were charged that they made firing upon the complainant party, due to which one person died whereas two sustained firearm injuries---Record showed that the unfortunate occurrence, whereby the deceased lost his life and two persons were injured, took place at or about 08:30 am on 01.08.2020 while the matter was reported to the police on the same day at 06:50 pm, with an inordinate delay of about 10 hours and 20 minutes despite the police station being merely 2 kilometers away from the place of occurrence---In column No. 3 of the inquest report, the date and time when police got information about the death was scribed as 01.08.2020 at 08:30 a.m.---Such belated lodging of the crime report shattered the sanctity of the same and reflected that the time was consumed in fabricating, deliberating, consulting and concocting a false story---No plausible justification or adequate explanation was furnished by the prosecution for that delay---Circumstances established that the prosecution had failed to prove its case through cogent, reliable and trustworthy evidence---Appeal of accused persons against conviction was allowed, accordingly. (b) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b), 324, 336, 337-F(iii), 337-F(vi), 148 & 149---Qatl-i-amd, attempt to commit qatl-i-amd, itlaf-i-salahiyyat-i-udw, ghayr-jaifah-mutalahimah, causing grievous hurt, rioting armed with deadly weapons, unlawful assembly---Appreciation of evidence---Delay of 13 hours and 45 minutes in conducting the postmortem examination upon the dead body of the deceased---Consequential---Accused were charged that they made firing upon the complainant party, due to which one person died whereas two sustained firearm injuries---It was evinced from the perusal of the Post-Mortem Examination Report of the deceased, that the dead body was received in the dead house at 10:00 am on 01.08.2020, whereas complete documents from Police were also received at 10:00 pm on 01.08.2020---Medical Officer conducted the autopsy of the deceased at 10:15 p.m., after a lapse of 13 hours and 45 minutes---Medical Officer admitted in his cross-examination that he received the written application to conduct the postmortem examination of the deceased by the police at 10.00 pm---Prosecutor and complainant were unable to point any justifiable reason for the said delay from the entire record---Such unexplained delay in the Post-Mortem Examination of a deceased would surely put a prudent mind on guard to very cautiously access and scrutinize the prosecution's evidence---In such circumstances, the most natural inference would be that the delay so caused was for preliminary investigation and prior consultation to nominate the accused persons and plant eye-witnesses of the crime---Circumstances established that the prosecution had failed to prove its case through cogent, reliable and trustworthy evidence---Appeal of accused persons against conviction was allowed, accordingly. (c) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b), 324, 336, 337-F(iii), 337-F(vi), 148 & 149---Qatl-i-amd, attempt to commit qatl-i-amd, itlaf-i-salahiyyat-i-udw, ghayr-jaifah-mutalahimah, causing grievous hurt, rioting armed with deadly weapons, unlawful assembly---Appreciation of evidence---Discrepancies in the prosecution case---Accused were charged that they made firing upon the complainant party, due to which one person died whereas two sustained firearm injuries---As per record, acquitted co-accused "W" fired with his Kalashnikov at the already fallen deceased, striking him on the left side of his back, on the middle of his back, and on the backside of his left shoulder and the right side of his back---All those injuries inflicted by said acquitted co-accused were declared fatal shots by Medical Officer who conducted the autopsy of the deceased---Said acquitted co-accused repeatedly fired his rifle at one of the injured persons, hitting him near the umbilicus and on his right ribs---Said injured in his examination-in-chief had not assigned any role to said acquitted co-accused "W" of causing any firearm injury to the deceased and consequently the Trial Court acquitted him of the charge---Likewise to the extent of acquitted co-accused "W", whose attribution of injuries was substituted by the complainant in paragraph No. 4 of the private complaint, such discrepancies were detrimental to the prosecution's case, primarily affecting the credibility of the evidence presented---Appellants' case was grounded on the same evidence and the roles assigned to them were similar to those of the co-accused who were acquitted---Sudden shift in the Court's findings, based on essentially the same facts, coupled with the modifications in the verdict, compelled to disbelieve the evidence of prosecution to the extent of present appellants---Circumstances established that the prosecution had failed to prove its case through cogent, reliable and trustworthy evidence---Appeal of accused persons against conviction was allowed, accordingly. (d) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b), 324, 336, 337-F(iii), 337-F(vi), 148 & 149---Qatl-i-amd, attempt to commit qatl-i-amd, itlaf-i-salahiyyat-i-udw, ghayr-jaifah-mutalahimah, causing grievous hurt, rioting armed with deadly weapons, unlawful assembly---Appreciation of evidence---Delay in recording the statements of injured witnesses---Accused were charged that they made firing upon the complainant party, due to which one person died whereas two sustained firearm injuries---Record showed that the statement of the injured witnesses were recorded by First Investigating Officer on 03.08.2020, two days after the lodging of FIR and on 04.08.2020, three days after the lodging of FIR, respectively---Said material aspect of the prosecution's case regarding the delay in recording the statements of injured witnesses under S.161, Cr.P.C., not only diminished the evidentiary value of their statements but also raised a reasonable doubt concerning the mode of injuries they received, especially when their Medico Legal Examination Certificate showed that they were conscious at the time of admission in the THQ Hospital---Unexplained delay of one or two days in recording the statement of eye-witnesses would be detrimental and testimony of such witnesses should be taken with a pinch of salt---Circumstances established that the prosecution had failed to prove its case through cogent, reliable and trustworthy evidence---Appeal of accused persons against conviction was allowed, accordingly. Amin Ali and another v. The State 2011 SCMR 323 rel. (e) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b), 324, 336, 337-F(iii), 337-F(vi), 148 & 149---Qatl-i-amd, attempt to commit qatl-i-amd, itlaf-i-salahiyyat-i-udw, ghayr-jaifah-mutalahimah, causing grievous hurt, rioting armed with deadly weapons, unlawful assembly---Appreciation of evidence---Delay of three months and 29 days in filing the complaint---Consequential---Accused were charged that they made firing upon the complainant party, due to which one person died whereas two sustained firearm injuries---Record showed that the complainant of the case being dissatisfied with the police investigation, while changing the prosecution version, filed a private complaint on 30.11.2020 with the delay of almost 03 months and 29 days of the occurrence---Complainant had not given any plausible reasoning qua such delay meaning that the private complaint had been filed after due deliberation and consultation just to fill up the lacunas left in the FIR---Circumstances established that the prosecution had failed to prove its case through cogent, reliable and trustworthy evidence---Appeal of accused persons against conviction was allowed, accordingly. Muhammad Azad v. Ahmad Ali and 2 others PLD 2003 SC 14 rel. (f) Criminal trial--- ----Ipse dixit of police---Scope---Ipse dixit of the police is not binding on the Courts, yet it can be considered if it is found on some cogent and convincing evidence. Khalid Mehmood and others v. The State 2011 SCMR 664 and Sajjad Hussain v. The State and others 2022 SCMR 1540 rel. (g) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b), 324, 336, 337-F(iii), 337-F(vi), 148 & 149---Qatl-i-amd, attempt to commit qatl-i-amd, itlaf-i-salahiyyat-i-udw, ghayr-jaifah-mutalahimah, causing grievous hurt, rioting armed with deadly weapons, unlawful assembly---Appreciation of evidence---Presence of complainant at the spot not proved---Accused were charged that they made firing upon the complainant party, due to which one person died whereas two sustained firearm injuries---According to the prosecution's account, the complainant of the case, along with his companions, allegedly escorted the deceased and the injured persons to the Civil Hospital---However, complainant was not listed as a witness of the identification of the dead body in the inquest report---Furthermore, if complainant was present at the hospital, the question aroseas to why he did not identify deceased's dead body at the time of the Post-Mortem Examination---Such inconsistency led to conclude that the complainant was not present at the time and place of the occurrence---Circumstances established that the prosecution had failed to prove its case through cogent, reliable and trustworthy evidence---Appeal of accused persons against conviction was allowed, accordingly. (h) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b), 324, 336, 337-F(iii), 337-F(vi), 148 & 149---Qatl-i-amd, attempt to commit qatl-i-amd, itlaf-i-salahiyyat-i-udw, ghayr-jaifah-mutalahimah, causing grievous hurt, rioting armed with deadly weapons, unlawful assembly---Appreciation of evidence---Recoveries of crime weapons on the disclosure of accused---Inconsequential---Accused were charged that they made firing upon the complainant party, due to which one person died whereas two sustained firearm injuries---Record showed that the appellants were arrested on 26.08.2020, who led to the recoveries on the basis of disclosures made by them on 07.09.2020---As per record, from one appellant, a 223-bore rifle along with four live bullets was recovered from another appellant, 222-bore rifle along with two live bullets was recovered from another appellant, rifle along with three live bullets was recovered; and a rifle along with five live bullets were recovered from acquitted accused, which were deposited to the office of Forensic Science Agency on 14.09.2020 for comparison with the crime empties already secured from the place of occurrence---Firearm and Toolmarks Examination Report in that regard was negative---Consequently, the evidentiary value of those recoveries remained inconclusive and could not be regarded as substantive proof---Circumstances established that the prosecution had failed to prove its case through cogent, reliable and trustworthy evidence---Appeal of accused persons against conviction was allowed, accordingly. (i) Penal Code (XLV of 1860)--- ----Ss. 302(b), 324, 336, 337-F(iii), 337-F(vi), 148 & 149---Qatl-i-amd, attempt to commit qatl-i-amd, itlaf-i-salahiyyat-i-udw, ghayr-jaifah-mutalahimah, causing grievous hurt, rioting armed with deadly weapons, unlawful assembly---Appreciation of evidence---Motive not proved---Accused were charged that they made firing upon the complainant party, due to which one person died whereas two sustained firearm injuries---Prosecution specifically alleged that the motive behind the occurrence was a previous enmity between the parties---Alleged motive rested solely on the oral assertion of the complainant as no corroborative evidence was presented by the prosecution to substantiate its claim---Prosecution is not obligated to prove motive in every murder case but it is equally established that once the prosecution sets up a specific motive, it assums the burden of proving it---Failure to discharge that burden operates to the detriment of the prosecution, not the accused---Circumstances established that the prosecution had failed to prove its case through cogent, reliable and trustworthy evidence---Appeal of accused persons against conviction was allowed, accordingly. (j) Criminal trial--- ----Benefit of doubt---Principle---Single or slightest doubt, if found reasonable, in the prosecution case would be sufficient to entitle the accused to its benefit, not as a matter of grace and concession but as a matter of right. Muhammad Ahsan Bhoon, Muhammad Mushtaq Chaudhry, Iftikhar Ahmad Bittu, Irfan Riaz Gondal, Ch. Zulfiqar Abrar, Mustansar Nazar Ghagh and Mohsin Raza Bhatti for Appellants. Ijaz Ahmad Pannu, Deputy District Public Prosecutor for the State. Barrister Salaman Safdar, Barrister Hamza Shehram Sarwar and Asad Zaman Tarrar for the Complainant. Date of hearing: 14th May, 2025. judgment Muhammad Jawad Zafar, J .--- Through this single judgment, we intend to dispose of Crl. Appeal No. 80283 of 2022 filed by Khitab Ullah, Muhammad Azhar, Muhammad Asif, Shahzad Mehmood and Muhammad Amir against their convictions and sentences, Criminal P.S.L.A. No. 80831 of 2022 filed by Mukhtar Ahmad, complainant of the case (PW-3) and Criminal Revision No. 80810 of 2022 filed by Mukhtar Ahmad, complainant of the case (PW-3) for enhancement of sentence, whereas Murder Reference No. 321 of 2022 has also been transmitted by learned Trial Court for confirmation or otherwise of death sentences of Khitab Ullah and Muhammad Azhar, appellants under section 374 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 ("Code" or "Cr.P.C"), all the matters being originated from the same judgment dated 12.11.2022 passed by learned Addl. Sessions Judge, Nowshera Virkan, District Gujranwala ("Trial Court") in the private complaint (Exh.PC) under sections 302, 324, 336, 337-F(iii), 337-F(vi), 148 and 149 P.P.C emanated from case FIR No.664 dated 01.08.2020, under Sections 302, 324, 148, 149 P.P.C registered at Police Station Tatlay Aali, Gujranwala whereby, at the conclusion of the trial in the said case, the learned Trial Court, while acquitting the co-accused persons Muhammad Waris and Waseem Nasar, convicted and sentenced the appellants as under: Khitab Ullah son of Muhammad Waris:- ? Under Section 302(b), P.P.C read with Section 149 P.P.C, sentenced to death as ta'zir with direction to pay Rs.7,00,000/- as compensation to legal heirs of the deceased in terms of Section 544-A, Cr.P.C., in case of default in payment thereof, to further undergo S.I. for six months. ? Under Section 324 P.P.C read with Section 149 P.P.C sentenced to ten years for attempt to commit qatl-i-amd of Muhammad Hashim and with the fine of Rs.50,000/- in default whereof, the convict shall undergo S.I for two months. ? Under Section 324 P.P.C read with Section 149 P.P.C sentenced with rigorous imprisonment for ten years for attempt to commit qatl-i-amd of Muhammad Nadeem and with the fine of Rs.50,000/- in default whereof, the convict shall undergo S.I for two months. ? Under Section 324 P.P.C read with Section 149 P.P.C sentenced with rigorous imprisonment for ten years for attempt to commit qatl-i-amd of Muhammad Hashim and with the fine of Rs.50,000/- in default whereof, the convict shall undergo S.I for two months. ? Under Section 336 P.P.C read with Section 149 P.P.C sentenced with rigorous imprisonment for seven years causing injury No.3 on the person of Muhammad Nadeem. ? Under Section 337-F(vi) P.P.C read with Section 149 P.P.C (for jurh-ghayr-jaifah) and is sentenced with rigorous imprisonment for five years and to pay Rs.200,000/- as daman to injured Muhammad Hashim. ? Under Section 337-F(iii) P.P.C read with Section 149 P.P.C (for jurh-ghayr-jaifah and mutalahimah) and is sentenced with rigorous imprisonment for two years and to pay Rs.50,000/- as daman to injured Muhammad Nadeem. ? Under Section 148 P.P.C and is sentenced with rigorous imprisonment for two years. Muhammad Azhar son of Mehmood Ahmad:- ? Under Section 302(b), P.P.C read with Section 149 P.P.C, sentenced to death as ta'zir with direction to pay Rs.7,00,000/- as compensation to legal heirs of the deceased in terms of Section 544-A, Cr.P.C., in case of default in payment thereof, to further undergo S.I. for six months. ? Under Section 324 P.P.C read with Section 149 P.P.C sentenced with rigorous imprisonment for ten years for attempt to commit qatl-i-amd of Muhammad Nadeem and with the fine of Rs.50,000/- in default whereof, the convict shall undergo S.I for two months. ? Under Section 324 P.P.C read with Section 149 P.P.C sentenced with rigorous imprisonment for ten years for attempt to commit qatl-i-amd of Muhammad Hashim and with the fine of Rs.50,000 in default whereof, the convict shall undergo S.I for two months. ? Under Section 336 P.P.C read with Section 149 P.P.C sentenced with rigorous imprisonment for seven years causing injury No.3 on the person of Muhammad Nadeem. ? Under Section 337-F(vi) P.P.C read with Section 149 P.P.C (for jurh-ghayr-jaifah) and is sentenced with rigorous imprisonment for five years and to pay Rs.200,000/- as daman to injured Muhammad Hashim. ? Under Section 337-F(iii) P.P.C read with Section 149 P.P.C (for jurh-ghayr-jaifah and mutalahimah) and is sentenced with rigorous imprisonment for two years and to pay Rs.50,000/- as daman to injured Muhammad Nadeem. ? Under Section 148 P.P.C and is sentenced with rigorous imprisonment for two years. Muhammad Asif son of Riasat Ali: ? Under Section 302(b), P.P.C read with Section 149 P.P.C, sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for life as ta'zir and with direction to pay Rs.7,00,000/-as compensation to legal heirs of the deceased in terms of Section 544-A, Cr.P.C., in case of default in payment thereof, to further undergo S.I. for six months. ? Under Section 324 P.P.C read with Section 149 P.P.C sentenced with rigorous imprisonment for ten years for attempt to commit qatl-i-amd of Muhammad Nadeem and with the fine of Rs.50,000/- in default whereof, the convict shall undergo S.I for two months. ? Under Section 324 P.P.C read with Section 149 P.P.C sentenced with rigorous imprisonment for ten years for attempt to commit qatl-i-amd of Muhammad Hashim and with the fine of Rs.50,000/- in default whereof, the convict shall undergo S.I for two months ? Under Section 336 P.P.C read with Section 149 P.P.C sentenced with rigorous imprisonment for seven years causing injury No.3 on the person of Muhammad Nadeem. ? Under Section 337-F(vi) P.P.C read with Section 149 P.P.C (for jurh-ghayr-jaifah) and is sentenced with rigorous imprisonment for five years and to pay Rs.200,000/- as daman to injured Muhammad Hashim. ? Under Section 337-F(iii) P.P.C read with Section 149 P.P.C (for jurh-ghayr-jaifah and mutalahimah) and is sentenced with rigorous imprisonment for two years and to pay Rs.50,000/- as daman to injured Muhammad Nadeem. ? Under Section 148 P.P.C and is sentenced with rigorous imprisonment for two years. Shahzad Mehmood son of Mehmood Ahmad:- ? Under Section 302(b), P.P.C read with Section 149 P.P.C, sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for life as ta'zir and with direction to pay Rs.7,00,000/- as compensation to legal heirs of the deceased in terms of Section 544-A, Cr.P.C., in case of default in payment thereof, to further undergo S.I. for six months. ? Under Section 324 P.P.C read with Section 149 P.P.C sentenced with rigorous imprisonment for ten years for attempt to commit qatl-i-amd of Muhammad Nadeem and with the fine of Rs.50,000/- in default whereof, the convict shall undergo S.I for two months. ? Under Section 324 P.P.C read with Section 149 P.P.C sentenced with rigorous imprisonment for ten years for attempt to commit qatl-i-amd of Muhammad Hashim and with the fine of Rs.50,000/- in default whereof, the convict shall undergo S.I for two months. ? Under Section 336 P.P.C read with Section 149 P.P.C sentenced with rigorous imprisonment for seven years causing injury No.3 on the person of Muhammad Nadeem. ? Under Section 337-F(vi) P.P.C read with Section 149 P.P.C (for jurh ghayr-jaifah) and is sentenced with rigorous imprisonment for five years and to pay Rs.200,000/- as daman to injured Muhammad Hashim. ? Under Section 337-F(iii) P.P.C read with Section 149 P.P.C (for jurh-ghayr-jaifah and mutalahimah) and is sentenced with rigorous imprisonment for two years and to pay Rs.50,000/- as daman to injured Muhammad Nadeem. ? Under Section 148 P.P.C and is sentenced with rigorous imprisonment for two years. Muhammad Amir son of Amanat Ali:- ? Under Section 302(b), P.P.C read with Section 149 P.P.C, sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for life as ta'zir and with direction to pay Rs.7,00,000/- as compensation to legal heirs of the deceased in terms of Section 544-A, Cr.P.C., in case of default in payment thereof, to further undergo S.I for six months. ? Under Section 324 P.P.C read with Section 149 P.P.C sentenced with rigorous imprisonment for ten years for attempt to commit qatl-i-amd of Muhammad Nadeem and with the fine of Rs.50,000/- in default whereof, the convict shall undergo S.I for two months. ? Under Section 324 P.P.C read with Section 149 P.P.C sentenced with rigorous imprisonment for ten years for attempt to commit qatl-i-amd of Muhammad Hashim and with the fine of Rs.50,000/- in default whereof, the convict shall undergo S.I for two months ? Under Section 336 P.P.C read with Section 149 P.P.C sentenced with rigorous imprisonment for seven years causing injury No.3 on the person of Muhammad Nadeem. ? Under Section 337-F(vi) P.P.C read with Section 149 P.P.C (for jurh-ghayr-jaifah) and is sentenced with rigorous imprisonment for five years and to pay Rs.200,000/- as daman to injured Muhammad Hashim. ? Under Section 337-F(iii) P.P.C read with Section 149 P.P.C (for jurh-ghayr-jaifah and mutalahimah) and is sentenced with rigorous imprisonment for two years and to pay Rs.50,000/- as daman to injured Muhammad Nadeem. ? Under Section 148 P.P.C and is sentenced with rigorous imprisonment for two years. Benefit of Section 382-B Cr.P.C. is extended in favour of the accused persons. All the sentences shall run concurrently. 2. The prosecution story as given in the judgment of the Trial Court reads as under: "On 01.08.2020 at 07:00 am, the complainant (Pw.3) along with Muhammad Arshad brother (since given up), Muhammad Hashim son of Muhammad Arshad (injured Pw.4), Muhammad Amir (deceased), Muhammad (injured Pw.5) both sons of Qamar, Hamza Mukhtar (Pw.6) son of complainant, went to Eid-Gaah situated on the north-western side of the village to offer Eid-Prayer. People from the village including Muhammad Waris (accused) along with his relatives were also present there for Eid-Prayer. After Eid-Prayer, at about 07:45 am, Muhammad Waris along with his relatives went to the village, whereas, the complainant party went to the graveyard, adjacent to the Eid-Gaah, to offer Fateh-Khawani for their deceased persons. After Fatch-Khawant, the complainant party left the graveyard and were going towards the village. Muhammad Nadeem (injured Pw.5) was boarded on his motorcycle GAL-8550, Honda 125, Model 2020 (PS), Muhammad Hashim (injured Pw.4) and Muhammad Amir (deceased) were boarded on motorcycle Metro 70-CC (P-6) Model 2020, Applied for. Amir was driving the motorcycle, while Hashim sitting on its rear seat, were going slowly towards the village, ahead of the complainant, Arshad and Hamza Mukhtar who were following them on foot. When, at about 08:30 am, the complainant party reached near the house of Kashif son of Khushi Muhammad, Muhammad Waris armed with kalashnikov, Muhammad Asif armed with kalashnikov, Khitabullah armed with kalashnikov, Azhar Mehmood armed with rifle, Shahzad armed with rifle, Amir armed with rifle and Waseem armed with rifle, all present in court with their mutual consultation, already present at the old DERA of Muhammad Waris, suddenly, emerged from there on the mettled road and blocked their passage. Accused Muhammad Waris raised a lalkara not to let Muhammad Amir and others alive. On this, Khitabullah made a straight burst with his kalashnikov to Amir which hit him on left side of his neck, on the different parts of his chest and on the left side of his face. Amir fell down from his motorcycle. Muhammad Waris made a burst with his kalashnikov on the person of Muhammad Amir who was already fallen on the ground which hit on left side of Amir's back, on the middle of his back, on the back side of his left shoulder and on the right side of his back. Azhar son of Mehmood made repeated fire shots with his rifle which hit on the right side of abdomen of Amir and on his left flank. Shahzad son of Mehmood made a fire shot with his rifle which hit on the front of right thigh of Hashim. Muhammad Amir son of Amanat made a fire shot with his rifle which hit on the-front of Hashim's left thigh. Waseem son of Nasar made repeated fire shots with his rifle on the person of Muhammad Nadeem which hit on his belly near his hila and on his right ribs. Accused Muhammad Asif son of Riasat Ali made fires with his firearm weapon on the person of Muhammad Nadeem which hit on his left arm, right thigh and left leg. Accused persons while making firing and raising lalkaras fled away from the spot. The complainant along with his companions took Muhammad Nadeem, Hashim and Amir to the civil hospital Nowshera Virkan on two private vehicles. Muhammad Amir succumbed to the injuries on the way. Besides the complainant, the occurrence was witnessed by Muhammad Nadeem (injured/PW.5), Hashim (injured/PW.6). Hamza Mukhtar (Pw.6) and Muhammad Arshad. The complainant along with Hamza Mukhtar and Muhammad Arshad witnessed the occurrence while taking shelter of the street and saved their lives. Motive behind the occurrence is their previous enmity with accused Muhammad Waris and others due to which they omitted the occurrence. While leaving Abdul Aziz and Mehboob am with the dead body of Amir, the complainant went to P.S Tat lay Aali, for registration of FIR......" 3. After recording cursory statements of the complainant and PWs, the appellants and acquitted co-accused were summoned to face trial. Learned trial court, after observing all the pre-trial codal formalities, framed charge under sections 302, 324, 336, 337-F3, 337-F6, 148 and 149 P.P.C against the appellants along with their acquitted co-accused on 18.06.2021, to which they pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. The prosecution in order to prove its case produced as many as 16 PWs and 03 witnesses were examined as CWs. Mukhtar Ahmad, complainant of the case, testified as PW-3; Muhammad Hashim, injured witness, appeared as PW-4; Muhammad Nadeem, injured witness, deposed as PW-5; Hamza Mukhtar, eye-witness of the occurrence, testified as PW-6; Naveed Akhtar ASI who registered the FIR (Exh.PA/1) through computer operator on the basis of written complaint (Exh.PA) submitted by the complainant (PW-3) appeared as PW-1; Dr. Ghulam Sarwar Cheema, medical officer, who conducted the postmortem examination of Muhammad Amir, deceased, at THQ hospital Nowshera Virkan and issued his postmortem report (Exh.PP) with pictorial diagrams comprising of two pages (Exh.PQ/1-2) appeared as PW-8; Adeel Ahmad 1929/C, recovery witness of 223-bore rifle (P.10) along with four live rounds (P.11/1-4) which were taken into possession through recovery memo (Exh.PV), appeared as PW-9; Ibrar Ahmad JFS, who collected eighteen cartridge cases and three deformed bullets from the place of occurrence, appeared as PW-10; Zahid 128/C, being witness of recovery proceedings, attested recovery memos (Exh.PD and Exh.PE) containing blood stained clothes of injured PWs (P1-P4) and attested the recovery memo (Exh.PL) containing lead bullet along with last worn clothes of the deceased (P7-P9), appeared as PW-11; Muhammad Awais 2754/C, the recovery witness of rifle 222-bore (P.12) along with two live bullets (P.13/1-2) taken into possession vide recovery memo (Exh.PW) appeared as PW-12; Muhammad Khalid SI, who collected 13 crime empties of kalashnikov and one crime empty of rifle 222-bore from the crime scene and presented the same to Javed Chaudhary SI, first investigating officer of the case (CW-2), appeared as PW-13; Ahsanullah 2762/C, witness of recovery proceedings, who attested the recovery memo (Exh.PX) regarding the recovery of rifle (P.14) along with three live rounds (P.15/1-3) from the possession of accused Shahzad by the I.O appeared as PW-15; Ikramullah 3899/C, being witness of recovery proceedings, he attested the recovery memo (Exh.PY) regarding the recovery of rifle 223-bore (P.16) along with five live bullets (P.17/1-5) from the possession of the accused Waseem Nasar by the I.O, appeared as PW-16; Tariq Mehmood SI, second investigation officer, appeared as CW-1; Javed Chaudhary, first investigation officer, appeared as CW-2 and Akhlaq Ahmad ASI who prepared injury statements (Exh.PS and Exh.PU) regarding the injuries on the persons of injured PWs Muhammad Nadeem (PW-5) and Muhammad Hashim (PW-4) appeared as CW-3. The remaining witnesses produced by the prosecution were formal in nature. The prosecution gave up Zufiqar Ali 69/C PW and Ijaz Ahmad 291/C PW being unnecessary and after tendering the reports of the Punjab Forensic Science Agency, Lahore ("PFSA") (Forensic DNA and Serology Analysis Report (Exh.PAA), Firearms and Toolmarks Examination Report (Exh.PBB) and Firearms and Toolmarks Examination Report (Exh.PCC)) closed its evidence. 4. Thereafter the statements of the appellants and their co-accused under section 342 Cr.P.C. were recorded wherein they refuted the allegations levelled against them and professed their innocence. The appellants neither opted to appear as their own witnesses on oath as provided under Section 340(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 in disproof of the allegation levelled against them, nor produced any defence evidence except accused Muhammad Waris, who tendered attested copy of FIR No.50/04, dated 18.02.2004, under section 302 P.P.C, P.S Tatlay Aali, District Gujranwala (Exh.DJ) and attested copy of FIR No.335/05, under sections 302, 429, 148 and 149 P.P.C read with sections 6 and 7 ATA, dated 04.05.2005, P.S Satellite Town, Gujranwala (Exh.DK) as his defence evidence. 5. The learned trial court vide judgment dated 12.11.2022 found the appellants guilty, convicted and sentenced them as mentioned above, however, acquitted their co-accused namely Muhammad Waris and Waseem Nasar through the same judgment by extending them the benefit of doubt, hence, the Criminal Appeal, Criminal P.S.L.A., Criminal Revision and connected Murder Reference before us. 6. We have heard the arguments of the learned counsel for the appellants and learned Deputy Prosecutor General assisted by learned counsel for the complainant meticulously and also scanned the record minutely with their able assistance. 7. It emerges from wade through the record that the unfortunate occurrence, whereby the deceased namely Amir lost his life, Muhammad Hashim (PW-4) and Muhammad Nadeem (PW-5) were injured, took place at or about 08:30 am on 01.08.2020 while the matter was reported to the police on the same day at 06:50 pm, with an inordinate delay of about 10 hours and 20 minutes despite the police station being merely 2 kilometers away from the place of occurrence. According to column No. 3 of the inquest report (Exh.PN), the date and time when police got information about the death is scribed as 01.08.2020 at 08:30 am. Such belated lodging of the Crime Report (Exh.PA/1) shatters the sanctity of the same and reflects that the time was consumed in fabricating, deliberating, consulting and concocting a false story, as no plausible justification or adequate explanation is furnished by the prosecution for this delay. 8. Along the same lines, it evinces from the perusal of the Post-Mortem Examination Report of the deceased (Exh.PP), the dead body was received in the dead house at 10:00 am on 01.08.2020, whereas complete documents from Police were also received at 10:00 pm on 01.08.2020. Dr. Ghulam Sarwar Cheema (PW-8) conducted the autopsy of the deceased at 10:15 p.m., after a lapse of 13 hours and 45 minutes. He admitted in his cross-examination that he received the written application (Exh.PO) to conduct the postmortem examination of the deceased by the police at 10.00 pm. The relevant excerpt of his cross-examination is infra: "I conducted the postmortem examination of deceased Amir on the written application (Ex.PO) su

Summary: (a) Punjab Consumer Protection Act (II of 2005)--- ----Ss. 28(4) & 35---Consumer complaints, limitation of---Filing of claims beyond period of thirty days---Scope---Discretion of Consumer Court to allow or extend limitation period beyond thirty days where there is sufficient cause for not filing the claim within time---Plea of dismissal of claim being frivolous and vexatious---Claim being time barred does not mean same is frivolous and vexatious---Facts in brevity where that the petitioner/service provider (respondent before the Consumer Court) challenged an order of the Consumer Court refusing to summarily dismiss a complaint filed against it by respondent No. 2---Petitioner argued that the complaint was time-barred, as the limitation period under S. 28(4) of the Punjab Consumer Protection Act, 2005 (the "Act 2005") was thirty days from the accrual of cause of action, referring to case reported as PLD 2023 SC 482 titled Pak Suzuki Motors Co. Ltd. v. Faisal Jameel Butt) and also sought dismissal of the complaint under S. 35 of the Act 2005 on grounds that the claim was frivolous or vexatious---Held: The limitation period provided under S. 28(4) of the Act 2005, for filing a claim, was thirty days from the date of accrual of cause of action, however, the said period of limitation was not so absolute as to leave no room for filing claim beyond the stipulated period of thirty days as evident from the first proviso to S. 28(4) of the Act 2005, which vested discretion within the court to allow a claim to be filed within such time as the court might allow, if it was satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not filing the complaint within the specified period---Similarly, the second proviso provided an upper ceiling of sixty days from the expiry of warranty or guarantee and if no period was specified one year from the date of purchase of the product or providing of services---Thus, the legislature in its wisdom had conferred discretion for extending the limitation for filing of a claim beyond the stipulated period of thirty days---The case of 'Pak Suzuki Motors' relied upon by the petitioner was hardly of any help as it was enunciated therein that the limitation period of thirty days was to run from the date of accrual of case of action, however, the said case by no means denuded the Trial Court from its discretionary power of extension of limitation period vested under the law---In the present case, the respondent also filed an application for condonation of delay, asserting that negotiations were ongoing between the parties regarding compensation---These facts rendered the limitation as a mixed question of law and fact, which could not be adjudicated in summary manner, without recording of evidence, hence, case of 'Pak Suzuki Motors' was not applicable, on account of distinguishable facts---As far as the plea for dismissal of complaint being frivolous and vexatious was concerned it sufficed that such terms did not encompass matters where there existed a genuine legal issue, even if that issue pertained to limitation---A complaint that was barred by time may ultimately fail on legal grounds, but it does not, on that count becomes frivolous or vexatious when relationship of customer-service provider is admitted and the claims that were hit by limitation must be addressed under the scheme provided in S. 28 of the Act 2005---A complaint that might have been time barred would not per se be frivolous---The conjunctive reading of Ss. 28 and 35 of the Act, 2005 showed that claims which are frivolous and vexatious were to be dismissed and did not encompass within its purview such cases where the court below was vested with the discretion to extend limitation provided by the law---Thus, the Trial Court was justified in holding that the plea of limitation could not be resolved without examining the application for condonation of delay---Trial Court was directed to consider whether the explanation furnished in the application for condonation of delay met the standard under S. 28 of the Act, 2005 and to render a reasoned finding on the applicability of the limitation periods contemplated thereunder and its extension; and determine, whether the complaint of the respondent was within time---Petition was dismissed in limine, in circumstances. Pak Suzuki Motors Company Limited through Manager v. Faisal Jameel Butt and another PLD 2023 SC 482 rel. Muhammad Ashraf v. Sheikh Muhammad Akram and others 2022 CLD 638 ref. (b) Punjab Consumer Protection Act (II of 2005)--- ----S. 35---Consumer complaints---Frivolous or vexatious claims, dismissal of---Terms "frivolous and "vexatious"---Definitions---Where a claim is found to be frivolous or vexatious, the Consumer Court shall dismiss the claim and impose fine on the claimant up to an amount not exceeding ten thousand rupees for having willfully instituted a false claim and shall award appropriate compensation to the defendant from the amount of fine so realized---This provision is aimed at curbing baseless or malicious complaints---The terms "frivolous" and "vexatious", as used in S. 35 of the Punjab Consumer Protection Act, 2005 carry distinct legal connotations---According to Black's Law Dictionary (Tenth Edition by Bryan A. Garnder) a "frivolous" action is one that lacks any legal basis or merit and is often brought to harass or embarrass the opposing party, and a "vexatious" proceeding, similarly, refers to one instituted without probable cause, primarily intended to cause inconvenience or expense to the defendant. Barrister Hammad-ur-Rehman Mazari assisted by Saif Ahmed Qureshi and Mohammad Hassan Shaigan for Petitioner.

Summary: Gas (Theft Control and Recovery) Act (XI of 2016)--- ----Ss. 6, 7 & 13---Gas theft, allegation of---Suit for recovery---Dismissal of suit on the basis of acquittal of accused in a related criminal case---Legality---Judgment acquitting the accused in a criminal case is not binding on civil matters and does not preclude institution and prosecution of a civil suit for recovery of dues---Civil and criminal proceedings---Distinct standard of proof---Appellant/Sui Southern Gas Company Limited (SNGPL), filed a summary suit for recovery against the respondent under S. 6 of the Gas (Theft Control and Recovery) Act, 2016 (the Act) alleging gas theft---The appellant claimed that during an inspection the respondent's gas meter was found tampered with, having a broken index and glass---A joint gas load survey was conducted, and the meter was replaced---The meter was later tested in respondent's presence and again found tampered---An FIR was lodged, and the appellant's claim assessment committee determined a loss of Rs. 439,700/---The appellant prayed for recovery of the amount and other reliefs, however, the Trial Court dismissed the suit in limine, citing the respondent's acquittal in the related criminal case---Pivotal question for determination by the High Court was as to "Whether a civil suit for recovery was maintainable under the Gas (Theft Control and Recovery) Act, 2016, despite the acquittal of the accused in the corresponding criminal proceedings?"---Held: The standard of proof in criminal proceedings (beyond a reasonable doubt) was distinct from the standard of proof in civil proceedings (preponderance of probability)---Acquittal of an accused in a criminal case did not, in itself, preclude the institution and successful prosecution of a civil suit for the recovery of dues---Consequently, the findings of a criminal court were not determinative of the outcome in a civil court addressing related matters---The determinations rendered in criminal proceedings did not ipso facto dictate the adjudication of civil liabilities---In the present case, the Trial Court dismissed the suit in limine based solely on the acquittal of the respondent in the criminal case, without considering the merits of the civil claim or adhering to the due procedure as laid down under Ss. 6 & 7 of the Gas (Theft Control and Recovery) Act, 2016---Section 6 of the Act authorizes both consumers and gas utility companies to file cases before gas utility courts under applicable civil or criminal procedure laws, supported by relevant documents such as gas bills or service agreements---It outlines the procedural requirements for institution of the suits, including specific content to be included in the plaint, particularly for utility companies, and establishes methods for serving summons through personal delivery, postal or courier services, and newspaper publication---Section 7 governs the defendant's right to contest the suit by mandating an application for leave to defend within 21 days of service---This application must be accompanied by a written statement identifying legal or factual disputes and supported by relevant documents---Failure to file such an application, or to meet its requirements, allows the Court to treat the claims as admitted and pass a decree accordingly---The Court may grant leave to defend only if substantial questions of law or fact are raised, and may impose conditions such as the deposit of claimed dues---Utility Court is also empowered to frame issues relating to such substantial questions, attach conditions to the grant of leave, and record evidence on those issues---In these circumstances, the approach adopted by the Trial Court was contrary to the spirit and intent of law---Consequently, the impugned order passed by the Trial Court was unsustainable in law and could not be upheld---Consequently, the impugned order was set aside and the suit was remanded to the trial court to be decided afresh on its own merits, strictly in accordance with the procedure stipulated under the Gas (Theft Control and Recovery) Act, 2016, and in adherence to the principles of natural justice---Appeal was accepted, in circumstances. Karachi Transport Corporation and another v. Muhammad Hanif and others 2009 SCMR 1005 and Salman Ashraf v. Additional District Judge, Lahore and others 2023 SCMR 1292 rel. Shakeel Ahmed Abro for Appellant. Gulsher Junejo for Respondent. Abdul Waris Bhutto, Assistant Advocate General for Government of Sindh. Date of hearing: 5th May, 2025.

Summary: (a) Service matters—Departmental policy ----Policy notification dated 29.09.1999 (having force of statutory rules)—20% quota for employees in Grades B-1 to B-4 for appointment/promotion as Junior Clerk—Status and enforceability—Held, the policy remains in the field, neither rescinded nor amended; proposed rules “in the pipeline” create no embargo—Accrued rights under an extant policy cannot be negated by prospective amendments—Department directed to adhere to 20% quota and consider eligible Grade B-1 to B-4 employees accordingly, within stipulated time. (b) Constitutional law (AJK) ----Art. 44 (AJK Interim Constitution, 1974)—Maintainability—Writ to enforce policy having the force of statutory rules—Where executive policy partakes the character of rules and is operative, its non-implementation amounts to administrative injustice; writ lies to secure adherence. (c) Interpretation—Textualism; meaning of “etc.”/“extra” in policy ----Plain-language rule—Where policy enumerates certain posts (e.g., Qasid/Naib Qasid) and, through the terms “etc.”/“extra”, provides a broader room for all categories within Grades 1–4, Drivers (subject to prescribed qualification/experience) fall within the same class—To exclude Drivers merely because the word “Driver” is not individually listed is arbitrary and extra legem—Dictionary meanings support inclusive construction—Doctrine reaffirmed that words must be given their ordinary sense and effect. (d) Equality before law—Reasonable classification ----Doctrine of classification—Equality is among equals; unequal treatment of like-situated employees within Grades 1–4 offends the guarantee of equal treatment—Any de-classing of Drivers from the Grade 1–4 cohort, absent intelligible differentia with reasonable nexus to the object, is discriminatory and impermissible—Discrimination termed a fraud upon the Constitution. (e) Administrative directions ----Department to: (i) implement the 20% quota for Grades B-1 to B-4; (ii) consider petitioner Muhammad Altaf (Driver, B-4) for promotion/appointment as Junior Clerk against available post within two months; and (iii) in connected petition, process Abdul Waheed’s permanence as Junior Clerk subject to qualification and requisite criteria—Compliance to be reported to the Registrar. Held, policy notification of 29.09.1999 subsists and binds; proposed amendments cannot defeat accrued rights; textual construction of “etc.”/“extra” brings Drivers within Grade 1–4 quota; exclusion would be discriminatory; writs merit interference to secure implementation of the quota and consideration of petitioners’ cases. Cited Cases: Kaneez Fatima v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan PLD 2023 Lahore 324; Prof. Dr. Sheikh Asrar Ahmad v. Govt. of Punjab 2025 PLC (C.S) 182; Gul Zarif Khan v. Govt. of KPK 2025 PLC (C.S) 533; Pakcom Limited v. Federation of Pakistan PLD 2011 SC 44. Disposition: Both writ petitions accepted; directions issued as above; compliance report to Registrar.